

DUKE POWER COMPANY

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April 26, 1985

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Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900  
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Subject: McGuire Nuclear Station  
Docket No. 50-370

Reference: RII:JLM  
NRC/OIE Inspection Report 50-370/85-07

Dear Dr. Grace:

Please find attached a response to deviation 50-370/85-07-01 which was identified in the above referenced inspection report.

Very truly yours,

*H.B. Tucker / BT*

H. B. Tucker

PBN/mjf

Attachment

cc: Mr. W. T. Orders  
Senior Resident Inspector - NRC  
McGuire Nuclear Station

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DUKE POWER COMPANY

McGuire Nuclear Station

RESPONSE TO NRC/OIE INSPECTION REPORT 50-370/85-07

Deviation 50-370/85-07-01:

In response to IE Bulletin 84-03, Duke Power Company committed to NRC by letter dated November 21, 1984, that the core unloading and reloading, and the annunciator alarm procedures would contain specific actions operators will take in event of a refueling water cavity seal failure.

Contrary to the above, as of February 11, 1985, the core unloading and reloading procedure was in draft form and no annunciator or computer alarm procedure had been issued to prescribe operator actions as stated in the November 21, 1984, response to IEB 84-03.

Response:

For McGuire Unit 1; periodic test procedure (PT) PT/1/A/4550/06 "Total Core Unloading", change 13 and PT/1/A/4550/07 "Total Core Reloading", change 17 incorporated the necessary limits and precautions. The changes were effective January 24, 1985. (The first Unit 1 refueling outage after issuance of NRC Bulletin 84-03 did not begin until April 19, 1985).

McGuire Unit 2 had never had a refueling before February 1985 so no approved procedures existed for Core Unloading or Core Reloading. These procedures were in draft form and included limits and precautions concerning the refueling cavity seal failure. The final version of PT/2/A/4500/22, "Total Core Unloading", was approved February 14, 1985 (prior to actual core unloading) with necessary limits and precautions, and PT/2/A/4550/07, "Total Core Reloading" was approved March 15, 1985 (prior to actual core reloading) with necessary limits and precautions. (The first Unit 2 refueling outage began January 25, 1985 with a projected Cycle 2 criticality date of April 30, 1985).

The annunciator or computer alarm concern will be included in an Abnormal Procedure (AP) to be implemented prior to flooding the cavity (scheduled for May 8, 1985) for the current Unit 1 outage and it will include appropriate alarms as symptoms which will address operator actions required for refueling cavity level loss.

The deviation was a result of miscommunication between the station and personnel preparing the bulletin response on the completion status of procedures. This was a unique situation and requires no actions to avoid further deviations.