October 15, 1996

Mr. Robert A. Williams, Project Manager
Westinghouse Electric Corporation
Commercial Nuclear Fuel Division
Drawer R
Columbia, South Carolina 29250

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

1. CSE AND FAULT TREE INFORMATION FOR THE URRS DISSOLVER SYSTEM, CSA SUMMARY INFORMATION FOR THE URRS SCRAP PROCESSING SYSTEM, AND CSE SUMMARY AND FAULT TREE INFORMATION FOR THE UN BULK STORAGE TANK SYSTEM (TAC NO. L30812)
2. CSE AND FAULT TREE INFORMATION FOR THE POWDER BLENDING SYSTEM (TAC NO. L30862)
3. CSE AND FAULT TREE INFORMATION FOR THE ADU CONVERSION PROCESS (TAC NO. L30877)

Dear Mr. Williams:

This refers to your applications dated September 29, 1995, February 15 and April 30, 1996, which respond to requirements listed in Safety License Condition S-2 of Materials License SNM-1107.

Our review of the applications has identified additional information that is needed before further action can be taken on your submittals. The additional information, specified in the enclosure to this letter, should be provided in the form of responses to the individual comments, as appropriate, or as revised pages to the application. Please provide this information within 30 days of the date of this letter and reference the above TAC Nos. in future correspondence related to this request.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Craig Hrabal at (301)415-5424 or me at (301)415-8116.

Sincerely,
Original signed by:
Charles Gaskin, Acting Section Leader
Licensing Section 1
Licensing Branch
Division of Fuel Cycle Safety
and Safeguards, NMSS

Docket 70-1151
License SNM-1107

NFO5 '1

Enclosure: As stated

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NAME	CHrabal CAH		DAHoadley		MKlasky		CGaskin	
DATE	10/ 2 /96		10/ 4 /96		10/ 7 /96		10/ 15 /96	

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

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If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Craig Hrabal at (301)415-5421 or me at (301)415-8116.

Sincerely,

Charles E. Gaskin

Charles Gaskin, Acting Section Leader
Licensing Section 1
Licensing Branch
Division of Fuel Cycle Safety
and Safeguards, NMSS

Docket 70-1151
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Enclosure: As stated

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

APPLICATIONS DATED 9/29/95, 2/15/96, AND 4/30/96

WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
DOCKET 70-1151

Please provide the following information:

1. In the Powder Blending System, samples are taken from the polypaks to determine the moisture content before the polypaks are dumped into an unfavorable geometry container. The safety analysis stated that a composite sample is taken (consisting of a small amount from each polypak), and a few polypaks are individually sampled as the second moisture measurement. Provide justification that supports the adequacy of these two sampling methods to assure that moisture limits are not exceeded in the unfavorable geometry device.

2. For the large lot blender in the Powder Blending System, the safety analysis report indicates that to ensure that a potential critical quantity of moderator does not enter the blender, the mass of material is restricted. However, the safety analysis report indicated that the mass measurement is performed after the material is in the blender. After the powder is in the blender, how does the mass measurement effectively prevent a critical quantity of moderator from entering the blender?

3. The safety analysis reports for the Powder Blending and UN Bulk Storage Tank Systems contained remarks that indicate that there was the potential for common mode failure. In addition, there are several remarks that some initiating events might have an indeterminate safety question. How have these been resolved?

4. Provide an analysis to demonstrate that monitoring of the [redacted] Storage Tanks is adequate to preclude a criticality. Specifically, how does your analysis show that monitoring is frequent enough to avert a potential criticality should precipitation or settling occur?

5. There are several discrepancies between Table 6.2.3 in your license and the CSEs. For example, the vaporizer CSE requires mass and configuration defenses to fail for double contingency protection, however, the Table 6.2.3 only addresses "geometry (level control)" as the criticality safety basis. "Level control" is also not defined in the license. Likewise, the hydrolysis column CSE requires favorable geometry and limits on the concentration of uranyl fluoride for double contingency protection, but Table 6.2.3 only requires geometry as a criticality safety basis. There are a number of other examples of these differences between the license and the CSEs. Provide an explanation or correction of these differences.

ENCLOSURE

6. Provide a justification for ensuring that tank ruptures will occur before exceeding geometry limits. Specifically, have analyses been performed to show that less than rupture stresses can not expand tanks to their geometry limit?

7. The CSEs provide numerous parametric/sensitivity calculations to show the effect on K_{eff} from changes in parameter limits from normal to off-normal quantities. However, there are no analyses that demonstrate that the physical margin of safety is sufficient to show the likelihood of changing parameters to these off-normal quantities. Provide analyses to show the margin of safety is sufficient.