

JUL 2 1985

In Reply Refer To:
Docket: 50-458

Gulf States Utilities
ATTN: William J. Cahill, Jr.
Senior Vice President
River Bend Nuclear Group
P. O. Box 2951
Beaumont, Texas 77704

Enclosed is a copy of the Federal Emergency Management Agency state and local agency Exercise Report for the River Bend Station emergency exercise held January 16, 1985.

Please review the report and be prepared to cooperate with state and local officials as necessary during their efforts to correct the off site deficiencies identified. In addition, you should give particular attention to Section 2.4 of the report which indicates that some offsite deficiencies were caused or compounded by the onsite operations.

Sincerely,

Original Signed By
E. H. Johnson

E. H. Johnson, Chief
Reactor Project Branch

Enclosure:
FEMA report dated April 5, 1985

cc w/enclosure:
Gulf States Utilities
ATTN: J. E. Booker, Manager-
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Gulf States Utilities

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FINAL

RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE REPORT

Nuclear Power Plant: River Bend Nuclear Generating Station
Applicant: Gulf States Utilities

Location of Plant: State of Louisiana
West Feliciana Parish
St. Francisville, Louisiana

Date of Report: April 5, 1985

Date of Exercise: January 16, 1985

Participants: State of Louisiana
West Feliciana Parish
East Feliciana Parish
Pointe Coupee Parish
West Baton Rouge Parish
East Baton Rouge Parish
West Feliciana Hospital

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

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ABBREVIATIONS

ANL	-	Argonne National Laboratory
ARC	-	American Red Cross
DOE	-	Department of Energy
DOT	-	Department of Transportation
EBS	-	Emergency Broadcast System
EOC	-	Emergency Operations Center
EOF	-	Emergency Operations Facility
EPA	-	Environmental Protection Agency
EPZ	-	Emergency Planning Zone
FEMA	-	Federal Emergency Management Agency
GSU	-	Gulf States Utilities
HHS	-	Health and Human Services
JIC	-	Joint Information Center
KI	-	Potassium Iodide
LNED	-	Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division
LOCA	-	Loss-of-Coolant Accident
LOEP	-	Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness
mR/h	-	Millirems per hour
NRC	-	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PAG	-	Protective Action Guide
PAR	-	Protective Action Recommendation
PAS	-	Protective Action Section
PIO	-	Public Information Officer
RAC	-	Regional Assistance Committee
RADEF	-	Radiological Defense
RBS	-	River Bend Station
RCS	-	Reactor Coolant System
RDO	-	Radiological Defense Officer
REP	-	Radiological Emergency Preparedness
SOP	-	Standard Operating Procedure
USDA	-	United States Department of Agriculture

EXERCISE SUMMARY

The initial qualifying radiological emergency preparedness exercise was conducted January 16, 1985, for the River Bend Station (RBS) located in St. Francisville, Louisiana. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) evaluated the off-site radiological emergency response capabilities of the State and local officials.

On January 17, 1985, two meetings were held -- a morning meeting with the 19 member Federal evaluation team to conduct a preliminary evaluation; and an afternoon meeting with Federal, State, local and utility participants to present preliminary findings. A critique for the general public was also held on January 17, 1985, at the Town Hall in St. Francisville, Louisiana.

This document provides narratives, deficiencies, areas for improvement and recommendations for each of the jurisdictions and field activities tested in the exercise.

Each deficiency with corresponding recommendation is described by jurisdiction in Section 2 of the report. Areas for improvement, which are not considered deficiencies, are also described in Section 2. Section 3 provides a summary listing of "A" deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding and "B" deficiencies, including those needing priority attention. This summary is in tabular format and provides space for State and local jurisdiction responses to the deficiencies. There were no category "A" deficiencies found during the evaluation of this exercise.

The following provides a brief overview of the exercise performances of the State of Louisiana and the local Parish governments. More explanatory discussions of the performances of individual agencies are provided in Section 2 of the report.

State of Louisiana Operations

Several agencies of the State of Louisiana participated in this initial River Bend Station Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) exercise. The Louisiana Office of

Emergency Preparedness (LOEP) and the Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division (LNED), both located at the State Emergency Operating Center (EOC) in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, demonstrated an adequate level of readiness for dealing with a radiological emergency. The EOC was staffed by all major departments required by the plan. Direction of operations was well managed by the Assistant Secretary of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, and his staff was involved in decision making.

Physical aspects of the EOC were adequate to support continuous operations. The management of the EOC and the concepts utilized in exercise activities were reasonable and appropriate for meeting the State EOC's role during an emergency at RBS.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

Five parishes have portions of their boundaries within the 10-mile EPZ of River Bend Station. Radiological Emergency Preparedness plans exist for each parish, and elected and volunteer officials of each parish participated in the exercise.

Facilities for each of the Parishes were adequate and equipped with necessary furniture, communication equipment, maps and displays. A new EOC for West Feliciana Parish is being constructed which will provide expanded space for future operations.

As will be discussed in the detailed narrative section of the report, each of the parishes actively participated and demonstrated during this exercise that they are capable of making effective emergency response decisions to protect their residents should an accident occur at RBS.

Generally, the local decisions and activities adequately met the objectives of the exercise. Specifically, however, deficiencies in performance were identified at several of the activity locations. Also, evaluators have provided recommendations for improving future exercises or effectiveness in a real emergency in areas or activities where

performances were less than desirable during this exercise. These are grouped as Areas for Improvement and discussed in the narrative evaluation for each location.

For a more thorough evaluation of activities and accomplishments at the local parishes, the narratives in Section 2 should be reviewed.

A narrative summary is provided of some of the utility problems which should be addressed because of their impact upon the offsite emergency response efforts of the State and parish governments.

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 EXERCISE BACKGROUND

On December 7, 1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assume lead role responsibility for all offsite nuclear power facility planning and response.

FEMA's immediate basic responsibilities in Fixed Nuclear Facility Radiological Emergency Response Planning include:

- Taking the lead in offsite emergency response planning and in the review and evaluation of State and local government emergency plans ensuring that the plans meet the Federal criteria set forth in NUREG-0654 FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1 (November 1980).
- Determining whether the State and local emergency response plans can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of an exercise conducted by the appropriate emergency response jurisdictions.
- Coordinating the activities of volunteer organizations and other involved Federal agencies. Representatives of these agencies listed below serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.
 - U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
 - U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
 - U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
 - U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
 - U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
 - U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)

The January 16, 1985, REP exercise was River Bend Station's initial qualifying exercise. The exercise was conducted between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. The 19-member evaluation team included representatives from FEMA Region VI staff, the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), and Argonne National Laboratory (ANL). The exercise was evaluated using the FEMA modular format evaluation forms. This report format reflects the use of the modular format which provides for a more objective, detailed recording of evaluations.

Following the exercise, the Federal evaluators met on January 17, 1985, at 8:30 a.m. to present their preliminary findings to the FEMA/RAC Chairman. At 1:00 p.m. a critique was conducted at River Bend Station for State, local, and utility officials. At this critique the FEMA RAC Chairman and selected FEMA, RAC evaluators presented a short overview of the preliminary results of the exercise. The public critique of the exercise followed at 3:00 p.m. at the Town Hall, St. Francisville, Louisiana.

A Public Meeting was held on January 21, 1985, at the St. Francisville Town Hall for residents of the five parishes. This meeting was held to acquaint residents living around the River Bend Station with the emergency response plans, to answer questions concerning contents and exercising of the plans, and to receive suggestions for their improvement.

The findings presented in this report were reviewed by the RAC Chairman of FEMA Region VI. FEMA suggests that State and Local jurisdictions take remedial actions in response to each of the deficiencies indicated in this report and that the State submit a schedule for addressing the identified deficiencies. The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director of State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that deficiencies identified during the exercise have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into State and local plans, as appropriate.

1.2 FEDERAL EVALUATORS

Nineteen federal evaluators participated in evaluating the January 16, 1985, qualifying exercise. These individuals, their agencies, and their evaluation location(s) are listed below.

<u>EVALUATORS</u>	<u>AGENCY</u>	<u>EVALUATION LOCATION</u>
John Benton	FEMA	State EOC - Baton Rouge
Bob Conley	USDA	State EOC - Baton Rouge
Hank May	EPA	Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
Al Lookabaugh	FEMA	Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
Hank Gilliam (Observer)	FEMA	Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
Harry Harrison	FEMA	RADEF Monitoring Team #1
Bob Barton	DOE	RADEF Monitoring Team #2
Jimmy Owens	DOE	RADEF Monitoring Team #3
Gary Sanborn	NRC	Joint Information Center (EOF)
Maryetta Cunningham	FEMA	Joint Information Center (EOF)
Phyllis Degler (Observer)	FEMA	Joint Information Center (EOF)
Gary Jones	FEMA	West Feliciana EOC (St. Francisville)
Don Fingleton	ANL	West Feliciana EOC (St. Francisville)
Jim Cox	DOT	West Feliciana Parish-Traffic Control Point
Kim Suchy	ANL	East Feliciana EOC (Jackson and Clinton)
Bill Gasper	ANL	Pointe Coupee EOC (New Roads)
Penny Wallingford	ANL	West Baton Rouge EOC (Port Allen)
Gary Kaszynski	ANL	East Baton Rouge EOC (Baton Rouge)
Travis Ratcliff	FEMA	East Baton Rouge Parish (Baton Rouge)
Tom Goertz	FDA	West Feliciana Hospital (St. Francisville) Decontamination and Reception Center (Baton Rouge)
Grace Fossati	FEMA	Reception Center (Riverside Centroplex- Baton Rouge)

1.3 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES

1.3.1 Gulf States Utilities Objectives

The River Bend Station emergency planning exercise objectives are based on NRC requirements provided in 10 CFR 50.47, "Emergency Plans," and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, "Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization

Facilities." Additional guidance provided in NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0696, "Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities," and "Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737-1-Requirements for Emergency Response Capability (Generic Letter 82-33)" was utilized in developing the objectives.

A. As a result of coordination between GSU, the State of Louisiana, the Parishes of East and West Feliciana, East and West Baton Rouge, Pointe Coupee, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the following objectives have been developed for the GSU exercise:

1. Demonstrate emergency response integrated capabilities by activating the emergency organization and staffing the RBS Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs), including the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center, Emergency Operations Facility, and the Joint Information Center and by implementing access control to these facilities.
2. Demonstrate the adequacy of ERFs and their personnel, documents, and equipment to support, direct, and control emergency operations.
3. Demonstrate the reliability and effective use of onsite and offsite emergency communications equipment and procedures.
4. Demonstrate the ability of appropriate individuals to direct the required emergency organizations and maintain continuity in the implementation of the emergency plan using the emergency plan implementation procedures.

5. Demonstrate the ability of the emergency organization to assess the initiating conditions for determining which emergency action level has been reached and properly classifying the accident.
6. Demonstrate the ability to perform dose calculations utilizing radiological and meteorological information to determine the magnitude of and for continuously assessing the impact of the release of radioactive materials to the environment and make appropriate recommendations for offsite protective actions utilizing all relevant factors.
7. Demonstrate the ability of offsite field monitoring teams to use emergency equipment in performing radiological surveys and report results and the effective sharing of field team data among emergency response organizations.
8. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for determining onsite radiation levels.
9. Demonstrate decision-making for appropriate onsite protective actions based on radiological information.
10. Demonstrate adequate facilities, equipment, and procedures for decontamination of onsite emergency workers and equipment, as required.
11. Demonstrate the ability of the RBS emergency organization to provide the Joint Information Center with accurate and timely information so reports may be made to the news media.
12. Demonstrate the capability of developing clear and accurate public information releases in conjunction with state and local representatives at the Joint Information Center.
13. Demonstrate the organization's ability to control rumors.

14. Demonstrate the ability to monitor and control exposures to GSU personnel within the Plant.
15. Demonstrate the ability to perform search and rescue, as required.
16. Demonstrate the ability to plan recovery operations and identify the need for additional resources as required.
17. Demonstration of shift relief capabilities will be limited to a display of personnel assignment schedules.
18. Demonstrate response to a medical emergency onsite and offsite medical support personnel and agencies.
19. Demonstrate decision-making and coordination with offsite agencies in de-escalating and terminating the emergency.

B. Areas of the RBS Emergency Response Planning which will not be demonstrated during this exercise:

1. Accountability following evacuation of the Protected Area. A limited number of evacuees will be designated to demonstrate personnel monitoring and decontamination at the Assembly Area.
2. Post Accident Sampling System Operations. Simulated post accident sampling results will be included to demonstrate core damage assessment in the ERFs.
3. Actual shift turn-over in each ERF will not be demonstrated for long-term staffing. Long-term shift assignments will be demonstrated.
4. ERF evacuation and activation and operation of the Alternate Emergency Operations Facility.
5. Relocation of the Joint Information Center.

6. Off-hours augmentation of the ERFs.
7. Offsite fire support agency.

1.3.2 State of Louisiana Objectives

1. Demonstrate the ability to alert State agencies emergency response personnel, activate and staff State EOC.
2. Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.
3. Demonstrate that the State EOC is adequate to support emergency functions.
4. Demonstrate communications capabilities among the following facilities:
 - a. RBS
 - b. Parish EOCs
 - c. State EOC
 - d. EBS Station
 - e. Joint Information Center
 - f. LNEC
5. Demonstrate the ability to communicate with State dispatched field personnel.
6. Demonstrate ability to mobilize and deploy field monitoring teams.
7. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for determining ambient radiation levels.
8. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for measurement of airborne radioiodine.

9. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for collection of environmental samples.
10. Demonstrate the ability to project plume exposure pathway doses and to determine appropriate protective measures.
11. Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
12. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate public information releases with Parish and utility representatives at the Joint Information Center.
13. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate press releases between the Joint Information Center and the State EOC.
14. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate rumor control between the Rumor Control Center and the State EOC.
15. Demonstrate the ability to identify the need for and request Federal assistance.
16. Demonstrate the ability to estimate total population exposure.
17. Demonstrate decision-making and coordination with the Parishes and the Utility in de-escalating and terminating the emergency.
18. Demonstrate the ability to monitor Emergency Classifications levels at the State EOC.
19. Demonstrate the capability to process incoming messages in a timely manner at the State EOC.

FEMA OBJECTIVES APPLICABLE TO STATE EMERGENCY OPERATION THAT WILL NOT BE DEMONSTRATED

1. 24-hour EOC operation and staffing will not be demonstrated.
2. Backup communication systems will not be tested.
3. The ability to determine the need for issuance of KI and the ability to distribute KI will not be tested.

4. Ingestion pathway dose projections and determination of protective measures will not be tested.
5. The ability to implement protective actions for ingestion pathway hazards will not be tested.
6. The ability to analyze environmental samples in the laboratory will not be demonstrated.

1.3.3 Parish Objectives

1. Demonstrate the ability to alert Parish emergency response personnel, activate and staff Parish EOC.
2. Demonstrate the ability to alert the staff and activate a reception center.
3. Demonstrate the ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.
4. Demonstrate that the Parish EOCs are adequate to support emergency functions.
5. Demonstrate communications capabilities among the following facilities:
 - a. RBS
 - b. Parish EOCs
 - c. State EOC
 - d. EBS Station
 - e. Joint Information Center
 - f. Local Special Facilities
 - g. LNED
6. Demonstrate communications between the Parish EOC and Parish dispatched field personnel.

7. Demonstrate decision making and coordination of the alerting process for the public within the affected area.
8. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of part of the plume EPZ.
9. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation.
10. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to the evacuated area.
11. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to evacuate mobility-impaired individuals within the affected area.
12. Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
13. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate public information releases with State and Utility representatives at the Joint Information Center.
14. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate press releases between the Joint Information Center and the Parish EOCs.
15. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate rumor control between the Rumor Control Center and the Parish EOCs.
16. Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees.
17. Demonstrate the adequacy of equipment and procedures for decontamination of emergency vehicles.
18. Demonstrate the adequacy of ambulance facilities and procedures for responding to a Utility request for transporting a contaminated injured individual.

19. Demonstrate the adequacy of hospital facilities and procedures for handling a contaminated injured individual transported from RBS.
20. Demonstrate decision making and coordination with State and the Utility in de-escalating and terminating the emergency.
21. Demonstrate the ability to monitor Emergency Classifications levels at the Parish EOC(s).
22. Demonstrate the capability to process incoming messages in a timely manner at the Parish EOC(s).

FEMA OBJECTIVES APPLICABLE TO PARISH EMERGENCY OPERATION THAT WILL NOT BE DEMONSTRATED

1. The ability to fully staff reception centers in response to a complete evacuation of the plume EPZ will not be demonstrated.
2. The activation of all reception centers will not be demonstrated.
3. 24-hour EOC and reception center operation and staffing will not be demonstrated.
4. The ability to issue protective action orders will not be tested in all Parishes.
5. Backup communication systems will not be tested.
6. The prompt notification system will not be activated.
7. The ability to alert the public in the event of a failure of the prompt notification system will not be tested.
8. Congregate care facility (shelters) operation will not be tested.
9. Ability and resources necessary to evacuate schools within the plume EPZ will not be tested.
10. Ability to distribute KI will not be tested.

11. The adequacy of ambulance and hospital facilities and procedures for handling contaminated local emergency workers or the public will not be tested. (See item V.C.18 and 19 for medical emergency drill.)
12. The ability to relocate to and operate an alternate EOC will not be tested.

NOTE: During a meeting with the State of Louisiana on January 8, 1985 the No. 17 Parish objective for decontamination of vehicles was expanded to include equipment and individuals.

1.4 EXERCISE GUIDELINES AND PARTICIPANT INFORMATION

This exercise is the required annual emergency preparedness exercise to demonstrate the readiness of the Plant to respond to an abnormal plant situation. The following information should be understood by the participants prior to beginning the exercise.

1. It should be understood that the circumstances simulated for this exercise are unrealistic in certain aspects, which should not be construed as flaws in the scenario. Moreover, it is due to the reliable design and construction of nuclear power facilities that requires unrealistic assumptions to be made in order to generate a problem that can affect the public. Thus, in order to achieve a sequence of events that will lead to a significant offsite radiological problem, the exercise scenario must contain an incredible plant situation, an unlikely series of equipment failures, or an improbable series of events combined with equipment failure.
2. The purpose of the exercise is to demonstrate actual integrated emergency response capabilities, including the use of emergency

facilities and equipment. Personnel knowledge of the Emergency Plan and Emergency Implementing Procedures is the primary aspect of evaluation. Demonstration of detailed knowledge of plant systems and equipment is of secondary importance for the exercise, since the plant conditions are simulated. For a real emergency this would not be the case. Although personnel knowledge of the plant is not being tested, the system evaluations and investigations should not be eliminated from discussions during the exercise since this adds to the realism of the response.

3. All emergency communications that relate to the exercise shall be identified as part of the drill. Verbal communications should be initiated and closed by the statement, "This is a drill."

Note: Care should be taken to assure that individuals who may overhear or see exercise activities are not misled into believing that an actual emergency exists.

4. Manipulation of any plant operating systems, valves, breakers or controls in response to this Exercise are only to be simulated. There are to be no alterations of any plant operating equipment, systems or circuits during the response to this Exercise.
5. Any motor vehicle response to this exercise, whether it be ambulance, fire fighting equipment, police/security vehicles or field monitoring teams, should observe all normal motor vehicle operating laws including posted speed limits, stop lights/signs, one way streets, etc.
6. Should any onsite security actions be required in response to this Exercise, exercise participants are to cooperate as directed, and security representatives are to be prudent and tolerant in their actions.

7. Participants shall inject as much realism into the exercise as is compatible with the safe performance of such exercise, using caution to neither under-react nor over-react since media attention and public protection are both key aspects of the exercise.

Exercise Guidelines

To meet the exercise objectives, the following guidelines have been developed:

1. The exercise is designed to be a "free-play" exercise. Prewritten or command messages are inserted by the exercise Controller/Evaluator at given times to cause or influence particular emergency actions or responses. All other exercise actions are determined by participants' response to the simulated emergency conditions.
2. Participants will respond to scenario conditions and take appropriate actions to protect workers and the general public. Mitigation or degradation of scenario conditions will not be allowed in the interest of controlling licensee, state, and local involvement in the exercise.
3. The Exercise will be conducted as scheduled in Section IV.D.
4. The exercise will commence with a postulated plant condition necessitating the declaration of an Unusual Event with plant conditions deteriorating to the extent that a General Emergency will be declared.
5. The postulated accident conditions will result in a simulated radiological release which necessitates the consideration of protective actions for the general public.

6. Exercise participants will perform, as appropriate, mobilization of the emergency response organization, radiological monitoring and dose assessment, accident assessment, notifications to offsite agencies, protection action recommendations for emergency workers and the general public, and dissemination of simulated emergency information to the news media.

1.5 SCENARIO NARRATIVE SUMMARY

Initial Conditions:

1. The reactor is at 100% power, and the core has been operated for 300 full-power days.
2. HPCS pump E22-C001 is out of service due to a bearing problem causing excessive vibration. A 7 day LCO has been in effect since noon yesterday.
3. A reactor coolant leak rate test is in progress to determine whether an existing 2 gpm leak has become significantly worse.
4. Willow Glen Unit 1 has been taken off the grid as of 0800 this morning due to problems with EHC system. Downtime is expected to be no longer than 24 hours. In the meantime, the Load Dispatcher has requested that River Bend Station provide full power to the grid to avoid industrial load shedding. Previous notice of any power reduction has been requested.

<u>Time</u>	<u>Scenario Time</u>	<u>Event</u>
Before 1000	-00/00	Initial conditions established.
1000	00/00	<p>Results of the completed leak rate test indicate that the unidentified Reactor Coolant leak rate is 6.5 gpm.</p> <p>AN UNUSUAL EVENT should be declared in accordance with EIP-2-001, Unusual Event No. 5.2; exceeding primary coolant leak rate Tech. Spec. limits. Notifications to offsite agencies and activation of the on-shift Emergency Response Organization should be accomplished.</p> <p>After discussions with the Load Dispatcher, operators will commence controlled reduction in power.</p>
1015	00/15	<p>Indications in the Control Room indicate that the leak rate has increased to 35 gpm.</p> <p>Condenser hotwell level has begun to fluctuate slowly, but remains within operational limits.</p>
1030	00/30	<p>Indications in the Control Room indicate that the leak rate has increased to 53 gpm. Controlled shutdown continues.</p> <p>AN ALERT should be declared in accordance with EIP-2-001, Alert No. 2.1, primary coolant system leak rate greater than 50 gpm with reactor at operating temperature and pressure. Notifications to offsite agencies and activation of augmented Emergency Response Organization designated for Alert (including TSC, OSC, part of JIC) should be accomplished.</p>
1045	00/45	The primary system leak rate has leveled out at approximately 55 gpm; however, the hotwell level has dropped considerably in the last half hour. The Control Room is continuing a unit shutdown.
1130	01/30	<p>The condenser hotwell level drops rapidly due to malfunction of the makeup valve from the Condensate Storage tank, causing a low suction pressure trip of the condensate pumps, and subsequently the reactor feedpumps.</p> <p>The total loss of feedwater causes the reactor level to drop very rapidly below the HPCS/RCIC automatic initiation setpoint (level 2, -30").</p> <p>The HPCS system is out of service; and, though RCIC auto starts, the pump does not deliver rated flow to the reactor. Indications in the Control Room are that the turbine governor is not properly controlling the discharge pressure of the pump. The reactor scrams and the recirculation pumps trip. Containment isolation is successful. MSIVs remain open (level 1 isolation). SBGT auto starts. The Division III diesel is secured and does not start.</p>

<u>Time</u>	<u>Scenario Time</u>	<u>Event</u>
1135	01/35	Within two minutes of the scram the reactor level has dropped to -145", causing the MSIVs to shut and the Division I and II diesels to start. The LPCI/LPCS pumps auto start and run on minimum flow. The reactor level is steady, but pressure remains high.
1150	01/50	An operations/maintenance team checking the RCIC turbine governor finds that the governor will have to be replaced.
before 1200	before 02/00	The operations/maintenance team in the RCIC equipment area checking the turbine governor observes a steam leak through a crack in the upstream pipe to valve body weld on E51-F045. The crack is beginning to worsen and a large puddle is forming on the floor. The Shift Supervisor and Emergency Director are notified.
1200	02/00	<p>The RCIC turbine steam supply line crack widens rapidly. All personnel move to rapidly exit the area; however, a technician trips and falls in the puddle. He is unconscious and bleeding from the back of his head.</p> <p>Indications are received in the Control Room that the RCIC turbine steam supply line has ruptured. In addition, position indication for RCIC steam line isolation valves F063 and F064 is lost. The reactor level begins to drop slowly, as only CRD pumps A and B provide makeup to the reactor.</p> <p>A SITE AREA EMERGENCY should be declared in accordance with EIP-2-001, Site Area emergency No. 3.3; Steamline break outside containment without isolation. Offsite agency notification and activation of the entire augmented Emergency Response Organization should be accomplished.</p>
1205 Approx.	02/05	Attempts to depressurize the reactor using ADS are unsuccessful due to an ADS logic failure.
1230	02/30	It has been determined that the injured individual is contaminated and does require transportation to the hospital for medical examination.
1300	03/00	Reactor level is still dropping slowly with reactor pressure dropping, but remaining higher than LPCI/LPCS pump shut off head.
1330	03/30	Reactor level has dropped to the top of active fuel (TAF), with pressure remaining far above RHR/LPCS capability. The steam release is being vented through the Aux. Bldg. ventilation system. Operators may divert the flow through SBT system at this time because of the impending release.

<u>Time</u>	<u>Scenario Time</u>	<u>Event</u>
		A GENERAL EMERGENCY should be declared in accordance with EIP-2-001, General Emergency No. 2.3; loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with potential for loss of the third.
1345	03/45	RE-213, Auxiliary Building RCIC Area ARM begins to show elevated radiation levels and the Aux. Bldg. Ventilation and Main Plant Exhaust Duct Monitors show indications that a radioactive release is in progress. Reactor pressure remains in excess of low pressure ECCS shut off head.
1445	04/45	Reactor pressure has dropped to RHR/LPCS pumps shut off head. Reactor level has decreased to -190". Severe cladding damage has occurred and the radiological release is still in progress. Low pressure ECCS is initiated.
1500	05/00	The core has been reflooded. The release continues as operators attempt to depressurize the reactor.
1600	06/00	Emergency Repair team successfully shut RCIC steam line outboard isolation valve. The release is terminated.
1615	06/15	Reactor pressure drops below shut down cooling upper limit. RHR system is aligned for shut down cooling. A storm is brewing in the vicinity of River Bend Station and meteorological conditions change rapidly.
1645	06/45	The plume is blown out of the 10 mile EPZ by the increasing winds. The Emergency is de-escalated.
1715	07/15	Offsite doses are returned to background.
1730	07/30	Emergency terminated. Recovery organization established.
1745	07/45	Recovery planning is discussed, with long term organization and response plans formulated.
1800	08/00	Terminate the exercise.

1.6 EVALUATION CRITERIA

The River Bend Station exercise evaluations presented in Sec. 2 are based on applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in Sec. II of NUREG-0654-FEMA-1, Rev. 1 (November 1980). After the narrative for each jurisdiction or evaluated activity, deficiencies and areas for improvements are presented with accompanying recommendations. Deficiencies are presented in two categories. Category A lists only

those deficiencies that caused a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can and will be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living near the site in a radiological emergency. These are deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding. A negative finding would be based on at least one deficiency in this category.

Category B lists all other deficiencies. These include those deficiencies where demonstrated performance during the exercise was evaluated and considered faulty and corrective actions are considered necessary but other factors indicate that reasonable assurance could be given that in a real radiological emergency, appropriate measures can and will be taken to protect the health and safety of the public. Deficiencies in this category should be relatively easy or straightforward to correct in comparison with those deficiencies in Category A. Category B deficiencies are numbered consecutively in Section 2 and are correlated with Tables 1, 2 and 3.

Areas for improvement are also listed as appropriate for each jurisdiction or evaluation activity. These items are not deficiencies but are suggestions for improved performance.

FEMA Region VI evaluated the exercise using a modular format questionnaire that permitted objective and detailed recording of observations and assured more uniformity among observation points. Federal evaluators were instructed to mark sections of the module "not applicable" if they did not correspond to the objectives for the exercise.

2 EXERCISE EVALUATION

On the basis of general criteria set forth in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1/Rev. 1 (November 1980), and exercise objectives and observations, an evaluation of the January 16, 1985 exercise of the River Bend Station has been performed. This evaluation, including deficiencies, areas for improvement, and recommendations, is presented herein. FEMA Region VI will maintain close liaison with the State and local governments in determining the corrective actions (including time frames) needed to resolve the deficiencies in accordance with established criteria and guidelines.

2.1 LOUISIANA STATE OPERATIONS

The following includes evaluations of the operations of the Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness (LOEP) and the Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division (LNED) at the State EOC in Baton Rouge; LNED operations at the EOF (River Bend Station); the activities of the three Radiological Field Monitoring Teams; and the media relations of State/Parish representatives at the Joint Information Center.

2.1.1 State EOC

Narrative

The State EOC, located in the Natural Resources Building in Baton Rouge, has the necessary resources for supporting a continuous operation, although round-the-clock staffing was not an objective nor was it demonstrated during the exercise.

Communications for alerting and activating staff consist of commercial landline telecon call down by the Office of Emergency Preparedness. A list is available of home, work and alternate phone numbers of all personnel. The EOC was activated in response to a call at 11:06, and staffing was completed by 1:00 p.m. following the declaration of site area emergency at 12:15 p.m. Agencies represented at the EOC were: Office of

Mental Health, Department of Education, Office of Hospitals, ARC, Emergency Medical Services, Department of Agriculture, Office of Family Services, Louisiana State Police, Department of Corrections, Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, Office of Health and Environmental Quality, Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division and Office of Emergency Preparedness. Additional representatives were called and placed on standby.

Management and operational concepts deployed from the EOC were practical and adequate to maintain an operational capability during an emergency.

All maps were not displayed or posted in the EOC. However, each staff member had personal copies for referencing as needed. It is recommended that at least population maps and evacuation route maps be developed and displayed for the entire EOC. These are important for explanation and clarity during briefings. The large display map containing meteorological data and portions of the sectors evacuated was used but was not visible to all staff members. For decision-making and operational activities this information should be located where it can be seen by the EOC staff.

Communications and message handling were conducted professionally and competently. Equipment included an operational hotline (blue phone), commercial telephone, radio, facsimile machine, teletype, ham radio and the law enforcement communications system. Noise levels were very low throughout the Communications Center. All incoming calls were received in this room and relayed to the appropriate personnel via intercom. This method proved efficient for reducing noise from otherwise frequently ringing telephones at the various desks located in the EOC room. A runner was responsible for delivering messages to the various individuals throughout the EOC. All equipment was operated competently and all personnel appeared to be well trained.

Evaluators at the parish EOCs documented a lack of coordination by the State EOC with the parishes on matters relating to formulation of the EBS message, timing of the EBS message with simulation of siren sounding, etc. These actions, according to some of the parishes, did not take place. From the viewpoint of parish EOC staff and

evaluators assigned to the parishes, better coordination is necessary from the State EOC. The State should involve the local parishes more frequently and much earlier in the process of development of the EBS and other messages relative to their parish. The EBS message flow chart shows this coordination but its implementation was not observed at the local EOCs.

A ham radio operator and the State Police Communications Specialist participated in the exercise. The evaluators recommend that future scenarios provide for actions which could involve them and their expertise.

Generally, most exercise objectives assigned to the State EOC were met with exception of the following:

"Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities." The need for better coordination and involvement with the local EOCs was identified as necessary for proper fulfillment of responsibilities assigned to the parishes.

"Demonstrate the ability to identify the need for and request Federal assistance." The scenario did not include conditions of sufficient severity to necessitate calling upon the Federal government for assistance.

Also, "Demonstrate decisionmaking and coordination with the parishes and utility in de-escalating and terminating the emergency," as it relates to recovery and reentry problems were not tested by the State EOC or coordinated with the parishes at the conclusion of the exercise.

DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CATEGORY "A" DEFICIENCIES - NONE

CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES

1. Description: Coordination and interaction by the State EOC with the five local parish EOCs was inadequate for meeting the needs of the parishes especially with regard to concurrence on EBS message

development and timing of the messages with the parishes' responsibilities for simulation of siren sounding, alerting, etc. (NUREG-0654, A.2.a.).

Recommendations: Procedures and requirements should be reviewed relating to concurrence with parishes on development of the EBS messages and for coordinating the issuance of messages with sounding of sirens. During the next exercise better coordination and interaction should be demonstrated between the five parishes and the State EOC.

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

- Description: Room-size population maps and evacuation route maps were not available or displayed in the EOC, although individual, small-scale copies were provided to staff members. The large display map of meteorological data and sectors evacuated, although used, was not visible to all staff members.

Recommendation: Develop and provide at front of briefing room, population and evacuation route maps to clarify and support information given during the staff briefings. Place maps, including meteorological and sector data maps, where they can be viewed by all staff members.

2.1.2 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

Narrative

The EOF is located at the River Bend Training Center. A separate room was set aside for the State emergency response personnel, where the following activities were performed: dose assessment analysis, field team coordination and communication with

field teams. The accident assessment advisor and dose assessment advisor were located immediately outside this room so they could coordinate with the utility personnel and have better access to all the utility data, charts and maps that were displayed. The room had adequate space, furniture, lighting and telephones to accommodate the staff. The noise level in the room at times was high and interfered with communications with the field teams.

The field team locations could be displayed better on the visual maps. Colored pins were set up but this method was unworkable because of the plastic plume "key-hole" which required an unobstructed map.

The accident and the dose assessment advisors and field team coordinator generally demonstrated their ability to get the job done. They demonstrated correct rationales for the decisions made, with the following few exceptions: One rationale used in judging whether to evacuate to 5 miles versus 10 miles was questionable. The dose assessment analyst performed unessential and time consuming calculations. Also, the field teams dosimeter ranges are questionable.

Recovery manager briefings were very competently conducted, timely, and informative without going into extraneous detail.

There was very close coordination between the utility, state field teams and coordinators. Also, there was very close coordination between accident and dose assessment advisors, especially when accident classification changes were about to be made. Before they were dispatched, utility field teams were given a very thorough briefing which included their maximum dose for the day (500 millirems).

Contacts were made regularly with deployed field teams to remind them to check and record dosimeter readings.

Periodic radiation screening in the EOF was initiated when potentially contaminated people started coming in.

"This is a drill" message was used very frequently over the radio to prevent any misunderstanding in case the messages were intercepted.

The State field team controller was aware of dose limits established for the field team members - graded responses at 1, 5 and 25 rem.

Activation of State staff was done at the LNED headquarters in Baton Rouge and the team members arrived at the EOF at 1:25 p.m. about 10 minutes before the General Emergency was declared. They coordinated protective actions with the utility prior to their issuance.

Good communications were available between the EOF, State and parish EOCs. Primary communications were by a dedicated line with secondary communications by radio. Conferencing was available for all (EOF, State and locals). Hard copy devices were also available at the EOF, state and local EOCs. There were delays in sending hard copies from the EOF. This will be discussed further under the Utility Support Section.

The scenario was adequate to provide enough activity for the state personnel at the EOF. They were kept busy throughout the day dealing with the changing conditions and coordinating actions with other officials.

Coordination was demonstrated between the decision makers for the utility and State EOF representatives in the de-escalation and termination of the exercise.

DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CATEGORY "A" DEFICIENCIES - NONE

CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES - NONE

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Description: Dosimeter ranges are questionable if field members are expected to report in at 1 rem as the evaluator was told. It is difficult to tell $\frac{1}{2}$ rem from $1\frac{1}{2}$ rem, for example, on a 0-20 rem dosimeter.

Recommendation: Consideration should be given to the proper range dosimeters which are needed by field teams. The State should coordinate with the utility, which appears to have a different philosophy.

- Description: Consideration was given, at approximately 2:15 p.m., to evacuating out to 10 miles instead of 5. The decision (5 miles) was supported by three rationales: (1) an extremely long (8 hr) default time, (2) anticipated wind shift, and (3) radiation release rate had already started to decline. The third rationale, according to the evaluator, was improper since the plant was still not under control and was, in fact, headed for a meltdown until 3:00 p.m., at which time the reactor core was successfully reflooded.

Recommendation: Decision makers should review the kinds of mitigating circumstances which are appropriate to use in judgment calls.

- Description: Field team locations were difficult to discern on the displays. Colored pins were set up but this method was unworkable because of the plastic plume "key hole" which required an unobstructed map.

Recommendation: Improve graphics display to show present location of field teams, en-route status, etc.

- Description: The dose assessment analyst spent practically the entire time going through the calculator program. The complete program was run through each time even when almost all the new data were unchanged.

Recommendation: In many cases the new results could be estimated with sufficient precision for decision making. This was

discussed at the end of the exercise and corrected by the players without prompting.

- Description: Background noise in the EOF interfered with field team communications.

Recommendations: Either improve noise insulation or isolate the two (utility and state) field team radios. The partitions used throughout the EOF make the walls essentially transparent to noise.

2.1.3 Radiological Field Monitoring Operations

Narrative

Three teams were involved during the exercise. An overview summarizing their performance is provided below. The field teams were activated and mobilized at the Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division Office. Since the exercise occurred during office hours, team members did not need special call-up procedures. The special call-up method is as follows: Each member has a call-up list at home as well as at the office. The state EOC (manned 24 hours a day) also has a list of these members, and they can be paged at anytime day or night. A call-out list is then used to mobilize the staff at the LNED office. The LNED chief did assemble his staff following each change in Emergency Action Levels (EAL) to inform them of the current status at the plant. The briefings were clear, precise and complete. Several briefings were held to keep teams informed of current conditions. When teams were dispatched, they were reminded of special procedures (communications back-up, exposure control, contamination control, etc.). These briefings also were exceptionally good and complete.

Equipment and supplies were pre-packaged, but a check list was used as they were checked out to the monitoring teams prior to deployment. The kits were complete and contained miscellaneous items that could prove useful in the monitoring

environment. One kit had only one set of anti-C clothing. Sets should be provided for both team members.

All teams had the required equipment for taking samples. The equipment is used routinely by the team members; it is calibrated and checked on a regular schedule.

The vehicles used could be operated in off-road activities if necessary.

All procedures were reviewed for measurement of airborne radioiodine and for collection of environmental samples. The air sampling technique was adequate and demonstrated proficiently. Due to a heavy thunderstorm at the time, sample collections were not actually made; however, each team explained in detail the requirements and their procedures for collecting these samples. All evaluators agreed that all three teams could have satisfactorily accomplished the sample collection activities and should be given credit for them. No monitoring techniques were demonstrated other than in-vehicle readings due to the weather.

Communications were generally good. All personnel were well trained in this area. Background noise at the EOF made it difficult to understand some transmissions.

Team #2 had some trouble "keying" the radio to make sure they were transmitting; however, they watched for the deflection of the alternator gauge on the instrument panel to assure that they were transmitting.

All teams were well trained and conscientiously tried to keep exposure to an absolute minimum. Attention was given to reading pocket dosimeters although they did not have the low-range models. Very good training of the teams was reflected in all their activities. They were aware of their locations in relation to the plume and potential exposure. At one point, the team leader directed Team #1 to proceed to a "low background area." The team responded with a request for verification of the direction and location of this "low background area" rather than proceed unknowingly.

The scenario appeared to be adequate for exercising the monitoring team activities; however, there were several times of inactivity. The scenario provided

realism in the "maximum release rate of 32 curies per second and the resulting dose projections downwind." The weather conditions prevented the collecting of soil and vegetation samples.

DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CATEGORY "A" DEFICIENCY - NONE

CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCY - NONE

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Description: Only one set of "Anti-C" gear was available in the monitoring kit of Team #2. If it were needed, both monitors would probably be required to suit up.

Recommendation: Two "Anti-C" suits should be placed in each kit.

- Description: The survey meter was not turned on until the monitoring Team #2 arrived in the vicinity of the plume path. This practice could result in the team being in a radiation area without realizing it due to errors, getting lost, etc.

Recommendation: The survey meter should be turned on when the vehicle is moving in response to such a radiological emergency.

- Description: Background noise at the EOF created some difficulty in receiving messages by the field team.

Recommendation: Recommendations for correction are addressed under the EOF section of this report.

2.1.4 Media Relations — Joint Information Center

Narrative

All media relations, including issuance of press releases and press briefings by State and local governments and the utility, emanate from a Joint Information Center (JIC) established at the GSU Training Center, St. Francisville. Representative Public Information Officers (PIOs) from each of the five parishes, LOEP, LNED and the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency are located during an exercise or real event, in one room set aside for off-site media activities.

The structure of media activities has been designed so that control is assumed by GSU. A GSU staff member serves as the JIC Director. He conducts all press briefings and makes all verbal announcements to the PIOs in the off-site coordination room. Coordination within this room of all PIOs is handled by a GSU employee designated as the Off-Site Coordinator. She reports directly to the JIC Director.

The physical arrangement of the room was adequate for the exercise. Sufficient telephones were available. There was a need for more than one typist, particularly at those times before press briefings when the PIOs, upon advice from the coordinator, prepared their news releases. One typist and typewriter served the five parishes and three State agencies (LNED, LOEP, Mississippi Division of Emergency Management).

The call-up procedures provide for each Parish or State EOC dispatcher to notify their PIOs at the Site Area Emergency. At that time they report either to the JIC or EOC, depending upon their assignment. Full staffing and round-the-clock capabilities were not planned, but all agencies were represented by one or more PIO.

Activation and staffing were accomplished in a timely manner. A call to activate the JIC was placed at 10:43 a.m. and arrival of PIOs began with the 11:06 a.m. arrival of the West Feliciana Parish PIOs. The plan is to staff the JIC with representatives from each Parish, with another PIO located in each Parish EOC for liaison between the EOC and the JIC. In some of the parishes, the PIO was the telefax

operator. Additional training is needed especially for those PIOs assigned to the EOC. Reports received from evaluators at the local EOCs show that these representatives need additional training and guidance in their PIO duties if they are to capably fulfill the liaison role between the PIOs of the JIC and the EOCs.

All PIOs at the JIC appeared to function cooperatively together. Evaluators at the parish EOCs noted that in many cases, the PIOs at the EOCs were not aware of what was taking place at the JIC. Communications capability from the JIC off-site coordination room consists of individual desk commercial telephone lines for each agency and telefax equipment located in the information production room across the hall. As soon as they reported for duty they telephoned their representative agencies to give their phone and telefax numbers and activate their stations at the JIC. Contact by LOEP is made to the Interagency Government Affairs Representative who has direct contact with the Governor. The LNED PIO contacts the Administrator or Manager of Nuclear Projects Section until the EOF is activated. Demonstration of secondary communication methods was not planned for this exercise.

Rumor control, another media activity, is also conducted from the JIC. A separate room with a GSU coordinator and five telephone operators manned the activities. The staffing consisted of only GSU employees, but it was stated that parish representatives have been obtained for future exercises or a real event. These parish representatives should be called upon to serve during the next exercise since State and local agencies also have a responsibility, by their plans, for rumor control.

The Rumor Control Center functioned extremely well. It was well organized and very effectively manned. Rumors or questions were taken by the Rumor Control Coordinator to the appropriate representative PIO for verification or answers, and then the problem (with the answer provided to the public) was written on large paper and taped around the room for quick, easy reference by the staff. The design and operation

of the joint rumor control function provided a model for achieving a workable, united effort in controlling rumors and answering the concerns of the citizens within the area.

The overall concept of a Joint Information Center (utility-state-local) for conducting media activities is excellent. Five parishes and three state agencies worked cooperatively together. However, there were several problems observed during the functioning of the JIC. They need attention and correcting, but they should not negate the effectiveness of a joint media center for coordination of all information to the news media.

The utility assumed the primary role for all activities at the JIC. This included management of the Off-Site Coordination Room where all PIOs were located. There was a tendency on the part of the PIOs to await leadership of GSU rather than to initiate actions on their own. This fact may have contributed to the excessive delays in issuance of press releases by the PIOs, as well as other problems noted. Both State and local PIOs should initiate an active role in the operation of media functions during future exercises in order to fulfill the primary responsibility role assigned to them in the State and local plans. Specifically, a coordinator for the Off-Site Coordination Room should be selected from the State and local PIOs to serve in a leadership role for those PIOs both at the JIC and the five parishes. This would ensure that off-site PIO activities are carried out in accordance with responsibilities set forth in the plans.

A status board at the front was used to document events, but entries on this board did not contain the time of the entry on the board or the time the announcement was made to the PIOs. For example, the JIC Director verbally announced to the PIOs at 2:25 p.m. that the General Emergency was declared at 1:35 p.m. The entry on the status board showed only the 1:35 p.m. declaration time. A lapse of 50 minutes before the Director announced this to the PIOs is excessive. The 12:15 Site Area Emergency was not announced to the PIOs until 12:55 p.m. Press briefings, although sufficient in number, should have been more frequent according to need. For example, the JIC

Director and PIOs were in a press briefing from 1:15 to 1:40 p.m. during which time a General Emergency was declared. The press briefing concluded at 1:40, but another press briefing, at which time the General Emergency was announced to the media, did not take place until 2:50 p.m.

PIOs were reminded before briefings to check with their own EOCs and draft their releases for the upcoming joint briefing. According to the state plan (Ch.4, IIB, p. 44) "Emergency public information will be accomplished through news releases by the facility and key response organization spokespersons." The State and local REP plans provide that the news media will be promptly and completely informed by the facility and appropriate governmental agencies. Each parish spokesperson (PIO) has primary responsibility for releasing information to the news media regarding his parish.

Another problem noted was the location in the room of the evacuation sector and EPZ maps. They were leaned against the walls inside the entrance and were not easily visible to the representatives. They should be placed in direct view of the PIOs and formally referred to by whoever is addressing the group on Protective Action Recommendations during the exercise.

Televisions for viewing press briefings had been placed in the Rumor Control and Off-site Coordination rooms for those staff members remaining in the rooms during briefings. The staff members were to monitor the questions asked by the media such as requests for statistical and other data. The problem with this arrangement was that no one could hear or understand the questions from the audience attending the briefing. An audience microphone should be used in future exercises or a real event to correct this problem.

Another problem noted was in coordination between the parish PIOs at the local EOCs and the PIOs stationed in the off-site coordination room at the JIC. According to the plan the parish PIOs are to coordinate with the PIOs at the JIC and vice versa in all actions relating to media relations. Evaluators at the parish EOCs reported that several

of the PIOs were confused concerning their own roles and the role of the counterpart PIO at the JIC. In some of the parishes, the telefax operator served as the Parish PIO. These problems could be corrected by selecting a PIO as coordinator of all PIOs, by involving all PIOs in joint training session to delineate responsibilities, and by the PIOs at the JIC initiating an active leadership role in media relations.

DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CATEGORY "A" DEFICIENCIES - NONE

CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES - NONE

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Description: The media activities of the PIOs at the JIC were directed by GSU. The State plan (Ch. 4, IIB, p. 44) identifies that State and Parish PIOs have responsibilities as spokespersons for providing emergency public information through the news releases to the media. Their dual assignments include: Developing news releases from accurate, up-to-date information from their respective Parish EOCs as well as obtaining from those EOCs concurrence with reports and data generated from the JIC; and providing the news media with prompt and accurate information relative to their parishes.

Recommendation: Coordination of State and Parish PIO activities at the Joint Information Center should be directed by either State or local PIOs. In this role, the PIOs should aggressively initiate more timely actions such as coordination with PIOs at EOCs, development of press releases, and public briefings.

- Description: Important information to the media was delayed to the extent that when presented it was not, in some cases, the most up-to-date information. Press briefings, although sufficient in number, were not timely to serve the media needs in a real situation.

Recommendation: Press briefings should provide information that is timely and representative of the situation as it exists at that time. State/local PIOs at the JIC should request press briefings when needed rather than await the discretion of the JIC Director who may not have knowledge of the state/local need for a press conference.

- Description: Questions from the press during news briefings could not be heard over the TV sets in PIO room or Rumor Control Center; thus, those representatives remaining in room during briefings could not determine the needs for data (such as number of people affected, potential rumors) which they needed to obtain from the EOCs, etc. The Rumor Control personnel were using these news briefings to obtain questions on rumors for which they could prepare responses to people calling in.

Recommendation: Obtain an audience microphone for press briefings and require media to use it; or have responder repeat questions asked before attempting to respond.

- Description: EPZ and sector maps were not placed where they could be easily referenced by PIOs. Question regarding PARs for Sector 16 could have been clarified by use of the maps.

Recommendation: Place appropriate maps at front of PIO room and formally reference them when leading discussions with PIOs.

- Description: No copies of State and local plans were provided in room.

Recommendation: Provide one or two reference copies of State and local plans for use by PIOs.

- Description: Facilities for the media while reasonably adequate for exercise, probably would be crowded during a real event; typing needs in PIO room during a real event would require more than one typist and typewriter.

Recommendation: Expand facilities in future for use by media; provide an additional secretary and typewriter in off-site coordination room during future exercises.

- Description Rumor Control was handled exclusively by GSU employees, although State and local plans assign responsibilities for Rumor Control to the representative PIOs as well as the utility.

Recommendation: Provide trained Parish personnel to staff Rumor Control Center jointly with GSU personnel.

2.2 LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

Evaluations of local government operations include the following: West Feliciana Parish EOC and Traffic Control Points; East Feliciana Parish EOC; Pointe Coupee Parish EOC; West/Baton Rouge Parish EOC; East Baton Rouge Parish EOC and Traffic Control Points; and monitoring, decontamination and registration procedures at the Reception Center at Riverside Centroplex, East Baton Rouge; and decontamination activities at Zachary High School.

2.2.1 West Feliciana Parish EOC

Narrative

At 10:15 a.m. the utility notified the Sheriff's office jail via "hotline" that an "unusual event" had been declared. The Sheriff's office immediately contacted the Civil Defense (CD) Director via telephone to alert him of the situation. The Sheriff's Office jail received another call from the plant via the hotline at 10:40 a.m. notifying them that the incident at the plant had been escalated to an "alert status." The communicator at the Sheriff's office again passed this message on to the CD Director via telephone. After calling the CD Director, the communicator then relocated to the EOC. A hotline is also available at the EOC. The EOC was activated by the CD Director and operational in a short period of time. Commercial telephone and radio are available as backup for alerting and notification. The staff can be contacted at any hour. The remaining staff were notified by telephone and soon began arriving at the EOC. The EOC was fully staffed with volunteers at 12:07 p.m. The EOC received the "Site Area Emergency" at 12:37 p.m. and the "General Emergency" at 1:56 p.m.

Upon activation of the EOC, two PIOs were sent to the Joint Information Center (JIC) at the EOF to represent West Feliciana Parish. The EOC also had a designated PIO who would communicate with the two PIOs at the JIC.

Staffing of the EOC included the CD Director, Assistant CD Director, Police Jury, Mayor, Communicator, Radef Officer, Transportation, PIO, Sheriff's Department, Police Department, Fire Department, School Board, Security and GSU liaison. Other staff were put on stand-by status.

The Police Jury President was in authority; however, as called for in the plan, the CD Director directed the EOC Operations. He was firmly in charge and demonstrated good management capabilities. Periodic briefings were held, and some of the staff were involved in decision making as necessary. However, other staff were not asked to provide input at the briefings. Had this been done, the entire EOC staff would

have been aware of all activities that were taking place rather than only those directly involving them. A copy of the plan was available as were written procedures, checklists, and a scenario book. Message handling was adequate; however, a master message log (in and out) was not kept. Messages would be distributed, and the CD Director would then announce them to the EOC staff. Access to the EOC was controlled by a local police officer, and all people entering the EOC were signed in and given a badge.

The West Feliciana EOC is located in the St. Francisville Town Hall. The EOC had adequate space, lighting, furniture, and telephones. Backup power and sleeping facilities were not available; however, this will not be a problem when the new EOC is completed next door at the fire station. The new EOC being built is more than adequate to support their emergency operations. A status board was effectively displayed and kept up to date. Maps illustrating the EPZ with sectors labeled and evacuation routes were also displayed. Other required maps were available and used by EOC staff.

The EOC has a direct line (hotline) to the utility. However, as mentioned previously, initial notification prior to an "alert status" is via hotline from the utility to the Sheriff's Office Jail. Once the EOC is activated, communication is switched to the EOC. Generally, the communications worked well with various back-up systems available (commercial telephones, FAX, sheriff's radio, fire radio, CD radio). There were several problems with the FAX system; messages were lost or were very late. Furthermore, the time the message was sent was often not shown. Also, the message form indicated that the information being sent was good up to 11:50 a.m. This time never changed from message to message even when it was clear that the message was from a much later time. There was no communications between local EOCs. This becomes a problem when one EOC takes action that could affect emergency operations at another EOC.

The local EOC has little responsibility for public alerting other than sounding the sirens at the time designated by the state. Sirens were activated (simulated) at 2:15 p.m.

prior to EBS activation. EBS messages are written by the State and the message is then to be confirmed at the local EOC for concurrence before broadcasting. This never took place. There needs to be more coordination and more involvement from the local EOC concerning the procedure, etc. for activation of sirens and EBS messages. This was very obvious from the local EOC level. Messages that were broadcast involved description of evacuation and shelter areas by familiar boundaries and landmarks.

The local EOC has no responsibility for dose projections or making protective action recommendation.

Access control points were promptly activated as protective actions were ordered. Although they do not have enough local manpower to totally control access, assistance is available from the State police upon request. The State police used their boats to stop river traffic until the Coast Guard could respond.

It is the responsibility of the state to activate reception centers. The State plan states that they will activate at the site area emergency. The local EOC called the reception center to verify that it was open and advise them of an approximate number of people to expect. At this time, the location of mobility-impaired individuals is not known. They are currently collecting information to verify those individuals. A call was placed to the local hospital to determine how many people would have to be evacuated and if special transportation arrangements would be necessary. There are not enough local school buses to evacuate all school children but arrangements have been made to request assistance from other school districts to ensure a sufficient number of buses will be available if needed. The parish agricultural agent would work with farmers and food processing people to implement all necessary protective actions.

Radiological exposure control was demonstrated. The EOC was equipped with 0-20 R and 0-200 R direct reading dosimeters, dosimeter chargers, record keeping cards and survey meters. Permanent record dosimeters were not available but have been ordered. Direct reading dosimeters were zeroed and distributed, along with simulated

permanent record dosimeters, record keeping cards and instructions to all emergency workers. The RADEF officer also instructed workers on how often to read their dosimeters (every half hour) and to record the readings on their cards. Every half hour a set timer rang to remind all staff to read and record their dosimeters. Periodic surveying was also done by the RADEF officer. The EOC did not have KI but the State would provide if it was necessary. Little information was available to emergency workers on decontamination procedures. The State would be expected to handle decontamination.

The RADEF officer did not start to monitor people entering the EOC until two hours after there had been a release of radioactive materials. When he did start, emergency workers were allowed into the EOC before they were monitored for contamination. Therefore, the EOC and other workers could be unnecessarily contaminated. It is clear that there is too much work for one person to handle. Additional RADEF personnel are needed to assist in the RADEF areas of responsibilities.

Recovery and reentry procedures were not demonstrated. The local EOC would expect help from the State and the local agricultural agent during this time. It is evident that additional training on these procedures is necessary.

The local exercise objectives assigned to West Feliciana Parish were adequately met with exception of the following objectives: (1) "Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure;" (2) "Demonstrate organizational ability and resources necessary to evacuate mobility-impaired individuals within the affected area." Also the objective for recovery and reentry, "Demonstrate decision making and coordination with the State and Utility in de-escalating and terminating the emergency," was not tested.

DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CATEGORY "A" - NONE

CATEGORY "B" -

2. Description: The RADEF officer did not survey emergency workers for contamination until two hours after there was a release of radioactivity from the plant. Furthermore, emergency workers were allowed to enter the EOC before being surveyed; thus the EOC and its staff could be unnecessarily contaminated (NUREG-0654, II., K.3.a.).

Recommendation: Emergency workers should be surveyed for contamination outside the EOC after there has been a release of radioactive materials from the River Bend Plant.

3. Description: A listing of the locations of mobility-impaired residents within the Parish had not been completed; therefore, demonstration of this exercise objective was not accomplished (NUREG-0654, J.10.d).

Recommendation: Complete process of obtaining listing of all mobility-impaired within Parish and demonstrate means for evacuation during next exercise.

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND RECOMMENDATION

- Description: The RADEF Officer had too much work to be effective in his job. He had to zero 30-50 dosimeters, fill out record cards, survey the building and personnel as well as other duties.

Recommendation: Additional RADEF personnel are necessary to provide adequate radiological exposure control at the EOC.

- Description: Department Heads were not requested to give periodic briefings of their activities. Others in the EOC were not aware of each other's activities. This could cause problems when one's actions affect the operations of another.

Recommendation: The CD Director should require his Department Heads to give status reports at periodic briefings throughout an event to keep everyone at the EOC abreast of all activities.

- Description: There was little communication between EOCs. This became a problem when one EOC learned that river traffic had been blocked by a barge. This had an effect on one of the possible evacuation routes for West Feliciana Parish.

Recommendation: EOCs should be in contact with each other and update each other regarding activities that may effect another EOC.

- Description: Little knowledge of recovery and reentry procedures was known or discussed.

Recommendation: EOC staff should be provided more training on recovery and reentry procedures.

Traffic Control

One access control point was established by the Sheriff of West Feliciana Parish at the intersection of Highway LA-10 and Bains Road. According to the deputy, the emergency personnel arrived at this location at 2:39 p.m.

Other access control points were listed in the scenario and were marked on the RBS 10-mile EPZ map.

The deputy at the check point did not have evacuation route maps with him but stated they were available. Equipment to keep the route open consists of three

commercial wreckers. However, no clearing of traffic obstruction was demonstrated. Personnel at the location were familiar with the evacuation routes and location of reception centers. They were able to communicate with the EOC by radio. Actual problems which occurred during the exercise were handled capably by the sheriff and local police.

The EOC staff demonstrated capability for handling traffic control should a real emergency occur at RBS.

DEFICIENCIES, AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CATEGORY "A" DEFICIENCIES - NONE

CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES - NONE

AREA FOR IMPROVEMENT -- NONE

2.2.2 East Feliciana Parish EOC

Narrative

East Feliciana Parish, located within the 10-mile EPZ, had adequate facilities and resources for performing emergency response functions. Maps of evacuation routes and relocation points were clearly visible to all participants. They did request desk-size maps for individual use during future exercises. A call to activate the EOC was received at 10:40 a.m. The call was verified and mobilization procedures initiated using an up-to-date call list. Call-up system consists of a phone, pagers and tone-alert radios.

Staffing was completed at 11:17 and was adequate for the exercise. Proper delegation of authority was demonstrated by the Civil Defense Director. His duties during the exercise were performed well. He demonstrated ability to locate or determine procedures to effectively carry out the emergency response plan for unusual situations, i.e., train wrecks or house fires.

There is adequate availability of communication equipment (both primary and backup). Personnel efficiently demonstrated capabilities for operation of all equipment. Primary communication devices were the dedicated hotline, telefax, radios, tone-alert radios and telephones. Backup communication equipment was the same as primary; however, utilization would vary depending upon the source and recipient of the information. It was observed that the sheriff's phone does not have a direct connection to the sheriff's office in Clinton. Present capabilities require calling a third number to contact someone in the sheriff's office.

Times documented for notification to the EOC of key actions or events of the exercise are as follows: Alert - 10:35 a.m.; Site Area Emergency - 12:40 p.m.; General Emergency - 2:00 p.m. In response to the General Emergency, the Parish EOC sounded the sirens (simulated) at 2:15, activated the EBS, dispatched vehicles, and called the school, recreational facilities, and other special institutions at 2:15, and activated tone alert radios at 2:18 p.m. Evacuation was advised for Sector 9 and sheltering for Sector 8.

Protective actions were the strongest facets of this EOC's participation in the exercise. The players demonstrated adequate capabilities in setting up road-blocks, evacuating school pupils, and locating and assisting handicapped persons. The State would be responsible for sheltering and administering KI to 1200 persons in the hospital and state prison located within East Feliciana Parish.

The East Feliciana EOC maintained the proper dosimetry equipment. Radiological exposure control equipment consisted of low and high range dosimeters, chargers, record keeping cards and permanent record dosimeters. No potassium iodide was on hand as distribution and actual administration would be handled by State officials, as explained by the Civil Defense Director.

The role of public information officer at the Parish EOC was filled by the telefax operator. He read information received via the Omnifax and distributed hard copies in a timely manner after receipt. The machine was not transmitting properly however, and

messages took about 25-30 minutes to transmit at times. The utility attributed this to the new installation of the equipment. The roles should be clarified of the East Feliciana PIOs assigned to both the parish EOC and the Joint Information Center. Training should be provided in these roles and coordination improved between PIOs at the two locations. According to the plan, the PIO has the primary responsibility for interfacing with the media on all news releases. The PIO at the parish would be removed from that role, providing only liaison duties, by virtue of placement of another East Feliciana PIO at the JIC. Delays in communication between the two may have resulted in some of the delays noted in media activities.

The attention at the EOC to recovery and reentry procedures consisted only of a brief discussion. The planners did appear to possess knowledge of their respective responsibilities during recovery and reentry.

The evaluator reported the situations of the scenario were adequate for testing the capabilities of East Feliciana emergency response personnel and equipment.

With exception of the deficiency in communication capabilities, all objectives were met. The objective for recovery and reentry, "Demonstrate decision making and coordination with State and Utility in de-escalating and terminating the exercise," was not tested.

DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CATEGORY "A" DEFICIENCIES - NONE

CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES

4. Description: The sheriff's phone at the EOC does not have a direct line to the sheriff's office in Clinton. He must use an alternate number and have messages forwarded (NUREG-0654.F.1.a).

Recommendation: A direct line should be provided between either the Sheriff's Office or the EOC and the Sheriff's Office in Clinton.

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

- Description: An excessive delay was experienced in receiving information through the Omnifax at the EOC.

Recommendation: Determine the source (or sources) of all transmittal delays and correct the problem.

2.2.3 Pointe Coupee Parish EOC

Narrative

The Pointe Coupee Parish EOC is located in the courthouse in New Roads, Louisiana. The sheriff's squad room is used as the Emergency Operations Center. This area is used for day-to-day sheriff/police duties, with the sheriff's office and communications room located adjacent to the EOC room. Following completion of the new, planned sheriff's building, the emergency operations center will remain set up and ready for activation at any time. All appropriate amenities were available for use by the Staff. The required maps and displays were all available -- either posted on the wall, in the written procedures, or in the resource reference booklet. The Emergency Classification Status Board depicting classification, wind speed, sectors affected, time, etc. was updated and maintained throughout the exercise; but the "Emergency Action Log" posted on the wall was not used during this drill. It should have been kept current with activities, responses and all EOC generated actions such as simulated siren sounding, tone alert, activation and route alerting.

The facility is equipped for extended operations. All resources for operating the parish jail (located at the courthouse) are available for use by the EOC staff (bunks, showers, clothing, etc.). A full kitchen facility is also available. Back-up power to the police station and the EOC would be provided by the emergency diesel generating equipment located at the courthouse. At various times, the communications officer had considerable difficulty hearing incoming calls because of excessive noise.

Timely activation of the Pointe Coupee EOC was demonstrated. The EOC had been set up and equipped prior to the arrival of the staff. The direct, dedicated hotline to the utility (RBS) is used to receive the initial notification call. This line is manned on a 24-hour basis by the Parish Police dispatch/communications center. Upon receipt of the notification call, the communication officer relocated his operation to the EOC room. The initial activation call was received at the EOC at 10:17 a.m. from the RBS EOF and verified through the dedicated line. A call-down procedure was then implemented using a current, written call list available in the procedures booklet. A complete staff was present by 12:50. The first shift staff appeared to be adequately trained, knew their functions and duties, and displayed a professional and concerned attitude throughout the exercise. However, during one instance, written procedures were not sufficiently followed by the EOC Director. Second shift staffing was not an objective for the exercise and was not demonstrated. Trained, qualified back-up personnel for all agencies and departments at the EOC have not yet been obtained. The roster shows numerous second-shift positions which have not been filled. Staff members are attempting to find qualified persons to serve as second shift personnel. The key EOC staff positions do have trained back-up personnel available; many of these people were active at the EOC during the exercise.

Management operations at the EOC were effective. The EOC Director was in charge of operations and received adequate support from his staff. Periodic briefings were held which contained updated information and current status reports from all agencies and departments at the EOC. The Director informed staff members of any changes which would impact on their duties. Proposed actions and alternatives were discussed openly among the members. Written procedures were available for referencing; however, the staff appeared to know their responsibilities and duties, and seldom needed to reference the written plans. Copies of messages were kept by the

communications operator, and equipment was available to reproduce copies for distribution. Message logs were not kept although copies of all messages were.

The communications officer provided incoming messages directly to the EOC director. Free play actions were injected into the exercise by the controller at various times. These were dealt with as seriously as were the actual scenario activities.

A problem in message content was observed in the protective action recommendations and corresponding /AS (Protective Action Sectors). The 1:56 message of the General Emergency included inaccurate and confusing information on the evacuation sectors and protective action recommendations. There was no recommendation to shelter the 5-mile radius not involved in the 5-mile downwind evacuation. The sectors involved in the evacuation were not correctly communicated to the staff at the EOC. This problem was not picked up by the EOC staff but when pointed out by the observer, the EOC director (at 2:45) requested clarification of the message from the EOF. This verification message was received at the EOC at 3:30, 45 minutes after the request was made. The cause of this problem was not known at the EOC. It appeared that the communications officer did not record the message transmission properly, perhaps due to the excessive noise levels present in the EOC.

Communications systems at the EOC are excellent. Multiple, redundant and back-up systems are available and functioned well during the exercise. Primary communication with the RBS is via the dedicated hotline (Blue Phone). In addition, this system can be used to talk with any or all of the Parish EOCs, the JIC and the State. Back-up communications with RBS could be through any of the numerous systems available - four dedicated telephone hard lines, commercial telephones, CD radio (provided to the EOC by RBS), police radio, facsimile machine over dedicated telephone line, and teletype machine. Additionally, a ham radio is connected through a repeater in Baton Rouge. It has the capability to communicate through any other ham radio or

through commercial telephones. The above systems are used as primary and back-up systems between all the participating agencies and various locations.

The equipment available and the personnel operating it adequately demonstrated ability to communicate with all required locations, organizations, and field personnel. Although not an exercise objective, back-up communication systems were available and utilized by the staff.

For reasons unknown, verification of four messages were held and not transmitted over the fax machine as they were generated from the EOF. These messages were all transmitted simultaneously along with the General Emergency message at 2:17. A similar problem occurred at 3:30 when messages 8, 9, 10, and 11 all came in at one time, with verification message 8 arriving 2 hours late. Message flow was minimal between the local Parish EOCs. Improved communications would provide an increase in capabilities of the EOC's emergency responses.

Although simulated, the Pointe Coupee EOC was required to play an active role in public alerting. They are responsible for sounding the sirens located within the Parish boundaries as well as activating the tone alert radios located at the schools, nursing homes, power plants and the state park. The initiating call for protective actions was received from the EOF at 1:56 alerting the EOC of the declaration at 1:35 and providing them with protective action recommendations. These recommendations were incomplete and erroneous; they did not include the shelter message for the 5-mile sectors not involved in the evacuation. Also, evacuated sectors were not accurately described - the exact message read as follows: "Evacuate 2 mile radius sector 4 and 9-1, 5 mile downwind 2-9." A clarification message was requested at 2:52 but not received until 3:30. It read: "evacuate 2 mile radius (PAS 1), Evacuate 5 mile downwind (PAS 4-9) Shelter 5 mile radius (PAS 2,3,8,16). Alert schools, institutions, recreational areas 5 mile radius." The EOC staff did not detect the errors in the initial message and neglected to (simulate) activate the siren system and the tone alert radios; there were no follow-up

messages received concerning the sounding of the sirens. The EOC staff simply overlooked the siren (simulated) activation, tone alert radios and any follow-up verification messages.

Protective action activities at the Pointe Coupee Parish were minimal. All demonstrations were by simulation at the EOC level. There were no planned field activities required by the scenario. According to the staff, appropriate resources are available to provide personnel and equipment for traffic control, access control, and maintenance of evacuation routes. A mail-in survey form to identify mobility-impaired persons and establish a written list has been initiated and will soon be completed. Provisions were adequately addressed for transporting school children if an evacuation order is declared. Buses are owned by their drivers, and the drivers are notified by the school principals by commercial telephones.

Radiological exposure control at this EOC was adequate. All required dosimetry equipment is available (Hi-range, Mid-range, and TLDs). This equipment was distributed during the exercise to all appropriate field personnel and EOC staff members. Dosimeters are charged and maintained by a RADEF officer on a six-month periodic maintenance schedule. Instructions for their use and record cards for recording readings were distributed along with the dosimeters at Site Area Emergency, 12:29. Numerous dosimeters were not properly zeroed when they were issued. This was known by the RADEF Officer and he cautioned the players to be aware of it and make appropriate readings. KI and its use was not an exercise objective and was not demonstrated.

Although it was an exercise objective, recovery and reentry were not discussed or addressed by the Pointe Coupee Staff. There were no messages received from the State instructing them on any procedures or precautions.

The scenario activities were adequate for activating and establishing EOC operations. However, there were not enough activities to keep a continuous emergency response going at the EOC. All activities were simulated (except activation) thereby not

providing enough actions to adequately test the full potential of the emergency staff. Free play messages were injected by the controller to provide some additional activities for EOC personnel during some of the exercise dead times. It is recommended that future scenarios provide more activities requiring activation of the field personnel in Pointe Coupee Parish which would result in greater activity at the EOC as well. It was learned during the exercise that public information brochures have not been received by all residents requiring them.

DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CATEGORY "A" DEFICIENCIES - NONE

CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES

5. Description: One of the exercise objectives was demonstration of coordination among the parishes and State EOC. Effective coordination was not demonstrated among Pointe Coupee and the other EOCs and RBS in public alerting and instructions. This was not simulated at Pointe Coupee Parish (NUREG-0654,A.2.a,E.5,6.).

Recommendation: Coordination with other agencies during the public alerting and notification activities should be demonstrated and evaluated at the next exercise.

6. Description: Protective action recommendations were not correct or complete; sheltering recommendations were not included in the initial message. Request for clarification and correction was made but no response received until 43 minutes later (NUREG-0654,E.).

Recommendation: Protective action recommendations should include all appropriate and correct information for the local parishes. The source of this error in the PAR and the reason for

the delayed correction should be investigated and corrective measures initiated to prevent its recurrence.

7. Description: A listing of the locations of mobility-impaired residents within the Parish has not been completed; therefore, demonstration of this exercise objective was not accomplished (NUREG-0654,J.10.d).

Recommendation: Complete process of obtaining listing of all mobility-impaired within Parish and demonstrate means for evacuation during next exercise.

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Description: Crowding and noise control were problems in the EOC operations room. At numerous times the communications officer had to request the staff to reduce the noise level so that transmission could be heard.

Recommendation: Provide noise reduction system and relocate the security guard outside the main EOC room to provide additional room.

- Description: A log of incoming/outgoing messages was not maintained. Hard copies of incoming/outgoing messages were available but were not logged for easy reference.

Recommendation: EOC staff should initiate a logging system to record messages, and should demonstrate this system during next exercise.

- Description: The Emergency Action Log Board in the EOC was not used during the exercise. The use of this board is needed to improve operations.

Recommendation: The Emergency Action Log Board should be used to record all significant response events during future exercises and any real event.

- Description: There was no interaction between the local Parish EOCs. Communication flow and discussion would have improved emergency responses.

Recommendation: Establish procedures and provide training to improve the flow of information between the five parish EOCs.

- Description: A list of alternatives and back-up personnel was not complete. All emergency staff positions were not provided with adequate back-up assignments in case of a real emergency.

Recommendation: Complete the process already initiated to obtain qualified personnel as back-up staff.

2.2.4 West Baton Rouge Parish EOC

Narrative

The West Baton Rouge Parish EOC is located in the Civil Defense Office, Port Allen, Louisiana. Only a small portion of the parish lies within the 10-mile EPZ. Coordination was very effectively administered by the Civil Defense Director. He held briefings, delegated responsibilities and consulted with his staff members.

Each staff member had a workbook for the exercise which contained directions and related checklists. This appeared to be an efficient method with exception of the designation of the area for vehicle decontamination. According to the RADEF Officer's Workbook, this area was to be selected by the EOC Director. In another workbook, the location had been written in by hand.

The communications system consists of a dedicated landline (hotline) connecting the Parish EOC with RBS. It is continuously monitored, and rings in the dispatcher's

office as well as the EOC office. Back-up communication capabilities are present through use of the facsimile system and commercial telephones. Calls were received by the police dispatcher at 10:16 and 10:35 to inform the Parish of the Unusual Event and Alert classifications. There was a period of time when the EOC was unable to communicate with the EOF via the facsimile but communication with other EOCs remained intact.

Staff mobilization procedures were effectively demonstrated using a call list. The EOC was staffed by the Civil Defense Director, Public Information Officer, Dispatcher/Communicator, RADEF Officer and members of the police department, mayor's office and police jury. Later the arrival of representatives from the agricultural extension office, sanitary district, school district, council on aging and the utility company completed the staffing for the exercise. Although round-the-clock staffing was not demonstrated, the parish plan lists both primary and back-up members. In many cases, both representatives participated in the exercise. All EOC staff appeared adequately trained. The number of telephones, while adequate for this scenario's activities, could prove inadequate under a situation that stressed the EOC's capabilities.

Coordination should be improved among the EOCs with respect to alerting and instruction. The Public Notification System was not yet operational. However, the EOC could have simulated this activity to test their activation process and their objective for demonstrating coordination with the other parishes and the State EOC. The scenario and direction of the plume did not necessitate demonstration of any protective actions such as sheltering, evacuation, or traffic and access control. The staff members did discuss handling traffic control, general population evacuation, and special evacuation problems. Addresses of the approximately 90 residents residing within the EPZ and bus routes were available, as were the locations of the two individuals requiring special assistance.

Both high-range and low-range dosimeters were available. Concern for their adequacy was raised; but it was decided the number was sufficient since additional

dosimeters could be easily obtained if needed. The confusion as to which group, and under what conditions, could receive specific doses of radiation was resolved by consulting the plans and the RADEF Officer.

Any briefings to the media center at the Joint Information Center were made through the facsimile equipment. The parish had a PIO in the EOC to serve as liaison with the WBR representatives at the JIC.

A staff member conscientiously kept the status board updated with all major undertakings of the EOC, as well as with all emergency action levels. Other necessary maps were posted. These showed the EPZ on which the plume was tracked and protective action sectors, evacuation routes and relocation centers noted. Only two roads within the parish provide access to the EPZ. Reference, using the map, was made to the locations of the two mobility-impaired residents within the parish.

The exercise objective which relates to recovery and reentry, "Demonstrate decisionmaking and coordination with the State and Utility in de-escalating and terminating the exercise," was not tested.

With exception of the exercise objective to "demonstrate decisionmaking and coordination of the alerting process" other objectives assigned to West Baton Rouge Parish were demonstrated.

DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMENDATIONS

CATEGORY "A" DEFICIENCIES - NONE

CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES - NONE

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND RECOMMENDATION

- Description: One exercise objective was demonstration of effective coordination among the parishes and State EOC. Effective coordination was not demonstrated among the other

EOCs and RBS in public alerting and instructions. This was not simulated at the West Baton Rouge Parish EOC.

Recommendation: Coordination with other agencies during the public alerting and notification activities should be demonstrated and evaluated during the next exercise.

- Description: The times for some messages were not logged on the message sheet.

Recommendation: Assure that all message sheets have a space for showing the time of the message and advise staff members to complete it.

2.2.5 East Baton Rouge Parish

Participation in the exercise related to East Baton Rouge Parish EOC functions and reception center activities at Riverside Centroplex (including monitoring, decontamination and registration efforts). Each of these activities will be addressed individually according to location. Generally, assigned objectives were met with the following exceptions:

- (1) "Demonstration of ability to make appropriate decisions and to coordinate emergency activities." (See deficiency under Reception Center Section.)
- (2) "Demonstrate organizational ability and resources necessary to evacuate mobility-impaired individuals within the affected area." (Identification of locations of mobility-impaired not yet developed.)

The following exercise objectives for East Baton Rouge Parish were not tested:

- (1) "Demonstrate decision making and coordination with the State and utility in de-escalating and terminating the emergency."

Only in-house discussions were conducted of general recovery/reentry problems.

- (2) Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation.
- (3) Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to the evacuated area.

East Baton Rouge Parish EOC

Narrative

The East Baton Rouge EOC is an excellent facility for responding to a radiological emergency. More than sufficient furniture, space and amenities were available to maintain operations over extended periods of time; back-up power was also available. All appropriate maps and status boards were available and updated as the conditions changed.

Activation and staffing of the EOC were performed in a timely fashion. The initial call from the utility over the blue phone hotline was received at 10:13 (Notification of Unusual Event). Some staffing occurred initially at this time, and the EOC was fully staffed at approximately 12:30 p.m. The transfer of responsibilities between the EMS dispatcher to the CD dispatcher should include a briefing so the CD dispatcher is aware of the current status of the situation. All appropriate emergency response organizations were present, and the Civil Defense Director was in telephone contact with the Mayor/President.

The East Baton Rouge EOC management and staff were excellent. The EOC contains the fire, police and EMS communication/dispatcher as well as a civil defense system. The staff for the most part, was well trained; procedures were followed and checklists were available to each department and were used during the day. The operation office gave briefings as situations changed. The CD Director was in charge and was informed of what was going on.

The EOC has an excellent communications system. Fire, police, EMS, and civil defense communication systems are all located within the EOC. The EOC has a hot line telephone to the EOF with a facsimile back-up system. Some fax transmittals were late in receipt at the EOC. Radio and telephone capabilities exist to the State EOC, sheriff's office, local EOCs; and, telephone capability exists to LNED. The EBS radio station is located in the EOC. Communications by radio are available to hospitals and ambulance (HEAR system) and to school buses. Tone alert radios are to be installed in the schools in the near future. For some incoming messages, the CD communication dispatcher could not verify the information received; this was evident in sector designation and in classification of events.

An excellent system for protective action recommendations exists in the EOC. Based on the dose projections and meteorological data, a scenario index is available to easily and clearly identify predefined evacuation and sheltering protective actions.

The EOC played a role in public alerting since the broadcast facilities available within the EOC are used for release of EBS messages. They did not notify the EBS station of any upcoming need for a broadcast although they did simulate calling EBS when the message was ready to be broadcast. It was not observed at this EOC if coordination among all of the EOCs occurred regarding development of the 2:26 p.m. EBS message. A better understanding needs to be demonstrated in the next exercise regarding the coordination of messages with all parish directors and timing of EBS messages with siren sounding at all local EOCs.

Evacuation of school children was simulated by having some individuals report to the Centroplex in Baton Rouge. The sheriff's office has responsibility for road blocks, traffic flow and control points in East Baton Rouge Parish with support from Baton Rouge police, the public works departments and State police. Procedures are adequate and personnel and equipment are sufficient to control an evacuation. Traffic control efforts, an exercise objective, was simulated at the EOC.

The location of mobility-impaired individuals is not currently known; however, the utility has sent out questionnaires to all individuals within the ten-mile EPZ asking them to respond if they need help. Arrangements to evacuate these individuals are made and responsibilities assigned by the department within the EOC. The only school in East Baton Rouge Parish (sector 13) is a private, child care school. The EOC has a call-down procedure to this school and buses are available to evacuate the students if necessary. The Georgia Pacific Plant is located in sector 14; the EOC also has a call down procedure to this plant.

All appropriate radiological exposure control equipment was available and dispensed to both EOC personnel and the emergency workers. The supply of dosimeters was adequate, and the emergency response staff reported their individual exposures to the RADEF officer every 30 minutes.

The EOC has a public affairs office at the EOC and a utility liaison public information officer. The PIO stays in telephone contact with the parish PIO at the Utility Joint Information Center (JIC), and all press releases are made from the JIC. No press briefings are made from the EOC; thus, no space is set aside in the EOC for the press. Information was slow in receipt from the JIC to the EOC, especially on situation changes.

General recovery and reentry issues were discussed during the closing critique. However, as they related to the assigned exercise objective, they were not tested. Overall, the participants felt the scenario was adequate to test the objectives and emergency staff at the East Baton Route EOC.

DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CATEGORY "A" DEFICIENCIES - NONE

CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES:

8. Description: A listing of the locations of mobility-impaired residents within the Parish had not been completed; therefore, demonstration of this exercise objective was not accomplished. (NUREG-0654, J.10.d)

Recommendation: Complete process of obtaining listing of all mobility-impaired within Parish and demonstrate means for evacuation during next exercise.

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Description: The Civil Defense Dispatcher was not aware of the current status of activation of the EOC and the plant when he began dispatching activities.

Recommendation: Brief the Civil Defense Dispatcher on the major status conditions (staff activation level, plant status, etc.) before he assumes the responsibility for obtaining information from the utility over the hotline.

- Description: There appeared to be some confusion over coordination of simulation of siren sounding and EBS message dissemination within the EOC and between all parish EOCs.

Recommendation: Review procedures and include a full testing of procedures for coordination of siren sounding and EBS dissemination at the next exercise. State and parishes should review the action of this exercise to determine what agency was responsible for the breakdown in coordination.

- Description: Message copying errors were identified, i.e., the wrong emergency action level and sector designation were checked on the message form.

Recommendation: Identify why message copy errors occurred; devise verification system and/or use the phonetic alphabet for sector letter designations.

- Description: The EBS stations were not notified during initial or follow-up notifications. (NUREG-0654, E.5.)

Recommendation: Include, as the SOPs state, the EBS stations as part of the initial and follow-up notifications.

Reception Center - Riverside Centroplex

Narrative

The demonstration of staffing went well despite the absence of a vital resource, a manager. Staff arrived and were able to set up their sections; but they lacked leadership from someone to give direction, answer questions and work with the staff of the Centroplex. Regardless, the groups worked together exceptionally well. The Red Cross group had previously worked on disasters with registration and case work. The Family Service and the Council on Aging personnel were knowledgeable of their duties.

The Red Cross workers addressed the need for a nurse at the center in the event any evacuees became ill. As it turned out, nursing support was being simulated by the Health Department but this was unknown to the controller and evaluator.

The registration process went very well. The form developed for registration is one of the best the evaluator has seen; its use was effectively demonstrated. Positive attitudes, professional management and flexibility were demonstrated by all emergency response personnel. The Centroplex is an exceptional facility and would allow registration of many evacuees without crowding.

Appropriate monitoring and decontamination procedures were demonstrated during the exercise. A bus and private vehicle were both monitored and decontaminated at the reception center. Initial screening of the private vehicle showed that both the evacuee and his vehicle were contaminated. Excellent discussion of procedures and methods for improved performance accompanied the decontamination of the evacuee. Procedures for wash-down of the vehicle were also reviewed, as were the proper procedures for handling the radioactive wastes (clothing, washwater, etc.). Overall, a very good display of capability was demonstrated.

DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CATEGORY "A" DEFICIENCIES - NONE

CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES

9. Description: There was a lack of direction, leadership, and information to the Centroplex Reception Center Staff. (NUREG-0654, II, A.1.d)

Recommendation: A manager for this large center is necessary for coordination of volunteers and emergency response activities. A manager is needed to ensure that communications flow is accurate and timely; that messages are reported to proper staff, and content explained when necessary.

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Description: Suitable seating was not available during registration for evacuees and for emergency response personnel.

Recommendation: Provide adequate seating arrangements for evacuees and emergency response personnel.

Decontamination — Zachary High School

Narrative

The wash down (decontamination) facility is located at the Zachary High School, approximately half way between the River Bend Station and Baton Rouge, LA. Decontamination procedures were demonstrated for vehicles and personnel during the exercise. The surveys were made using the standard CD survey meter CDV-700. If higher than background .01 mR/Hr is detected, the vehicle or person is decontaminated.

Scans of the interior and exterior of the vehicle were made and were adequate to detect any contamination. Contamination was removed from the interior of the vehicle with a portable vacuum and tape. The contaminated exterior then was washed with a fire hose. The decontamination area was roped off and radiation area warning signs posted. It was noticed that during the wash down some water splashed on one of the workers. He left the area without being surveyed to see if he was contaminated.

Equipment and standard decontamination procedures were demonstrated and were adequate. The facility is adequate and can handle approximately 10 vehicles and 12 persons per hour.

Contaminated water from the showers goes directly in the Zachary sewer system. An old swimming pool which has been filled with sand and gravel is used for washdown of vehicles. Water from the wash down filters down into the sand and gravel and does not run off. Contaminated sand and gravel can be removed if needed after the emergency.

The Zachary Fire Chief was handed a message by the controller that one of his men reported that his dosimeter had a reading of 35R. The firechief then declared the man dead. It was determined later that by "dead" he was in effect removing the man from duty. According to the chief he removes all workers from duty when 5R of exposure are reached.

At a critique before leaving the staging area, the evaluator discussed with the Fire Chief that he was looking for a response which provided the following: (1) A determination of the areas where this emergency worker has been, (2) whether other personnel were with him, (3) their dosimeter readings, (4) whether a radiological survey had been made of the worker, and (5) whether the worker was actually contaminated or the reading due to a possible equipment failure? After the chief had declared the emergency worker "dead," the controller provided him with a message that the worker had dropped his dosimeter.

The Zachary Fire Chief was handed a message by the controller that one of his men had a 2R reading on his 0-20R dosimeter, and a 0 reading on his 0-200R dosimeter. The chief responded to the problem that he would just re "zero" the 0-20R dosimeter. At the critique the evaluator expressed that he was looking for a response similar to the above response and that it would be difficult to read 2R on a 0-200R dosimeter.

DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CATEGORY "A" DEFICIENCIES - NONE

CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES - NONE

AREA FOR IMPROVEMENT AND RECOMMENDATION

- Description: One worker who had been splashed with possibly contaminated water left the area without being surveyed. Also, it was not determined in another instance whether the equipment failed or a worker was contaminated.
- Recommendation: Offer additional training to the Zachary "wash-down" facility staff on the correct procedures of decontamination and the use of dosimeters.

2.3 MEDICAL SUPPORT

West Feliciana Hospital

Narrative

The West Feliciana Hospital located in St. Francisville was requested to respond to and treat an injured, contaminated patient. The Parish hospital also operates the local ambulance service which has two vehicles. Staffing of the ambulance is by emergency room personnel.

There is a communications base station located within the nurses station. Also, a "hotline" is installed with a direct link to the plant. Communications exist between hospital and ambulance. A sheriff's radio is also available within the hospital and in each ambulance.

The hospital was notified at 12:12 p.m. to send an ambulance in response to a contaminated, injured person at the plant. The ambulance crew responded immediately. Excellent communications took place from the ambulance personnel to the hospital personnel concerning patient information and estimated time of arrival. The ambulance arrived with the patient at approximately 12:40 p.m. The ambulance crew members were wearing protective clothing and dosimeters. There was one problem observed following the removal of the patient from the ambulance; and that related to the fact that no one surveyed the vehicle, and not all ambulance crew members were surveyed for contamination. Good security measures were demonstrated around the vehicle outside the hospital.

The injured, contaminated patient was accompanied by a utility health physicist who was wearing protective clothing. The hospital had an excellent radiological management room set up with outstanding equipment available to them. The radiological management room (RMR) had a separate entrance and was very well designed. A physician was in charge of procedures. Both he and his hospital staff demonstrated excellent training techniques and procedures in (1) preparing the radiological emergency

management area and wearing protective clothing and dosimeters; (2) establishing good communications with the patient; (3) decontaminating the patient; (4) "hotline" procedures (not contaminating the remainder of the room); (5) excellent communication between physician and utility H.P.; (6) patient surveying techniques by the utility H.P., and (7) exit procedures in removing protective clothing. Also, proper disposal and security of contaminated clothing, etc., was handled effectively.

Overall, the emergency room staff and ambulance crew (with exception of one problem mentioned previously) were well trained and are capable of handling a radiological emergency in an adequate manner.

DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CATEGORY "A" DEFICIENCIES - NONE

CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES

10. Description: The ambulance vehicle which transported the injured, contaminated patient was not surveyed. Also, not all of the ambulance crew members were surveyed for contamination following exchange of patient to hospital staff. (NUREG-0654, II., L.4)

Recommendation: Ensure during next exercise that both ambulance vehicle and all ambulance crew members are surveyed.

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

None

2.4 UTILITY SUPPORT

A summary is provided below of some of the Gulf States Utilities' problems which relate to or impact upon the off-site activities performed by the various Louisiana

State and local Parish participating agencies. This is presented because the Federal evaluators determined that several of the problems encountered at the off-site locations were caused or compounded by deficiencies in the Utility operations during the exercise. FEMA realizes that we cannot designate a Category "A" or "B" deficiency against the Utility. However, these noted deficiencies need to be addressed by the NRC and/or Utility to prevent their recurrence during future exercises or a real emergency at River Bend Station, and to allow for a full demonstration of off-site emergency preparedness capabilities.

DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Description: Issuance to State and local agencies of messages (EBS, Follow-Up Notifications, Protective Action Recommendations, and other needed hard copy verifications) was excessively delayed due to the inoperability of the facsimile machine. Transmittals were often so late that their meaning was inappropriate by the time they were received. A request from one of the Parishes for verification of the Protective Action Recommendations for that Parish took 43 minutes before the verification was received. (See Pointe Coupe Parish.) Likewise, issuances were excessively late to other Parishes when they were awaiting verifications of verbal instructions from the State, the EOF, and other Parishes.

Recommendation: Determine the problems which caused breakdown of the equipment; have checked and operable before next exercise. Maintain readiness in case of a real incident at RBS.
- Description: In one Parish, Public Information Brochures had not been fully distributed to all residents of the Parish within 10 miles from the plant.

Recommendation: Determine those areas where full distribution has not been made and provide brochures.

- Description: State and Parish media activities at the JIC were directed by the Utility, rather than by the PIOs as provided for in the State/Parish plans. It was documented that liaison between the PIOs at the parishes and the JIC did not function as intended; that in some cases the PIOs at the parish did not know what their duties were. State and Local PIOs have assignment by their plans to provide emergency public information through prompt and accurate information to the news media. This was not demonstrated effectively during the exercise. Likewise, Rumor Control, while very efficiently handled by GSU, is a responsibility assigned by their plans to the State and Parish governments.

Recommendation: Training which previously has been provided by the Utility to the PIOs should be expanded to include all PIOs — both at the parishes and the JIC — and should include, perhaps in the form of Standard Operating Procedures, delineation of their duties during an exercise or emergency. Leadership of the State/Parish media relations at the JIC should be provided by State or Parish PIOs. Additionally, Parish representatives should be assigned to Rumor Control functions at the JIC. Or, if the present arrangement of Utility leadership in all media functions at RBS has been given to GSU by the State of Louisiana, the State and Parish radiological emergency preparedness plans should be revised to show media relations as a utility responsibility.

- Description: The ambulance vehicle which transported the injured, contaminated patient was not surveyed. Also, not all of the ambulance crew members were surveyed for contamination following exchange of patient to hospital staff. (NUREG-0654, II., L.4)

Recommendation: Ensure during next exercise that both ambulance vehicle and all ambulance crew members are surveyed.

3 DEFICIENCY TRACKING AND SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Section 2 of this exercise report has provided a listing of deficiencies with recommendations noted by federal evaluators during the most recent exercise conducted on January 16, 1985. The evaluations were based on the applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in Section II of the NUREG-0654-FEMA-1, Rev. 1 (November 1980) and exercise objectives.

The FEMA Region VI director is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director, State and Local Programs and support, Washington, D.C., that any deficiencies noted in the exercise will be corrected and such corrections will also be incorporated into the emergency response plans as appropriate.

FEMA Region VI may request that the State of Louisiana and local jurisdictions participating in the River Bend exercise submit measures that they will take or intend to take in correcting those deficiencies found by the federal evaluators. If corrective actions are necessary, FEMA Region VI will request that a detailed plan, including dates for scheduling and implementing remedial action, be provided if remedial action cannot be instituted immediately.

Table 1 provides a consolidated summary of all deficiencies by jurisdiction. The table is designed so that space has been allowed to add: (1) the proposed corrective actions that have been recommended and (2) the projected and actual date of completion. The listing has been broken down in the table by category "A" and "B" deficiencies. As noted, there were no Category "A" deficiencies found in the River Bend off-site radiological emergency response preparedness exercise.

TABLE 1 Remedial Actions for the January 16, 1985 River Bend Exercise

Deficiencies and FEMA/RAC Recommendations for Corrective Actions	State (S) and Local (L) Proposed Corrective Actions	Proposed Completion Date	FEMA Evaluation of State and Local Corrective Actions And Determination of Adequacy or Inadequacy	Actual Completion Date
<p><u>STATE EOC:</u></p> <p>Category "A" Deficiencies: None</p> <p>Category "B" Deficiencies:</p> <p>1. Description: Coordination and interaction by the State EOC with the five local parish EOCs was inadequate for meeting the needs of the parishes especially with regard to concurrence on EBS message development and timing of the messages with the parishes' responsibilities for siren sounding, alerting, etc. (NUREG-0654, A.2.a.)</p> <p>Recommendation: Procedures and requirements should be reviewed relating to concurrence with parishes on development of the EBS messages and for coordinating the issuance of messages with the sounding of sirens, etc. This coordination should be demonstrated between the five parishes and the State EOC.</p>	<p>Develop methods to expedite message flow; modify procedures for use of precanned messages for all five parishes and the hotline conference call to the parishes for advisement and concurrent on the EBS message and time of sounding of sirens prior to EBS broadcast.</p>	<p>Prior to next exercise.</p>	<p>Will evaluate at next exercise.</p>	

TABLE 1 (Cont'd)

Deficiencies and FEMA/RAC Recommendations for Corrective Actions	State (S) and Local (L) Proposed Corrective Actions	Proposed Completion Date	FEMA Evaluation of State and Local Corrective Actions And Determination of Adequacy or Inadequacy	Actual Completion Date
<p><u>WEST FELICIANA PARISH EOC</u></p> <p>Category "A" Deficiencies: None</p> <p>Category "B" Deficiencies:</p> <p>2. Description: The RADEF officer did not survey emergency workers for contamination until two hours after there was a release of radioactivity from the plant. Furthermore, emergency workers were allowed to enter the EOC before being surveyed; thus, the EOC and its staff could be unnecessarily exposed. (NUREG-0654, K.3.a.)</p> <p>Recommendation: Emergency workers should be surveyed for contamination outside the EOC after there has been a release of radioactive materials from the River Bend Plant.</p>	<p>Have revised procedure for the RADEF officer which will reflect the need to survey workers prior to entry into the EOC; additional support personnel will be identified to assure that functions such as zeroing dosimeters, surveys, etc. are accomplished in a timely fashion.</p>	<p>Prior to next exercise.</p>	<p>Will evaluate at next exercise.</p>	

TABLE 1 (Cont'd)

Deficiencies and FEMA/RAC Recommendations for Corrective Actions	State (S) and Local (L) Proposed Corrective Actions	Proposed Completion Date	FEMA Evaluation of State and Local Corrective Actions And Determination of Adequacy or Inadequacy	Actual Completion Date
<p><u>WEST FELICIANA PARISH:</u> (Cont'd)</p> <p>3. Description: A listing of the locations of mobility-impaired residents within the Parish had not been completed. (NUREG-0654, J.10.d.)</p> <p>Recommendation: Complete process of obtaining listing of all mobility impaired within Parish and demonstrate means for evacuation during next exercise.</p> <p><u>EAST FELICIANA PARISH</u></p> <p>Category "A" Deficiencies: None</p> <p>Category "B" Deficiencies:</p> <p>4. Description: The Sheriff's phone at the EOC does not have a direct line to the Sheriff's office in Clinton. He must use an alternate number and have messages forwarded. (NUREG-0654, F.1.a.)</p>	<p>Mobility-impaired residents' listing will be completed, and responses used by LOEP to generate master list with a copy to be provided the parishes; listing will also be included in appropriate implementing procedure and referenced in scenario data books.</p>	<p>Prior to next exercise.</p>	<p>Will evaluate at next exercise.</p>	

TABLE 1 (Cont'd)

Deficiencies and FEMA/RAC Recommendations for Corrective Actions	State (S) and Local (L) Proposed Corrective Actions	Proposed Completion Date	FEMA Evaluation of State and Local Corrective Actions And Determination of Adequacy or Inadequacy	Actual Completion Date
<p><u>EAST FELICIANA PARISH (Cont'd)</u></p> <p>Recommendation: A direct line should be provided between either the Sheriff's Office -- or the EOC -- and the Sheriff's office in Clinton.</p>	Will discuss with CSU a proposal to include an alternate direct line at the EOC for direct communication between the sheriff's office in Clinton and the EOC.	Resolved prior to next exercise.	Will reevaluate at next exercise.	
<p><u>POINTE COUPEE PARISH</u></p> <p>Category "A" Deficiencies: None</p> <p>Category "B" Deficiencies:</p> <p>5. Description: Effective coordination cannot be assured between Pointe Coupee Parish and the other EOCs and RBS in public alerting and instructions. This was not simulated at Pointe Coupee Parish. (NUREC-0654, A.2a.; E.5,6)</p>				

TABLE 1 (Cont'd)

Deficiencies and FEMA/RAC Recommendations for Corrective Actions	State (S) and Local (L) Proposed Corrective Actions	Proposed Completion Date	FEMA Evaluation of State and Local Corrective Actions And Determination of Adequacy or Inadequacy	Actual Completion Date
<p>Recommendation: Coordination with other agencies during the public alerting and notification should be demonstrated and evaluated at the next exercise.</p>	<p>Develop methods to expedite message flow; modify procedures for use of pre-canned messages for all five parishes, and the hotline conference call to the parishes for advisement and concurrence on the EBS message and time of sounding of sirens prior to EBS broadcast.</p>	<p>Prior to next exercise.</p>	<p>Will evaluate at next exercise.</p>	

TABLE 1 (Cont'd)

Deficiencies and FEMA/RAC Recommendations for Corrective Actions	State (S) and Local (L) Proposed Corrective Actions	Proposed Completion Date	FEMA Evaluation of State and Local Corrective Actions And Determination of Adequacy or Inadequacy	Actual Completion Date
<u>POINT COUPEE PARISH (Cont'd)</u>				
<p>6. Description: Protective Action recommendations were not correct or complete; sheltering recommendations were not included in the initial message. Request for clarification and correction was made but no response received until 43 minutes had elapsed. (NUREG-0654, E.)</p> <p>Recommendation: Protective Action Recommendations must include all appropriate and correct information for the local parishes. The source of this error in the PAR and reason for the delay in correcting should be investigated and measures taken to prevent its recurrence.</p>	<p>Are presently revising the notification forms; problem with fax machines traced to a telephone line problem; have instructed parish personnel in the two mechanisms for clarifying PAR's -- hotline between parishes, LNED, and CSU at conclusion of notification; and contact to the State EOC to request clarification; training and drills in future will include this guidance.</p>	<p>Prior to next exercise.</p>	<p>Will evaluate at next exercise.</p>	

TABLE 1 (Cont'd)

Deficiencies and FEMA/RAC Recommendations for Corrective Actions	State (S) and Local (L) Proposed Corrective Actions	Proposed Completion Date	FEMA Evaluation of State and Local Corrective Actions And Determination of Adequacy or Inadequacy	Actual Completion Date
<p><u>POINTE COUPEE</u> (Cont'd)</p> <p>7. A listing of the locations of mobility-impaired residents within the Parish had not been completed; therefore, demonstration of the exercise objective was not accomplished. (NUREG-0654, J.10.d.)</p> <p>Recommendation: Complete process of obtaining listing of all mobility-impaired within Parish and demonstrate means for evacuation during next exercise.</p>	<p>Mobility-impaired residents' listing will be completed, and responses used by LOEP to generate master list with a copy to be provided the parishes; listing will also be included in appropriate implementing procedure and referenced in scenario data books.</p>	<p>Prior to next exercise.</p>	<p>Will evaluate at next exercise.</p>	

TABLE 1 (Cont'd)

Deficiencies and FEMA/RAC Recommendations for Corrective Actions	State (S) and Local (L) Proposed Corrective Actions	Proposed Completion Date	FEMA Evaluation of State and Local Corrective Actions And Determination of Adequacy or Inadequacy	Actual Completion Date
<p><u>EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH</u></p> <p>Category "A" Deficiencies: None</p> <p>Category "B" Deficiencies:</p> <p>8. Description: A listing of the locations of mobility-impaired residents within the Parish had not been completed. Therefore, demonstration of this exercise objective was not accomplished. (NUREG-0654,J.10.d.)</p> <p>Recommendation: Complete process of obtaining listing of all mobility-impaired within Parish and demonstrate means for evacuation during next exercise.</p>	<p>Mobility-impaired residents' listing will be completed and responses used by LOEP to generate master list with a copy to be provided the parishes; listing will also be included in appropriate implementing procedure and referenced in scenario data books.</p>	<p>Prior to next exercise.</p>	<p>Will evaluate at next exercise.</p>	

TABLE 1 (Cont'd)

Deficiencies and FEMA/RAC Recommendations for Corrective Actions	State (S) and Local (L) Proposed Corrective Actions	Proposed Completion Date	FEMA Evaluation of State and Local Corrective Actions And Determination of Adequacy or Inadequacy	Actual Completion Date
<u>RECEPTION CENTER - RIVERSIDE CENTROPLEX</u> Category "A" Deficiencies: None Category "B" Deficiencies: 9. Description: There was a lack of direction, leader- ship, and information pro- vided to the staff of the Metroplex Riverside Centro- plex due to lack of a manager. (NUREG-0654, A.1.d.) Recommendation: A manager is necessary for coordina- tion of volunteers and emergency response activ- ities and to provide direction to the staff members.	Centroplex manager has been briefed on his duties as Director of reception center; he has indicated availability for participation in future exercises; backup manager has been iden- tified from EOC staff.	Prior to next exercise.	Backup manager should be trained in duties. Will evaluate at next exer- cise.	

TABLE 1 (Cont'd)

Deficiencies and FEMA/RAC Recommendations for Corrective Actions	State (S) and Local (L) Proposed Corrective Actions	Proposed Completion Date	FEMA Evaluation of State and Local Corrective Actions And Determination of Adequacy or Inadequacy	Actual Completion Date
<p><u>WEST FELICIANA HOSPITAL</u></p> <p>Category "A" Deficiencies: None</p> <p>Category "B" Deficiencies:</p> <p>10. Description: The ambulance vehicle which transported the injured, contaminated patient was not surveyed. Also, not all of the ambulance crew members were surveyed for contamination following exchange of the patient to hospital staff. (NUREG-0654, L.4.)</p> <p>Recommendation: Ensure during next exercise that both the ambulance vehicle and all ambulance crew members are surveyed for contamination.</p>	<p>This problem cannot be resolved until a formal discussion with CSU is arranged after report is finalized.</p>	<p>Prior to next exercise.</p>	<p>After determination of whose responsibility it is and written notification of FEMA, FEMA will reevaluate at next exercise.</p>	

4 EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES

4.1 SUMMARY OF FEMA OBJECTIVES REMAINING TO BE MET

Table 2 provides a listing of those FEMA objectives which, according to the FEMA RAC Chairman, have not been satisfactorily met or tested and which should be incorporated into the exercise objectives by the fifth year of the five-year period in which all the objectives should be tested. These should be considered in the development of future exercise objectives; as well as those FEMA objectives which, although previously tested and satisfactorily demonstrated, must be tested and evaluated during any exercise of off-site State and Local response capabilities.

TABLE 2 Summary of FEMA Objectives Remaining to be Met

FEMA Objective & NUREC Reference	Jurisdiction and Deficiency (if applicable)
2. Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock. (A.2.a, A.4)	State and Parishes Not Tested 1-16-85
3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities. (A.1.d., e., A.2.a)	State & Parish: State EOC Def #1 Pointe Coupee EOC Def #5
5. Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel. (F.)	State & Parishes: E. Feliciana EOC Parish Def. #4 Partially met by State & all other Parishes (No backup communications tested.)
9. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for collection, transport, analysis of samples of soil, vegetation, snow, water and milk. (I.8)	Partially met by State 1-16-85 (Sample analyzation not tested)
11. Demonstrate ability to project dosage to the public via ingestion pathway exposure, based on field data; and to determine appropriate protective measures based on PAG's and other relevant factors. (I.10., I.11., J.11)	State: Not tested 1-16-85
12. Demonstrate ability to implement protective actions for ingestion pathway hazards. (J.9., J.11)	State and Parishes Not tested 1-16-85
13. Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and disseminate an initial instructional message within 15 minutes. (E.6, Append 3)	Parishes: Pointe Coupee Def. #5; Not tested by East Baton Rouge and West Baton Rouge Parishes

TABLE 2 (Cont'd)

FEMA Objective & NUREG Reference	Jurisdiction and Deficiency (if applicable)
14. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely fashion. (E.5., E.7)	State and Parishes Not tested
15. Demonstrate organizational ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ. (J.9., J.10.a., g.)	Parishes: Not tested by East Baton Rouge Parish, West Baton Rouge Parish, Pointe Coupee Parish
16. Demonstrate organizational ability and resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation, as inclement weather or traffic obstructions. (J.10.k)	Parishes: Not tested 1-16-85 by East Baton Rouge, E. Feliciana, Pointe Coupee, West Baton Rouge Parishes
17. Demonstrate organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area. (J.10.j.)	Parishes: Not tested by East Baton Rouge, West Baton Rouge, East Feliciana, Pointe Coupee Parishes
18. Demonstrate organizational ability and resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of mobility-impaired individuals within the plume EPZ. (J.10.d)	Parishes: Deficiency #3, West Feliciana Parish; Def #7, Pointe Coupee Parish; Def #8 East Baton Rouge Parish
19. Demonstrate organizational ability and resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the plume EPZ. (J.9., J.10.g)	Parishes: Not tested 1-16-85
20. Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure. (K.3.a., b.)	Parishes: West Feliciana Parish Deficiency #2; Not tested by other parishes
21. Demonstrate ability to make the decision, based on predetermined criteria, whether to issue KI to emergency workers and/or the general population. (J.10.f)	State: Not tested 1-16-85

TABLE 2 (Cont'd)

FEMA Objective & NUREG Reference	Jurisdiction and Deficiency (if applicable)
22. Demonstrate ability to supply and administer KI, once the decision has been made to do so. (J.10.e.)	State/Parishes: Not tested 1-16-85
23. Demonstrate ability to effect an orderly evacuation of onsite personnel. (J.2)	State: Not tested 1-16-85
28. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities for mass care of evacuees. (J.10.h)	State/Parishes: Not tested 1-16-85
29. Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles. (K.5.a.,b.)	Parishes: West Feliciana Hospital Deficiency #10
32. Demonstrate ability to identify need for, request, and obtain Federal assistance. (C.1.,a.b.)	State: Not tested 1-16-85
33. Demonstrate ability to estimate total population exposure. (M.4)	State: Not tested 1-16-85
34. Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry. (M.1)	State/Parishes: Not tested
35. Demonstrate the ability to effectively call upon and utilize outside support agencies when local capabilities are exceeded. (C.4)	States/Parishes: Not tested
38. Demonstrate capability to effectively process all incoming messages in a timely manner. (E.)	Parishes: Not met by Pointe Coupee Parish

4.2 FEMA OBJECTIVES MET OR YET TO BE ACHIEVED

Table 3 provides a comprehensive summary of FEMA objectives, NUREG-0654 reference elements, River Bend Station, State, and Local exercise objectives and jurisdictional responsibility for demonstration. Additionally, it identifies those objectives which were satisfactorily met, those which have not been tested to date, and those for which a deficiency was documented during the past exercise.

TABLE 3 Objectives Met or Yet to be Achieved - River Bend Station

NOTE: Parish Identification Code: West Feliciana = WFel; East Feliciana = E.Fel; Pointe Coupee = P.Cou.; East Baton Rouge = EBR; West Baton Rouge = WBR

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FEMA Objectives	NUREG-0654 Reference	January 16, 1985 Exercise Objective	Jurisdictional Responsibility		Date of Exercise	Deficiency Noted (By Deficiency Tracking No.)	Date Met	
			State	Local			State	Local
1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly. (Objective for which capability should be demonstrated during each exercise)	E.1, E.2 [S&L]	Demonstrate the ability to alert State agencies' emergency response personnel, activate and staff Parish EOC.	X		1-16-85		1-16-85	
		Demonstrate the ability to alert Parish emergency response personnel, activate and staff Parish EOC.		X	1-16-85			1-16-85
		Demonstrate the ability to alert the staff and activate a reception center.		X	1-16-85			1-16-85
2. Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.	A.2.a, A.4 [S&L]							
3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities. (Objectives for which capability should be demonstrated during each exercise)	A.1.d,e, A.2.a [S&L]	Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.	X	X	1-16-85	Deficiency #1 - State EOC Deficiency #9 Reception Ctr	Not met	Not Met Reception Center R.C.
		Demonstrate decision making and coordination of the alerting process for the public within the affected area.		X	1-16-85	Deficiency #5 Pointe Coupee EOC		Not Met P. Cou. Not Tested EBR WBR

TABLE 3 (Cont'd)

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FEMA Objectives	NUREG-0654 Reference	January 16, 1985 Exercise Objective	Jurisdictional Responsibility		Date of Exercise	Deficiency Noted (By Deficiency Tracking No.)	Date Objective Met	
			State	Local			State	Local
4. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations. (Objective for which capability should be demonstrated during each exercise)	C.3.a., H.3 [S&L]	Demonstrate that the State EOC is adequate to support emergency functions.	X		1-16-85		1-16-85	
		Demonstrate that the Parish EOCs are adequate to support emergency functions.		X	1-16-85			1-16-85
5. Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel. (Objectives for which capability should be demonstrated during each exercise)	P [S&L]	Demonstrate communications capabilities among the following facilities: RBS, Parish EOCs, State EOC, EBS Station, Joint Information Center, & LNED (No backup communication tested)	X		1-16-85		Partially Met	
		Demonstrate the ability to communicate with State dispatched field personnel.	X		1-16-85		Partially Met	
		Demonstrate communications capabilities among the following facilities: RBS, Parish EOCs, State EOC, EBS Station, Joint Information Center, Local Special Facilities, LNED (No backup communication demonstrated)		X	1-16-85	Deficiency #4 East Feliciana EOC		Partially met by W.Fel, EBR, WBR, P. Cou. Not met by E.Fel
		Demonstrate communications between the Parish EOC and Parish dispatched field personnel.		X	1-16-85			1-16-85

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TABLE 3 (Cont'd)

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FEMA Objectives	NURPC-0654 Reference	January 16, 1985 Exercise Objective	Jurisdictional Responsibility		Date of Exercise	Deficiency Noted (By Deficiency Tracking No.)	Date Objective Met	
			State	Local			State	Local
6. Demonstrate ability to mobilize and deploy field monitoring teams in a timely fashion. (Objective for which capability should be demonstrated during each exercise)	1.8 [S&L]	Demonstrate ability to mobilize and deploy field monitoring teams.	X		1-16-85		1-16-85	
7. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for determining ambient radiation levels. (Objective for which capability should be demonstrated during each exercise)	1.8, 1.11 [1.8-S&L] [1.11-S]	Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for determining ambient radiation.	X		1-16-85		1-16-85	
8. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for measurement of airborne radioiodine concentrations as low as 10^{-7} $\mu\text{Ci}/\text{CC}$ in the presence of noble gases. (Objective for which capability should be demonstrated during each exercise)	1.9 [S&L]	Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for measurement of airborne radioiodine.	X		1-16-85		1-16-85	

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TABLE 3 (Cont'd)

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PPHA Objectives	NUREG-0654 Reference	January 16, 1985 Exercise Objective	Jurisdictional Responsibility		Date of Exercise	Deficiency Noted (By Deficiency Tracking No.)	Date Objective Met	
			State	Local			State	Local
9. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for collection, transport, analysis of samples of soil, vegetation, snow, water and milk. (Objective for which capability should be demonstrated during each exercise)	1.8 (S&L)	Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for collection of environmental samples. (No analysis of samples)	X		1-16-85		Partially Met 1-16-85	
10. Demonstrate ability to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data, and to determine appropriate protective measures based on PACs, available shelter, evacuation time estimates and all other appropriate factors. (Objective for which capability should be demonstrated during each exercise)	1.10, J.9 (1.10-S) (J.9-S&L)	Demonstrate the ability to project plume exposure pathway doses and to determine appropriate protective measures.	X		1-16-85		1-16-85	

TABLE 3 (Cont'd)

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VFHA Objectives	NURPC-0654 Reference	January 16, 1985 Exercise Objective	Jurisdictional Responsibility		Date of Exercise	Deficiency Noted (By Deficiency Tracking No.)	Date Objective Met	
			State	Local			State	Local
11. Demonstrate ability to project dosage to the public via ingestion pathway exposure, based on field data, and to determine appropriate protective measures based on PACs and other relevant factors.	I.10, I.11, J.11 [5]							
12. Demonstrate ability to implement protective actions for ingestion pathway hazards.	J.9, J.11 [J.9-S&L] [J.11-S]							
13. Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and disseminate an initial instructional message within 15 minutes. (Objective for which capability should be demonstrated during each exercise)	E.6, App. 3 [S&L]	Demonstrate decision making and coordination of the alerting process for the public within the affected area.		X	1-16-85	Deficiency #5 Pointe Coupee	Not Met P. Coupee	Met EF&L, W&F Not Tested MOR EBR
14. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely fashion.	E.5, E.7 [S&L]							

TABLE 3 (Cont'd)

FEMA Objectives	NUREC-0654 Reference	January 16, 1985 Exercise Objective	Jurisdictional Responsibility		Date of Exercise	Deficiency Noted (By Deficiency Tracking No.)	Date Objective Met	
			State	Local			State	Local
15. Demonstrate organizational ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ. (Objective for which capability should be demonstrated during each exercise)	J.9, J.10.a.g [S&L]	Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of part of the plume EPZ.		X	1-16-85			Met by P.Cou. E.Fel W.Fel Not Tested EBR,WBR
16. Demonstrate organizational ability and resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation, as inclement weather or traffic obstructions.	J.10.k [S&L]	Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation.		X	1-16-85			Met by W.Fel Not Tested Other Parishes
17. Demonstrate organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.	J.10.j [S&L]	Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to the evacuated area.		X	1-16-85			Met by W.Fel. Not Tested E.Fel, P.Cou., EBR,WBR

TABLE 3 (Cont'd)

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FEMA Objectives	NUREG-0654 Reference	January 16, 1985 Exercise Objective	Jurisdictional Responsibility		Date of Exercise	Deficiency Noted (By Deficiency Tracking No.)	Date Objective Met	
			State	Local			State	Local
18. Demonstrate organizational ability and resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of mobility-impaired individuals within the plume EPZ.	J.10.d [S&L]	Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to evacuate mobility-impaired individuals within the affected area.		X	1-16-85	Deficiency #3 W.Feliciano EOC Pointe Coupee #7 East Baton Rouge EOC #8		Not Met W.Fel. P. Coupee E.B.R. Met by E.Fel W.B.R
19. Demonstrate organizational ability and resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the plume EPZ.	J.9, J.10.g [S&L]							
20. Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure. (Objective for which capability should be demonstrated during each exercise)	K.3.a,b [S&L]	Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.	X	X	1-16-85	Deficiency #2 W.Feliciano EOC	1-16-85	Not Met W.Fel Not Tested E.Fel W.B.R E.B.R P. Coupee

TABLE 3 (Cont'd)

FEMA Objectives	NUREG-0654 Reference	January 16, 1985 Exercise Objective	Jurisdictional Responsibility		Date of Exercise	Deficiency Noted (By Deficiency Tracking No.)	Date Objective Met	
			State	Local			State	Local
21. Demonstrate ability to make the decision, based on predetermined criteria, whether to issue KI to emergency workers and/or the general population.	J.10.f [S&L]							
22. Demonstrate ability to supply and administer KI, once the decision has been made to do so.	J.10.e [S&L]							
23. Demonstrate ability to effect an orderly evacuation of onsite personnel.	J.2 [S&L]							
24. Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner.	C.3.a, C.4.a [S&L]	Demonstrate ability to coordinate public information releases with Parish & Utility representatives at the Joint Information Ctr	X		1-16-85		1-16-85	
		Demonstrate the ability to coordinate press releases between the Joint Information Ctr and the State EOC	X		1-16-85		1-16-85	

TABLE 3 (Cont'd)

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FEMA Objectives	NUREG-0654 Reference	January 16, 1985 Exercise Objective	Jurisdictional Responsibility		Date of Exercise	Deficiency Noted (By Deficiency Tracking No.)	Date Objective Met	
			State	Local			State	Local
		Demonstrate ability to coordinate public information releases with State and Utility representatives at the Joint Information Ctr		X	1-16-85			1-16-85
		Demonstrate ability to coordinate press releases between Joint Information Ctr and Parish EOCs.		X	1-16-85			1-16-85
25. Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of information released.	G.4.b [S&L]	Demonstrate ability to coordinate public information releases with Parish & Utility representatives at the Joint Information Ctr	X		1-16-85		1-16-85	
		Demonstrate the ability to coordinate press releases between the Joint Information Ctr and the State EOC.	X		1-16-85		1-16-85	
		Demonstrate ability to coordinate public information releases with State and Utility representatives at the Joint Information Ctr		X	1-16-85			1-16-85
		Demonstrate the ability to coordinate press releases between the Joint Information Center and Parish EOCs.		X	1-16-85			1-16-85

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TABLE 3 (Cont'd)

FEHA Objectives	NUREG-0654 Reference	January 16, 1985 Exercise Objective	Jurisdictional Responsibility		Date of Exercise	Deficiency Noted (By Deficiency Tracking No.)	Date Objective Met	
			State	Local			State	Local
26. Demonstrate ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.	G.4.c [S&L]	Demonstrate the ability to coordinate rumor control between the Rumor Control Center and the State EOC.	X		1-16-85		1-16-85	
		Demonstrate the ability to coordinate rumor control between the Rumor Control Center and the Parish EOCs.		X	1-16-85			1-16-85
27. Demonstrate adequacy of procedures for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees. (Objective for which capability should be demonstrated during each exercise)	J.12 [S&L]	Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees.		X	1-16-85			1-16-85
28. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities for mass care of evacuees.	J.10.b [S&L]							
29. Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles. (Objective for which capability should be demonstrated during each exercise)	K.5.a,b [S&L]	Demonstrate the adequacy of equipment and procedures for decontamination.		X	1-16-85	Deficiency #10 W Feliciana Hospital - EMS		Not Met

TABLE 3 (Cont'd)

FEMA Objectives	NURRC-0654 Reference	January 16, 1985 Exercise Objective	Jurisdictional Responsibility		Date of Exercise	Deficiency Noted (By Deficiency Tracking No.)	Date Objective Met	
			State	Local			State	Local
30. Demonstrate adequacy of EMS transportation, personnel, and procedures for handling contaminated individuals including proper decontamination of vehicle and equipment. (Objective for which capability should be demonstrated during each exercise)	L.4 [S&L]	Demonstrate the adequacy of ambulance facilities and procedures for responding to a Utility request for transporting a contaminated injured individual.		X	1-16-85			1-16-85
31. Demonstrate adequacy of hospital facilities and procedures for handling contaminated individuals. (Objective for which capability should be demonstrated during each exercise)	L.1 [S&L]	Demonstrate the adequacy of hospital facilities and procedures for handling a contaminated injured individual transported from RBS.		X	1-16-85			1-16-85
32. Demonstrate ability to identify need for, request, and obtain Federal assistance.	C.1.a,b [S]	Demonstrate the ability to identify the need for and request Federal assistance.	X		1-16-85		Not Tested	
33. Demonstrate ability to estimate total population exposure.	M.4 [S]	Demonstrate the ability to estimate total population exposure	X		1-16-85		Not Tested	

TABLE 3 (Cont'd)

FEA Objectives	NUREG-0654 Reference	January 16, 1985 Exercise Objective	Jurisdictional Responsibility		Date of Exercise	Deficiency Noted (By Deficiency Tracking No.)	Date Objective Met	
			State	Local			State	Local
34. Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.	M.1 [S&L]	Demonstrate decision making and coordination of recovery operation, ordination with the Parishes and Utility in de-escalating and terminating the emergency.	X		1-16-85		Not Tested	
		Demonstrate decision making and coordination with the State and the Utility in de-escalating and terminating the emergency.		X	1-16-85			Not Tested
35. Demonstrate the ability to effectively call upon and utilize outside support agencies when local capabilities are exceeded.	C.4 [S&L]							
36. Demonstrate the adequacy, operability and effective use of emergency communication equipment and the adequacy of communications procedures and methods. (Objectives for which capability should be demonstrated during each exercise)	F.1 [S&L]	Demonstrate communications capabilities among the following facilities: RBS, Parish EOCs, State EOC, EBS Station, Joint Information Center, & LNED	X		1-16-85		1-16-85	
		Demonstrate the ability to communicate with State dispatched field personnel	X		1-16-85		1-16-85	

TABLE 3 (Cont'd)

FEMA Objectives	NUREG-0654 Reference	January 16, 1985 Exercise Objective	Jurisdictional Responsibility		Date of Exercise	Deficiency Noted (By Deficiency Tracking No.)	Date Objective Met	
			State	Local			State	Local
		Demonstrate communications capabilities among the following facilities: RBS, Parish EOCs, State EOC, EBS Station, Joint Information Center, Local Special Facilities, LNEC.		X	1-16-85			1-16-85
		Demonstrate communications between the Parish EOC and Parish dispatched field personnel. (NO BACKUP COMMUNICATION TO BE TESTED)		X	1-16-85			1-16-85
37. Demonstrate ability to monitor Emergency Classification levels continuously and implement procedures in a timely manner. (Objective for which capability should be demonstrated during each exercise)	D.4 [S&L]	Demonstrate the ability to monitor Emergency Classifications levels at the State EOC.	X		1-16-85		1-16-85	
		Demonstrate the ability to monitor Emergency Classification levels at the Parish EOCs.		X	1-16-85			1-16-85
38. Demonstrate capability to effectively process all incoming messages in a timely manner.	E [S&L]	Demonstrate the capability to process incoming messages in a timely manner at the state EOC.	X		1-16-85		1-16-85	
		Demonstrate capability to process incoming messages in a timely manner at the Parish EOCs.		X	1-16-85	Deficiency #6 Pointe Coupee		Not Met P. Coupee Met by E.Fel, W.Fel EBR, WBR

TABLE 3 (Cont'd)

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PEHA Objectives	NUREG-0654 Reference	January 16, 1985 Exercise Objective	Jurisdictional Responsibility		Date of Exercise	Deficiency Noted (By Deficiency Tracking No.)	Date Objective Met	
			State	Local			State	Local
39. Demonstrate that authority exists in activating a reception center (as necessary) in a timely manner.	A.2.a, A.3 [S&L]	Demonstrate the ability to alert the staff and activate a reception center.		X	1-16-85			1-16-85