COOPER NUCLEAR STATION
TABLE 4.2.D
MINIMUM TEST AND CALIBRATION FREQUENCIES FOR RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEMS

System	Instrument I.D. No.	Functional Test Freq.	Calibration Freq.	Instrument Check
Instrument Channels				
Steam Jet Air Ejector Off-Gas System	RMP-RM-150 A & B	(12)	(12)	(12)
Reactor Building Isolation and Standby Gas Treatment Initiation	RMP-RM-452 A, B, C & D	(12)	(12)	(12)
Liquid Radwaste Discharge Isolation	RMP-RM-1	(11)	(11)	(11)
Main Control Room Ventilation Isolation	RMV-RM-1	Once/Month (1)	Once/3 Months	Once/Day
Mechanical Vacuum Pump Isolation	RMP-RM-251 A, B, C, & D		See Table 4.2.A	
Logic Systems				
SJAE Off-Gas Isolation		Once/18 Months		
Standby Gas Treatment Initiation		Once/18 Months		
Reactor Building Isolation		Once/18 Months		
Liquid Radwaste Disch. Isolation		Once/6 Months		
Main Control Room Vent Isolation		Once/6 Months		
Mechanical Vacuum Pump Isolation		Once/Operating Cycle		

NOTES FOR TABLES 4.2.A THROUGH 4.2.F

1. Initially once every month until exposure (M as defined on Figure 4.1.1) is 2.0×10^3; thereafter, according to Figure 4.1.1 (after NRC approval). The compilation of instrument failure rate data may include data obtained from other boiling water reactors for which the same design instrument operates in an environment similar to that of CNS.

2. Functional tests shall be performed before each startup with a required frequency not to exceed once per week.

3. This instrumentation is excepted from the functional test definition. The functional test will consist of applying simulated inputs. Local alarm lights representing upscale and downscale trips will be verified but no rod block will be produced at this time. The inoperative trip will be initiated to produce a rod block (SRM and IRM inoperative also bypassed with the mode switch in RUN). The functions that cannot be verified to produce a rod block directly will be verified during the operating cycle.

4. Simulated automatic actuation shall be performed once each operating cycle. Where possible, all logic system functional tests will be performed using the test jacks.

5. Reactor low water level and high drywell pressure are not included on Table 4.2.A since they are tested on Table 4.1.2.

6. The logic system functional tests shall include an actuation of time delay relays and timers necessary for proper functioning of the trip systems.

7. These units are tested as part of the Core Spray System tests.

8. The flow bias comparator will be tested by putting one flow unit in "Test" (producing a rod block) and adjusting the test input to obtain comparator rod block. The flow bias upscale will be verified by observing a local upscale trip light during operation and verifying that it will produce a rod block during the operating cycle.

9. Performed during operating cycle. Portions of the logic is checked more frequently during functional tests of the functions that produce a rod block.

10. The detector will be inserted during each operating cycle and the proper amount of travel into the core verified.

11. Surveillance requirements for this system are defined in Table 4.21.A.1.

12. Surveillance requirements for this system are defined in Table 4.21.A.2.

13. This instrumentation is exempted from the instrument channel test definition. The instrument channel functional test will consist of injecting a simulated electrical signal into the measurement channels to test the alarm and trip functions.

14. Calibration shall be performed using a standard current source. The current source provides instrument channel alignment. Calibration using a radiation source shall be made each refueling outage.

3.2 BASES: (Cont'd)

and the guidelines of 10CFR100 will not be exceeded. For large breaks up to the complete circumferential break of a 28-inch recirculation line and with the trip setting given above, CSCS initiation and primary system isolation are initiated in time to meet the above criteria. Reference Paragraph VI.5.3.1 USAR.

The high drywell pressure instrumentation is a diverse signal for malfunctions to the water level instrumentation and in addition to initiating CSCS, it causes isolation of Group 2 and 6 isolation valves. For the breaks discussed above, this instrumentation will generally initiate CSCS operation before the low-low-low water level instrumentation; thus the results given above are applicable here also. The water level instrumentation initiates protection for the full spectrum of loss-of-coolant accidents and causes isolation of all isolation valves except Groups 4 and 5.

Venturis are provided in the main steam lines as a means of measuring steam flow and also limiting the loss of mass inventory from the vessel during a steam line break accident. The primary function of the instrumentation is to detect a break in the main steam line. For the worst case of accident, main steam line break outside the drywell, a trip setting of 150% of rated steam flow in conjunction with the flow limiters and main steam line valve closure, limits the mass inventory loss such that fuel is not uncovered, fuel clad temperatures peak at approximately 1000°F and release of radioactivity to the environs is below 10CFR100 guidelines. Reference Section XIV.6.5 USAR.

Temperature monitoring instrumentation is provided in the main steam tunnel and along the steam line in the turbine building to detect leaks in these areas. Trips are provided on this instrumentation and when exceeded, cause closure of isolation valves. See Spec. 3.7 for Valve Group. The setting is 200°F for the main steam leak detection system. For large breaks, the high steam flow instrumentation is a backup to the temp. instrumentation.

High radiation monitors in the main steam tunnel have been provided to detect gross fuel failure as in the control rod drop accident. These monitors alert control room operators to potential fuel degradation by means of an alarm set at $\leq$ 1.5 times the normal background, and initiate a Group 7 isolation at $\leq$ 3 times the normal background.

Pressure instrumentation is provided to close the main steam isolation valves in RUN Mode when the main steam line pressure drops below Specification 2.1.A.6. The Reactor Pressure Vessel thermal transient due to an inadvertent opening of the turbine bypass valves when not in the RUN Mode is less severe than the loss of feedwater analyzed in Section XIV.5 of the USAR, therefore, closure of the Main Steam Isolation valves for thermal transient protection when not in RUN mode is not required.

The Reactor Water Cleanup System high flow and temperature instrumentation are arranged similar to that for the HPCI. The trip settings are such that core uncovery is prevented and fission product release is within limits.