

Maine Yankee

RELIABLE ELECTRICITY FOR MAINE SINCE 1972

PO. BOX 408 • WISCASSET, MAINE 04578 • (207) 882-6321

February 12, 1993
MN-93-17 JRH-93-31

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

References: (a) License No. DPR-36 (Docket No. 50-309)
 (b) MYAPCo Letter to USNRC dated November 17, 1992 (MN-92-121)
 LER92-11


Subject: Maine Yankee Licensee Event Report 93-002, Control Room Ventilation Trains
Inoperable Due to Preventative Maintenance

Gentlemen:

Please find enclosed Maine Yankee Licensee Event Report 93-002-00. This report
is submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).

Please contact us should you have any questions regarding this matter.

Very truly yours,



James R. Hebert, Acting Manager
Licensing & Engineering Support Department


JVW/jag

c: Mr. Thomas T. Martin
Mr. Charles S. Marschall
Mr. E. H. Trottier
Mr. Patrick J. Dostie

220054

9302220388 930219
PDR ADCK 05000309
S PDR

LI\93mn\9317



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Facility Name(1) Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company	Docket Number(2) 0 15 10 10 13 10 19 1 of 2	Page(3) 2
---	--	--------------

Title(4) Control Room Ventilation Trains Inoperable due to Preventive Maintenance											
Event Date(5)			LER Number(6)			Report Date(7)			Other Facilities Involved(8)		
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names	Docket Number(s)	
0	1	21	93	93	- 0 10 12 - 0 10	012	119	93			

This Report is Submitted Pursuant to the Requirements of 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)											
Operating Mode (9)		7		20.402(b)		20.405(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)	
Power Level (10)		1 0 0		20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)	
				20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		Other (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)	
				20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)			
				20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)			
				20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)			

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)											
NAME Paul R. Willoughby, Nuclear Safety Engineer								Telephone Number Area Code 2 0 7 8 8 2 6 3 2 1			

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)											
Cause	System	Com-ponent	Manufac-turer	Reportable to NPRDS	Cause	System	Com-ponent	Manufac-turer	Reportable to NPRDS		

Supplemental Report Expected (14)								Expected Submission Date(15)	Month	Day	Year
(If yes, complete Expected Submission Date)											
Yes											
No											

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On January 21, 1993, both trains of Control Room Ventilation were declared inoperable and Technical Specification 3.0.A.2 was entered. The inoperability of both trains was a result of preventive maintenance (PM) for filter replacement, internal to "B" train air handler (AC-1B). Because of damper configuration, it is impossible to externally isolate the AC-1B air handler and maintain a recirculation path. When AC-1B is opened, both trains via FN-11A or FN-11B have direct paths to the atmosphere, bypassing the recirculation flow.

The consequences of this event, which will occur quarterly, is minimal since the loss of both trains is short duration (less than 1 hour - no shutdown initiated) for the PM.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

Facility Name(1)	Docket Number(2)	LER Number (6)			Page(3)	
		Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number		
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company	015101013109	913	- 01 012	- 010	2	of 12

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On January 21, 1993, both trains of Control Room Ventilation were declared inoperable and Technical Specification 3.0.A.2 was entered. The inoperability of both trains was a result of preventive maintenance (PM) for filter replacement, internal to "B" train air handler (AC-1B). Because of damper configuration, it is impossible to externally isolate the AC-1B air handler and maintain a recirculation path. When AC-1B is opened, both trains via FN-11A or FN-11B have direct paths to the atmosphere, bypassing the recirculation flow.

A bolted entrance enclosure is removed within approximately 15 minutes to allow access to the air handler's internals. Once inside the air handler, a hinged plate with four wing nuts is closed to isolate AC-1B's air inlet which then makes AC-1A's recirculation path operable. Tech. Spec. 3.0.A.2 is exited and 14 days are allowed for one operable control room ventilation train. When the PM is completed, the hinged plate is placed back in it's original position and Tech. Spec. 3.0.A.2 is entered again. The enclosure is bolted and both trains are then operable, in conformance to Technical Specifications.

The consequences of this event, which will occur quarterly, is minimal since the loss of both trains is short duration (less than 1 hour - no shutdown initiated) for the PM.