

APPENDIX B

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-458/91-09

Operating License: NPF-47

Docket: 50-458

Licensee: Gulf States Utilities (GSU)  
P.O. Box 220  
St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775

Facility Name: River Bend Station (RBS)

Inspection At: RBS, St. Francisville, Louisiana

Inspection Conducted: February 25-26, 1991

Inspectors:

R. A. Caldwell  
R. A. Caldwell, Security Inspector, Nuclear  
Materials and Safeguards Inspection Section

2-2-91  
Date

R. A. Caldwell  
for A. B. Earnest, Security Inspector, Nuclear  
Materials and Safeguards Inspection Section

2-2-91  
Date

Approved:

Charles L. Cain  
Charles L. Cain, Chief, Nuclear Materials and  
Safeguards Inspection Section

4/12/91  
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted February 25-26, 1991 (Report 50-458/91-09)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of the licensee's physical security program. The areas inspected within the physical security program included management effectiveness - security program, reports and records, assessment aids, and protected area detection aids.

Results: Within the areas inspected, one violation and one noncited violation were identified.

At the time of this inspection, RBS had reduced the size of the security organization. The inspectors, with licensee assistance, evaluated licensee

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ability to provide adequate countermeasures for certain contingencies with a smaller security force each shift.

The inspectors determined that licensee security management had reduced the size of the security organization without first changing the security program to provide for a smaller security force. The licensee failed to redesign the protection system so that it was capable of meeting certain safeguard contingency countermeasures with the reduced security personnel available each shift.

Since the licensee had not redefined the protective envelope as required with fewer security officers, the capability to train security personnel in execution of the redefined protective envelope was not possible. For approximately 2 months, this inaction significantly reduced the effectiveness of the security organization to meet certain contingencies should the contingency reaction have been required.

Also, an isolated Severity Level V violation was identified for failing to maintain control of a visitor. This violation is described in paragraph 7 and is not being cited because the criteria of Section V.A of NRC's Enforcement Policy have been met.

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