


James A. FitzPatrick  
Nuclear Power Plant  
P.O. Box 41  
Lycoming, New York 13093  
315 342-3840



Harry P. Salmon, Jr.  
Resident Manager

December 31, 1992  
JAFFP-92-0873

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Mail Station P1-137  
Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT: DOCKET NO. 50-333  
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT: 92-052-00 - Rovinj Fire  
Watch Late Due t  
Personnel Error by Fire  
Watch Personnel

Dear Sir:

This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR  
50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Questions concerning this report may be addressed to  
Mr. David Holliday at (315) 349-6359.

Very truly yours,

HARRY P. SALMON, JR.

HPS:DAH:tld  
Enclosure

cc: USNRC, Region I  
USNRC Resident Inspector  
INPO Records Center

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.5 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-630), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503

FACILITY NAME (1)

James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3 1 OF 0 4

PAGE (3)

TITLE (4)

Roving Fire Watch Late Due to Personnel Error by Fire Watch Personnel

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)											
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)										
1	2	0	3	9	2	9	2	0	5	2	0	0	1	2	3	1	9	2		
OPERATING MODE (9) N										THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5 (Check one or more of the following) (11)										
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0										20.402(b) 20.406(a)(1)(i) 20.406(a)(1)(ii) 20.406(a)(1)(iii) 20.406(a)(1)(iv) 20.406(a)(1)(v) 20.406(c) 50.36(a)(1) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)										
										73.71(b) 73.71(c) OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)										

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

TELEPHONE NUMBER

Mr. David Holliday, Senior Licensing Engineer

AREA CODE

3 1 5 3 4 9 - 6 3 5 9

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

X NO

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

EIIIS Codes are in []

The plant was shutdown and in the cold condition for maintenance and refuel. On December 3, a roving fire watch tour was not performed as required by Technical Specifications 3.12.F due to personnel error (Cause Code A). The roving fire watch tour was to compensate for some smoke detection circuits [IC] which were taken out of service. The assigned fire watchperson did not perform the tour as assigned, did not formally turn over the assignment to another fire watchperson, and did not contact the fire watch supervisor. The event was not safety significant due to the short time interval, the limited work being performed at the time, and the plant conditions. Corrective actions involved immediate re-assignment of the fire watch tour, continuing reinforcement of professional behavior and procedural adherence, and disciplinary action. EIIIS Codes are in []

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-830), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (P-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)  James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3 9 2	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		0 5	2	0	0 2	OF	0 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 308A's) (17)

Description

The plant was shutdown and in the cold condition for maintenance and refuel. During the month of December, approximately 30 fire watches per shift were on duty to provide compensatory action for deficiencies in fire barrier penetrations, fire suppression systems, 10CFR50, Appendix R requirements (see LER-91-024, 92-004, 92-015, and 92-017) and to support maintenance and modification activities.

On November 29, 1992, roving fire watches had been established (on an hourly basis) to compensate for a number of smoke detection circuits [IC] taken out of service due to an electrical malfunction. On December 3, 1992, one of the roving fire watch tours was not performed as required by Technical Specifications, Section 3.12.F. The situation involved fire watch personnel error (Cause Code A).

A fire watchperson had been assigned to tour three areas in the Reactor Building (Secondary Containment Structure) [NG]. The assignment was posted using a nickname and written on a board in the fire watch trailer. The watch-person had completed the previous tour between 0700 and 0725 hours. The fire watch did not perform the 0800 hour tour, did not formally turn over the assignment to another fire watch, and did not contact the fire watch supervisor in accordance with department procedures.

While reviewing the log in preparation for the 0900 hour assignments, it was realized by fire watch personnel that the 0800 hour tour had not yet been performed. The fire watch supervisor took action to re-assign the tour. According to log entries, the tour was initiated at 0850 hours and completed at 0911 hours. The tour was also performed between 0900 and 0924 hours and regularly thereafter by other fire watch personnel.

Although the fire watch supervisor knew the tour was late, he believed that initiating the tour within the hour was acceptable. The Fire Protection Supervisor was notified later that day that the tour had been performed late in the hour, but that it had been completed.

After being notified of a possible problem and performing a review of the fire watch tour records, the Operations Manager determined that completion of the compensatory fire watch should be considered late, since the records indicated that completion (return to the fire watch trailer) was at 0911 and the tour should have been performed and completed between 0800 and 0900 hours. The Fire Protection Supervisor was notified on December 8, 1992. Appropriate reporting documents were properly initiated and reviewed.



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-630), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
	0   5   0   0   0   3   3   3	9   2	0   5   2	0   0	0   3	OF 0   4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Cause

The brief lapse in providing compensatory action in the form of a roving fire watch was due to personnel error. Specifically, a fire watchperson did not perform the assigned fire watch tour. The fire watchperson did not ensure proper turnover to a relief and did not contact the fire watch supervisor as described in department procedures.

Corrective actions taken as a result of previous fire watch incidents (LERs-92-001, 92-006, 92-010, 92-030, and 92-042) and increased sensitivity towards performance of fire watches should have prevented this event. The corrective actions previously taken did help to minimize the brief lapse in compensatory measures and assisted in the prompt re-assignment of the fire watch tour. Additional fire watch supervisors, on site 24 hours a day, checking on fire watch posts, and improved communication lead to quick discovery of the lapse and prompt re-assignment of the tour with other fire watch personnel. Procedures and training are in place and are emphasized to fire watch personnel which specify requirements for maintaining professional behavior and performing fire watch relief and acknowledgement. This situation would have been averted if the fire watchperson and the fire watch supervisor had adhered to these standards.

Analysis

The failure to maintain the roving hourly fire watch resulted in a violation of Technical Specification 3.12.F.2. As a result, the event requires a report under 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B); that is, an operation prohibited by the plant technical specifications.

This event is not significant from a safety point of view because of the short time involved. As discussed in the Description Section, the fire watch was initially established because area smoke detection circuits were taken out of service. The areas covered by the roving fire watch contain safety related Emergency Core Cooling Systems on two elevations in the Reactor Building and in the Standby Gas Treatment [BH] Building. Fixed suppression systems in high hazard areas (High Pressure Coolant Injection [BJ] pump skid, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling [BN] pump skid, and Standby Gas Treatment filter train) were still available.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F-430), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6)

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James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant

0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3 9 2 - 0 5 2 - 0 0 0 4 OF 0 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 305A's) (17)

There were no work activities being performed that added transient combustibles or ignition sources to the area during the hour in question. The area is visited by operating personnel on a regular basis and by fire watch personnel traveling to and from other posts. As a result, any postulated fire would have been discovered or detected quickly and could have been suppressed using fixed systems, fire extinguishers, or installed hose stations.

Corrective Actions

1. The roving fire watch tour was re-assigned to other qualified fire watch personnel bringing the plant into compliance with the Technical Specifications.
2. The use of nicknames in records or scheduling has stopped. Confirmation that roving watches are initiated at the top of each hour has been re-emphasized, and additional training of fire watch supervisors in the timely commencement of tours, proper logging of unusual events, and reporting of discrepancies to the Operations Manager has been completed.
3. The situations and consequences described in this LER, along with reinforcement of procedural requirements and the plant's high standards of personnel performance, has been reviewed by all compensatory fire watch personnel.
4. The fire watch who failed to follow instructions and procedures for fire watch tours and turnovers, and the fire watch supervisor who failed to provide adequate oversight and failed to clearly report the event, have been disciplined.

Additional Information

Failed Components: None

Previous Similar Events: LERs-92-010, 92-019, and 92-025 describe other missed fire watches due to supervisory or procedural deficiencies. LERs-92-001, 92-006, 92-030, 92-042, and 92-045 describe other fire watch performance deficiencies.

Related Industry Experience: None