

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Unit #1DOCKET NUMBER (2)
0 5 0 0 0 3 2 2PAGE (3)
1 OF 0 3TITLE (4)
ESF Actuation Caused by False RPV Low Water Level Signals

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)				
0	4	2	9	8	5	8	5	0	1	7	0	5	0	0	0
0	4	2	9	8	5	8	5	0	1	7	0	5	0	0	0

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)					
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.38(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)					
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.38(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)					
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)						

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME
Gary Rhoads, Operational Compliance EngineerTELEPHONE NUMBER
AREA CODE
5 1 6 9 2 9 - 8 3 0 0

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)									
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On April 29, 1985 at 0914 an I&C Technician, while performing an MSIV Leakage Control Surveillance Test, started to valve in pressure transmitter 1E32*P042 and caused a pressure transient in the reactor pressure vessel level reference leg. The transient caused momentary false low level (Level 3 +12.5") signals resulting in a full scram and a one half NS4 isolation. The plant was in Operational Condition 4, with the mode switch in refuel to accommodate repair work on the Control Rod drives. The reference leg is common to reactor pressure vessel level transmitters 1B21*LT154C and D. RHR B shutdown cooling loop was automatically isolated causing the pump to trip. Vessel level was verified to be normal (+42") and the scram reset. Within a few seconds after resetting the scram a second low level scram was initiated from the same source due to pressure oscillations in the reference leg. Vessel level was normal at +42", vessel temperature was 124 F and vessel pressure was 0 psig. Plant management was notified and all work which could affect the level reference leg was immediately stopped. At 0948 the NS4 isolation was reset and RHR Shutdown Cooling loop B was returned to service. The NRC was notified of the event per 10 CFR 50.72 at 1046.

IE22
11

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Unit 1	0500032285	0	17	0	0	2 OF 03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

On April 29, 1985 at 0914, I&C Technicians were performing SP 44.406.01, MSIV Leakage Control Operating Instrumentation Calibration and Functional Test. When the technician opened the reactor pressure vessel level reference leg isolation valve for pressure transmitter 1E32*PT042 (N060), a full scram and a one half NS4 isolation were initiated. The plant was in Operational Condition 4, and the mode switch was in refuel to accomodate repair work on the Control Rod Drives. The technician stopped opening the valve when the scram occurred. The reference leg is common to level transmitters 1B21*LT154 C and D. Opening the valve caused a pressure transient, tripping low level (Level 3 +12.5") switches 1B21*LIS 154C and D, causing the scram and isolation. The Watch Engineer verified that Reactor Vessel level was normal at +42" and reset the scram. RHR B shutdown cooling loop was automatically isolated due to the false low level, causing RHR B pump to trip. Within a few seconds another full low level scram was initiated from the same source due to continuing pressure oscillations. Reactor Vessel Level was again verified to be normal, the mode switch was placed in Shutdown and the scram was reset. The technician immediately informed his foreman that he may have caused the scram.

At 0948 the isolation was reset and RHR Shutdown Cooling loop B was returned to service. Plant management was informed of the event and the NRC was notified per 10 CFR 50.72 at 1046.

Immediately after the event all work which could affect the reference leg was stopped. I&C supervision reviewed the event and the surveillance procedure with the technicians. I&C personnel were made aware that not all procedures and MWRs presently identify transmitters and switches connected to the reference leg. Personnel were cautioned to refer to SP 41.012.02, Reactor Vessel Reference Leg Instrument Removal and Return to Service procedure, which contains a list of all instruments connected to the reference leg and to notify the Watch Engineer's office immediately if it is suspected that work in progress caused a scram. A review of the procedure used for the surveillance, SP 44.406.01, and discussion with the technicians identified the need to note that the instruments were connected to the reference leg and to specify a better way to relieve test pressure to avoid leaving an air bubble in the instrument.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Unit 1	05000322	85	017	00	03	OF	03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

The following steps have been taken or are in process to prevent recurrence of this event.

1. SP 44.406.01 was revised to incorporate caution notes for three pressure transmitters in the procedure which could cause a scram. The return to service steps were revised to clearly specify the use of the transmitter vent valve to relieve test pressure versus using the testing rig vent valve to avoid leaving an air bubble in the transmitter. The vent to use was not specified in the procedure.
2. All surveillance procedures which affect the RPV level reference legs will be revised to add the appropriate caution notes and to revise the return to service steps.
3. All instruments connected to the RPV level reference legs have been tagged with information tags indicating that they are connected to the level reference legs.
4. All I&C technicians who are involved with work affecting the reactor pressure vessel level reference legs will receive special training.

LER85-006 discussed a similar event. The first two steps, which were initiated in accordance with LER 85-006, will be expedited to assure completion prior to the next performance of surveillance procedures but no later than May 30, 1985. All similar changes to procedures which can affect the RPV level reference legs will be completed by June 30, 1985 instead of September 1, 1985 as stated in LER 85-006.

The expected completion date for step 4 above is June 30, 1985.



LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY

SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION • P.O. BOX 328 • WADING RIVER, NEW YORK 11792

TEL. (516) 929-8300

May 17, 1985

PM 85-082

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

In accordance with 10CFR50.73, enclosed is a copy of Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Unit 1's License Event Report 85-017.

Sincerely yours,

William E. Steiger, Jr.
Plant Manager

WES/gr

Enclosure

cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Regional Administrator
Peter Eselgroth, Senior Resident Inspector
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Records Center
American Nuclear Insurers

SR.A21.0200

LE22
1/1