

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5					PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3	
TITLE (4) CONDITION PROHIBITED BY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS																
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)			
0 4	3 0	8 5	8 5	0 1 3	0 1	0 7	1 2	8 5	DIABLO CANYON UNIT 2				0 5 0 0 0 3 2 3			
														0 5 0 0 0		
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)														
4		20.402(b)				20.406(c)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)		
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.36(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)		
0 0 0		20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 368A)		
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
		20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)						
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME DAVID P. SISK, REGULATORY COMPLIANCE ENGINEER										TELEPHONE NUMBER						
										AREA CODE 8 0 5 5 9 5 - 7 3 5 1						
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS						
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)						
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										X NO						

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On April 30, 1985, Unit 1 entered Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown) with two ESF timer settings outside acceptable Technical Specification (TS) limits. Similarly, on May 7, 1985, Unit 2 entered Mode 6 (Refueling) with one auto transfer timer setting outside acceptable TS limits. The acceptable limits are specified in Table 4.8-2 of each Unit's TS. Since these timer settings are specified in the TS surveillance requirements, DG 1-3 should have been declared inoperable for all Unit 2 Modes and Modes 1-4 on Unit 1, in accordance with TS 3.0.4.

The out-of-specification timers were discovered during the performance of Procedure M-13B. The timers were not reset as required prior to the mode changes. The Unit 1 event was discovered on May 10, 1985, during a review of outstanding Unit 1 problem reports. The Unit 2 event was discovered on June 12, 1985 while the Unit 2 Nuclear Plant Problem Report (NPPR) was being signed off.

The timers were promptly reset. To prevent recurrence, appropriate personnel received additional training on the importance of verifying data. In addition, Procedure M-13B was revised to require that testing personnel declare the applicable diesel generator inoperable per TS requirements if an out-of-tolerance condition or a failure is discovered during performance of the procedure.

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1	05000275	85	013	01	02	OF	03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

At 2309 PDT, April 30, 1985, Unit 1 entered Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown) with only two operable diesel generators. This action is not allowed by Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.4, which restricts entry into an operational Mode unless the limiting Conditions for Operation are met. Diesel Generator 1-3 (EK)(DG) had load sequence timers that were set outside the limits required by TS 4.8.1.1.2.b.2), Table 4.8-2, for operation in Modes 1-4. TS 3.8.1.1 requires three operable diesel generators in Mode 4. Action Items a and c were not met within their time requirements.

On April 27, 1985, during performance of Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) M-13B, ("Engineered Safeguards Automatic Timers Setting Verification") on DG 1-3, two Unit 1 Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) timers were shown to be outside TS limits. As required by the procedure, Nuclear Plant Problem Reports (NPPRs) were initiated and the procedure was signed off. The Unit 1 timers were scheduled to be reset on April 28, 1985. On April 30, the Unit 1 transition to Mode 4 was made on the basis that all diesel generators were operable; however, the load sequence timers had not been reset as scheduled.

The Unit 1 event was discovered on May 10, 1985 during a review of outstanding NPPRs. Prompt attention was given to resetting the two timers to conform with TS Table 4.8-2 requirements. The plant had been in Modes 1-4 for 10 days when the condition was identified. Performance of the surveillance test that determined the timers to be only slightly out of specification also demonstrated the capability of the diesel generator to accept loads with the load sequence timers slightly out of specification. Therefore, plant management considered TS Action Statement 3.8.1.1a, which requires starting the remaining diesel generators within one hour and a plant shutdown and cooldown within 72 hours, to be inappropriate and to pose a greater risk to plant safety than continued operation and expeditious correction of the situation. Performance of Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.1.a and 4.8.1.1.2.a.2) would not have verified load sequence timer operability (the components which caused the problem), and would have subjected the DGs to unnecessary starting cycles.

On May 7, 1985, Unit 2 entered Mode 6 (Refueling) without an operable diesel generator. This action is not allowed by TS 3.0.4 which restricts entry into an operational Mode unless the Limiting Conditions for Operation are met. Although the initial surveillance testing had not been completed for the two Unit 2 designated diesels, DG 1-3, the swing Unit diesel, was considered available for Unit 2 use. However, DG 1-3 had one Unit 2 load sequence timer that was outside the limits required by TS 4.8.1.1.2.b.2), Table 4.8.2. TS 3.8.1.2 requires one operable diesel generator in Modes 5 or 6. The action item was not met.

On April 30, 1985, during performance of Procedure M-13B on DG 1-3, one Unit 2 Auto Transfer timer was tested outside TS limits. The Unit 2 event was discovered on June 12, 1985, during a review of completed Unit 2 NPPRs.

The timer had been reset and tested on June 11, 1985. The action requirement of TS 3.8.1.2 was not met during the core loading of Unit 2 (May 7 through May 15, 1985).

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YEAR  8 5	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER — 0 1 3	REVISION NUMBER — 0 1		OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

To prevent recurrence, appropriate personnel received additional training on the importance of verifying data. Procedure M-13B was revised to require that testing personnel declare the DG inoperable in accordance with TS requirements, if a failure occurs during performance of the procedure. Other test procedures are being reviewed to determine if similar changes are required.

# PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

PG&E

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JAMES D. SHIFFER  
VICE PRESIDENT  
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION

July 12, 1985

PGandE Letter No.: DCL-85-239

Document Control Desk  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Re: Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80  
Docket No. 50-323, OL-DPR-81  
Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2  
Licensee Event Report 85-013-01  
Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications


Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), PGandE is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report concerning the failure to meet Limiting Conditions for Operation due to a diesel generator designated inoperable because load sequence timers were slightly out of specification.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Kindly acknowledge receipt of this material on the enclosed copy of this letter and return it in the enclosed addressed envelope.

Sincerely,

  
for J. B. Shiffer

Enclosure

cc: J. B. Martin  
Service List

IE22  
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