



**Commonwealth Edison**

One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois  
Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767  
Chicago, Illinois 60690

June 28, 1985

Mr. James G. Keppler  
Regional Administrator  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region III  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Subject: Dresden Station Units 2 and 3  
Response to GSEP Exercise  
Weaknesses - Inspection Report  
Nos. 50-237/85-011 & 50-249/85-010  
NRC Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249

Reference (a): C. J. Paperiello letter to Cordell  
Reed dated May 17, 1985.

Dear Mr. Keppler:

This letter is in response to the inspection conducted by Mr. G. A. Brown during the period of April 22 through April 24, 1985, of activities at Dresden Station. Reference (a) indicated that certain activities were identified as exercise weaknesses. The Commonwealth Edison Company response to these weaknesses is provided in Attachment A.

If you have any further questions on this matter, please direct them to this office.

Very truly yours,

*for M.S. Junrak*  
D. L. Farrar  
Director of Nuclear Licensing

lm

Attachment

cc: NRC Resident Inspector - Dresden

0313K

8507260479 850628  
PDR ADCK 05000237  
Q PDR

JUL 17 1985

ATTACHMENT A

The following items are responses to the weaknesses found in the routine safety inspection conducted by Mr. G.A. Brown and his associates on April 22 through April 24, 1985.

1. Weakness - Access control to the TSC was not accomplished in a timely manner nor was it performed in a satisfactory manner after it was established.

Response - EPIP 100-C7, Security Director Checklist, shall be revised to better define requirements to control access to the TSC. This will be completed by September 1, 1985.

2. Weakness - Implementation of shift staffing and augmentation was not accomplished in a timely manner. There was a breakdown in the call tree.

Response - Additional training on the operation of the call tree will be provided to Shift Engineers, Shift Control Room Engineers, Station Directors and Station Duty Supervisors. Augmentation callers will also receive this training. This training will be completed by October 1, 1985.

3. Weakness - Evacuation of non-essential personnel was not ordered in a timely manner following completion of the simulated accountability of onsite personnel.

Response - Additional training on the requirements to evacuate non-essential personnel in a timely manner following a declaration of a Site or General Emergency will be given to Station Directors (including Shift Engineers), Security Directors and Rad-Chem Directors. This training will be completed by September 1, 1985.

4. Weakness - Poor radiological control technique was observed during the handling of the radiological injury.

Response - Additional training on surveying a potentially contaminated injured person and contamination control will be provided in the next scheduled Rad-Chem Technician training. This training will be completed by October 1, 1985.

5. Weakness - The EOF failed to provide adequately detailed followup messages in accordance with the licensee's EOF Procedure EOF-1, paragraphs 4.2.f and 5.2.f.

Response - The Station Director's Procedure, the Corporate Command Center Director's Procedure and the Recovery Manager's Procedure will be revised to provide guidance on the mechanisms that may be used to provide and to document followup information to the appropriate state agencies. These revisions will be completed by October 1, 1985.