

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7 1 OF 0 2				PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2		
TITLE (4) Unit 2/3 Diesel Generator Auto Start																
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES Dresden Station, U-3				DOCKET NUMBER(S) 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 9			
0 4	1 9	8 5	8 5	0 1 9	0 0	0 5	1 7	8 5	N/A				0 5 0 0 0			
OPERATING MODE (9) N		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §. (Check one or more of the following) (11)														
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 6 5		20.402(b)				20.405(c)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)		
		20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.36(c)(1)				<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)		
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(c)(2)				<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vi)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)		
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)						
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
		20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)						
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME Ronald Jackson (X-549)										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 8 1 5 9 4 2 - 2 9 2 0						
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPD		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPD						
X				N												
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)																
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)																
<p>During normal plant operation, the 2/3 diesel generator automatically started with no indication of bus undervoltage, reactor low low water level, or drywell high pressure. The only surveillance being conducted at the time of the event was DIS 1500-1, Reactor Low Pressure ECCS Permissive, which functionally tests reactor low pressure sensors PS 3-263-52A and B. Relays which require verification of operation during the surveillance are located in the same cabinet (903-32) as the auto start relay 1430-108A. At the time of the event, it was believed that during the course of performing the surveillance the 108A relay was accidentally bumped causing the 2/3 diesel generator to auto start. Individuals involved in the test stated that they were unaware of jarring the relay. Therefore, an attempt was made to duplicate the event. Since DIS 1500-1 functionally tests pressure sensors 3-263-52A and B, which energize the 107A relay, the surveillance was duplicated by manually operating the 107A relay. However, the 108A relay did not operate and the 2/3 diesel generator did not auto start as before. Since the test indicated that no design differences existed and based on a previous event, the only conclusion that can be reached was that the relay was unknowingly jarred.</p> <p>LER #85-008-0 reported that the 2/3 diesel generator automatically started previously on March 11, 1985 when a Substation Construction crew was drilling a hole in the auto start relay cabinet, thereby vibrating the auto start relay. This event was of minimal safety significance since the 2/3 diesel generator operated as designed. Both events will be presented in one of the weekly tailgate sessions in order to emphasize the need for caution during work in electrical cabinets.</p>																

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7	8 5	— 0 1 9	— 0 0	0 2	OF 0	2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

During normal plant operation, the 2/3 diesel generator automatically started with no indication of bus undervoltage, reactor low low water level, or drywell high pressure. The 2/3 diesel generator was closed onto Bus 23-1 and full load applied for 1 hour per procedure DOS 6600-1, Diesel Generator Surveillance Tests.

The only surveillance being conducted at the time of the event was DIS 1500-1, Reactor Low Pressure (350 psig) ECCS Permissive which functionally tests the reactor low pressure sensors PS 3-263-52A and 52B. During the surveillance it is required that an Instrument Mechanic visually verify that relays 1530-150 and 250, 1430-129 A & B, and 1430-107 A & B located in panels 903-32 and 33 operate upon reaching the pressure sensors setpoint. The 2/3 diesel generator auto start relay, 1430-108A, is also located in panel 903-32, and was found in the normal position when the 2/3 diesel generator auto started. At the time of the event, it was believed that DIS 1500-1 probably caused the 108A relay to auto start the 2/3 diesel generator due to the potential to accidentally actuate the relay; however, individuals involved in the test stated that they were unaware of jarring the relay. Therefore, an attempt was made to duplicate the event. Since DIS 1500-1 functionally tests pressure sensors 3-263-52A and 52B, which energizes the 107A relay, the surveillance was duplicated by manually operating the 107A relay. There was no operation of the 108A relay and the 2/3 diesel generator didn't auto start as before. Since the test indicated that no design deficiencies existed and based on a previous event the only conclusion that can be reached was that the relay was unknowingly jarred.

LER #85-008-0 reported that the 2/3 diesel generator automatically started previously on March 11, 1985 when a Substation Construction crew was drilling a hole in the auto start relay cabinet, thereby vibrating the auto start relay. This event was of minimal safety significance since the 2/3 diesel generator operated as designed. Both events will be presented in one of the weekly tailgate sessions in order to emphasize the need for caution during work in electrical cabinets.



Commonwealth Edison

Dresden Nuclear Power Station

R.R. #1

Morris, Illinois 60450


Telephone 815/942-2920

May 17, 1985

DJS Ltr #85-552

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Licensee Event Report #85-019-0, Docket #050237 is being submitted as required by Technical Specification 6.6, NUREG 1022 and 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv).


D.J. Scott
Station Manager
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

DJS/kjl

Enclosure

cc: J.G. Keppler, Regional Administrator, Region III
File/NRC
File/Numerical

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