NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Nine Mile Point Unit #1	0 5 0 0 0 2 2 0	1 OF 0 5

TITLE (4)
Reactor Scram Initiated by Reactor Protection System

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 4	1 6	8 5	8 5	0 0 5	0 0	0 5	1 6	8 5		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)					
N	20.402(b)		20.405(c)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 0	20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
Robert Randall, Supervisor, Technical Support	3 1 5 3 4 9 - 2 4 4 5

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	
X	E A	5 2	G 0 8 0	Y							

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

ABSTRACT

During normal operation on April 16, 1985 a disturbance in the turbine control system resulted in the partial closing of the turbine control valves. This throttling action caused reactor pressure and neutron flux to rise which resulted in an automatic reactor scram due to an Average Power Range Monitor high flux level. High Pressure Coolant Injection initiated as a result of reactor low water level. Power Board 11 failed to transfer automatically to reserve power. Work requests were issued to troubleshoot the turbine control system and to investigate the failure of Power Board 11 to tranfer to reserve power automatically. Both problems were resolved and both systems satisfactorily returned to service.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

TEXT

During normal operation the turbine control system experienced a system disturbance. Control voltage fluctuations were noticed in the turbine control oil system electronic pressure regulator. Prior to investigation of these fluctuations, the reactor scrammed due to Average Power Range Monitor high neutron flux level. This situation arose from the partial closing of the turbine control valves and this resultant steam throttling increased reactor pressure and neutron flux levels.

Four seconds after the reactor scram High Pressure Coolant Injection was initiated due to reactor low water level. However, only the No. 12 system actuated due to the failure of Power Board 11 to transfer automatically to reserve power. Power Board 11 was manually transferred to reserve power by operations in order to restore its loads.

Work requests were issued to troubleshoot the electronic pressure regulator and to investigate the cause of the failure of Power Board 11 to transfer to reserve power automatically and to make needed repairs. The electronic pressure regulator was calibration checked and the Moog valve was stroke checked. No obvious or measurable deviations from proper operation were noted. The filter in the Moog valve assembly was replaced. The system was returned to service. The mechanical pressure regulator stroke required lubrication of the bushings as the stroke was binding and sticky. The mechanical pressure regulator was satisfactorily returned to service. The failure of Power Board 11 to transfer was traced to dirty auxiliary AC breaker contacts. These contacts were cleaned, the relay was checked and then restored to service.

ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

The initiation of the reactor scram resulted from parameters monitored by the reactor protection system and this system reacted as designed. The initiation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection System was in response to reactor water level reaching the HPCI initiation set point. The failure of Power Board 11 to transfer automatically to reserve power did not adversely affect the ability of the reactor to be brought to a safe shutdown as the High Pressure Coolant Injection System is designed to provide adequate cooling with one set of pumps. Restoration of power manually to Power Board 11 enabled the No. 11 pumps to be actuated if needed.

There is potential for concern should the High Pressure Coolant Injection System not operate. However, due to backup systems to the High Pressure Coolant Injection System, Automatic Depressurization System and Core Spray, the potential consequences are within the design basis of the plant.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Both the electronic and mechanical pressure regulators were satisfactorily returned to service. The mechanical pressure regulator required the bushings to be lubricated to eliminate a sticky and binding control linkage. No deviations from correct operation were noted in the electronic pressure regulator. A brush recorder was installed to monitor electronic pressure regulator input/output amplifier section. No control deviations have been noted. The Moog valve checkout yielded no deviations from correct operation and the filter was replaced. The turbine control system was restored and returned to service. Dirty contacts on the auxiliary AC breaker were cleaned, the relay checked, and returned to service.

NMP-11559

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NIAGARA MOHAWK

300 ERIE BOULEVARD, WEST
SYRACUSE, N. Y. 13202

May 16, 1985

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control
Washington, DC 20555

RE: Docket No. 50-220
LER 85-05

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, we hereby submit the following Licensee Event Report:

LER 85-05 Which is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), "Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS). However, actuation of an ESF, including the RPS, that resulted from and was part of the preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation need not be reported."

This report was completed in the format designated in NUREG-1022 dated September 1983.

Very truly yours,

Thomas E. Lempges

Thomas E. Lempges
Vice President
Nuclear Generation

TEL/lo
Attachments
cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley
Regional Administrator

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