NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station - Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 8 7	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)

Unanticipated Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Due to Communication Error.

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 5	2 8	8 5	8 5	0 2 2	0 0	0 6	2 1	8 5		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	4	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	[X] 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
D.J. Gandenberger, Power Production Engineer	AREA CODE 7 1 7 5 4 2 - 3 9 1 4

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
[ ] YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	[X] NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 0320 on May 28, 1985, during the performance of 18 Month Logic System Functional Test of the Primary and Secondary Containment Isolation System (SE-159-200), a communication error between test personnel resulted in a loss of Zone I and Zone III Reactor Building Ventilation (VA) and automatic initiation of the Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply System (CREOASS), Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) (BH), and the 'B' Reactor Building Ventilation Recirculation Fan. CREOASS and SGTS are Engineered Safety Features. The trip was reset and the systems returned to their normal lineup. The test personnel involved were counseled by the Test Director and the surveillance test was completed without further incident.

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 8 7	8 5	— 0 2 2	— 0 0	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

During the performance of 18 Month Logic System Functional Test of the Primary and Secondary Containment Isolation System (SE-159-200) on May 28, 1985, a communication error between test personnel at 0320 resulted in a loss of Zone I and Zone III Reactor Building Ventilation (VA) and automatic initiation of the Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply System (CREOASS), Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) (BH), and the 'B' Reactor Building Ventilation Recirculation Fan. CREOASS and SGTS are Engineered Safety Features (ESF).

To perform the surveillance, test personnel (utility, non-licensed) were located in the Control Room and Upper Relay Room with the Test Director (utility, non-licensed) in the Lower Relay Room. All the test personnel had highlighted copies of the procedure identifying applicable steps to be performed or monitored from different locations. The installed plant page system was used to provide communication among the test personnel. After completion of procedure steps 6.9.26 and 6.9.27 in the Lower Relay Room, the Test Director informed the test personnel that the steps were completed and the next step would be performed. The Test Director read procedure step 6.9.28 aloud over the page system and placed switch S22D in the Lower Relay Room in the Test position as required by the step. The test person in the Upper Relay Room erroneously placed switch S22C in the Test position because he construed the information on the page as a direction to himself. The placement of both switches in the Test position resulted in the unanticipated ESF actuations. The trip was reset and the systems restored to their normal lineup. The test personnel were briefed to read the steps in the procedure in their entirety before performing the same and to maintain continued communication with the Test Director. The surveillance test was successfully completed without further incident.

PP&L

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION
PO BOX 467, BERWICK, PA 18603

June 21, 1985

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 85-022-00
ER 100450 FILE 841-23
PLAS-095

Docket No. 50-387
License No. NPF-14

Attached is Licensee Event Report 85-022-00. This event was determined reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv), in that an unanticipated Engineered Safety Feature actuation occurred due to a communication error between test personnel.

H.W. Keiser
Superintendent of Plant-Susquehanna

DJG/pjg

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