



PEACH BOTTOM—THE POWER OF EXCELLENCE

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION

R. D. 1, Box 208
Delta, Pennsylvania 17314

(717) 456-7014

D. B. Miller, Jr.
Vice President

November 30, 1992

Docket Nos. 50-277
50-278

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS)
Annual 10 CFR 50.59 Report
For The Period 1/1/91 through 12/31/91

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is the 1991 Annual 10 CFR 50.59 Report as required by 10 CFR 50.59.

Should you have any questions, or require further information, please contact us.

Sincerely,

DBM
DBM/AAF/JBM/MJB/BLT

Attachment

cc: R.A. Burricelli, Public Service Electric & Gas
T.M. Gerusky, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
J.J. Lyash, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector
R.I. McLean, State of Maryland
T.T. Martin, Administrator, Region I, USNRC
H.C. Schwemm, Atlantic Electric
C.D. Schaefer, Delmarva Power

1dtevr:lr

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9212070244 921231
PDR ADOCK 05000277
R FNR

Ent No 012401543
FEAT
11

bcc: J. A. Basilio
J. A. Bernstein
Commitment Coordinator
Correspondence Control Desk
E. J. Cullen
A. A. Fulvio

D. E. Miller
T. J. Robb
D. M. Smith

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY
PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION
UNITS 2 AND 3
DOCKET NOS. 50-277; 50-278

1991
ANNUAL 10 CFR 50.59 REPORT

1991
PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION
ANNUAL 10 CFR 50.59 REPORT

This Report is issued pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3 (Facility License Numbers DPR-44 and DPR-56 respectively). This report addresses, but is not limited to, tests and changes to the facility and procedures as they are described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. This report consists of those tests and changes that were completed in 1991. A summary of the safety evaluation for each item, concluding that an unreviewed safety question, as defined in 10 CFR 50.59 (a) (2) was not involved is included.

1991
PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION
ANNUAL 10 CFR 50.50 REPORT

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UNITS 2 & 3

Valve Replacement

MODIFICATION NO.: 1498

A. SYSTEM: High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI), Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC), Core Spray

B. DESCRIPTION:

This modification replaces two tilting disc check valves in the core spray injection line, and one swing check valve each in the HPCI and RCIC injection lines with swing check valves. A minor reroute of Core Spray loop "B" piping was required for this installation. A HPCI and a RCIC equalizing block valve were relocated to outside the outboard MSIV room.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

The replacement of the tilting disk check valves was necessary because valve indication was not reliable, the disc was sticking in the valve seat, valves would not open fully, and two valves would not pass testing requirements. The reroute of the core spray piping was done to eliminate an interference with a junction box. The core spray piping change was based on ISI testing results, and the block valves were moved to minimize dose.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The new valves do not impact any test procedures and are still flow actuated components. The replacement of core spray piping meets the original design requirements.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The scope of this activity only involves the replacement of one style of testable check valve with another, and a minor block valve relocation.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Section 3.5 was reviewed and it was determined that there are no limits or regulations specifically listed for these check valves and their auxiliary components.

Control Room Upgrade

MODIFICATION NO.: 1729 and NCRs 90-423, 424, 425

A. SYSTEM: Miscellaneous

B. DESCRIPTION:

This modification rearranged control room office space, added 2 lunchrooms with kitchenettes, and an instrument lab. UFSAR Figure 10.13.1 was revised to show the new air flow pattern. Figures 12.1.4 and 12.3.4 were revised to show the shielding for the areas, and FPP figure B-7 was revised to show fire barriers and CO₂ hose reel locations. The associated NCRs address the changes to the P&IDs made by this modification.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This modification was completed to optimize the working environment and implement human factors recommendations.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The consequences of fire, earthquake, and LOCA have been determined not to be any greater as a result of this modification.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. Appropriate provisions were taken to assure physical security of the control room complex. Additional electric loads have been considered in the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning and electrical designs.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Section 3.14 was reviewed for making this determination. Table 13.14.C.1 was changed to reflect the addition of one smoke detector.

Removal Of Cardox SystemMODIFICATION NO.: 5041A. SYSTEM: Fire ProtectionB. DESCRIPTION:

This modification removed the cardox hose reels and associated piping, hangers, and electrical equipment from the control room. UFSAR EPR Sections 2.8, 3.1, 3.3, and associated Tables and Figures will be changed.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This modification eliminated a hazard associated with control room habitability.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The probability of a fire is not increased by the removal of the hose reels. The control room operators and fire brigade are adequately equipped to handle a fire in the control room.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The elimination of a redundant fire suppression system does not create the possibility for a new or different type of accident.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Section 3.14 was reviewed for making this determination.

Turbine Valve Setpoint ChangesMODIFICATION NO.: 5085A. SYSTEM: TurbineB. DESCRIPTION:

This modification revised the turbine stop valve closure (TSVC) and turbine control valve fast closure (TCVFC) scram bypass setpoints. FSAR Sections 7.2, 14.5, and associated documentation will reflect these changes.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This modification corrects the TSVC and TCVFC scram setpoint. These changes are based on GE SIL 423.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This setpoint change conservatively decreases the minimum reactor power level for which the TSVC and TCVFC scram function is operable and insures consistency with assumptions in the safety analysis report.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The TSVC and TCVFC scram continues to function to insert negative reactivity into the reactor in anticipation of the pressurization transient resulting from turbine trip, TSV closure and TCV fast abnormal operational transient, but will now perform this function over a wider range of reactor power levels.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. This is a more conservative approach than the Technical Specifications recommend. Sections 3.1, 3.3.B, 4.1, and 4.3 were reviewed in making this decision.

Fuse Replacement Installation And Class SeparationMODIFICATION NO.: 5243A. SYSTEM: 125/250 V DCB. DESCRIPTION:

This modification replaced fuses that did not meet test criteria, removed redundant fuses, and provided separation between Class 1E and non 1E electrical circuits associated with cables between 2(3)A(B)D18 and 2(3)A(B)D36, and 2(3)A(B)D18 and 2(3)A(B)38. FSAR Figures in Section 8.7 and FPP Section 6.1 were updated to reflect these changes.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This modification was necessary because the fuses failed PECO tests, to create separation between Class 1E and non 1E, and to ensure the functional requirements of the circuits are satisfied.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The fuse replacement and fuse block installations do not affect any existing accident analysis. The operation of other systems required for accident investigation are not affected, and the radiological consequences of an accident are not increased.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The new fuses have the same failure modes as the old fuses, but the new fuses have improved design characteristics. No new failure modes are introduced.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Sections 3/4.9.A and associated Bases were reviewed to make this determination.

Establishment Of Single-Unit Cooler OperationMODIFICATION NO.: 5346A. SYSTEM: Emergency Core Cooling (ECC) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)B. DESCRIPTION:

This modification implemented a change in system operational alignment to isolate cooling water and electric power to the standby cooler in each of the ECC system and RCIC pump compartments. Also the valve positioning for the emergency service water (ESW) manual throttle valves on the cooling water outlet lines from all ECC and RCIC room unit coolers, residual heat removal pump seal coolers, and core spray coolers has been revised from locked throttle to locked open. FSAR Sections 5 and 7, Table 8.5.2h and Figure 10.7.1 reflect the changes made.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This modification was necessary to return the system to a configuration consistent with the original design intent of a single cooler operation and will permit system flow balancing to provide the maximum cooling water flow to the operating cooler. The changes will also ensure that maximum ESW flow is available for components.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. None of the changes will have an adverse impact on the operation or maintenance of equipment. The probability of occurrence or consequences of previously evaluated accidents and malfunctions remains unchanged.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. No new accident initiators or malfunctions are created by these changes.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Sections 3, 4, and 6 were reviewed to make this determination.

NONCONFORMANCE REPORT NO.: P-90288A. SYSTEM: DieselB. DESCRIPTION:

This NCR addresses the consistency of the diesel generators and plant installed equipment agreement with design drawings, and the replacement of a 1/2" globe valve with a plug valve (petcock) at the E4 diesel jacket coolant cooler vent connection. UFSAR Figure 8.5.1 has been changed to reflect these changes.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This NCR is dispositioned rework to restore consistency to the diesel generators and to assure plant installed equipment agrees with design drawings. The change in valve type provides for consistency between the four diesel engines. The other three cooler vents utilize plug valves. Replacement with a "Q" plug valve provides acceptable design, safety and functional characteristics.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This activity did not affect the intended function of the jacket cooling or standing AC power systems. UFSAR Section 14.0 "Plant Safety Analysis" was reviewed. The replacement valve performs an identical safety function (maintains pressure boundary) as the original valve.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This activity maintains the design function of the affected systems and components.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specifications Section 3.9 A and C were reviewed in making this decision.

Resolution Of Discrepancy Between As -Built And Documentation

NONCONFORMANCE REPORT NO.: P-90529

A. SYSTEM: Instrument Air

B. DESCRIPTION:

This NCR addresses drawing discrepancies, identified during a walkdown, on valves and piping which provide distribution of air. These discrepancies included: differing line class representation, piping end connection, and valve type or missing valve locked status. UFSAR Figure 10.17.1 and associated documentation were revised to reflect as-installed conditions.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This NCR is dispositioned to use-as-is.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This is a drawing change to reflect the "as built" plant condition. System function is not affected by differing line class representation, piping end connection, valve type or missing valve locked status.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This a drawing correction only.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. The disposition of this NCR does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification. Technical Specification Sections 3/4.7 were reviewed in making this determination.

Resolution Of Discrepancy Between As-Built And DocumentationNONCONFORMANCE REPORT NO.: P-90586A. SYSTEM: Reactor Water Clean-up SystemB. DESCRIPTION:

This NCR is dispositioned to change the SAR Figure 4.9.1 and associated documentation to reflect better detail and to add a symbol for a Thermowell.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This NCR is dispositioned to revise documentation.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. These are drawing changes only and do not reflect any changes to the physical plant condition.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

no. The changes make the drawing agree with the as-built condition. These changes do not affect the integrity, operability, or function of the system in any way.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Sections 3/4.6.A were reviewed for making this determination.

Resolution Of Discrepancy Between As-Installed And Documentation

NONCONFORMANCE REPORT NO.: P-90619

A. SYSTEM: Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI)

B. DESCRIPTION:

This NCR resolved an inconsistency between the 70 amp fuse rating for circuits 29-2303 and 29-2406 shown on Drawing E-27 (UFSAR Figure 8.7.2.a) and the field installed rating of 30 amps. The circuits affected provide DC power for ARI system solenoids. Documentation was revised to show the 30 amp fuses.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This NCR is dispositioned to use-as-is.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This is an editorial revision reflecting the correct fuse size as-installed, based on the cable, load size, and protection coordination. A 30A fuse was determined to be the correct size.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The fuses are the correct size. No hardware changes have been made.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. The Technical Specification Bases applicable to this NCR are not affected. Technical Specification Sections 3.9, 4.5 and 4.9 were reviewed.

External Design Pressure For Suppression Chamber Discrepancy

NONCONFORMANCE REPORT NO.: P-90640

A. SYSTEM: Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

B. DESCRIPTION:

This NCR identified inconsistencies the UFSAR and actual suppression chamber external pressure which is identified as 2 psig but is actually 2 psid. UFSAR Section M.3.2.4.9 and Table M.3.4 will be changed to reflect 2 psid.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This NCR is dispositioned to change the FSAR.



D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This is an editorial correction only and makes no physical changes to the plant.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This is a text change only and makes no physical change to the plant.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Sections 3.7.A and 4.7.A were reviewed for making this determination.

External Design Pressure For Suppression DiscrepancyNONCONFORMANCE REPORT NO.: P-90640

A. SYSTEM: Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

B. DESCRIPTION:

This NCR identified inconsistencies the UFSAR and actual suppression chamber external pressure which is identified as 2 psig but is actually 2 psid. UFSAR Section M.3.2.4.9 and Table M.3.4 will be changed to reflect 2 psid.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This NCR is dispositioned to change the FSAR.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This is an editorial correction only and makes no physical changes to the plant.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This is a text change only and makes no physical change to the plant.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Sections 3.7.A and 4.7.A were reviewed for making this determination.

Resolution Of Discrepancy Between As-Built Plant Condition And Existing DocumentationNONCONFORMANCE REPORT NO.: P-90650A. SYSTEM: Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)B. DESCRIPTION:

This NCR identified inconsistencies between Functional Control Diagram M-1-CC-43 sheets 4 and 10 and the as-built configuration of the RCIC turbine speed control system. UFSAR Figure 4.7.2D and associated documentation were revised to reflect the as-built condition.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This NCR is dispositioned to use-as-is, and revise diagrams.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This is a drawing change only and does not alter any equipment or hardware in the plant.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. There has been no change to the plant configuration. This is a drawing change only.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Sections 3.5D and 4.5D were reviewed for making this determination.

Resolution Of Discrepancy Between As-Built Plant Condition And Existing DocumentationNONCONFORMANCE REPORT NO.: P-90725A. SYSTEM: Steam Leak DetectionB. DESCRIPTION:

This NCR clarifies documentation to identify that no area temperature monitoring exists in the reactor water cleanup pump room. UFSAR Sections 4.10 and 7.3 were revised.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This NCR is dispositioned to use-as-is.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. Plant functional capabilities, as previously evaluated, are unaffected.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. There are no hardware changes or changes to the operation of installed equipment as a result of these changes.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Sections 3/4.2,6,7, and 8 were reviewed for making this determination.

Correct Discrepancies

NONCONFORMANCE REPORT NO.: P-90762

A. SYSTEM: Radiation Monitoring

B. DESCRIPTION:

This NCR identifies a non-conformance between the UFSAR Table 7.13.2 and actual plant installation. The non-conformance involved wording in UFSAR Table 7.13.2 describing the actual location of radiation detectors RE 0-18-30J and RE 0-18-30K. The Table was revised to reflect as-installed conditions.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This NCR is dispositioned to use-as-is.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. Changing the nameplate legend description of UFSAR Section 7.13, Table 7.13.2 to agree with actual plant installation and system design documentation did not impact any accidents evaluated in the SAR. UFSAR Sections 7.13, 9.0, 14.0 and Appendix J were reviewed in making this determination.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. Changing the location description in UFSAR Table 7.13.2 does not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the SAR.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. The Technical Specifications Bases were reviewed and none were found to be applicable for the Radwaste Radiation Monitors.

Resolution Of Discrepancy Between As-Built Plant Condition And Existing DocumentationNONCONFORMANCE REPORT NO.: P-90766A. SYSTEM: Fire ProtectionB. DESCRIPTION:

UFSAR Figure B-2 of the Fire Protection Program was revised to show the 4" fire water piping to the Vendor Building sprinkler system as a 12" diameter Main Fire Water Line. The drawing and the associated P&IDs were changed to reflect the as-built condition.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This NCR is dispositioned to use-as-is.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The design base function of the fire protection system is unaffected by this drawing change.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This change maintains the design base function of the fire line.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Sections 3.14 and 6.12 were reviewed for making this determination.

Resolution Of Discrepancy Between As-Built Plant Condition And Existing Documentation

NONCONFORMANCE REPORT NO.: P-90805

A. SYSTEM: Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

B. DESCRIPTION:

This NCR identified the following valves that should be shown as normally closed to reflect the actual configuration of the RHR system.

HV-2-10-21572A,B	HV-3-10-31572A,B
HV-2-10-21573A,B	HV-3-10-31573A,B
HV-2-10-21618A,B	HV-3-10-31618B
HV-2-10-21619A,B	HV-3-10-31619B

In addition, the associated nitrogen bottle regulating valve must be shown as normally closed. UFSAR Figure 4.8.2 was changed to reflect these changes.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This NCR is dispositioned to use-as-is and show these valves to be normally closed.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. These valves are used for surveillance testing. This change does not affect the performance of the RHR system.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The performance of the RHR system is not degraded by the normally closed position.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. There are no applicable Technical Specifications that specifically address this portion of the RHR system.

Power Cable Failure

NONCONFORMANCE REPORT NO.: P-91317

A. SYSTEM: Emergency Auxiliary Transformer

B. DESCRIPTION:

This modification is an interim repair which involved abandoning cable 2OAX04R(A, B, C phase) in place, and removing a section of Cable OAX04T (A, B, C phase) between MH (manhole) -061 and MH-09 and replacing it with 15kV cable and splicing in MH-09. The total number of conductors between the transformer and the bus duct has been changed from 27 to 24. The installation may be reworked in the future pending additional evaluations.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

Two of the 27 cables connecting the 2 emergency auxiliary transformer OAX04 to the non-seg phase bus duct OOA19 failed.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The circuit has the current carrying capacity to supply the actual worst case loading. The original design requirements are satisfied with respect to current carrying capacity and an acceptable voltage drop is maintained.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The use of 8-1/C 1000 MCM cables and added splices has been evaluated and found to meet design requirements of the Auxiliary Power system.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Sections 3/4.9 and the associated Bases were reviewed for making this determination.

Cooling Water Cross Tie Valves

REVIEW

A. SYSTEM: Emergency Service Water (ESW), Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW)

B. DESCRIPTION:

This review addressed the closure of the 33-520 "A" and "B" ESW to Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) cross tie valves. This closure was performed in 1979 to isolate the non-seismic RBCCW system from the seismic ESW to assure the integrity of the ESW pressure boundary during and following a design basis seismic event. Reportable Occurrence Report No. 2-79-16/IP documented this change. UFSAR Sections 5, 7, and 10 were changed to reflect this closure.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

To document the adequacy of the design configuration change in accordance with the enhanced 10CFR50.59 Review requirements.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. Those accidents which are potentially negatively impacted by the change are accidents or events that involve a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) or Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). All systems that could be impacted by this change were individually evaluated. It was determined that no increase in the probability of an accident or malfunction was created.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. Systems that could be impacted by this modification were individually evaluated. It was determined that the modification does not create the possibility of a different type of accident or malfunction.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Sections 3 and 6 were reviewed for making this determination.

Valve Lineup ChangeREVIEW

A. SYSTEM: Emergency Service Water (ESW)

B. DESCRIPTION:

This change closed the bypass valve around the air operated valves upstream of each Inservice operating Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and Reactor Core Injection Cooling (RCIC) System room cooler.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This temporary change is invoked when the ESW Chemical Injection System is inoperable.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The position of these valves has no bearing on the probability of an accident. The temporary lineup will not affect the ESW system's capability to support ECCS and RCIC equipment if it is called on to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This change does not affect the ESW system's capability to support ECCS and RCIC equipment if it is necessary for mitigation of the consequences of an accident.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Sections 3.5 and 3.9 were reviewed for making this determination.

Portable Demineralizers

PROCEDURES AO-38D.1 and AO-38D.2

A. SYSTEM: Demineralizer

B. DESCRIPTION:

This revision provides instructions for the use of a trailered online demineralizer.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

A temporary portable demineralizer and trailer were installed.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. Water quality is monitored and maintained to the same specifications as the existing system.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. Equipment important to safety is not impacted by the use of a portable demineralizer.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. The Makeup Demin system is not mentioned in the Technical Specifications.

Manual For Clearance And TaggingPROCEDURE Clearance and Tagging ManualA. SYSTEM: Performance MonitoringB. DESCRIPTION:

Implementation of a Clearance and Tagging Manual to provide methods of protection for personnel and plant equipment during operations, maintenance, and modification activities.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This change is necessary because of the changes instituted with the new computer.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This procedure will only be used for Load Dispatcher's Permits. No accidents are described in the FSAR which involve this procedure.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The change is administrative only. No changes were made to the levels of control of equipment.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Section 6.8 was reviewed to make this determination.

UNIT 2

Plant Monitoring System (PMS) InstallationsMODIFICATION NO.: 955EA. SYSTEM: Plant MonitoringB. DESCRIPTION:

This modification installed raceway, cable, cable terminations, loop-taps, and class 1E multiplexers for the new Plant Monitoring System (PMS) computer. In addition, this modification removes some temperature elements for monitoring secondary containment area temperatures from the Q List. UFSAR Sections 4.8, 9, 10; 7.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 12, 13, 16, 19, 20; 8.5; 10.9; 17; and 11.3, 15, 6 and associated documentation were changed to reflect the changes.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This modification was necessary to make the circuits compatible with the new PMS.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. For equipment that is important to safety, qualified isolators will be used to isolate the non-safety related PMS from the safety related circuits. The signal isolators being added are more reliable than other components in the loops and do not change the way the instrument loops function.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The PMS input taps do not change the way the instrument loops function or introduce any new failure modes. Temperature elements deleted from the Q List do not affect the capability to safely shutdown the plant in case of fire.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specifications Sections 3.5C, 4.5C, 3.7D, 4.7D and associated bases were reviewed and are not affected.

Installation Of Safety Grade N2 SupplyMODIFICATION NO.: 1316

A. SYSTEM: Primary Containment, Containment Atmosphere Control (CAC),
Containment Atmosphere Dilution (CAD)

B. DESCRIPTION:

Installation of a safety grade N2 supply to the containment isolation valves and an upgrade of CAC and CAD components, including work on mechanical piping and tubing, valves, fittings and switches.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This system will remove the need for the bottled gas supply, and the associated requirement to establish and maintain air supply system leak rate criteria for individual users, and will allow verification of adequate system performance by functional testing. The upgrade was also done to assure compliance with I.E. Bulletin 79-01B and Regulatory Guide 1.97.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. Design requirements applied to this modification include, but are not limited to, seismic qualification, quality assurance, testability, maintainability, original equipment performance specification, environmental qualification, separation criteria, safeguard power sources, and protection from jet impingement.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The criteria used as a basis for the protection and evaluation of one plant component from adverse interactions of another plant component during various operating conditions comply with the UFSAR and ANSI standards.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specifications Sections 3.7 and 4.7 have been reviewed. All load stress acceptance criteria for all components evaluated and/or repaired by this work comply with the original design code requirements specified in the UFSAR or as allowed by ASME Section XI.

Drywell Cooler Fan LogicMODIFICATION NO.: 1542A. SYSTEM: Drywell CoolingB. DESCRIPTION:

This modification changes the control logic of drywell cooler fans 2AV26 through 2GV26 to bypass the high drywell pressure or low reactor water level trip signal.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This modification implements the NRC recommendation to improve the plant recovery from high drywell pressure (above 2 psig) per I.E. Information Notice 84-35.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report has not been increased. Failure of the new bypass circuit may result in increased loading on the emergency buses, however, the additional load will not exceed the capacity of the diesel generators. The equipment added by this modification has been located in safety related panels and has been mounted in a similar manner to that of safety related components to prevent damage to the safety related equipment inside the panel.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report has not been created. Failure of the bypass circuit does not result in the placement of unacceptable loads on the emergency bus or its associated diesel generator. This change allows the operator to restart the drywell cooler fans from the control room to improve the plant recovery from high drywell pressure.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications has not been reduced. Technical Specification Sections 3.4.9 were reviewed in making this determination.

Automatic Sprinkler Extension for Turbine/Generator Bearings And Front Standard

MODIFICATION NO.: 1832

A. SYSTEM: Sprinkler

B. DESCRIPTION:

This modification provided wet pipe automatic sprinkler protection for the turbine bearings, generator bearings, and front standard, and removed the dry chemical piping and nozzles. UFSAR Section 10.2.3.4 and FPP Sections 2.2, 2.9, 3.3.1, 5.3.40, and associated tables and figures were revised to show these modifications.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This modification was an enhancement to comply with Insurance (ANI) recommendations.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. There is no equipment important to safety affected by this modification. The modification does not require a revision to the analysis of safe shutdown in the event of a fire, therefore, the modification has no effect on the probability of occurrence of any postulated accident.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This modification provides automatic sprinkler protection. It does not affect any safety related or safe shutdown equipment.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Sections 3/4.14 were reviewed for making this determination.

Replace Existing Flow TransmittersMODIFICATION NO.: 1891A. SYSTEM: VariousB. DESCRIPTION:

This modification replaced existing flow transmitters with environmentally qualified flow transmitters in various systems. It also replaced existing signal conditioning instruments associated with these flow transmitters to accommodate the new transmitter with 4-20 ma output. Appropriate UFSAR Figures in Sections 4 and 7 were updated to reflect changes made by this modification.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This modification was necessary to meet a Reg. Guide 1.97 commitment.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This modification replaced existing flow transmitters with environmentally qualified flow transmitters in various safety systems. This modification did not change the operation of the safety systems involved.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This modification does not change the operation of the affected system and has a negligible effect on loop accuracy and reliability. It does not introduce any new accident initiators.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specifications Sections 3.4.2 and 3.5.A, B, C, and D were reviewed in making this determination.

Appendix J ModificationMODIFICATION NO.: 2075A. SYSTEM: Primary ContainmentB. DESCRIPTION:

This modification added block valve and/or test connections to ensure local leak rate tests (WP) of containment isolation valves are performed in full compliance with 10CFR50, Appendix J. This modification also reverses manual block valves between the primary containment and the inboard containment isolation valve to include valve stem packing in the boundary and modifies twenty-three penetrations.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This modification was done in response to Inspection Report 50-277/85-23 and 50-278/85-23.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. Modification of the containment isolation boundary will allow a more conservative Local Leak Rate Test for the penetrations since previously untested valve stem packing will now be included. It is now more likely that packing leaks will be detected by routine testing and repaired, lowering the probability of radiation release outside containment.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The design of the systems affected by this modification are essentially unchanged with the exception of an enhancement of the leak rate testing of the containment boundary. No new accident initiators were introduced.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Sections 3.7 A and D were reviewed for making this determination.

Installation Of Fuses And Fuse Blocks

MODIFICATION NO.: 2268

A. SYSTEM: 250 & 125 Volt

B. DESCRIPTION:

This modification installed fuses and fuse blocks in the bus undervoltage relay circuits contained in the 250 VDC motor control center 20D08 and the 125 VDC distribution panels 20D21, 20D22, 20D23, 20D24, and 20D25. UFSAR Figures 8.7.1a, 8.7.1b, and 8.7.2b will be revised to show these changes.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This modification was made so that the undervoltage relays can be tested and calibrated without a safeguard bus outage.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The function of the DC system is unchanged. It will make testing and calibration easier.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. These fuses and fuse blocks are qualified for the worst-case environmental and seismic condition for their locations. This modification did not introduce any new failure modes.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Sections 3/4.9.A were reviewed for making this determination.

Emergency Service Water (ESW) Piping Relocation And Changes

MODIFICATION NO.: 5046

A. SYSTEM: Emergency Service WaterB. DESCRIPTION:

This modification and its associated Engineering Review Request Form replaced and relocated the ESW ring headers and associated piping in the Torus room and provided ring header segmentation valves and plug valves with position indicators for maintenance purposes. To complete the modification temporary breaching of steam/flood barriers was required. Testing was performed to determine flowrates and the plug valves may be left in the throttled position during operations. Appendix A of the FSAR has been changed to indicate code updates, valve types and to update valve positions. Associated Check Out Lists have been changed.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This modification was necessary because of problems with piping corrosion and flow balancing of the ESW system.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This modification makes no functional change, nor introduces any new hazards.

- 2) Does This modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This modification makes no functional changes to the system and introduces no new hazards. The modification does not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Sections 3.5 and 3.9 were reviewed for making this determination.

Emergency Service Water (ESW)/Emergency Cooling Water (ECW) Flow Instrumentation ChangesMODIFICATION NO.: 5110A. SYSTEM: ESW/ECWB. DESCRIPTION:

This modification replaced a section of the carbon steel pipe with a flanged stainless steel spool piece and provided flow measuring devices. FSAR Sections 10.9 and 10.24 were revised to show these changes.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This modification was necessary to comply with ASME XI requirements.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This modification was installed in accordance with the original design basis.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This modification does not affect any current event initiators or introduce any new event initiators.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Sections 3.9.C and 3.11.B were reviewed in making this determination.

Alternate Feed To Battery Chargers And 120 VAC Distribution Panels

MODIFICATION NO.: 5209

A. SYSTEM: 4kV

B. DESCRIPTION:

This modification installed alternate power feeds for battery chargers 2AD03, 2BD03 and 120 VAC distribution panels 2OY33, 2OY34, 2OY35, OY03. Changes were made to FSAR Sections 8 and 9 as well as Appendices F and J, and associated documentation.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This modification was necessary to resolve two outstanding problems associated with maintaining qualified control power to the common diesel generators, their associated 4kV emergency buses, and to Unit 2 instrument AC panels when performing tests and maintenance on Division I or II equipment during a Unit 2 cold shutdown or refueling mode.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. There are no specific UFSAR Chapter 14 accident analyses that discuss taking credit for the 125/250V DC system and the 120V AC instrument power supply systems. The modification does not alter any assumption made in evaluating the radiological consequences of an accident.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This modification does not change the function of the battery chargers or the instrument AC panels.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Sections 3.9 and 4.9 were reviewed for making this determination.

Level Switch Change

MODIFICATION NO.: 5240

A. SYSTEM: Reactor Core Isolation Cooling

B. DESCRIPTION:

This modification removed level switch LS-2-13-74 and replaced it with a similar level switch. A minor change to the drain line piping was necessary to accommodate the new switch. FSAR Figure 4.7.1A reflects these changes.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This modification was necessary because the existing model level switch was obsolete.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The new switch performs the same function as the original switch.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The new level switch meets the same design criteria as the original switch.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Sections 3.5 and 4.5 were reviewed in making this determination.

Resolution Of Discrepancy Between As-Built And DocumentationNONCONFORMANCE REPORT NO.: P-90214A. SYSTEM: Nuclear Boiler Vessel InstrumentationB. DESCRIPTION:

This NCR addressed valve numbering changes, correction of drafting errors, and makes clarifications to existing documentation. P&ID M-52 sheets 3 & 4 and SAR Figure 7.3.1 will be changed.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This NCR is dispositioned to use-as-is.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. These are drawing changes only and do not reflect any changes to the physical plant condition.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The changes provide a greater level of detail and clarity in the P&ID representation of the plant's actual as-built condition.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Section 3/4.2 was reviewed for making this determination.

Resolution Of Discrepancy Between As-Built And DocumentationNONCONFORMANCE REPORT NO.: P-90216A. SYSTEM: Reactor Water Clean-up SystemB. DESCRIPTION:

This NCR addresses inconsistencies between the as-built condition of the reactor water clean-up system and documentation. P&ID M-354 Sheet 2 and the SAR Figure 4.9.1 sheet 2 were changed.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This NCR is dispositioned to use-as-is.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. These are drawing changes only and do not reflect any changes to the physical plant condition.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. These changes do not affect the integrity, operability, or function of the system in any way. The consequences if a SAR evaluated accident are unchanged.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Section 3/4.6.A were reviewed for making this determination.

Resolution Of Discrepancy Between As-Built And DocumentationNONCONFORMANCE REPORT NO.: P-90353A. SYSTEM: Emergency Service Water and High Pressure Service WaterB. DESCRIPTION:

This NCR identified inconsistencies between documentation and actual valve position. The demineralized water isolation valve HV-2-38D-47074A to RHR heat exchanger 2AE024 should not be shown as locked closed on UFSAP figure 10.7.1, sht. 1 of 4 and associated documentation. Documentation was revised to reflect these changes. This change is consistent with that of the remaining Unit 2 RHR heat exchangers and is in accordance with the Unit 2 locked valve list.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

The NCR is dispositioned to use-as-is.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. Deleting the drawing notation that the valve is locked closed has no effect on the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment as previously evaluated in the SAR.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This drawing change does not effect the safety related function of the valve and does not prevent other safety related systems or equipment from fulfilling their safety related function.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Sections 3.5 and 6.8 were reviewed to make this determination.

Resolution Of Discrepancy Between As-Built And Documentation

NONCONFORMANCE REPORT NO.: P90376

A. SYSTEM: Radiation Monitoring System

B. DESCRIPTION:

This NCR involves a drawing discrepancy and is dispositioned to change the UFSAR Figure 7.12.3 description of 63L-19427B from a globe valve to its as-is configuration of a gate valve.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This NCR is dispositioned to use-as-is.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. 63L-19427B provides a system pressure boundary and does not impact an accident or malfunction important to safety as previously evaluated in the SAR.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This is a description change only. Since the probability of failure of a globe valve is the same as that of a gate valve, the failure of 63L-19427B will not cause an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the SAR.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Sections 1.0.3/4.2 2/4.14 were reviewed for making this determination.

Resolution Of Discrepancy Between As-Built Plant Condition And Existing DocumentationNONCONFORMANCE REPORT NO.: P-90599A. SYSTEM: RecombinerB. DESCRIPTION:

This NCR identifies inconsistencies between documentation and actual configuration of the off-gas recombining steam supply drain piping installed correctly, but not shown correctly on UFSAR Figures 9.5.1, 11.2.1, and associated documentation.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This NCR is dispositioned to revise documentation to show correct configuration.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This NCR makes no physical changes to the system.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This NCR changes documentation only.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. This portion of the gas recombining system is not addressed in the Technical Specifications.

Resolution Of Discrepancy Between As-Built Plant Condition And Existing DocumentationNONCONFORMANCE REPORT NO.: P-90789A. SYSTEM: Fire ProtectionB. DESCRIPTION:

This NCR indicated that a wet standpipe in the turbine building is connected to the 10 inch fire main upstream of HR-116-19 only. The FSAR and associated P&ID showed the standpipe to be connected to the main in two places. UFSAR Figure B-2 of the Fire Protection Program and associated documentation were revised to reflect the as-installed condition.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This NCR is dispositioned to use-as-is.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The possibility of a fire or line break in the turbine building is not increased.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The drawing change does not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the SAR.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Sections 3/4.14 were reviewed for making this determination.

Resolution Of Discrepancy Between As-Built Plant Condition And Existing Documentation

NONCONFORMANCE REPORT NO.: P-91159

A. SYSTEM: High Pressure Coolant Injection

B. DESCRIPTION:

This NCR involved drawing changes to accurately reflect circuit breaker size and replacement of a 25 Amp circuit breaker with a 10 Amp circuit breaker. UFSAR Figure 8.4.6, and associated documents were revised.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This NCR is dispositioned to revise drawings to show this as installed, 10 Amp circuit breaker for MCC 20B36 compartment 52-3614 and to replace the installed 35 Amp circuit breaker in MCC 20B37 compartment 52-3752 with a 10 Amp breaker.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The intended design function and operation of the plant Electrical Distribution system and the High Pressure Coolant Injection system are not affected by this modification.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The failure modes of the 25 Amp and 10 Amp circuit breakers are the same. No new accident initiators were introduced.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Sections 3.4.7, 3.4.9 and associated bases were reviewed for making this determination.

Lost Parts In Reactor Vessel

NONCONFORMANCE REPORT NO.: P-91193

A. SYSTEM: Steam Separator

B. DESCRIPTION:

While removing the lockpin to manipulate the steam separator latching tool, the lanyard clip became detached from the lock pin and fell into the reactor vessel. The lost part analysis evaluated the effect on safe reactor operations of the lost part and the cumulative effect of the clip and previously lost parts.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This NCR was dispositioned to have GE perform a full lost parts analysis to determine a use-as-is assessment because the SAR assumes that lost parts do not exist.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The lost parts do not interfere with control rod motion or fuel bundle coolant flow. The lost objects do not create a chemical or corrosion concern.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The lost objects will not block control rod operation, cause fuel bundle flow blockage or, cause damage to reactor internal components. The ability to safely shutdown the plant is maintained.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Reactor water chemistry limits and reactor performance will be unaffected. The Bases for Technical Specification Sections 1.1, 3.3A, 3.6A and 3.6B were reviewed in making this determination.

Resolution Of Discrepancy Between As-Built Plant Condition And Existing DocumentationNONCONFORMANCE REPORT NO.: P-91283A. SYSTEM: Residual Heat Removal (RHR)B. DESCRIPTION:

This NCR addressed the replacement of a 480 VAC Westinghouse type HFB circuit breaker feeding the RHR recirc loop A return valve MO-2-10-25A. The breaker tripped due to high inrush current experienced during valve operation. Testing of the breaker found the breaker tripped at a much lower current on the A phase than on the B and C phases. In addition, the instantaneous trip setting of the breaker was not set high enough to prevent the breaker from tripping as a result of high in-rush current.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This NCR is dispositioned to replace the breaker to prevent trip on in-rush current, and increase the instantaneous trip setting.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The breaker was replaced with a functionally equivalent one. The change on the instantaneous trip setting of the new breaker to prevent inadvertent tripping will have no effect on any accident identified in the SAR. The RHR system functions have not been changed.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The new breaker will perform the same function as the original breaker and the ability to open and close valve MO-2-10-25A is maintained.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Sections 1/2.2 and 3/4.5 were reviewed for making this determination.

'C' Channel TripTEMPORARY ALTERATION NO.: 2-13-07A. SYSTEM: Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)B. DESCRIPTION:

Installation of a jumper to insert 'C' channel trip.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

The Technical Specifications state that when the number of operable channels is less than required the channel should be placed in the tripped condition or RCIC should be declared inoperable.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This configuration is safe because it is more conservative.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This is only a jumper to initiate a trip.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Section 3.2 was reviewed for making this determination.

Defeat Of Loss Of Power AlarmTEMPORARY PLANT ALTERATION: TPA 2-23-07

A. SYSTEM: High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI)

B. DESCRIPTION:

This TPA was installed to defeat the HPCI gland seal blower DC motor power loss alarm.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

The undervoltage relay for the gland seal blower motor had failed and was bringing up an alarm, masking any problem with critical equipment.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. Undervoltage conditions on the HPCI gland seal blower are not detected by alarm, and have no impact on HPCI operability.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. Operators were able to monitor for degradation of the HPCI system. The gland seal blower is not required for HPCI operability and the loss of power alarm for it provides no safety function.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification section 3.5.C was reviewed for making this determination.

Service Water Valve Lineup During Chiller Maintenance

TEMPORARY PLANT ALTERATION: TPA 2-30-07

A. SYSTEM: Service Water

B. DESCRIPTION:

This TPA involved opening valves HV-2-30-21791 and 21792 to provide cooling water to a refrigerant vapor recovery system during the repair of a drywell chiller.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This modification was required to prevent loss of the refrigerant to the atmosphere during repair of the chiller.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. Service Water is not a safety related system.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. Service Water is not a safety related system.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for 10 CFR Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Service Water is not mentioned in the Technical Specifications.

Reactor Protection Motor Generator (M/G) Set MonitoringTEMPORARY PLANT ALTERATION: TPA 2-60-18

A. SYSTEM: Reactor Protection

B. DESCRIPTION:

This TPA added a voltage recorder to the 2 "B" M/G set.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This allowed better monitoring of M/G voltage output and voltage regulator input and output.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The M/G set is protected from a failure in the monitoring equipment by fuses, and the equipment is seismically mounted.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This TPA only connects monitoring equipment to the M/G set.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Section 3.1 was reviewed for making this determination.

UNIT 3

Resolution Of Discrepancy Between As-Built And Existing P&IDsNONCONFORMANCE REPORT NO.: P89232-313A. SYSTEM: Instrument NitrogenB. DESCRIPTION:

This NCR identifies changes to P&ID 6280-M-333 and related P&ID 6280-M-327 as a result of discrepancies with the as-built plant condition for the Instrument Nitrogen system for Unit 3. NCR P89232-313 identifies nine individual items requiring evaluation, including numerous changes to valves, drain taps, piping, and pressure switches. These discrepancies were generated as a result of a field walkdown of the system.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This NCR is dispositioned to use-as-is.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. These changes do not affect the function or operation of the Instrument Nitrogen system or interfacing systems in a manner that would increase the probability of occurrence of a transient accident, or event previously evaluated in the UFSAR Chapter 14.0 Appendix G.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. These changes do not affect the function or operation of the Instrument Nitrogen system or interfacing systems in a manner that would affect the safety related function of any component required to mitigate the consequences of a transient, accident, or event previously evaluated in the UFSAR, including Chapter 14.0 and Appendix G.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. The Instrument Nitrogen system is not addressed in any Technical Specification. Additionally these changes specified to the Instrument Nitrogen System do not affect the Technical Specification bases of any interfacing system.

Resolution Of Discrepancy Between As-Built Plant Condition And Existing Documentation

NONCONFORMANCE REPORT NO.: P-90538

A. SYSTEM: Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

B. DESCRIPTION:

This NCR identified inconsistencies between documentation and actual valve position of HV-3-10-65. UFSAR Figures 4.8.2, 7.4.6, 13.3 and associated documentation were revised to show this valve in a normally closed position.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This NCR is dispositioned to show this valve as normally closed.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This change has no effect on the existing accident analysis or operational analysis as previously evaluated in the SAR.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. Closing the inner block valve does not create an accident initiator not previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Section 3.5 was reviewed for making this determination.

Resolution Of Discrepancy Between As-Built Plant Condition And Existing DocumentationNONCONFORMANCE REPORT NO.: P-90678A. SYSTEM: Circulating WaterB. DESCRIPTION:

This NCR identified inconsistencies between P&ID M-312 Sheet 2 and as-is condition of the plant. UFSAR Figure 11.6.1 was revised to show that valves HV-3-28A-38011A, B, C and HV-3-28A-3012A,B,C are carbon steel instead of brass valves.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This NCR is dispositioned to use-as-is.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. These valves meet system design requirements and have no impact on the plant accident scenario described in the UFSAR.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This is a drawing change only and does not change the current plant configuration.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specifications do not address these valves.

Resolution Of Discrepancy Between As-Built Plant Condition And Existing DocumentationNONCONFORMANCE REPORT NO.: P-91116A. SYSTEM: FeedwaterB. DESCRIPTION:

This NCR identified inconsistencies between documentation and actual plant configuration. Modification 2391 replaced conical orifices with flat plate orifices. UFSAR Figure 4.3.2A and associated documents did not reflect these changes.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This NCR is dispositioned to revise documentation.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This is a document update only.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This is a document change only.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Sections 3.5, 3.6, and 5.6 were reviewed for making this determination.

Resolution Of Discrepancy Between As-Built Plant Condition And Existing DocumentationNONCONFORMANCE REPORT NO.: P-91167A. SYSTEM: 440 V Emergency AuxiliaryB. DESCRIPTION:

This NCR identified inconsistencies between documentation and actual configuration. The UFSAR Single Line drawings E-1617 and E-1717 in section 8.4, were to be revised to show breaker 3881 and 3803 as 100 Amp breakers.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This NCR is dispositioned to revise drawings.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The breaker sizes were sized for modification 5045. When the modification was complete these drawings were overlooked and never changed. This is a drawing change only and does not change current plant configuration.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This is an editorial change only.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Sections 3/4.9 were reviewed for making this determination.

Repair of High Pressure Coolant Injection Oil CoolerNONCONFORMANCE REPORT NO.: P-91347A. SYSTEM: High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI)B. DESCRIPTION:

This NCR evaluated plugging one tube of the HPCI lube oil cooler.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This NCR is dispositioned to repair the HPCI lube oil cooler.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The plugging of the tube will increase reliability of the system by preventing water from leaking into the HPCI lube oil.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. There is no risk that a dislodged plug would travel beyond the heat exchanger. The plug was installed in the second pass of a four pass exchanger.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Sections 3/4.5A were reviewed for making this determination.

Feedwater Heater Valve

TEMPORARY ALTERATION NO.: TPA 3-6-7

A. SYSTEM: Feedwater Heater

B. DESCRIPTION:

This TPA installed a temporary hand valve and pipe cap downstream of HV-3-6-53178A.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This valve and cap were added to isolate leakage.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. No accidents are mentioned in the FSAR only a drawing of vent lines is shown.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. No accidents are mentioned in the FSAR.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. The Feedwater Heater system is not shown in the Technical Specifications.

Limit Switches On Refuel Platform

TEMPORARY ALTERATION NO.: TPA 3-18-4

A. SYSTEM: Refuel Platform

B. DESCRIPTION:

This TPA lifted limit switch leads on the refuel platform.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

To facilitate major maintenance without causing rod withdrawal block when over reactor cavity shield plugs.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. No procedure exists in the SAR which governs bridge position over the reactor vessel with the vessel completely assembled and the core inaccessible.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. No these interlocks are intended to prevent two independent means to change core reactivity when the core is exposed. The core was not exposed during this TPA.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. The plant was not in the refuel mode during this TPA.

Installation Of Blank Flanges

TEMPORARY ALTERATION NO.: TPA 3-40B-4

A. SYSTEM: Ventilation

B. DESCRIPTION:

This TPA installed blank flanges on two reactor building ventilation supply ducts.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

To help maintain the residual heat removal (RHR) rooms at negative pressure when the hatch is removed.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. There are no procedures in the SAR which pertain to the reactor building ventilation.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. Both RHR pumps had clearances applied during this TPA.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specifications Section 3.5 was reviewed in making this determination.

Control Rod CircuitsPRIMARY PLANT ALTERATION: TPA 3-52-22

SYSTEM: Control Rods

DESCRIPTION:

This TPA was completed to jumper in the full-in indication for control rod 50-39.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This control rod has a full-in position indicating probe (PIP) problem.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. Rod 50-39 will be blocked full-in while this TPA is applied so that rod 02-43 and any other rod can not be withdrawn simultaneously.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This TPA only allows the refuel mode one rod permissive interlock to be operational.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Sections 3.10.A and 4.10.A were reviewed for making this determination.

Control Rod Circuitry

TEMPORARY PLANT ALTERATION: TPA 3-62-24

A. SYSTEM: Control Rods

B. DESCRIPTION:

This TPA jumpered in a green backlight full-in indication for rod 30-55.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

The reed switch is defective.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. Rod 30-55 will be blocked full-in while this TPA is applied so that rod 02-43 and any other rod can not be withdrawn simultaneously.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This TPA only allows the refuel mode one rod permissive interlock to be operational.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Sections 3.10.A and 4.10.A were reviewed for making this determination.

Control Rod CircuitryTEMPORARY PLANT ALTERATION: TPA 3-62-2

A. SYSTEM: Control Rods

B. DESCRIPTION:

This TPA was completed to jumper in the full-in indication for control rod 10-19.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

This control rod has a full-in PIP problem.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. Rod 10-19 will be blocked full-in while this TPA is applied so that rod 02-43 and any other rod can not be withdrawn simultaneously.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This TPA only allows the refuel mode one rod permissive interlock to be operational.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Sections 3.10.A and 4.10.A were reviewed for making this determination.

Control Rod CircuitryTEMPORARY PLANT ALTERATION: TPA 3-62-27

A. SYSTEM: Control Rods

B. DESCRIPTION:

This TPA jumpered in a closure signal for rod 34-27.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

The reed switch on the PIP probe is defective.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. Rod 34-27 will be blocked full-in while this TPA is applied so that rod 34-27 and any other rod can not be withdrawn simultaneously.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. This TPA only allows the refuel mode one rod permissive interlock to be operational.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Sections 3.10.A and 4.10.A were reviewed for making this determination.

Relief Valve, Injection, And Recirculating Testing

PROCEDURE: ST 13.18-3

A. SYSTEM: Standby Liquid Control (SBLC)

B. DESCRIPTION:

This procedure makes clarifications, adds unit designations for valving, updates IST criteria to reflect the new velocity readings, and makes minor changes to the chemical analysis after flushing.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

These changes make the procedure easier to use and provides more accurate data.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The SBLC will not be required during the period when testing is being done.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The equipment continues to operate in the same manner as previous to the procedure revision.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Sections 3.3/4 and 4.4 were reviewed for making this determination.

MISCELLANEOUS

Installation Of A Fish Ladder At Conowingo DamINSTALLATIONA. SYSTEM: FloodB. DESCRIPTION:

This review discusses the fish ladder installed at Conowingo Dam and its impact on Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station during a major flood event.

C. REASON FOR CHANGE:

Installation of the fish ladder reduced the regulating gates at Conowingo from three to two and made changes to operational procedures for Conowingo Dam as described in UFSAR Section 2.4.3.5.4.

D. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMARY:

- 1) Does this modification increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. The changes will not affect flood levels at Peach Bottom as described in the UFSAR.

- 2) Does this modification create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report?

Answer:

No. Changes at Conowingo do not affect flood levels at Peach Bottom.

- 3) Does this modification reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications?

Answer:

No. Technical Specification Section 3.12 was reviewed for making this determination.