

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Wolf Creek Generating Station										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 8 2				PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2									
TITLE (4) ESF Actuation - Feedwater Isolation, Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation, Steam Generator Blowdown and Sample Isolation																							
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)													
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)										
0	5	3	1	8	5	8	5	0	3	6	0	0	0	6	2	8	8	5	0	5	0	0	0
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 8: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																					
POWER LEVEL (10)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)																					
3		20.402(b) 20.406(c) X 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(b)																					
0 0 0		20.406(a)(1)(i) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c)																					
		20.406(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) OTHER																					
		20.406(a)(1)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)																					
		20.406(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)																					
		20.406(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)																					
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																							
NAME Merlin G. Williams - Superintendent of Regulatory, Quality and Administrative Services										TELEPHONE NUMBER													
										AREA CODE													
										3 1 1 6 3 1 6 4 - 1 8 1 3 1 1													
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																							
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC				
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR									
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										X NO													

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 1217 CDT on May 31, 1985, an Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signal was initiated when a Steam Generator level bistable was tripped in error during a maintenance activity. This initiated a Feedwater Isolation Signal, and Main Turbine and Main Feedwater Pump (MFP) Turbine trip signals. The MFP trip caused an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal and a Steam Generator Blowdown and Sample Isolation Signal to be initiated. The Main Turbine was not in operation at the time of this event, and all required Engineered Safety Features equipment responded properly.

The plant was in Mode 3, Hot Standby, at the time of this event. The Reactor Coolant System was at normal operating pressure and temperature.

There was no damage to plant equipment or release of radioactivity as a result of this event. At no time did this event pose a threat to the public health or safety.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
Wolf Creek Generating Station	0500048285	—	036	—00	02	OF 02

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

At 1217 CDT on May 31, 1985, an Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signal was initiated when a Steam Generator (S/G) level bistable was tripped in error.

At the time of this event, I&C technicians were in the process of tripping the actuation bistables associated with S/G level transmitters AE-LT519 (S/G "A"), AE-LT539 (S/G "C") and AE-LT554 (S/G "D") to support a maintenance activity on the corresponding instrument root valves. Since the actuation logic associated with each S/G involves two-out-of-four coincidence, no trip signals were to occur. Subsequent to tripping the bistable for AE-LT554 (S/G "D") however, a second S/G "D" level bistable was tripped in error; the bistable for AE-LT549 was tripped instead of AE-LT519. This resulted in a two-out-of-four HI-HI S/G "D" level trip which initiated a Feedwater Isolation Signal, and Main Turbine and Main Feedwater Pump (MFP) Turbine trip signals. The MFP trip caused an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal (AFAS) and a Steam Generator Blowdown and Sample Isolation Signal to be initiated. The Main Turbine was not in operation at the time of this event, and all required Engineered Safety Features equipment responded properly.

The plant was in Mode 3, Hot Standby, at the time of this event. The Reactor Coolant System was at normal operating pressure and temperature. There were no appreciable changes in primary plant parameters as a result of this event. Levels increased approximately 6 percent in all four S/G's to 55 percent as a result of the AFAS. The actuated plant systems were restored to normal configurations and S/G blowdown was reestablished per plant operating procedures at 1220 CDT.

This incident occurred when an I&C Technician inadvertently pressed a trip button on the wrong bistable logic card. This bistable logic card is located directly adjacent to the bistable logic card which should have been tripped. This cognitive personnel error was subsequently discussed with the I&C personnel involved. The need to exercise extreme caution when tripping protection system bistables and the necessity for attention to detail was emphasized. In addition, this Licensee Event Report is being assigned as required reading for I&C personnel.

LER 85-032-00 describes an ESF actuation which resulted from a similar personnel error. On that prior occasion, impaired visibility led to the operation of the wrong test switch during a surveillance test, and consequently the incorrect implementation of a written test procedure. The incident described herein was the result of a mental error in the identification of a bistable logic card during a routine evolution for which no procedure is required. Although both personnel errors resulted in ESF actuations, these incidents are not considered related due to their having different causal factors.

There was no damage to plant equipment or release of radioactivity as a result of this event. At no time did this event pose a threat to the public health or safety.




KANSAS GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

GLENN L. KOESTER
VICE PRESIDENT - NUCLEAR

June 28, 1985

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. R.P. Denise, Director
Wolf Creek Task Force
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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
KMLNRC 85-166
Re: Docket No. STN 50-482
Subj: Licensee Event Report 85-036-00

Gentlemen:

The enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (iv) concerning an Engineered Safety Feature actuation.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me or Mr. Otto Maynard of my staff.

Yours very truly,


Glenn L. Koester
Vice President - Nuclear

GLK:dab

Enclosure

xc: PO'Connor (2), w/a
JCummins, w/a

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