

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT I										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1										PAGE (3) 1 OF 2																														
TITLE (4) UNPLANNED ACTUATION OF PART OF REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM																																																		
EVENT DATE (5)									LER NUMBER (6)									REPORT DATE (7)									OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																							
MONTH			DAY			YEAR			YEAR			SEQUENTIAL NUMBER			REVISION NUMBER			MONTH			DAY			YEAR			FACILITY NAMES												DOCKET NUMBER(S)											
0 6			1 8			8 5			8 5			0 2			5 0																								0 5 0 0 0											
0 6			1 8			8 5			8 5			0 2			5 0																								0 5 0 0 0											
OPERATING MODE (9) 4									THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5. (Check one or more of the following) (11)																																									
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0									20.402(b)									20.406(c)									<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)									73.71(b)														
									20.406(a)(1)(i)									50.36(a)(1)									50.73(a)(2)(v)									73.71(c)														
									20.406(a)(1)(ii)									50.36(a)(2)									50.73(a)(2)(vi)									OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)														
									20.406(a)(1)(iii)									50.73(a)(2)(i)									50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)																							
									20.406(a)(1)(iv)									50.73(a)(2)(ii)									50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)																							
20.406(a)(1)(v)									50.73(a)(2)(iii)									50.73(a)(2)(ix)																																
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																																																		
NAME Steven B. Tipps, Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance																				TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 9 1 2 3 6 7 7 8 5 1																														
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																																																		
CAUSE			SYSTEM			COMPONENT			MANUFACTURER			REPORTABLE TO NRC						CAUSE			SYSTEM			COMPONENT			MANUFACTURER			REPORTABLE TO NRC																				
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)																				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)										MONTH DAY YEAR																				
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)																				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO																														
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)																																																		
<p>On 06/18/85 at approximately 1231 CDT personnel were performing "IRM INSTRUMENT FUNCTIONAL TEST" procedure (HNP-1-3052) on Intermediate Range Monitors (IRM's) when a full RPS logic actuation was received on one or two of the four rod groups (i.e., should have received a 1/2 RPS logic actuation on all four rod groups). Then scram discharge volume filled, resulting in a full RPS logic actuation on all four rod groups.</p> <p>The actual cause of this event is unknown. However, from an in-depth investigation the following conclusion was made. Following the completion of surveillance testing on an IRM in "B" RPS channel, operations personnel reset the 1/2 RPS logic actuation in that channel. When operations personnel reset the "B" RPS channel logic actuation, the logic actuation did not reset on all of the four rod groups. The Instrument and Control (I & C) personnel gave the expected RPS logic actuation in the "A" RPS channel. The rod groups that did not reset when operations reset the "B" RPS channel had a full RPS logic actuation on them. This full RPS logic actuation on one or two of the four rod groups caused the scram discharge volume header to fill and activate a full RPS logic actuation on all four rod groups.</p> <p>As an interim measure to prevent recurrence of this event per STANDING ORDER 85-34, personnel are to verify the 4 rod group lights are lit on both (A & B) RPS channel panels, thus, indicating that all rod groups are reset prior to generating RPS channel actuations during surveillance testing.</p>																																																		
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT I	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1 8 5 — 0 2 5 — 0 0 0 2 OF 0 2	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

On 06/18/85 at approximately 1231 CDT the unit was in cold shutdown when personnel were performing "IRM INSTRUMENT FUNCTIONAL TEST" procedure (HNP-1-3052). A full RPS logic actuation was received on one or two of the four rod groups (i.e., should have received a 1/2 RPS logic actuation on all four Rod groups). Following this RPS logic actuation the scram discharge volume header filled resulting in a full RPS logic actuation on all four Rod groups. Thus, the event is reportable per the requirements of 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) because it is an unplanned actuation of an ESF.

The actual cause of this event is unknown. However, from an in-depth investigation the following conclusion was made. Following the completion of surveillance testing on an IRM in "B" RPS channel, operations personnel reset the 1/2 RPS logic actuation in that channel. When operations personnel reset the "B" RPS channel logic actuation, the logic actuation did not reset on all of the four rod groups. When Instrument and Control (I & C) personnel gave the expected "A" RPS channel logic actuation in the "A" channel, the rod groups that had not reset received a full RPS logic actuation (both "A" and "B" channels). A full RPS logic actuation on one or two of the four rod groups caused the scram discharge volume header to fill and activate a full RPS logic actuation on all four rod groups.


As an interim measure to prevent recurrence of this event per STANDING ORDER 85-34, personnel prior to generating RPS channel actuations during surveillance testing, are to verify the 4 rod group lights are lit on both (A & B) RPS channel panels, thus, indicating that all rod groups are reset.

This event did not affect Unit 2. On Unit 2 the four RPS rod group lights which are illuminated to indicate that the four Rod groups are reset are located on the front control panel above the RPS channel reset switch and on each (A & B) RPS trip panel.

As a permanent corrective action for Unit 1, a design change request (i.e., initiated prior to this event) will install Rod group indication lights on the unit's control panel just above the RPS channel reset switches.

This event did not affect the safety of the plant nor did it affect the health and safety of the public. There are no known previous similar events to this event (i.e., full RPS logic actuation, one or two out of four rod groups).

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
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

July 12, 1985
LR-MGR-019-0785

PLANT E. I. HATCH
Licensee Event Report
Docket No. 50-321

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-321/1985-025. This report is required by 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).



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HCN/SBT/vlz

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