

FEB 18 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brian K. Crimes, Director
Division of Operating Reactor Support

FROM: Alfred E. Chaffee, Chief
Events Assessment Branch
Division of Operating Reactor Support

SUBJECT: OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING
FEBRUARY 10, 1993 - BRIEFING 93-05

On February 10, 1993, we conducted an Operating Reactors Events Briefing (93-05) to inform senior managers from offices of the Commission, OE, ACRS, RES, AEOD, NRR, and regional offices of selected events that occurred since our last briefing on February 3, 1993. Enclosure 1 lists the attendees. Enclosure 2 presents the significant elements of the discussed events.

Enclosure 3 contains reactor scram statistics for the week ending February 7, 1993. Six significant events were identified for input into the NRC performance indicator program (Enclosure 4).

original signed by Edward F. Goodwin for
Alfred E. Chaffee, Chief
Events Assessment Branch
Division of Operating
Reactor Support

Enclosures: As stated

cc w/attachments:
See next page

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CC:

Y, NRR (12G18)
P. lia, NRR (12G18)
F. lespie, NRR (12G18)
J. Partlow, NRR (12G18)
S. Varga, NRR (14E4)
J. Calvo, NRR (14A4)
G. Lainas, NRR (14H3)
J. Roe, NRR (13E4)
J. Zwolinski, NRR (13H24)
M. Virgilio, NRR (13E4)
W. Russell, NRR (12G18)
J. Richardson, NRR (7D26)
A. Thadani, NRR (8E2)
S. Rosenberg, NRR (10E4)
C. Rossi, NRR (9A2)
B. Boger, NRR (10H3)
F. Congel, NRR (10E2)
D. Crutchfield, NRR (11H21)
W. Travers, NRR (11B19)
D. Coe, ACRS (P-315)
E. Jordan, AEOD (MN-3701)
T. Novak, AEOD (MN-9112)
L. Spessard, AEOD (MN-3701)
K. Brockman, AEOD (MN-3206)
S. Rubin, AEOD (MN-5219)
M. Harper, AEOD (MN-9112)
J. Grant, EDO (17G21)
R. Newlin, GPA (2G5)
E. Beckjord, RES (NLS-007)
A. Bates, SECY (16G15)
G. Rammling, OCM (16G15)
T. Martin, Region I
W. Kane, Region I
C. Hehl, Region I
S. Ebnetter, Region II
E. Merschhoff, Region II
B. Davis, Region III
E. Greenman, Region III
J. Milhoan, Region IV
B. Beach, Region IV
J.B. Martin, Region V
K. Perkins, Region V

R. Hernan (PDI-4)
J. Stolz (PDI-4)
G. Dick (PDIV-2)
S. Black (PDIV-2)
C. Trammell (PDV)
T. Quay (PDV)

bcc: Mr. Sam Newton, Manager
Events Analysis Department
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500
Atlanta, GA 30339-3064

ENCLOSURE 1

LIST OF ATTENDEES

OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS FULL BRIEFING (93-05)

FEBRUARY 10, 1993

<u>NAME</u>	<u>OFFICE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>OFFICE</u>
B. GRIMES	NRR	J. RCE	NRR
A. CHAFFEE	NRR	J. STOLZ	NRR
R. BENEDICT	NRR	J. PARTLOW	NRR
C. ORSINI	NRR	S. BLACK	NRR
K. GRAY	NRR	F. MIRAGLIA	NRR
E. BENNER	NRR	S. VARGA	NRR
N. FIELDS	NRR	R. ZIMMERMAN	NRR
C. BEARDSLEE	NRR	M. DAVIS	NRR
E. GOODWIN	NRR	V. BENAROYA	AEOD
J. ZIMMERMAN	NRR	C. HUFFMAN	AEOD
R. HERNAN	NRR	P. BARANOWSKY	AEOD
G. MARCUS	NRR	W. MINNERS	RES
L. TRAN	NRR	W. TROSKOSKI	OE
S. ROSENBERG	NRR	D. COE	ACRS
J. BONGARRA	NRR	M. FLEISHMAN	OCM/KR
R. SCHAAF	NRR		

TELEPHONE ATTENDANCE
(AT ROLL CALL)

Regions

Region I
Region III
Region IV
Region V

Resident Inspectors

IIT/AIT Team Leaders

S. Collins (Three Mile Island)
T. Stetka (South Texas)
H. Wong (Region V)

Misc.

OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING 93-05

LOCATION: 10 B11, WHITE FLINT
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1993, 11:00 A.M.

THREE MILE ISLAND,
UNIT 1

PLANT SECURITY BREACH -
SITE AREA EMERGENCY (IIT)

SOUTH TEXAS,
UNITS 1 & 2

INOPERABLE TURBINE DRIVEN
AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS
(AIT)

PALO VERDE, UNIT 3

REACTOR SCRAM/SAFETY
INJECTION WITH FEEDWATER
ABNORMALITIES

PRESENTED BY: EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH
DIVISION OF OPERATING REACTOR
SUPPORT, NRR

93-05

THREE MILE ISLAND, UNIT 1
PLANT SECURITY BREACH -
SITE AREA EMERGENCY (IIT)
FEBRUARY 7, 1993

PROBLEM

AN UNAUTHORIZED VEHICLE CRASHED THROUGH A SECURITY GATE INTO THE PROTECTED AREA.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

THREAT OF PERSONAL INJURY AND RADIOLOGICAL SABOTAGE.

DISCUSSION

06:54 UNAUTHORIZED VEHICLE DROVE THROUGH THE OWNER CONTROLLED AREA CHECKPOINT, THROUGH A CLOSED GATE (PORTION OF THE PROTECTED AREA BOUNDARY), AND INTO A METAL ROLL UP DOOR ON THE TURBINE BUILDING.

07:05 SITE AREA EMERGENCY DECLARED.

- INTERIOR OF THE VEHICLE CONTAINED ONE PACKAGE, SUSPECTED OF BEING A BOMB, WHICH WAS LATER IDENTIFIED AS CLOTHING.
- NO MOTIVE HAS YET BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR THE PERPETRATOR'S ACTIONS.

CONTACT: E. BENNER, NRR/DORS

IIT: YES

REFERENCES: 10 CFR 50.72 #25035,

SIGEVENT: TBD

MORNING REPORT DATED 02/08/93,
AND PN19311

THREE MILE ISLAND,
UNIT 1

- 2 -

93-05

11:00 SUSPECT WAS APPREHENDED IN THE TURBINE BUILDING
UNDER THE MAIN CONDENSER.


- INITIAL QUESTIONING INDICATED THAT HE HAD ACTED ALONE, DID NOT POSSESS ANY EXPLOSIVES OR OTHER HAZARDOUS MATERIALS, AND DID NOT DAMAGE OR MANIPULATE ANY PLANT EQUIPMENT OR CONTROLS.

16:35 SITE AREA EMERGENCY TERMINATED.

FOLLOWUP

- NRC ENTERED STANDBY RESPONSE MODE.
- SENIOR RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND OTHER REGION I PERSONNEL RESPONDED TO THE EVENT.
- AN INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM HAS BEEN FORMED AND IS RESPONDING TO THE EVENT.

BRIEFING 93-05
THREE MILE ISLAND, UNIT 1



	Update -1
	7/82
	White Frontboard - Design Flood

Fig. 2.8-15

SCALE IN FEET
0 100 200 300 400 500

SOUTH TEXAS, UNITS 1 & 2
INOPERABLE TURBINE DRIVEN
AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS (AIT)
FEBRUARY 3, 1993

PROBLEM

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT, UNITS 1 & 2 TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS (TDAFP) TRIPPED SEVERAL TIMES ON OVERSPEED FROM THE END OF DECEMBER 1992 THROUGH JANUARY 1993.

CAUSES

- INADEQUATE PREVENTIVE AND CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE PRACTICES, INADEQUATE ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS, INADEQUATE MANAGEMENT OF DESIGN AND CONFIGURATION CONTROL.
- PRESENCE OF FOREIGN MATERIAL IN THE UNIT 1 TDAFP TURBINE EXHAUST STACK DRAIN LINE.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

- THE TDAFP IS RELIED ON DURING A STATION BLACKOUT CONDITION. THERE ARE THREE AVAILABLE 100% MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS FOR EACH UNIT.
- THE NUMBER OF PROBLEMS FOUND MAY BE INDICATIVE OF POTENTIAL PROBLEMS ELSEWHERE IN THE PLANT.

CONTACTS:	T. STETKA, RIV	AIT: YES
	N. FIELDS, NRR/DORS	SIGEVEN: TBD
REFERENCES:	10 CFR 50.72 #25008, #25013, MORNING REPORT DATED 02/03/93, AND PN49303	

DISCUSSION

SOUTH TEXAS, UNIT 1 (STP1)

- ON DECEMBER 27, 1992, THE STP1 TDAFP TRIPPED ON OVERSPEED DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING. THE TDAFP TURBINE IS MANUFACTURED BY THE TERRY TURBINE COMPANY. SUBSEQUENT TESTS CONDUCTED THAT DAY WERE COMPLETED SATISFACTORILY.
- ON JANUARY 28, 1993, THE TDAFP AGAIN TRIPPED ON OVERSPEED DURING A SURVEILLANCE TEST. NUMEROUS TESTS OF THE TDAFP WERE CONDUCTED AND THE UNIT WAS SUCCESSFULLY TESTED.
- ON FEBRUARY 1, 1993, TDAFP WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE FOLLOWING A TRIP ON OVERSPEED THAT OCCURRED DURING AN OPERABILITY SURVEILLANCE TEST. IT APPEARS THAT THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE OVERSPEED TRIP WAS:
 - MISADJUSTMENT OF GOVERNOR VALVE CAUSED THE VALVE TO BE SLIGHTLY OPEN.
 - COORDINATION BETWEEN THE OPENING TIME OF THE TRIP/THROTTLE VALVE AND THE GOVERNOR VALVE CAUSED A MARGINAL SITUATION FOR AN OVERSPEED.
 - A POSSIBILITY OF EXCESSIVE CONDENSATE UPSTREAM OF THE TRIP/THROTTLE VALVE.
 - EXCESSIVE LEAKAGE PAST THE TRIP/THROTTLE VALVE FURTHER REDUCED THE MARGIN BETWEEN THE TURBINE START AND AN OVERSPEED TRIP.

- THE LICENSEE'S ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS IS CONTINUING. THE LICENSEE INVESTIGATION HAS DETERMINED THAT:
 - THE TWO STEAM ADMISSION LINE DRAIN VALVES WERE PARTIALLY CLOSED AND FROZEN. THE VALVES WERE VERIFIED TO BE OPEN BUT DUE TO DEGRADED VALVE STEM BEARINGS THEY WERE VERY DIFFICULT TO OPERATE AND THEREFORE INCAPABLE OF BEING FULLY OPENED.
 - THE TRIP AND THROTTLE VALVE WAS LEAKING AT A RATE OF ABOUT 0.7 GALLONS PER MINUTE (42 GALLONS PER HOUR). THE MAXIMUM ACCEPTABLE LEAK RATE FOR THIS VALVE IS 8 CC PER HR.
 - THERE WAS FOREIGN MATERIAL, PROBABLY SAND FROM SAND BLASTING DATING BACK TO THE 1989-1990 TIME FRAME, CLOGGING THE EXHAUST HEADER DRAIN LINE.
 - RECENT REGION-BASED INSPECTIONS HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE LICENSEE'S PREVENTIVE AND CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS FOR TDAFPS WERE WEAK.

SOUTH TEXAS UNIT 2 (STP2)


- ON FEBRUARY 3, 1993, THE TDAFP FOR STP2 TRIPPED ON OVERSPEED AFTER AN EMERGENCY START SIGNAL FROM A LOW-LOW STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CONDITION.
- PRIOR SURVEILLANCE STARTS OF THE TDAFP HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL.

- THE MOST PROBABLE ROOT CAUSE OF THIS OVERSPEED TRIP HAS BEEN INVESTIGATED. IT WAS CAUSED BY A WATER SLUG INTO THE TURBINE DUE TO A CONDENSATE BUILD-UP UPSTREAM OF THE TRIP/THROTTLE (514) VALVE. THE BUILD-UP WAS CAUSED BY CLOSING OF THE STEAM LINE DRAIN STEAM TRAP BYPASS VALVE IN COMBINATION WITH AN INOPERABLE STEAM TRAP. BUT SEVERAL CAUSES APPEAR TO BE SIMILAR TO THOSE ON THE UNIT 1 TDAFP.
- THE LICENSEE HAS DETERMINED THAT:
 - THE TRIP AND THROTTLE VALVE WAS LEAKING AT ABOUT ONE HALF THE RATE OF THE STP1 TDAFP VALVE. (ABOUT 20 GALLONS PER HOUR).
 - THERE WAS NO FOREIGN MATERIAL IN THE EXHAUST HEADER OR ELSEWHERE.
 - THE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE USED IN ADJUSTING THE GOVERNOR LINKAGE WAS INCOMPLETE AND THEREFORE INADEQUATE. IN ADDITION, PREVIOUS REGIONAL INSPECTIONS DETERMINED THAT UNDOCUMENTED ADJUSTMENTS OF THE GOVERNOR LINKAGE WERE CONDUCTED BY UNAUTHORIZED PERSONNEL. HOWEVER, THIS ADJUSTMENT IS NOT CONSIDERED TO BE THE CAUSE OF THE OVERSPEED TRIP.

FOLLOWUP

- THE TRIP AND THROTTLE VALVE FOR BOTH UNITS HAVE BEEN REMOVED, LEAK TESTED AND REFURBISHED BY THE VENDOR.

- THE FOREIGN MATERIAL FOUND IN THE STP1 TDAFP HAS BEEN REMOVED AND A SAMPLE ANALYSIS INDICATES A HIGH PROBABILITY THAT IT WAS SAND BLASTING SAND.
- THERE IS EVIDENCE OF GOVERNOR RESPONSE PROBLEMS. STP2 TDAFP RAMPS UP TOO FAST (SHOULD BE APPROX 30 SEC BUT IT RAMPS UP IN ABOUT 7 SEC). THE STP1 TDAFP RAMPS UP BETWEEN 16 AND 30 SEC. AS A RESULT OF THIS, THE GOVERNORS FOR BOTH UNITS HAVE BEEN REMOVED AND SENT TO THE VENDOR (WOODWARD) FOR ANALYSIS.
- THE GOVERNOR VALVES HAVE BEEN DISASSEMBLED FOR INSPECTION. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE VALVE STEMS ARE STICKING WHICH CONTRIBUTES TO THE GOVERNOR CONTROL PROBLEMS. THE INSPECTION INDICATED THAT THE VALVES WERE ACCEPTABLE; HOWEVER, THEY ARE REPLACING THE STEMS.
- THE REGION HAS ISSUED A CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER.
- AN AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM (AIT) WAS DISPATCHED TO THE SITE ON FEBRUARY 4, 1993. THE AIT INVESTIGATION IS CONTINUING.



TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY AND EXHAUST SYSTEM
TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP

93-05

PALO VERDE, UNIT 3
REACTOR SCRAM/SAFETY INJECTION
WITH FEEDWATER ABNORMALITIES
FEBRUARY 4, 1993

PROBLEM

REACTOR SCRAM AND SAFETY INJECTION DUE TO UNEXPECTED MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM RESPONSE.

CAUSE

MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP SPEED CONTROL FAILURE.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

COOLDOWN OF REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM TO JUST BELOW SAFETY INJECTION SET-POINT.

DISCUSSION

- REACTOR AT 100% POWER.
- (15:22:48) ALARMS DUE TO PERTURBATIONS IN STEAM FLOW TO TURBINE OF MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP "A".
- (15:22:52) ALARM DUE TO VIBRATION IN MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP "A".
- MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP "A" SLOWED DOWN RAPIDLY BUT DID NOT TRIP. OTHER PUMP CONTINUED AT FULL SPEED.

CONTACT: R. BENEDICT, NRR/DORS AIT: NO
REFERENCES: 10 CFR 50.72 #25018 AND SIGEVENT: TBD
MORNING REPORT DATED 02/05/93

- SHIFT SUPERVISOR ORDERED MANUAL TRIP OF "A" PUMP, BUT, PRIOR TO OPERATOR ACTION, REACTOR SCRAMMED AT 15:23:53 ON LOW LEVEL IN STEAM GENERATOR #2.
- (15:23:54) AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ACTUATION ON LOW LEVEL IN STEAM GENERATORS.
- (15:23:55) STEAM BYPASS CONTROL VALVES OPENED BRIEFLY.
- REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE DECREASED.
- (15:24:34) SAFETY INJECTION AND CONTAINMENT ISOLATION FROM LOW PRESSURIZER PRESSURE.
- NUE DECLARED BASED ON VALID SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION (ESTIMATED 50 GALLONS TOTAL INJECTION).
- POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTORS TO OVERCOOLING INCLUDE:
 - ECONOMIZER VALVE LEAK ON STEAM GENERATOR #1.
 - DOWNCOMER VALVE TO STEAM GENERATOR #1 FAILED TO CLOSE COMPLETELY.
- REACTOR POWER CUTBACK SYSTEM IS ACTUATED FROM TRIP OF MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP. "A" PUMP SLOWED, BUT DID NOT TRIP. "B" PUMP CONTINUED TO RUN. NO CUTBACK OCCURRED.

PALO VERDE,
UNIT 3

- 3 -

93-05

- MINOR COMPLICATION:

- VALVE HV-30 IN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM OPENED ONLY 5% DUE TO BREAKER TRIP ON OVER-CURRENT.

FOLLOWUP

- TWO REGION V INSPECTORS WENT TO SITE TO ASSIST THE RESIDENT INSPECTORS.
- AEOD DISPATCHED HUMAN PERFORMANCE INVESTIGATION TEAM TO REVIEW OPERATOR ACTIONS AS PART OF ROUTINE REVIEW OF EVENT.

REACTOR SCRAM

Reporting Period: 02/01/93 to 02/07/93

DATE	PLANT & UNIT	POWER	TYPE	CAUSE	COMPLICATIONS	YTD ABOVE 15%	YTD BELOW 15%	YTD TOTAL
02/03/93	SOUTH TEXAS 2	50	SA	Equipment Failure	NO	2	0	2
02/04/93	PALO VERDE 3	100	SA	Equipment Failure	NO	1	0	1
02/05/93	SEQUOYAH 1	1	SM	Equipment Failure	NO	0	1	1
02/06/93	WASHINGTON NUCLEAR 2	51	SA	Design or Installation	NO	2	0	2

NOTES

- PLANT SPECIFIC DATA BASED ON INITIAL REVIEW OF 50.72 REPORTS FOR PERIOD OF INTEREST. SCRAMS ARE DEFINED AS REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM ACTUATIONS WHICH RESULT IN ROD MOTION, AND EXCLUDE THOSE FROM PLANNED TESTS OR AS PART OF PLANNED SHUTDOWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH A PLANT PROCEDURE.
- COMPLICATIONS: RECOVERY COMPLICATED BY EQUIPMENT FAILURES OR PERSONNEL ERRORS UNRELATED TO CAUSE OF SCRAM.
- SA = SCRAM AUTOMATIC; SM = SCRAM MANUAL

OEAB SCRAM DATA

Manual and Automatic Scrams for 1987	-----	435
Manual and Automatic Scrams for 1988	-----	291
Manual and Automatic Scrams for 1989	-----	252
Manual and Automatic Scrams for 1990	-----	226
Manual and Automatic Scrams for 1991	-----	206
Manual and Automatic Scrams for 1992	-----	212
Manual and Automatic Scrams for 1993	--(YTD 02/07/93)--	029

Note: Year To Date (YTD) Totals Include Events Within The Calendar Year Indicated By The End Date Of The Specified Reporting Period

COMPARISON OF WEEKLY SCRAM STATISTICS WITH INDUSTRY AVERAGES

PERIOD ENDING
02/01/93 to 02/07/93

SCRAM CAUSE	NUMBER OF SCRAMS	1993 WEEKLY AVERAGE (YTD)	1992* WEEKLY AVERAGE	1991* WEEKLY AVERAGE	1990* WEEKLY AVERAGE	1989* WEEKLY AVERAGE
POWER GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 15%						
EQUIPMENT FAILURE*	2	2.6	2.6	2.9	3.4	3.1
DESIGN/INSTALLATION ERROR*	1	0.4	-	-	-	-
OPERATING ERROR*	0	0.4	0.8	0.6	0.5	1.0
MAINTENANCE ERROR*	0	1.1	-	-	-	-
EXTERNAL*	0	0.2	-	-	-	-
OTHER*	0	0.0	-	-	-	0.1
Subtotal	3	4.7	3.4	3.5	3.9	4.2
POWER LESS THAN 15%						
EQUIPMENT FAILURE*	1	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3
DESIGN/INSTALLATION ERROR*	0	0.0	-	-	-	-
OPERATING ERROR*	0	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.3
MAINTENANCE ERROR*	0	0.0	-	-	-	-
EXTERNAL*	0	0.0	-	-	-	-
OTHER*	0	0.0	-	-	-	-
Subtotal	1	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.6
TOTAL	4	5.5	4.0	4.0	4.4	4.8

SCRAM TYPE	NO. OF SCRAMS	1993 WEEKLY AVERAGE (YTD)	1992 WEEKLY AVERAGE	1991 WEEKLY AVERAGE	1990 WEEKLY AVERAGE	1989 WEEKLY AVERAGE
TOTAL AUTOMATIC SCRAMS	3	4.1	3.0	3.3	3.2	3.9
TOTAL MANUAL SCRAMS	1	1.3	1.0	0.7	1.2	0.9

* Detailed breakdown not in database for 1989 and earlier

- EXTERNAL cause included in EQUIPMENT FAILURE

- MAINTENANCE ERROR and DESIGN/INSTALLATION ERROR causes included in OPERATING ERROR

- OTHER cause included in EQUIPMENT FAILURE 1991 and 1990

EXTERNAL CAUSE INCLUDES SCRAMS ATTRIBUTED TO ENVIRONMENTAL CAUSES
(EG LIGHTNING, LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER)

ROUNDING OFF MAY RESULT IN A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TOTALS.

OPERATING REACTOR PLANTS SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

SORT> Event Date						
QUERY> Event Type SIG & Close Out Date >= 12/10/92 & Event Date >= 08/06/91 & Event Date <= 12/01/92 & Event Type = "SIG"						
PLANT & UNIT	DATE OF EVENT	50.72 NUMBER	DESCRIPTION OF EVENT	SIGNIFICANCE	OR	
					BRIEFING	PRESENTER
						CLOSEOUT RECORD
* MILLSTONE 3	08/06/91	21548	MISSELS FOULED THE ENGINE JACKET WATER COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER, CAUSING "B" DIESEL GENERATOR TO BE DECLARED INOPERABLE. CAUSED BY INADEQUATE CLEANING PROGRAM. REPEAT OF EARLIER OCCURRENCES.	OTHER - UNAVAILABLE EMERGENCY POWER	91-14	BENEDICT R. EFR 93-010
* PERRY 1	03/28/92	23125	THREE OF FOUR MSIV PENETRATIONS EXHIBITED EXCESSIVE LEAKAGE DURING LLRT.	Containment	NONE	CARTER J. INFORMAL
INDIAN POINT 2	04/13/92	23230	REACTOR TRIP AND AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP FAILURES.	Safety-Related Cooling System	NONE	BENEDICT R. EFR 93-005
* MILLSTONE 2	07/06/92	23805	SINGLE FAILURE VULNERABILITY OF DC CONTROL FOR ECCS.	Safety-Related Cooling System	92-11	KOSHY T. EFR 93-003
LASALLE 2	08/27/92	24130	FOLLOWING A REACTOR TRIP, THE FEEDWATER PUMP TURBINES COULD NOT BE TRIPPED AUTOMATICALLY OR MANUALLY. MSIVs WERE CLOSED BY OPERATORS. AN AIT WAS FORMED.	Unsuspected Plant Performance	92-15	GREENE T. EFR 92-036
* RIVER BEND 1	10/01/92	0	POOR RADIATION PROTECTION PRACTICES DURING THE REFUEL OUTAGE RESULTED IN UNNECESSARY EXPOSURE OF WORKERS DUE TO AN UNPOSTED HIGH RADIATION AREA AND THE TRANSFER OF LOW LEVEL RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OFFSITE TO AN UNAUTHORIZED RECIPIENT.	OTHER - POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE OF WORKERS	93-02	SKEEN D. EFR 93-002
* CALLAWAY 1	10/17/92	24453	IMPROPER MAINTENANCE RESULTED IN A COMPLETE LOSS OF ANNUNCIATORS WHICH WAS NOT RECOGNIZED BY PLANT PERSONNEL. (INFORMATION NOTICE 93- , DATED / /93; SUBJECT:)	OTHER - INDICATION	92-17	BENNER E. EFR 92-038
OCOONEE 2	10/19/92	24455	PLANT TRIP AND LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER WITH COMPLICATIONS.	Plant Power	92-17	FIELDS M. EFR 93-011
SEABOYAN 1,2	10/26/92	24502	WATER ENTRAINMENT IN THE INSTRUMENT AIR RESULTED IN UNIT 1 TRIP AND UNIT 2 RUNBACK.	OTHER - 2-UNIT TRANSIENT	92-18	BENEDICT R. EFR 93-008
* VOGTLE 1	11/18/92	0	REVIEW THE EDG FAILURES IN THE PAST 1 YEAR.	Plant Power	NONE	FIELDS M. EFR 93-007

OPERATING REACTOR PLANTS SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

SO&T> Event Date

QWER > Event Type SIG & Close Out Date == 12/10/92 & Event Date == 08/06/91 & Event Date <= 12/01/92 & Event Type = "SIG

PLANT & UNIT	DATE OF EVENT	50.72 NUMBER	DESCRIPTION OF EVENT	SIGNIFICANCE	OR BRIEFING	PRESENTER	CLOSEOUT RECORD
DRESDEN 2	11/25/92	24657	LICENSEE SUSPENDED FIVE INDIVIDUALS PENDING INVESTIGATION OF INFORMATION THAT THEY FAILED TO REPORT AN ERROR IN CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL DURING A ROUTINE OPERATION ON SEPTEMBER 18, 1992. REGION OI IS CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION.	Reactor Protection System	92-20	GREENE T.	EFR 93-012
SEQUOYAH 1,2	12/01/92	24680	THE LICENSEE DISCOVERED INSUFFICIENT QUANTITY OF ICE WAS MAINTAINED IN THE ICE CONDENSER UNITS IN THE PAST CYCLES 4 AND 5.	Containment	93-01	BENEDICT R.	EFR 93-009

* PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED AS SIGNIFICANT EVENTS FOR THE PERFORMANCE INDICATOR REPORT