

SNUPPS

Standardized Nuclear Unit
Power Plant System

5 Choke Cherry Road
Rockville, Maryland 20850
(301) 869-8010

Nicholas A. Petrick
Executive Director

June 12, 1985

SLNRC 85-19 FILE: 0278
SUBJ: Control of Heavy Loads

Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Docket No.: STN 50-483

References: 1. SLNRC 82-033, 8/4/82: Same Subject
2. SLNRC 84-008, 1/27/84: Same Subject
3. SLNRC 84-056, 3/28/84: Same Subject

Dear Mr. Denton:

Reference 1 submitted for NRC staff review the SNUPPS Report on Control of Heavy Loads for Callaway Plant, Unit No. 1, and Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit No. 1. References 2 and 3 submitted Revisions 1 and 2 of the report, respectively.

Enclosed is Revision 3 of the report which consists of one revised page to be inserted into the report. As described in the text of the revised page, this revision is applicable to Callaway Plant only.

Very truly yours,


N. A. Petrick

MHF/NAP/dkw19a12

Enclosure: Revision 3 to SNUPPS Report on Control of Heavy Loads

cc: G. L. Koester	KGE
J. M. Evans	KCPL
D. F. Schnell	UE
B. Little	USNRC/CAL
G. C. Wright	USNRC/III
R. P. Denise	USNRC/RIV
J. Cummins	USNRC/WC

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SNUPPS
REPORT ON CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS
REVISION 3

Instructions for Revision 3:

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affected in the event of a load drop. The components handled by the fuel pool cooling pump monorail and hoist are required for safe shutdown. However, sufficient horizontal physical separation exists between redundant trains to preclude loss of both trains due to a single load drop.

Routing of the lines running to and from the fuel pool was investigated with respect to the path of travel of the subject hoists. A load drop from one of the hoists could not adversely affect the piping associated with the other redundant fuel pool cooling train. Thus, a single load drop from the fuel pool cooling pump monorail and hoist will not preclude safe shutdown.

2.4.4 Review of the 150 P Galion Crane at Callaway Plant

The 150 P Galion Crane (15 ton capacity) located outside containment at Callaway Plant will be used during cold shutdown and refueling to transport items into and out of containment through the equipment hatch. As the crane will be permanently installed, an evaluation of the effect on plant safety was performed for all modes of plant operation from Modes 1 through 6. The evaluation considered the requirements for control of heavy loads, the effects of crane failure resulting from a postulated seismic event, and the effects of the crane components becoming externally generated missiles. Based on the evaluation, it was concluded that the loads to be carried by the crane are enveloped by the analysis of the reactor building in 2.4.1 above and that the effects of postulated impact of crane components on Category I structures are enveloped by the external missile hazards evaluations in the SNUPPS FSAR.