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(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

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CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

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Cause Description & Corrective Actions

The root cause of this event is a design deficiency in the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) which caused automatic isolation of the sample line isolation valves for R-11 and R-12. Interim corrective action was to implement a temporary procedure to install a jumper, when necessary, to override the automatic function. Final corrective actions were to modify the valves' circuitry to allow overriding of the automatic function and to revise the PASS operating procedures.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
FOR
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 83-018

I. Cause Description and Analysis

On July 29, 1983, at 1255 hours, with the unit at 56% power, a low flow alarm was received on the Containment Atmosphere Radiation Monitors R-11 and R-12. This event occurred during a routine containment pressure relief.

Investigation revealed that the vacuum pump for R-11 and R-12 had overheated and had tripped off. Further investigation revealed that during pre-operational testing of the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS), a pressure surge was apparently sent into the piping between containment and the R-11 and R-12 vacuum pump. This pressure surge caused the Containment Atmosphere Sampling Isolation Valves RMS-1, 2, 3, and 4 to close from a high pressure signal and subsequently caused overheating and tripping of the vacuum pump.

This event resulted in operation in a degraded mode permitted by a Limiting Condition for Operation as defined by Technical Specification Table 3.5-4, Item 1.c.i, and is reported pursuant to 6.9.2.b.2. The loss of R-11 and R-12 did not affect normal Plant operation, and the containment pressure relief was continuously monitored by other instrumentation. Therefore, this event did not represent a threat to the public health and safety.

Corrective Action

Following the initial investigation and verification that R-11 and R-12 were out of service, the containment pressure relief was terminated at 1313 hours on July 29, 1983. Examination of the vacuum pump and motor determined that both components were in satisfactory condition. R-11 and R-12 were then returned to service at 1725 hours on July 29, 1983.

III. Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence

The root cause of this event is a design deficiency in the PASS. Specifically, a system override function to prevent automatic closing and/or allow re-opening of RMS-1, 2, 3, and 4 does not function as expected. Under normal Plant conditions, the override function did not prevent the closing of RMS-1, 2, 3, and 4. Also during accident conditions, the system override would not have allowed re-opening of the valves.

Interim corrective action was to implement a temporary procedure to jumper the pressure switches, when necessary, which close RMS-1, 2, 3, and 4. This jumper will prevent closing and/or allow re-opening of these valves.

A Plant modification has been completed that modified the valves' circuitry and makes permanent the above interim corrective action. The PASS operating procedures were revised to ensure isolation of R-11 and R-12 from containment pressure prior to sampling.



Carolina Power & Light Company

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H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2
DOCKET NO. 50-261
LICENSE NO. DPR-23
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 83-018 REV. 1

Dear Sir:

In accordance with Technical Specification Section 6.9.2, Amendment 85, Licensee Event Report System prior to January 1, 1984, the enclosed supplemental Licensee Event Report is submitted.

The original report, dated August 26, 1983, described the tripping of the vacuum pump for the Containment Atmosphere Radiation Monitors R-11 and R-12 with a containment pressure release in progress. The root cause of the vacuum pump trip was a design deficiency in the Post Accident Sampling System. This revision contains a complete description of the event in addition to current corrective actions and should replace all existing copies of the original report. (The supplemental information has been barred for your convenience.)

Very truly yours,

R. E. Morgan
General Manager
H. B. Robinson S. E. Plant

CLW:sr

Enclosure

cc: J. N. Grace
INPO
H. E. P. Krug

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