

TABLE 3.3.7.9-1 (Continued)
FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION

			MINIMUM INSTRUMENTS OPERABLE*		
<u>ROOM</u>	<u>ELEV</u>	<u>ROOM NAME</u>	<u>HEAT</u> (X/Y)	<u>FLAME</u> ⁽¹⁾ (X/Y)	<u>SMOKE</u> ⁽¹⁾ (X/Y)
12. Zone 2-17					16/0
1A101	93'	Passage			
1A109	93'	HPCS Pump Rm.			
1A111	93'	Piping Penetration Rm.			
1A114	93'	Fan Coil Area (Partial)			
1A117	93'	Misc. Equip. Area (Partial)			
1A121	103'	East Corridor			
1A122	103'	South Corridor (Partial)			
1A123	103'	North Corridor (Partial)			
13. Zone 2-18					20/0
1A201	119'	East Corridor			
1A211	119'	North Corridor (Partial)			
1A215	119'	South Corridor (Partial)			
14. Zone 2-19					13/0
1A314	139'	South Corridor (Partial)			
1A316	139'	North Corridor (Partial)			
1A321	139'	MCC Area			
1A322	139'	Centrifugal Chiller Area			
1A323	139'	SGTS Area			
1A324	139'	HVAC Equip. Area			
1A326	139'	SGTS Area			
15. Zone 2-20					2/0
1A305	139'	Steam Tunnel			

INSERTd. DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING

1. Zone 2-10

1D301	133'	Corridor	0/3 (Deluge)
1D304	133'	Day Tank Area	
1D306	133'	Div. III Diesel Gen. Room	
1D401	158'	Div. III Diesel Gen. Room	0/7 (Deluge)

2. 2-11

1D303	133'	Day Tank Area	
1D308	133'	Div. II Diesel Gen. Room	
1D402	158'	Div. II Diesel Gen. Room	0/7 (Deluge)

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GRAND GULF-UNIT 1

3/4 3-87

Amendment No. —

9/0
6/0

3/0

(NPE-85/11)

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<u>MINIMUM INSTRUMENT OPERABLE*</u>					
<u>ROOM</u>	<u>ELEV</u>	<u>ROOM NAME</u>	<u>HEAT</u> <u>(X/Y)</u>	<u>FLAME</u> ⁽¹⁾ <u>(X/Y)</u>	<u>SMOKE</u> ⁽¹⁾ <u>(X/Y)</u>
16. Zone 2-21					4/0
1A12	185'	Stairwell			
1A12	208'	Stairwell			
1A12	245'	Stairwell			

2. (NPE-85/12)

SUBJECT: Technical Specification Table 3.8.4.1-1, page 3/4 8-26

DISCUSSION: This technical specification change results from a design change to the plant and is planned for implementation in an outage presently scheduled to commence in October, 1985.

It is proposed to add primary containment penetration conductor overcurrent protection circuit breaker number 52-1252-27 for the Horizontal Fuel Transfer System (HFTS) main console 480 VAC power circuit to the subject table.

JUSTIFICATION: The proposed change will ensure adequate surveillance of the subject breaker when the design change enhancing the safety of operation of the HFTS is completed. The current HFTS design has a fuel bundle upending mechanism which incorporates a mechanical cam plate and pivot pin actuation device. The design change will replace this device with two (2) hydraulic servo mechanisms which will substantially increase the stability and reliability of the upending assembly. These servos will be driven by two (2) hydraulic power units located inside containment and powered by a 480 VAC circuit from the HFTS main console. The breaker provides redundant overcurrent protection to the associated electrical penetration in accordance with MP&L commitments to Regulatory Guide 1.63.

SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION:

The design change is being performed in accordance with appropriate regulatory and industry codes and standards and the Grand Gulf Quality Assurance Program. The circuit design meets the requirements described in the GGNS FSAR. As such, it is included in the current licensing bases and bounded by existing safety analyses. The proposed change to the technical specifications does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated or create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, nor does it involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Therefore, the proposed change involves no significant hazards considerations.

TABLE 3.8.4.1-1 (Continued)

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR
OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

c. 480 VAC Circuit Breakers (Continued)

Molded Case, Type NZM

BREAKER NUMBER	TRIP SETPOINT (Amperes)	RESPONSE TIME (Seconds)	SYSTEM/COMPONENT AFFECTED
52-1251-13	800	0.100	CNTMT CLR FAN COIL UNIT FAN (N1M41B001C-N)
52-1251-15	32	0.100	MOV - RWCS HX INL ISOL VLV (N1G33F256-N)
52-1251-18	38	0.100	MOV - REGEN HEAT EXCHANGER BYPASS (Q1G33F107-N)
52-1251-19	38	0.100	MOV - RWCU DRAIN FLOW ORIFICE BYP (N1G33F031-N)
52-1251-20	320	0.100	CNTMT EQUIP DRAIN PUMP (N1P45C004B-N)
52-1251-22	32	0.100	MOV - RWCU TO FLT "S" ISOL VLV (N1G33F255-N)
52-1251-26	1200	0.100	LIGHTING XFMR 1X112 (N1R18S112-D)
52-1251-28	5	0.100	MOV - STM TUNNEL COOLER INLET (N1P44F105B-N)
52-1252-23	60	0.100	DRYWELL FLOOR DRAIN SUMP PUMP (N1P45C001B-N)
52-1252-27 52-1411-01	500 38	0.100 0.100	MOV - VESSEL HEAD VENTILATION (Q1B21F002-N)
			FUEL TRANSFER SYS MN CONSOLE (N1F11E015-MC)

3. (NPE-85/11)

SUBJECT: Technical Specification Table 3.3.7.9-1, page 3/4 3-87

DISCUSSION:

This technical specification change results from a design change to replace the three (3) smoke detectors in the diesel generator corridor with three (3) flame detectors and is planned for implementation during an outage currently scheduled to commence in October, 1985.

It is proposed to change the minimum instrument operable requirement for zone 2-10 of the diesel generator building in the subject table from 6/0 flame detectors and 3/0 smoke detectors to 9/0 flame detectors. (Please note that attached technical specification page 3/4 3-87 is also affected by change NPE-85/04, item 1 of this submittal, and has been marked to reflect both changes.)

JUSTIFICATION:

As reported in LER 82-050/99 X-1, dated August 29, 1983, diesel generator exhaust fumes drift into the corridor between the diesel generator and auxiliary buildings and contaminate the smoke detectors, thereby causing false alarms. The design change for which this technical specification is required will replace those smoke detectors with flame detectors which are not sensitive to dust or fumes. Flame detectors are adequate for the fire detection function. MP&L will submit a change to GGNS FSAR Appendix 9A at the next annual update to reflect this change from smoke to flame detectors.

SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION:

The proposed change is an operational enhancement which will lessen the frequency of occurrence of false fire alarms. The design change will be performed in accordance with applicable industry and regulatory codes and standards, the GGNS Quality Assurance Program and the requirements of the GGNS FSAR. It is consistent with the licensing basis and the safety analyses. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated or create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, nor does it involve a reduction in a margin of safety.

Therefore, the proposed change involves no significant hazards considerations.

TABLE 3.3.7.9-1 (Continued)
FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION

			MINIMUM INSTRUMENTS OPERABLE*		
ROOM	ELEV	ROOM NAME	HEAT (X/Y)	FLAME ⁽¹⁾ (X/Y)	SMOKE ⁽¹⁾ (X/Y)
12. Zone 2-17					16/0
1A101	93'	Passage			
1A109	93'	HPCS Pump Rm.			
1A111	93'	Piping Penetration Rm.			
1A114	93'	Fan Coil Area (Partial)			
1A117	93'	Misc. Equip. Area (Partial)			
1A121	103'	East Corridor			
1A122	103	South Corridor (Partial)			
1A123	103'	North Corridor (Partial)			
13. Zone 2-18					20/0
1A201	119'	East Corridor			
1A211	119'	North Corridor (Partial)			
1A215	119'	South Corridor (Partial)			
14. Zone 2-19					13/0
1A314	139'	South Corridor (Partial)			
1A316	139'	North Corridor (Partial)			
1A321	139'	MCC Area			
1A322	139'	Centrifugal Chiller Area			
1A323	139'	SGTS Area			
1A324	139'	HVAC Equip. Area			
1A326	139'	SGTS Area			
15. Zone 2-20					2/0
1A305	139'	Steam Tunnel			
(INSERT from NPE-85/04, Item 1 of this submittal)					
d.	<u>DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING</u>				
1. Zone 2-10				9/0 6/0	3/0
1D301	133'	Corridor		0/3 (Deluge)	
1D304	133'	Day Tank Area			
1D306	133'	Div. III Diesel Gen. Room			
1D401	158'	Div. III Diesel Gen. Room		0/7 (Deluge)	
2. 2-11				6/0	
1D303	133'	Day Tank Area			
1D308	133'	Div. II Diesel Gen. Room			
1D402	158'	Div. II Diesel Gen. Room		0/7 (Deluge)	

4. (NLS-85/06)

SUBJECT: Technical Specification Table 3.6.4-1, pages 3/4 6-31, 35, 39 and 43

DISCUSSION:

This technical specification change results from a design change to extend the RHR "C" and LPCS test return lines to the suppression pool to ensure that they will maintain a water seal during accident conditions and is planned for implementation during an outage currently scheduled to commence in October, 1985.

It is proposed that footnote "d" be added to valves E12-F021-B, E21-F012-A, E12-F064C-B, E21-F011-A, E12-F280 and 281, E21-F217 and 218, and that footnote "c" be added to valves E12-F311 and 304 and E21-F222 and 221. This revises the required local leak rate test method from pneumatic to hydrostatic.

JUSTIFICATION:

The RHR "C" and LPCS test return lines currently terminate above the minimum suppression pool water level analyzed for accident conditions. This necessitated that the associated valves be pneumatically tested since a water seal of the lines could not be assured. The design change will add sufficient pipe to the lines to ensure that the line exits will remain under water during accident conditions but will terminate high enough to allow normal test flow to discharge into the suppression pool. The proposed change will allow credit for the water seal and less restrictive leak testing in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section XI.

SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION:

The design change is an enhancement that is conservative in nature since it will ensure that a water seal of potential containment leakage paths will be maintained during accident conditions. The supporting technical specification change will allow less restrictive testing in accordance with the applicable requirements of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and 10 CFR 50 Appendix J. The proposed change is consistent with the requirements of ASME Section XI and therefore provides consistency with the licensing bases and the safety analyses. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated or create the possibility of an new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, nor does it involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Therefore, the proposed change involves no significant hazards considerations.

TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued)
CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES

SYSTEM AND VALVE NUMBER		PENETRATION NUMBER	VALVE GROUP ^(a)	MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME (Seconds)
<u>Containment (Continued)</u>				
Main Steam Line	B21-F016-B	19(I)	1	20
Drains				
RHR Heat Exchanger	E12-F028A-A	20(I)	5	90
"A" to LPCI				
RHR Heat Exchanger	E12-F037A-A	20(I)	3	74
"A" to LPCI				
RHR Heat Exchanger	E12-F028B-B	21(I)	5	90
"B" to LPCI				
RHR Heat Exchanger	E12-F037B-B	21(I)	3	74
"B" to LPCI				
RHR "A" Test Line	E12-F024A-A	23(0) ^(d)	5	90
to Supp. Pool				
RHR "A" Test Line	E12-F011A-A	23(0) ^(d)	5	36
to Supp. Pool				
RHR "C" Test Line	E12-F021-B	24(0) ^(d)	5	144
to Supp. Pool				
HPCS Test Line	E22-F023-C	27(0) ^(d)	6B	75
RCIC Pump Suction	E51-F031-A	28(0) ^(d)	4	56
RCIC Turbine	E51-F077-A	29(0) ^(c)	9	26
Exhaust				
LPCS Test Line	E21-F012-A	32(0) ^(d)	5	144
Cont. Purge and	M41-F011-(A)	34(0)	7	4
Vent Air Supply				
Cont. Purge and	M41-F012-(B)	34(I)	7	4
Vent Air Supply				
Cont. Purge and	M41-F034-(B)	35(I)	7	4
Vent Air Exh.				
Cont. Purge and	M41-F035-(A)	35(0)	7	4
Vent Air Exh.				
Plant Service	P44-F070-B	36(I)	6A	33
Water Return				
Plant Service	P44-F069-A	36(0)	6A	33
Water Return				
Plant Service	P44-F053-A	37(0)	6A	33
Water Supply				
Chilled Water	P71-F150-(A)	38(0)	6A	12
Supply				

TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued)
CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES

<u>SYSTEM AND VALVE NUMBER</u>		<u>PENETRATION NUMBER</u>
2. <u>Manual Isolation Valves</u> (g)#		
a. <u>Containment</u>		
Main Steam Lines	E32-F001A-A	5(0)
Main Steam Lines	E32-F001E-A	6(0)
Main Steam Lines	E32-F001J-A	7(0)
Main Steam Lines	E32-F001N-A	8(0)
Feedwater Inlet	B21-F065A-A	9(0)
Feedwater Inlet	B21-F065B-A	10(0)
RHR Pump "A"	E12-F004A-A	11(0)(d)
Suction		
RHR Pump "B"	E12-F004B-B	12(0)(d)
Suction		
RHR Pump "C"	E12-F004C-B	13(0)(d)
Suction		
RHR Heat Exchanger	E12-F042A-A	20(I)
"A" to LPCI		
RHR Heat Ex. "A"	E12-F027A-A	20(0)
to LPCI		
RHR Heat Exchanger	E12-F042B-B	21(I)
"B" to LPCI		
RHR Heat Ex. "B"	E12-F027B-B	21(0)
to LPCI		
RHR Pump "C" to	E12-F042C-B	22(0)
LPCI		
RHR "A" Test Line	E12-F064A-A	23(0)(d)
To Suppr. Pool		
RHR "C" Test Line	E12-F064C-B	24(0)(d)
To Suppr. Pool		
HPCS Suction	E22-F015-C	25(0)(d)
HPCS Discharge	E22-F004-C	26(0)
HPCS Test Line	E22-F012-C	27(0)(d)
RCIC Turbine Exh.	E51-F068-A	29(0)(c)
LPCS Pump Suction	E21-F001-A	30(0)(d)
LPCS Pump	E21-F005-A	31(0)
Discharge		
LPCS Min. Flow	E21-F011-A	32(0)(d)
CRD Pump	C11-F083-A	33(0)
Discharge		
CCW Supply	P42-F066-A	44(0)
CCW Return	P42-F067-A	45(0)
CCW Return	P42-F068-B	45(I)
RCIC Pump	E51-F019-A	46(0)(d)
Discharge		
Min. Flow		
Reactor Recirc.	B33-F128-B	47(I)
Post Accident		
Sampling		

TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES

<u>SYSTEM AND VALVE NUMBER</u>	<u>PENETRATION NUMBER</u>
<u>Containment (Continued)</u>	
RHR Pump "A" Test Line to Suppr. Pool E12-F227	23(0) ^(e)
RHR Pump "A" Test Line to Suppr. Pool E12-F262	23(0) ^(e)
RHR Pump "A" Test Line to Suppr. Pool E12-F228	23(0) ^(e)
RHR "A" Test Line to Suppr. Pool E12-F290A-A	23(0) ^(d)
RHR Pump "A" Test Line to Suppr. Pool E12-F338	23(0) ^(c)
RHR Pump "A" Test Line to Suppr. Pool E12-F339	23(0) ^(c)
RHR Pump "A" Test Line to Suppr. Pool E12-F260	23(0) ^(e)
RHR Pump "C" Test Line to Suppr. Pool E12-F280	24(0) ^(d)
RHR Pump "C" Test Line to Suppr. Pool E12-F281	24(0) ^(d)
HPCS Suction E22-F014	25(0) ^(d)
HPCS Discharge E22-F005-(C)	26(I)
HPCS Discharge E22-F218	26(I)
HPCS Discharge E22-F201	26(I)
HPCS Test Line E22-F035	27(0) ^(d)
HPCS Test Line E22-F302	27(0) ^(e)
HPCS Test Line E22-F301	27(0) ^(e)
LPCS Pump Suction E21-F031	30(0) ^(d)
LPCS Discharge E21-F006-(A)	31(I)
LPCS Discharge E21-F200	31(I)
LPCS Discharge E21-F207	31(I)
LPCS Test Line E21-F217	32(0) ^(d)
LPCS Test Line E21-F218	32(0) ^(d)
CRD Pump C11-F122	33(I)
Discharge P44-F043	37(I)
PSW Supply P71-F151	38(I)
Plant Chilled Water Supply P52-F122	41(I)
Service Air Supply	

TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES

<u>SYSTEM AND VALVE NUMBER</u>		<u>PENETRATION NUMBER</u>
4. <u>Test Connections</u> (g)		
a. <u>Containment</u>		
Main Steam T/C	B21-F025A	5(0)
Main Steam T/C	B21-F025B	6(0)
Main Steam T/C	B21-F025C	7(0)
Main Steam T/C	B21-F025D	8(0)
Feedwater T/C	B21-F030A	9(0)
Feedwater T/C	B21-F063A	9(0)
Feedwater T/C	B21-F063B	10(0)
Feedwater T/C	B21-F030B	10(0)
RHR Shutdown Cool. Suction T/C	E12-F002	14(0)
RCIC Steam Line T/C	E51-F072	17(0)
RHR to Head Spray T/C	E12-F342	18(0)
RHR to Head Spray T/C	E12-F061	18(0)
LPCI "C" T/C	E12-F056C	22(0)
RHR "A" Pump Test Line T/C	E12-F322	23(0) (c)
RHR "A" Pump Test Line T/C	E12-F336	23(0) (c)
RHR "A" Pump Test Line T/C	E12-F349	23(0) (c)
RHR "A" Pump Test Line T/C	E12-F303	23(0) (c)
RHR "A" Pump Test Line T/C	E12-F310	23(0) (c)
RHR "A" Pump Test Line T/C	E12-F348	23(0) (c)
RHR "C" Pump Test Line T/C	E12-F311	24(0) (c)
RHR "C" Pump Test Line T/C	E12-F304	24(0) (c)
HPCS Discharge T/C	E22-F021	26(0) (c)
HPCS Test Line T/C	E22-F303	27(0) (c)
HPCS Test Line T/C	E22-F304	27(0) (c)
RCIC Turbine Exhaust T/C	E51-F258	29(0) (c)
RCIC Turbine Exhaust T/C	E51-F257	29(0) (c)
LPCS T/C	E21-F013	31(0) (c)
LPCS Test Line T/C	E21-F222	32(0) (c)
LPCS Test Line T/C	E21-F221	32(0) (c)

SUBJECT: Facility Operating License No. NPF-29, page 14

DISCUSSION: It is proposed to amend the subject license to allow a temporary exception to Technical Specification 3/4.6.6.1 requirements whereby the railroad bay area including the exterior railroad bay door on the auxiliary building will be classified as a secondary containment isolation boundary, subject to the same actions and requirements as other secondary containment isolation boundaries. This exception will last for the duration of the task of moving new high density spent fuel storage racks, horizontal fuel transfer mechanism and associated equipment into the auxiliary building, but not to exceed 144 cumulative hours. The proposed license condition is as follows:

- (39) For a period of time not to exceed 144 cumulative hours, the provisions of Specification 3/4.6.6.1 may be applied to the railroad bay area including the exterior railroad bay door on the auxiliary building in lieu of the present secondary containment boundaries that isolate the railroad bay area. While the railroad bay door is being used as a secondary containment boundary, it may remain open for periods of time for the purpose of moving trucks in and out provided that Technical Specification 3.6.6.1 action statements are applied. A fire watch shall be established in the railroad bay area while the door is being used as a secondary containment boundary.

JUSTIFICATION: During an outage scheduled for October, 1985, MP&L plans to install high density spent fuel storage racks in the GGNS upper containment pool. On May 5, 1985, MP&L submitted a proposed change to the operating license requesting that Technical Specification Section 5.6 be amended to incorporate the high density racks in the design features section of the technical specifications. Prior to this outage, MP&L intends to complete installation of the racks that are to be installed in the spent fuel storage pool in the auxiliary building. MP&L believes that it is permissible to proceed with this installation prior to approval of the referenced request for a technical specification change provided no fuel is placed in the racks before issuance of the revised technical specification. MP&L also plans to place a new Horizontal Fuel Transfer Mechanism in the fuel handling area of the auxiliary building prior to the outage scheduled for October, 1985.

The proposed operating license condition is necessary to allow movement of the new high density spent fuel racks, horizontal fuel transfer mechanism and associated equipment into the auxiliary building fuel handling area while the plant is in operation. This activity is scheduled to begin about September 1, 1985 depending on shipment schedules. The present design configuration of the auxiliary building railroad bay area does not qualify this area to be a part of secondary containment. This area is isolated from secondary containment by inner railroad bay doors and overhead equipment hatch plugs. In order to move the new spent fuel racks and other equipment to the fuel handling area of the auxiliary building, the exterior railroad bay door must be opened and reclosed when a

truck is placed in the railroad bay. The railroad bay door is not expected to remain open longer than one hour at a time when moving trucks in and out of the railroad bay. Then the equipment hatch plugs must be removed which technically causes a loss of secondary containment integrity. MP&L does not intend to reinstall the equipment hatch plugs each time a truckload of fuel racks or other equipment is moved into or an empty truck is moved out of the railroad bay area. Instead, MP&L proposes to credit the exterior railroad bay door as a secondary containment isolation barrier during the estimated 144 hours required to complete the task. If at any time during the activity secondary containment integrity cannot be obtained using the exterior railroad bay door, the provisions of Technical Specification 3/4.6.6.1 will be applied. This will allow four (4) hours to reestablish secondary containment integrity or be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 24 hours for operational conditions 1, 2 or 3. If required, the equipment hatch plugs can be reinstalled in six to eight (6 to 8) hours.

While the railroad bay door does not meet secondary containment design requirements, it has a seal and the secondary containment function operability using this railroad bay door will be proven in accordance with the requirements of specification 4.6.6.1 prior to initial removal of the equipment hatch plugs. Functional operability will consist of meeting the surveillance requirements specified in Technical Specification 4.6.6.1.b and will only be demonstrated at the start of this license condition. Furthermore, the actions required by specification 3.6.6.1 will be applied should the bay door ever fail to serve the secondary containment integrity function. Additionally, administrative controls shall be implemented during the exception period to ensure periodic monitoring of meteorological conditions so that appropriate precautions may be taken to fulfill the design requirements for tornado depressurization. Fire protection for the railroad bay area is provided by a 6 inch fire water line passing through a penetration that does not conform to secondary containment isolation design requirements. This line will be isolated by a manually operated valve. Fire protection for the railroad bay area during this evolution will then be assured by establishment of a fire watch.

SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION:

While the railroad bay door is not seismic category one, it will serve to provide secondary containment integrity for the proposed license condition period in accordance with the requirements of specification 3/4.6.6.1. Should the bay door fail for any reason to provide the secondary containment function, it has been found that the equipment hatch can be reclosed in six to eight (6 to 8) hours, and failure to reestablish secondary containment will result in the unit being placed in a condition where secondary containment integrity is not required in accordance with Technical

Specification 3.6.6.1. Furthermore, the probability of an accident including a seismic event during the relatively brief period for which the exception is requested is low. Fire protection during this period of time will be assured by establishing a fire watch. Therefore, the proposed change to the operating license does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated or create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, nor does it involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Therefore, the proposed change involves no significant hazards considerations.

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- (b) Provide the second level undervoltage protection for Division 3 power supply (Item No. 373, T.S. Table 3.3.3-2).
- (c) Incorporate a bypass or coincident logic in all Division 1 and 2 diesel generator protective trips, except for trips on diesel engine overspeed and generator differential current (Item No. 808, T.S. 4.8.1.1.2.d.16.d).

(38) Control Room Leak Rate (Section 6.2.6, SSER #6)

MP&L shall operate Grand Gulf Unit 1 with an allowable control room leak rate not to exceed 590 cfm. Upon restart of construction of Unit 2 control room, MP&L will be permitted to operate at a leak rate of 760 cfm as evaluated in SSER No. 6.

INSERT →

- D. The facility requires exemptions from certain requirements of Appendices A and D to 10 CFR Part 50. These include: (a) exemption from General Design Criterion 17 of Appendix A until startup following the first refueling outage, for (1) the emergency override of the test mode for the Division 3 diesel engine, (2) the second level undervoltage protection for the Division 3 diesel engine, and (3) the generator ground over current trip function for the Division 1 and 2 diesel generators (Section 8.3.1 of SSER #7) and (b) exemption from the requirements of Paragraph III.D.2(b)(ii) of Appendix J for the containment airlock testing following normal door opening when containment integrity is not required (Section 6.2.6 of SSER #7). These exemptions are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security and are otherwise in the public interest. Therefore, these exemptions are hereby granted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12. With the granting of these exemptions, the facility will operate, to the extent authorized herein, in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act and the rules and regulations of the Commission.
- E. MP&L shall maintain in effect and fully implement all the provisions of the Commission-approved physical security plan, guard training and qualification plan and safeguards contingency plan, including amendments made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR Section 50.54(p). The approved plans, which are safeguards information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, are collectively entitled Grand Gulf Nuclear Station "Physical Security Plan," Revision 1, 2 and 3; the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station "Security Training and Qualification Plan," and the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station "Safeguards Contingency Plan." The identification of vital areas and measures used to control access to these areas, as described in the physical security plan, may be subject to amendments in the future based upon a confirmatory evaluation of the plant to determine those areas where acts of sabotage might cause a release of radionuclides in sufficient quantities to result in dose rates equal to or exceeding 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines.

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- (39) For a period of time not to exceed 144 cumulative hours, the provisions of Specification 3/4.6.6.1 may be applied to the railroad bay area including the exterior railroad bay door on the auxiliary building in lieu of the present secondary containment boundaries that isolate the railroad bay area. While the railroad bay door is being used as a secondary containment boundary, it may remain open for periods of time for the purpose of moving trucks in and out provided that Technical Specification 3.6.6.1 action statements are applied. A fire watch shall be established in the railroad bay area while the door is being used as a secondary containment boundary.