NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT II	0 5 0 0 0 3 6 6	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)

ESF ACTUATION DUE TO AN INADEQUATE PROCEDURE

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)					REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 5	1 0	8 5	8 5	—	0 1 4	—	0 6	0 7	8 5			0 5 0 0 0
												0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)											
	4		20.402(b)		20.406(c)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)				
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 0 0		20.406(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)				
			20.406(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)				
			20.406(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
			20.406(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
			20.406(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)						

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
Steven B. Tipps, Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance	9 1 2 — 3 6 7 - 7 8 5 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	
N/A											

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
	YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)				
X	NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 05/10/85, at approximately 0443 CDT, with the reactor in cold shutdown for a refueling outage, and during performance of the "ADS LSFT" procedure (HNP-2-3252-E), plant personnel noted that the seven safety relief valves (SRVs) which serve an Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) function (2B21-F013 A, C, E, H, K, L, and M) opened. When the ADS valves opened, reactor water level decreased from 195 inches (reference instrument zero) to approximately 153 inches (reference instrument zero). With reactor water level at 195" the Main Steam Outlet nozzles were covered. Thus, when the ADS valves opened, reactor water drained via the main steamline to the Torus.

This event was the result of HNP-2-3252-E being inadequate. HNP-2-3252-E did not fully address the need to perform certain steps of the procedure in a timely manner. All the steps should have been performed in less than 2 minutes, otherwise the ADS logic timers would time out and open the ADS SRVs.

HNP-2-3252-E was revised to include opening the links for the ADS SRVs which will preclude their opening on an ADS initiation signal during performance of the procedure.

This event had no impact on any other Unit 2 system or on Unit 1. There have been past events where ESF actuations occurred due to inadequate procedure revisions (refer to LERs 50-366/1984-009 and 1985-023).

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

This 30-day LER is required by 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv) due to the unplanned opening of the ADS (i.e., Automatic Depressurization System) SRVs, which constitutes the actuation of an engineered safety feature (ESF).

On 05/10/85, at approximately 0443 CDT, with the reactor in cold shutdown for a refueling outage, and during performance of the "ADS LSFT" procedure (HNP-2-3252-E), plant personnel noted that the seven safety relief valves (SRVs) which serve an Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) function (2B21-F013 A, C, E, H, K, L, and M) opened. When the ADS valves opened, reactor water level decreased from 195 inches (reference instrument zero) to approximately 153 inches (reference instrument zero). With reactor water level at 195" the Main Steam Outlet nozzles were covered. Thus, when the ADS valves opened, reactor water drained via the main steamline to the Torus. The valves remained open for approximately 17 minutes and were closed when the procedure performance was completed.

When this event occurred, the plant was in operating mode 4 (cold shutdown), thus the increase in torus water level was not required to be considered under Tech. Specs. section 3.6.2.1.a.

This event was the result of an inadequate revision to HNP-2-3252-E. The procedure had been revised on 05/09/85 to include additional steps to be performed. The steps having to do with the segment of logic being tested must be performed in less than two (2) minutes, or the ADS logic timers will time out and open the ADS SRVs. The procedure did not adequately address the time constraint.

Supervisory personnel talked to the personnel responsible for the inadequate procedure revision, and stressed to them the consequences of the inadequate procedure and the need to more thoroughly review proposed changes to procedures.

On 05/10/85, HNP-2-3252-E was revised to include opening the links for the ADS SRVs which will preclude their opening on an ADS initiation signal during performance of the procedure. This revision was successfully performed on 05/11/85.

Information from the valve vendor has indicated that this event would have no effect on the valves. Thus, this event had no impact on plant safety. It did not affect any other Unit 2 system or any Unit 1 system.

There have been past events where ESF actuations occurred due to inadequate procedure revisions (refer to LERs 50-366/1984-009 and 1985-023). Past corrective actions could not have prevented this occurrence.

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Georgia Power

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

June 7, 1985
GM-85-565

PLANT E. I. HATCH
Licensee Event Report
Docket No. 50-366

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-366/1985-014. This report is required by 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

H. C. Nix
General Manager

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HCN/SBT/vlz

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