

January 8, 1993

Docket Nos. 50-373
and 50-374

Mr. Thomas J. Kovach
Nuclear Licensing Manager
Commonwealth Edison Company-Suite 300
OPUS West III
1400 OPUS Place
Downers Grove, Illinois 60515

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OPA	OC/LFDCB
PDIII-2 p/f	BClayton, RIII

Dear Mr. Kovach:

SUBJECT: LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - CHANGE TO TECHNICAL
SPECIFICATION BASES SECTION 3/4.1.3 (TAC NOS. M84992 AND M84993)

By letter dated September 16, 1992, the Commonwealth Edison Company (CECo) proposed to change LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specification (TS) Bases 3/4.1.3. The proposed change would correct the bases to reflect a modification to the control rod drive (CRD) support structures of both units. In particular, you plan to lower the CRD support structure by approximately 0.5 inches, in order to increase the clearance between the CRD housings and the CRD support structure. This modification would improve access by personnel working under the reactor vessel, thus decreasing the dose to these workers.

The staff has reviewed your proposed change to the TS Bases, as well as the associated 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation concerning the modification to the CRD support structure, and agrees that the proposed change to TS Bases 3/4.1.3 is appropriate. Enclosed is a copy of revised Bases page B 3/4 1-3 for both the Unit 1 and 2 Technical Specifications. If you have any questions regarding this change, please contact me at (301) 504-1346.

Sincerely,

Original Signed by:

Robert J. Stransky, Project Manager
Project Directorate III-2
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

Unit 1 Bases page B 3/4 1-3

Unit 2 Bases page B 3/4 1-3

cc w/enclosure:

See next page

OFFICE	PDIII-2:IA	PDIII-2:PM	SRXB	PDIII-2:D
NAME	CMoore	RStransky	RJones	JDyer
DATE	12/23/92	12/23/92	1/17/93	1/18/93

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PDR ADOCK 05000373
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Unit 1 Bases page B 3/4 1-3

Unit 2 Bases page B 3/4 1-3

cc w/enclosure:

See next page

OFFICE	PDIII-2:LA	PDIII-2:PM	SRXB	PDIII-2:D
NAME	CMoore	RStransky	RJones	JDyer
DATE	12/23/92	12/23/92	1/7/93	1/8/93

Mr. Thomas J. Kovach
Commonwealth Edison Company

cc:

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LaSalle County Courthouse
Ottawa, Illinois 61350

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Springfield, Illinois 62701

Chairman
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LaSalle County Station
Unit Nos. 1 and 2

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Marseilles, Illinois 61341

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

BASES

CONTROL RODS (Continued)

In addition, the automatic CRD charging water header low pressure scram (see Table 2.2.1-1) initiates well before any accumulator loses its full capability to insert the control rod. With this added automatic scram feature, the surveillance of each individual accumulator check valve is no longer necessary to demonstrate adequate stored energy is available for normal scram action.

Control rod coupling integrity is required to ensure compliance with the analysis of the rod drop accident in the FSAR. The overtravel position feature provides the only positive means of determining that a rod is properly coupled and therefore this check must be performed prior to achieving criticality after completing CORE ALTERATIONS that could have affected the control rod drive coupling integrity. The subsequent check is performed as a backup to the initial demonstration.

In order to ensure that the control rod patterns can be followed and therefore that other parameters are within their limits, the control rod position indication system must be OPERABLE.

The control rod housing support restricts the outward movement of a control rod to less than 3.65 inches in the event of a housing failure. The amount of rod reactivity which could be added by this small amount of rod withdrawal is less than a normal withdrawal increment and will not contribute to any damage to the primary coolant system. The support is not required when there is no pressure to act as a driving force to rapidly eject a drive housing.

The required surveillance intervals are adequate to determine that the rods are OPERABLE and not so frequent as to cause excessive wear on the system components.

3/4.1.4 CONTROL ROD PROGRAM CONTROLS

Control rod withdrawal and insertion sequences are established to assure that the maximum insequence individual control rod or control rod segments which are withdrawn at any time during the fuel cycle could not be worth enough to result in a peak fuel enthalpy greater than 280 cal/gm in the event of a control rod drop accident. The specified sequences are characterized by homogeneous, scattered patterns of control rod withdrawal. When THERMAL POWER is greater than 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER, there is no possible rod worth which, if dropped at the design rate of the velocity limiter, could result in a peak enthalpy of 280 cal/gm. Thus requiring the RWM to be OPERABLE when THERMAL POWER is less than or equal to 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER provides adequate control.

The RWM provide automatic supervision to assure that out-of-sequence rods will not be withdrawn or inserted.

The analysis of the rod drop accident is presented in Section 15.4.9 of the FSAR and the techniques of the analysis are presented in a topical report, Reference 1, and two supplements, References 2 and 3.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

BASES

CONTROL RODS (Continued)

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