

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7 1				PAGE (3) OF 0 2		
TITLE (4) HPCI 2301-4 Valve Failure to Close																
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)			
									N/A				0 5 0 0 0			
0 4	2 4	8 5	8 5	0 2 0	0 0 0	5	2 1	8 5	N/A				0 5 0 0 0			
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)														
N		20.402(b)				20.406(c)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)		
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.406(a)(1)(i)				50.36(a)(1)				X 50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)		
0 9 0		20.406(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(a)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)		
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
		20.406(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)						
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME Tim Wojtulewicz										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 8 1 5 9 4 2 - 2 9 2 0						
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS						
X	B J	1 5 2	G 0 8 0	Y												
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)																
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										X NO		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)																
<p>During normal unit operation, while performing high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) steam line high flow isolation surveillance (DIS 2300-1) the HPCI 2301-4 valve failed to close. The 2301-4 and 5 valves are the inboard and outboard primary containment isolation valves of the HPCI steam supply subsystem. These valves are designed to close after high HPCI steam flow is detected for 6 seconds plus or minus 3 seconds, thereby providing line break protection.</p> <p>Per Technical Specifications 3.7.D.2 and 4.7.D.2 the 2301-5 valve was closed and HPCI declared inoperable. Upon investigation into this event Electrical Maintenance found dirty breaker auxiliary contacts; the auxiliary contacts were cleaned and the HPCI system was declared operable on 4/24/85 at 1425. Later, per the request of the Maintenance Staff the auxiliary contacts were replaced and the valve was successfully cycled 3 times at 1720 on 4/24/85. The Channel "A" portion of DIS 2300-1 was completed on 4/24/85. This event was of minimal safety significance since all other safety systems were operable at the time of this event. The Electrical Maintenance Department cleans and overhauls safety related motor control centers on a rotating basis each refueling outage.</p> <p>Previous similar event reported by RO #80-40 on Docket #050249.</p>																
8506040253 850521 PDR ADOCK 05000237 S PDR																

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (5)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7	8 5	— 0 2 0	— 0 0	0 2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

During normal unit operation, while performing high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) steam line high flow isolation surveillance (DIS 2300-1) the HPCI 2301-4 valve failed to close. The 2301-4 and 5 valves are the inboard and outboard primary containment isolation valves of the HPCI steam supply subsystem. These valves are designed to close after high HPCI steam flow is detected for 6 seconds plus or minus 3 seconds, thereby providing line break protection.

Per Technical Specifications 3.7.D.2 and 4.7.D.2 the 2301-5 valve was closed and HPCI declared inoperable. Upon investigation into this event, Electrical Maintenance found dirty breaker auxiliary contacts; the auxiliary contacts were cleaned and the HPCI system was declared operable on 4/24/85 at 1425. Later, per the request of the Maintenance Staff the auxiliary contacts were replaced and the valve was successfully cycled 3 times at 1720 on 4/24/85. The Channel "A" portion of DIS 2300-1 was completed on 4/24/85.

This event was of minimal safety significance since all other safety systems were operable at the time of this event. The Electrical Maintenance Department cleans and overhauls safety related motor control centers on a rotating basis each refueling outage.

Previous similar occurrence reported by RO #80-40 on Docket #050249.



**Commonwealth Edison**

Dresden Nuclear Power Station

R.R. #1

Morris, Illinois 60450


Telephone 815/942-2920

May 21, 1985

DJS Ltr #85-564

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Licensee Event Report #85-020-0, Docket #050237 is being submitted as required by Technical Specification 6.6, NUREG 1022 and 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(v).

  
D.J. Scott  
Station Manager  
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

DJS/kjl

Enclosure

cc: J.G. Keppler, Regional Administrator, Region III  
File/NRC  
File/Numerical

*TE22*  
*11*