

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1):

LaSalle County Station Unit 2

DOCKET NUMBER (2):

0 5 0 0 0 3 7 4 1 OF 0 3

PAGE (3)

TITLE (4):

Reactor Scrams from LES-RP-02

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBERS
0	6	0	6	8	5	0	2	5	0	0	0
0	6	0	6	8	5	0	0	6	2	0	8
OPERATING MODE (9): 4			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5 (Check one or more of the following) (11):								
POWER LEVEL (10): 0 0 10			20.402(a)			20.406(c)			X 60.73(a)(2)(iv)		
			20.406(a)(1)(i)			60.36(c)(1)			60.73(a)(2)(v)		
			20.406(a)(1)(ii)			60.36(c)(2)			60.73(a)(2)(vi)		
			20.406(a)(1)(iii)			60.73(a)(2)(i)			60.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)		
			20.406(a)(1)(iv)			60.73(a)(2)(ii)			60.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)		
			20.406(a)(1)(v)			60.73(a)(2)(iii)			60.73(a)(2)(viii)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12):

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
John C. Klika, extension 533	811 531 5171-1617 1611

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13):

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC
D	JIC	Z1919	Z1919	N					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14):

YES (If you complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
	X				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16):

On June 6 and 7, 1985, and Reactor Protection System Logic Test (LES-RP-02) was being conducted. In the process of conducting this test in Condition 4 (Cold Shutdown) 3 full scrams were experienced. The scrams were valid but had not been previously identified by the Operators or those conducting the test. These scrams were respectively due to MSIV's being closed in RUN, High Discharge Volume Water Level in Startup and leads being lifted on the scram contactors which were electrically daisy chained together. Corrective actions will include Operator training, procedure revisions, and a new mode switch procedure which will be conducted prior to each movement of the Reactor Mode Switch.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104
EXPIRES 8/31/85

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

I. EVENT DESCRIPTION

The Reactor Protection System Logic Test, LES-RP-02, was being conducted on Unit 2 on June 6 and 7, 1985. Full reactor scrams (JC) were observed when 1) the mode switch was moved from REFUEL to STARTUP with high scram discharge volume water level, 2) the mode switch was moved from STARTUP to RUN with the MSIV's closed, and 3) the leads were lifted on terminal #2 of scram contactors K14A and K14B due to daisy-chain wiring.

II. CAUSE

Since the last time LES-RP-02 was conducted, a major revision was made to the procedure. The revision deleted all parts of the logic test which could be shown to be covered by other maintenance and operating surveillances. In addition, a new section was added to test all positions of the reactor mode switch and to assure that all contacts on the switch functioned properly.

Prior to starting the logic test the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's)(SB) were closed and out of service due to outage work in progress. As a prerequisite to the procedure, the charging water valve and the scram air header were taken out of service to minimize unnecessary cycling of the scram valves. The Scram Discharge Volume (AA) High Level Bypass switch was also placed in BYPASS per the test.

When the air header was valved out, the loss of air caused the scram valves to open allowing the Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) to fill up and the SDV drain valves to remain closed. With the mode switch in SHUTDOWN or REFUEL, the scram signal is bypassed. When the mode switch was moved to STARTUP, the bypass was removed and a full reactor scram signal was received. The test procedure did not alert the Operators or test personnel of this possibility.

The second scram occurred upon receiving the mode switch from STARTUP to RUN with the MSIV's closed. The Shift Control Room Engineer (Licensed Senior Reactor Operator) was consulted prior to changing the mode switch position but failed to recall that a scram would result with the existing plant conditions.

The third scram, unlike the first two, was partially expected. Testing was being performed to verify proper logic for the backup scram valves. In order to do this, leads had to be removed from specific scram contactor relay coils. It was expected that 2 of the 4 rod groups would receive full scram signals but when the leads were lifted from the contactor coils, all rod groups received the scram signal. After a detailed review of the schematics and wiring diagrams, it was determined that the scram contactor coils for the remaining rod groups were daisy-chain wired causing both contactors in each RPS subdivision to deenergize causing all rod groups to be affected.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

III. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCES

The plant was in COLD SHUTDOWN at the time of the occurrences. All systems functioned as required and, with the unit already shutdown, no protective features were compromised. Therefore, these events were of no safety significance.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

A letter was sent to all Shift Engineers for review with their crews which highlights unnecessary ESF actuations which have recently occurred.

To ensure that Operators are aware of potential scram situations during this logic test, LES-RP-02 will be revised to include precautions related to these events. In addition, a new procedure will be written to provide a checklist to be utilized by the Operator prior to changing mode switch positions. (AIR 374-200-85-00110 and AIR 374-200-85-00109).

To avoid the unexpected scrams due to the wiring on the scram contactors, the logic test is being revised to lift the leads on the opposite end of the contactor coils where the daisy-chain has no effect. (AIR 374-200-85-00110)

A review of the reactor mode switch functions will be included in the next operator requalification training module. (AIR 374-200-85-00111)

V. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES

None.

VI. NAME AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF PREPARER

John C. Klika, 815/357-6761, extension 533.



Commonwealth Edison
LaSalle County Nuclear Station
Rural Route #1, Box 220
Marseilles, Illinois 61341
Telephone 815/357-6761

June 20, 1985

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Reportable Occurrence Report #85-025-00, Docket #050-374 is being submitted to your office in accordance with 10CFR 50.73.

R.O. Bullock
for G. J. Diederich
Station Manager
LaSalle County Station

GJD/DRR/kg

Enclosure

xc: NRC, Regional Director
INPO-Records Center
File/NRC

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