

# NORTHEAST UTILITIES



The Connecticut Light And Power Company  
Western Massachusetts Electric Company  
Holyoke Water Power Company  
Northeast Utilities Service Company  
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company

General Offices: Seiden Street, Berlin Connecticut

P.O. BOX 270

HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06141-0270

(203)665-5000

January 29, 1993

MP-93-109

Re: 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Reference: Facility Operating License No. NPF-49  
Docket No. 50-423  
Licensee Event Report 92-033-00

Gentlemen:

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report 92-033-00 required to be submitted within thirty (30) days pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

Stephen E. Scace  
Vice President - Millstone Station

SES/PAF:ljs

Attachment: LER 92-033-00

cc: T. T. Martin, Region I Administrator  
P. D. Swetland, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3  
V. L. Rooney, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 3

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this information collection request: 50.0 hrs. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and Reports Management Branch (p-530), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 2 3 PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 4

TITLE (4) Incomplete Construction of Fire Boundary Wall

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)									
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES									
1	2	3	1	9	2	9	2	0	3	3	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	2	3	1	9	2	9	2	0	3	3	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0

OPERATING MODE (9)	1	THIS REPORT IS BEING SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)											
POWER LEVEL (10)	0	1	5	0	20.402(b)	20.402(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)					
					20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(a)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)					
					20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(a)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)					
					20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)						
					20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)						
				20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)							

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Peter A. Freeman, Engineer, Ext. 5322	AREA CODE 2 0 3 4 4 7 - 1 7 9 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)											
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On December 31, 1992, at approximately 2200 with the plant in Mode 1 at 60% power, a Plant Equipment Operator (PEO) discovered a Technical Specification fire boundary wall which was missing fire grouting in the web of a structural I-beam. The resulting hole was approximately 50 square inches. The deficiency was discovered during the surveillance of Fire Rated Assemblies. The fire boundary is located between the process computer room and the instrument rack room. Both areas are within the Control Room envelope. Continuing inspection of the wall revealed another similar deficiency.

The root cause of this event was incomplete work practices during construction.

As immediate corrective action, the fire boundary rated was declared inoperable and an hourly fire watch patrol was established. As long term corrective action, the wall was repaired.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

Estimated burden per response to comply with this information collection request: 50.0 hrs. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and Reports Management Branch (p-530), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)  Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0500042392	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		03	033	01	02	OF	04

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

I. Description of Event

On December 31, 1992, at approximately 2200 with the plant in Mode 1 at 100% power (575 degrees Fahrenheit and 2250 psia), a PEO (non-licensed operator) discovered a Technical Specification fire boundary wall which was missing fire grouting in the web of a structural I-beam. The deficiency was difficult to see because it was approximately 17 feet above the floor and hidden by supplemental steel. The deficiency was discovered during the surveillance of Fire Rated Assemblies. The fire boundary is located between the process computer room and the instrument rack room. Both areas are within the Control Room envelope.

As immediate corrective action, the fire boundary rated wall was declared inoperable and an hourly fire watch patrol was established as required by Technical Specification 3.7.13.

The Fire Protection Engineer continued the inspection of this and surrounding assemblies and discovered an additional identical construction deficiency.

II. Cause of Event

The root cause of this event was incomplete work practices during construction.

The subject fire boundary wall had not been completed properly because installation detail was not provided on construction drawings for this beam configuration. Specific installation details were provided for other beam configurations.

The deficiency was not discovered earlier because it was located behind a multiple beam arrangement and HVAC ducting approximately 17 feet above the floor. During the last fuel cycle, the Fire Protection Engineer has worked extensively with the Operations Department to resolve questions arising from an increased attention to detail in performing this surveillance.

III. Analysis of Event

This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i), as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications. Technical Specification 3.7.13 requires that all fire-rated assemblies (walls, floors/ceilings, cable tray enclosures, and other fire barriers) separating safety-related fire areas or separating portions of redundant systems important to safe shutdown within a fire area to be operable. Surveillance requirement 4.7.13-1.a. requires a visual inspection of exposed surfaces of each fire rated assembly every 18 months.

Both wall deficiencies were approximately 50 square inches. All openings were blocked by supplemental steel on either side of the wall. While a communicable fire path did exist, the tortuous path would have prevented flame impingement on plant equipment within the instrument rack room. Therefore, the ability of required equipment to perform its design function was not significantly affected by this event.

Fire suppression for the affected area consists of a self actuating halon system and the unit's fire brigade. The halon system is designed to suppress fires in the cabling under the floor. At the time of discovery, fire detection and suppression was fully operable. Fire watches have been posted whenever fire detection or suppression in this area have been inoperable. Therefore, this event posed no significant safety consequences.

IV. Corrective Action

As immediate corrective action, an hourly firewatch was posted in the affected area.

As long term corrective action, the deficiencies in the wall were repaired in accordance with design requirements. In addition, the Fire Protection System Engineer will continue to work with the operations Department to clarify and strengthen the surveillance process.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

Estimated burden per response to comply with this information collection request: 50 0 hrs. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and Reports Management Branch (p-530), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)  Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  015000042392	LER NUMBER (5)			PAGE (3)  03 OF 04
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
		01	033	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

If any additional deficiencies with fire rated assemblies are discovered during the current surveillance, they will be reported in a revision to this report no later than April 3, 1993 (30 days after required completion of the surveillance).

V. Additional Information

Other Licensee Event Reports (LERs) which have been submitted where a surveillance requirement on a Fire Rated Assembly was improperly performed are as follows:

<u>LER Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
91-029	Unsealed Fire Stop and Seal Penetration in the Engineered Safety Features Building
89-003	Unidentified Fire Seal Due to Inadequate Design Review

LER 89-003 discusses an event where a temporary sealed penetration in a wall of the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Building was discovered. The root cause of this event was personnel error in that inadequate verification was performed when construction was accepted. This was considered to be an isolated event.

LER 91-029 discusses an event where an unsealed penetration in a wall in the ESF Building was identified. The root cause of this event was incomplete work practices during construction. The penetration was not identified on drawings and was not identified when the drawing was compared to the final installation. The corrective action was to perform a 100% inspection of all fire seals in the ESF building. 980 penetrations were inspected and 7 were found to require sealing.

The above listed LERs involve events where a planned penetration was identified which should have been sealed. In this case, the deficiency was in wall construction. The resulting hole was unplanned and not part of the design. Therefore, the corrective action of the listed LERs would not have prevented the current event.

EIIS codes

<u>Systems</u>	<u>Component</u>
Control Building - VI	Fire Barrier

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION**

Estimated burden per response to comply with this information collection request: 50.0 hrs. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and Reports Management Branch (p-630), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (1450-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)


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Millstone Nuclear Power Station  
Unit 3

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A, s) (17)



Plane View of Deficiency