

GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY

RIVER BEND STATION POST OFFICE BOX 220 ST. FRANCISVILLE, LOUISIANA 70775

AREA CODE 504 833-8094 344-8661



January 4, 1973

RBG- 37966

File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

River Bend Station - Unit 1

Docket No. 50-458

Please find enclosed Licensee Event Report No. 97-028 for River Bend Station
-Unit 1. This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73.

Sincerely,

W. H. Odell
Manager - Oversight
River Bend Nuclear Group

for my file
LAE/JPS/FRC/DCH/VCC/kvm

DND

080075

9301080268 930104
PDR ADOCK 05000458
S PDR

IF 22
11

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400
Arlington, TX 76011

NRC Resident Inspector
P.O. Box 1051
St. Francisville, LA 70775

INPO Records Center
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, GA 30339-3064

Mr. C.R. Oberg
Public Utility Commission of Texas
7800 Shoal Creek Blvd., Suite 400 North
Austin, TX 78757

Department of Environmental Quality
Radiation Protection Division
P.O. Box 82135
Baton Rouge, LA 70884-2135
ATTN: Administrator

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PL. RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MIRB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

RIVER BEND STATION

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000 458

PAGE (3)

1 OF 4

TITLE (4) NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION INOPERABLE DUE TO FAILURE OF A SHIFT SUPERVISOR TO RECOGNIZE THAT SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS WERE NOT MET

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT NUMBER (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
12	07	92	92	028	00	01	04	93	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 1: (Check one or more) (11)										
OPERATING MODE (9) 3			20.402(b)			20.405(c)			50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(b)	
POWER LEVEL (10) 0			20.405(a)(1)(i)			50.52(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c)	
			20.435(a)(1)(ii)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vi) OTHER	
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)			X 50.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 305F)	
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
			20.405(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

L.A. ENGLAND, DIRECTOR - NUCLEAR LICENSING

TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code)
(504) 381-4145

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES

(If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

X

NO

EXPECTED
SUBMISSION
DATE (15)

MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On 12/07/92 at 0630 with the plant shutdown for a planned outage (Operational Condition 3 - Hot Shutdown), it was discovered that all source range and intermediate range monitors (SRMs and IRMs) were inoperable. This condition was due to weekly surveillance requirements that were not kept current and the failure to take actions required by Technical Specifications 3.3.1 and 3.3.7.6. Therefore, this report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as operation prohibited by the plant Technical Specifications.

The root cause of this event was failure of the Shift Supervisor to recognize that the surveillance requirements were not current. Corrective actions include modifying the applicable procedures to alert operators to SRM/IRM operability, training, and an evaluation by Plant Management of the need for disciplinary action.

During this event, all rods remained fully inserted in the core and the reactor mode switch remained in the shutdown position. When the STPs were performed, all data was acceptable with no adjustments required.

REQUIRED NUMBER OF DIGITS/CHARACTERS
FOR EACH BLOCK

BLOCK NUMBER	NUMBER OF DIGITS/CHARACTERS	TITLE
1	UP TO 46	FACILITY NAME
2	8 TOTAL 3 IN ADDITION TO 05000	DOCKET NUMBER
3	VARIES	PAGE NUMBER
4	UP TO 76	TITLE
5	5 TOTAL 2 PER BLOCK	EVENT DATE
6	7 TOTAL 2 FOR YEAR 3 FOR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 2 FOR REVISION NUMBER	LER NUMBER
7	5 TOTAL 2 PER BLOCK	REPORT DATE
8	UP TO 18 -- FACILITY NAME 8 TOTAL -- DOCKET NUMBER 3 IN ADDITION TO 05000	OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED
9	1	OPERATING MODE
10	3	POWER LEVEL
11	1 CHECK BOX THAT APPLIES	REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR
12	UP TO 50 FOR NAME 14 FOR TELEPHONE	LICENSEE CONTACT
13	CAUSE VARIES 2 FOR SYSTEM 4 FOR COMPONENT 4 FOR MANUFACTURER NPRDS VARIES	EACH COMPONENT FAILURE
14	1 CHECK BOX THAT APPLIES	SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED
15	6 TOTAL 2 PER BLOCK	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) **TEXT CONTINUATION**

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 80.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT, 3150-0104, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
RIVER BEND STATION	05000 458	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	2 OF 4
		92	028	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

REPORTED CONDITION

On 12/07/92 at 0630 with the plant shutdown for a planned outage (Operational Condition 3 - Hot Shutdown), it was discovered that all source range and intermediate range monitors (SRMs and IRMs) of the nuclear instrumentation system were inoperable. This condition was due to weekly surveillance requirements that were not kept current and the failure to take actions required by Technical Specifications 3.3.1 action 'b' and 3.3.7.6 action 'b'. Therefore, this report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as operation prohibited by the plant Technical Specifications.

INVESTIGATION

On 12/06/92, a shutdown was in progress in preparation to repair the 'B' reactor recirculation pump seal. At 1729 a manual reactor scram was inserted and the reactor mode switch was placed in the shutdown position. Abnormal operating procedure (AOP)-0001 ("REACTOR SCRAM") was entered and all immediate operator actions were completed including a verification that all rods were fully inserted. Completion of the immediate actions of AOP-0001 was documented in the control room log book on 12/06/92 at 1731.

When the reactor mode switch was placed in the shutdown position, this placed the plant in Operational Condition 3, Hot Shutdown. Per Technical Specification 3.3.1 "Reactor Protection System Instrumentation", the intermediate range monitors (IRMs) are required to be operable in Operational Condition 3 with a minimum of 3 instruments per trip system. At this time the weekly functional surveillance test procedure (STPs) for the IRMs were not current. With these STPs not current, all IRMs were inoperable. The fact that the IRMs were inoperable was not noted by Operations personnel until 0630 on 12/07/92. Technical Specification 3.3.1 action 'b' requires that with less than the minimum number of channels operable in both trip systems, that one trip system be placed in the tripped condition within one hour and that the required actions per Table 3.3.1-1 be taken.

Similarly, the source range monitors (SRMs) are required to be operable in Operational Condition 3 per Technical Specification 3.3.7.6. As with the IRMs, the weekly functional STPs were not current causing the SRMs to be inoperable. Operations personnel noted this also at 0630 on 12/07/92, the same time it had been discovered that the IRMs were inoperable.

The required actions of both Technical Specifications 3.3.1, action 'b' and 3.3.7.6, action 'b' are to verify within 1 hour that all insertable control rods are inserted into the core, and to lock the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position (by removing the key). These requirements were satisfied at

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THE INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (IMRB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
RIVER BEND STATION	05000 458	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	3 OF 4
		92	- 028 -	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

0636 on 12/07/92 as documented by limiting condition for operation (LCO) 92-629. During the period from 1829 on 12/06/92 until 0636 on 12/07/92 the requirements of Specification 3.3.1 action 'b' were not met; however, all rods remained inserted into the core and the reactor mode switch remained in the shutdown position. At 1400 on 12/07/92 all required IRM STPs were completed and action 'b' of Specification 3.3.1 was exited. The weekly functional STPs for the SRMs were started at 1352 on 12/07/92. At 1434 the minimum number of SRMs were operable and at 2112, on 12/07/92, all SRMs were operable. With the required SRMs operable, action 'b' of Specification 3.3.7.6 was exited.

Technical Specification 3.3.1 action 'b' and 3.3.7.6 action 'h' were not entered at the proper time due to a failure of the Shift Supervisor to recognize that the IRM and SRM STPs were not current. The Shift Supervisor reviewed the outage schedule and found that the nuclear instrument STPs were not scheduled to begin until the day shift on 12/07/92. From this information, he assumed that the STPs were still current. The "Surveillance Test Events - Shutdown/Startup Logic" sheet listed the last time these STPs were performed and had it been reviewed by the Shift Supervisor this error could have been prevented.

ROOT CAUSE

The root cause in this incident was failure of the Shift Supervisor to recognize that the SRM and IRM STPs were not current at the time of entry into Operational Condition 3 (Hot Shutdown). This error was caused by reviewing only the Outage Schedule instead of using the "Surveillance Test Events - Shutdown/Startup Logic" sheet which would have shown these STPs to be past their due date.

A recent event reported in LER 92-027, described a violation of TS 3.0.4 involving an incorrect interpretation of TS 3.7.3. TS 3.7.3 requires that the reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC) be operable prior to increasing reactor vessel pressure above 150 psig. LER 92-027 has similarities to the event reported in this LER (LER 92-028). In LER 92-027, the Shift Supervisor (SS) and Administrative Control Operating Foreman (Admin COF) failed to recognize that raising reactor vessel pressure above 150 psig placed the plant in violation of the specified applicability conditions of TS 3.7.3. Similarly, in LER 92-028, the SS did not realize that the STPs were not current. While these events have similarities, there are differences in development of the events and in the contributing factors. In LER-027, there was some confusion over a footnote in TS 3.7.3 and a Control Operating Foreman failed to challenge the SS on his decision to not place the RCIC system in the standby lineup as required by procedure. In LER 92-028, the major contributor to the event was the reliance on the outage schedule by the SS. He failed to review the proper documentation to

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (INBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (4)			PAGE (3)
RIVER BEND STATION	05000 458	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	4 OF 4
		92	028	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

assure that the STPs were current. Note that different Shift Supervisors were involved in these two cases. Thus, different circumstances and contributors combined with improper decisions resulted in Technical Specification violations in each case.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The following corrective actions will be taken:

1. As previously described in LER 92-027, GSU is developing a case study concerning the event described in that report. The case study will be analyzed by each operating crew as an integral part of training to specifically address Technical Specification violations, including this event (LER 92-028).
2. The need for disciplinary action will be evaluated and administered by Plant Management.
3. As an enhancement to prevent recurrence, change notices will be initiated to general operating procedure (GOP)-0002, "POWER DECREASE/PLANT SHUTDOWN" and GOP-0003, "SCRAM RECOVERY," to include a caution to remind personnel that if the plant has been operating for greater than 7 days that the SRM/IRM STPs are not current and to add a step for SS/COF to verify that the SRMs and IRMs are operable.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

During the period of time that the SRM/IRMs were not operable, all SRMs and IRMs were fully inserted into the core, as required by subsequent operator action 5.2 of abnormal operating procedure (AOP)-0001, "REACTOR SCRAM" and therefore, were monitoring reactor power level. All rods remained fully inserted in the core and the reactor mode switch remained in the shutdown position. When the STPs were performed on the SRMs and IRMs, all data was acceptable with no adjustments required.