



GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY

RIVER BEND STATION POST OFFICE BOX 320 ST. FRANCISVILLE, LOUISIANA 70775
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February 5, 1993

RBG- 38103

File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

River Bend Station - Unit 1
Docket No. 50-458

Please find enclosed Supplement 4 to Licensee Event Report No. 91-008 for River Bend Station - Unit 1. This supplement is submitted to document an additional case of improper cable separation discovered as a result of a follow-up safety system functional inspection (SSFI). The supplemental text is indicated with change bars, the remaining text was current as of the dates of prior submittals.

Sincerely,

for

W.H. Odell
Manager - Oversight
River Bend Nuclear Group

ME JPS GAB mas DCH RJK
LAE/JPS/FRC/MAS/DCH/RJK/kvm
RJK

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cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400
Arlington, TX 76011

NRC Resident Inspector
P.O. Box 1051
St. Francisville, LA 70775

INPO Records Center
1100 Circle Parkway
Atlanta, GA 30339-3064

Mr. C.R. Oberg
Public Utility Commission of Texas
7800 Shoal Creek Blvd., Suite 400 North
Austin, TX 78757

Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality
Nuclear Energy Division
P O. Box 82135
Baton Rouge, LA 70884-2135
ATTN: Administrator

NRC FORM 366 (5-92)		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION			APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95				
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)									
(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)									
FACILITY NAME (1) RIVER BEND STATION					DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000 458			PAGE (3) 1 OF 11	
TITLE (4) FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS DEFICIENCIES INCLUDING LACK OF FIRE WRAP/ INADEQUATE FIRE BARRIER									
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT NUMBER (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME
04	15	91	91	008	04	02	05	93	DOCKET NUMBER 05000
OPERATING MODE (9) 1			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)						
POWER LEVEL (10) 100			20.402(b)			20.405(c)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)
			20.405(a)(1)(i)			50.36(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)
			20.405(a)(1)(ii)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)			X 50.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
			20.405(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(x)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)									
NAME L.A. ENGLAND, DIRECTOR - NUCLEAR LICENSING								TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code) (504) 381-4145	
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)									
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)									
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)					X NO				
					EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)									
<p>At 1345 hours on 4/15/91, with the reactor at full power in Operational Condition 1, it was discovered that electrical cables located in fire area ET-2, which may cause spurious operation of valves 1E51*MOV063 (RCIC inboard steam isolation valve) and 1E51*MOV078 (RCIC vacuum breaker valve), did not have fire wrap contrary to Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) requirements. At 1300 on 4/23/91, additional cables, which could cause the same problem were found in fire areas AB-2, C-2 and C-6. RCIC is required by the FHA for safe shutdown in these fire areas. Since these valves are required not to change position for operation of RCIC and fire damage to these cables may cause loss of RCIC, the cables would require wrapping in these fire areas.</p> <p>Upon discovery of this condition, the affected cables were treated as having missing fire barriers and the action statement prescribed in Technical Specification 3/4.7.7, "Fire Rated Assemblies", was implemented for areas containing these cables. Errors made during the original development of the FHA were the cause for the identified cables not being wrapped in the identified fire areas. Additional deficiencies were discovered and resolved as a result of the FHA review. As a follow-up to the resolution of the deficiencies in the Fire Hazards Analysis, a safety system functional inspection (SSFI) was performed. This effort has resulted in identifying an additional case of improper cable separation. Corrective actions have been developed to address this condition.</p>									

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)		DOCKET NUMBER (2)		LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
RIVER BEND STATION		05000		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	OF 2 11
				91	- 008	- 04	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A). (17)

REPORTED CONDITION

At 1345 hours on 4/15/91, with the reactor at full power in Operational Condition 1, it was reported to the shift supervisor that certain electrical cables associated with valves 1E51*MOVFO63 (*ISV*) (RCIC inboard steam isolation valve) and 1E51*MOVFO78 (*VTV*) (RCIC vacuum breaker valve) located in fire area ET-2 (Electrical Tunnel "B" West), did not have fire wrap. This discovered condition is contrary to requirements contained in the FHA. While working on resolution of this issue, additional cables which could cause the same problem were found in fire areas AB-2, C-2 and C-6. At 1300 hours on 4/23/91, these additional areas of concern were reported to the shift supervisor. The FHA lists Method 1 as the analyzed method of shutdown for fire areas AB-2, C-2, C-6 and ET-2. Method 1 shutdown is identified as using 3 safety relief valves (SRVs) (*RV*) for reactor pressure vessel (RPV) (*JE*) pressure control, RCIC for RPV level control, and RHR-A for suppression pool cooling and shutdown cooling. The FHA lists these valves as "Passive Valves" required for Method 1 shutdown which means the valves must not change position due to fire damage on their cables. The FHA states the identified cables for these valves should be wrapped in these fire areas.

The affected cables did not have the required fire wrap (fire barrier) since plant startup; therefore, the fire barrier is considered inoperable per Technical Specification 3/4.7.7 and this report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as operation prohibited by the Technical Specification.

Additional reportable conditions were discovered as a result of the FHA review. These conditions concerned Appendix R separation, the discovery of a previously unidentified fire area, and safe shutdown equipment omitted from the main control room fire analysis.

As a follow-up to the resolution of the deficiencies in the Fire Hazards Analysis, a safety system functional inspection (SSFI) was performed. During the SSFI, an area was identified in which cable separation was such that a single fire could have disabled both methods of monitoring spent fuel pool temperature. In this case, Thermo-Lag fire barrier material was not installed.

INVESTIGATION

The River Bend Station - Unit 1 A Appendix R Data Management System lists equipment, raceways, and cables by fire area. A review of this data base found inconsistencies between the data base and the FHA for the identified cables which may cause spurious operation of valves 1E51*MOVFO63 and 1E51*MOVFO78. The FHA indicates the cables should be wrapped in these fire areas but the