



Northeast  
Utilities System

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February 15, 1996

Docket No. 50-423  
B15547

Re: 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report 96-001-00, which is submitted within thirty (30) days pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

F. R. Dacimo  
Vice President - Nuclear Operations

Attachment: LER 96-001-00

cc: T. T. Martin, Region I Administrator  
A. C. Cerne, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit No. 3  
V. L. Rooney, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 3

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NRC FORM 386 (4-95)		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION		APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 04/30/98						
<b>LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)</b>  (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)				ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (18-F-33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20545-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.						
FACILITY NAME (1)  Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3				DOCKET NUMBER (2)  05000423	PAGE (3)  1 of 4					
TITLE (4)  Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System Inoperable due to Equipment Failure of Door Latch										
EVENT DATE (5)		LER NUMBER (6)		REPORT DATE (7)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
01	20	96	96	001	00	02	15	96	FACILITY NAME  DOCKET NUMBER	
OPERATING MODE (9)  1		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 6: (Check one or more) (11)								
POWER LEVEL (10)  100%		20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(2)(v)		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)		
		20.2203(a)(1)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)		
		20.2203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)		73.71		
		20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		20.2203(a)(4)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)		OTHER		
		20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c)(1)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)		Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A		
		20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.36(c)(2)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)				
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)										
NAME  Robert L. McGuinness, Unit 3 Engineering						TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)  (860)447-1791 x6855				
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)										
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)						EXPECTED SUBMISSION				
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).						<input type="checkbox"/> NO				
						MONTH DAY YEAR				
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)										
<p>On January 20, 1996 at 0746 hours, with the plant in Mode 1 at 100-percent power, 587 degrees Fahrenheit and 2250 psia, a door which forms part of the Secondary Containment Boundary would not latch. Both trains of the Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System (SLCRS) were declared inoperable as a result of the boundary breach. A plant shutdown was initiated under Technical Specification 3.0.3 when the door could not be immediately repaired.</p> <p>The root cause of the event was a mechanical failure of the door latching mechanism. As corrective action, the door was repaired and the plant returned to 100-percent power. As action to prevent recurrence, a Technical Specification change (approved by the NRC on February 5, 1996) restored a 24-hour LCO Action Statement for SLCRS boundary breaches. The change effectively resolved the generic implications of allowing sufficient time to repair minor boundary breaches of this nature without requiring a plant shutdown. The change recognized the inherent integrity of the primary containment which remained unaffected, and considered that there was no loss of safety function while in the action statement.</p> <p>Prior to implementing the new Technical Specification change in the control room, a second identical event occurred on February 11, 1996 at 0554 hours, with the plant in Mode 1 at 100-percent power. Although the change was issued by the NRC, the plant entered Technical Specification 3.0.3. Within one hour, the new Technical Specification was made effective in the control room, the 24-hour Action Statement was entered, and the door was repaired without a power reduction.</p> <p>These events posed no significant safety consequences. The latch failures occurred at the time of discovery. The doors were held closed or under administrative control from the time of discovery until they were repaired.</p>										

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

## TEXT CONTINUATION

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

I. Description of Event

On January 20, 1996 at 0746 hours, with the plant in Mode 1 at 100-percent power, 587 degrees Fahrenheit and 2250 psia, it was discovered that a door, which formed part of the Secondary Containment Boundary was broken. The door is located at the 94-foot elevation of the Auxiliary Building and provides access to the Auxiliary Building roof. A security guard, transiting through the door noticed that it would not latch behind him. The Control Room was immediately notified, and both trains of Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System (SLCRS) were declared inoperable due to the boundary breach. The door was closed, and a security guard was posted. Personnel were called-in to repair the door since the event occurred on a Saturday.

In accordance with the plant's Technical Specifications an initiation of shutdown was commenced, and an immediate notification was made under 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(i). At 0941 hours the repair was completed and the plant returned to 100-percent power.

Following this event the NRC issued a Technical Specification change on February 5, 1996, which effectively allowed 24 hours to repair minor boundary breaches of this nature. However, before the new Technical Specification change was implemented in the control room, a second identical event occurred on February 11, 1996 at 0554 hours, with the plant in Mode 1 at 100-percent power. A security guard, transiting through a SLCRS boundary door to the hydrogen recombiner building noticed that it would not latch behind him. The Control Room was immediately notified and entered Technical Specification 3.0.3. Within one hour the new Technical Specification was made effective in the control room, the 24-hour action statement was entered, and the door was repaired without requiring a reduction in power.

II. Cause of Event

The root cause of the January 20, 1996 event is mechanical failure of the door latching mechanism possibly aided by extreme cold weather. The plant's initiation of a shutdown was a result of the lack of a Technical Specification Action Statement that would allow time to effect a repair. A 24-hour LCO Action Statement had existed in Technical Specification 3.6.6.2 for a loss of secondary containment boundary. However, a previous interpretation on March 22, 1995 concluded that a Secondary Containment Boundary breach could render both SLCRS trains incapable of achieving a negative pressure drawdown surveillance requirement, which resulted in a violation of Technical Specification 3.6.6.1 for not having at least one train operable. (Reference LER 95-004-01 and see Additional Information, below).

The cause of the February 11, 1996 event is a mechanical failure of the door latching mechanism. Although the NRC issued a Technical Specification change which provided a 24-hour action statement to effect repairs, this second event occurred before the Technical Specification change was implemented in the control room.

III. Analysis of Event

The January 20, 1996 event is reportable under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) as a condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications. Technical Specification 3.6.6.1 requires that a least one train of SLCRS be operable with the plant in Modes 1-4. This boundary breach was determined to result in a noncompliance with Technical Specification 3.6.6.1, and an entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 was made.

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The second identical event of February 11, 1996 also resulted in a decision to enter Technical Specification 3.0.3. The NRC had issued a Technical Specification change on February 5, 1996, which effectively allowed 24 hours to repair minor boundary breaches of this nature. However, this second event occurred before the new Technical Specification change was implemented in the control room. The plant immediately entered Technical Specification 3.0.3. Within one hour the new Technical Specification was made effective in the control room, the 24-hour action statement was entered, and the door was repaired without requiring a reduction in power. Accordingly, this second event did not involve an immediate notification for initiation of shutdown.

The SLCRS system is designed to create and maintain a negative pressure in the Secondary Containment to minimize the release of radioiodines that may escape the primary containment in an accident. Without the latching mechanism, the doors were held closed by the differential pressure which could have been overcome by seismic or wind effects. If the doors were to be open during a Design Basis Accident (DBA), SLCRS may not have been capable of creating or maintaining the full required negative pressure in the secondary containment for the worst case meteorological assumptions.

The events did not pose a significant safety concern. It was determined that the events occurred at the time of discovery. The doors have a security alarm that alerts security personnel if the doors are unlatched, and there was no evidence of prior degradation. The doors were administratively controlled after the conditions were discovered, and could have been readily secured in the closed position if a DBA occurred during the repair process. Additionally, for the January 20, 1996 event, the door is located at the top of a stairwell which is isolated from all areas of the Auxiliary Building by other doors. There is no direct flow path from this stairwell to the SLCRS ventilation system, but the stairwell is maintained at a negative pressure by air flow around the door seals into the Auxiliary Building. This arrangement would ensure that even if the broken door were to open, a minimal (if any) release would occur as a result. Also, the plant's proposed Technical Specification changes and the approved Bases of the Technical Specification changes that were issued by the NRC considered that there exists no loss of safety function while in the action statement for secondary containment integrity.

## IV. Corrective Action

As immediate action for the January 20, 1996 event, the control room was notified, the door was administratively controlled, both trains of SLCRS were declared inoperable, and a plant shutdown was commenced in accordance with Technical Specifications. As immediate action for the February 11, 1996 event, the control room was notified, the door was administratively controlled, and both trains of SLCRS were declared inoperable.

As corrective action, the door latch in each case was repaired and verified to be working properly.

As action to prevent recurrence, a Technical Specification change had been previously proposed to the NRC, which would restore a 24-hour LCO Action Statement for SLCRS boundary breaches. The proposed change would resolve the generic implications of minor operational occurrences involving the secondary containment boundary, by recognizing the inherent integrity of the primary containment which remains unaffected. The License Amendment approved on February 5, 1996, revises Technical Specification 3.6.6.2 by effectively



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restoring a 24-hour LCO Action Statement for SLCRS boundary breeches. The change allows sufficient time to repair future boundary breaches of this nature without requiring a plant shutdown.

V. Additional InformationSimilar Events

LER 95-004-01 reported historical breeches of the Control Building envelope and the Secondary Containment boundary that had occurred due to a misinterpretation of Technical Specifications 3.7.8 and 3.6.6.2, respectively. A proposed Technical Specification change was submitted to the NRC on June 9, 1995 to move the negative pressure requirement from Technical Specification 3.6.6.1 for the SLCRS ventilation trains, to 3.6.6.2 for Secondary Containment boundary. The change in effect allows sufficient time to repair future boundary breaches of this nature without requiring a plant shutdown. The change is in accordance with the New and Improved Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Plants (NUREG-1431). The proposed change was approved in License Amendment No. 126, dated February 5, 1996.

Manufacturer DataEIIS Codes

Containment Leakage Control System-BD