

TO:

Boyce H. Grier  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations  
Region I  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

LER

FROM:


Jersey Central Power & Light Company  
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station  
Docket No. 50-219  
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

SUBJECT:

Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-219/81-22/01P

The following is a preliminary report being  
submitted in compliance with the Technical  
Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.a.6.

Preliminary Approval:

  
J. T. Carroll, Jr.  
Director Station Operations Date: 5/21/81

Director (2)  
Office of Management Information and  
Progress Control  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector (1)  
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station  
Forked River, N. J.



M007  
3/0

8105270 358

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS  
POOR QUALITY PAGES

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION  
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report  
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-22/01P

Report Date

May 21, 1981

Occurrence Date

May 20, 1981

Identification of Occurrence

Violation of Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.5.B.1 when secondary containment integrity was not maintained at all times. Both personnel access airlock doors on the Northeast side of the Reactor Building were found ajar.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.a.6.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was shutdown in the REFUEL mode with reactor temperature less than 212°F.

Analysis of Occurrence

Secondary containment is designed to minimize any ground release of radioactive materials which might result from a serious accident. The Reactor Building provides secondary containment during reactor operation when the drywell is sealed and in service and provides primary containment when the reactor is shutdown and the drywell is open.

When this event occurred, all of the Technical Specification requirements, except for the reactor mode switch position, were met for conditions which do not require secondary containment integrity. The reactor mode switch was in "Refuel", whereas the Technical Specifications require "Shutdown" if secondary containment integrity is not maintained.

Corrective Action

The outer door was closed immediately by the Group Shift Supervisor.

The strike plate on the inner door was repaired by maintenance personnel within several minutes after the problem was discovered.

Future corrective action, if any, will be determined after a more thorough investigation is completed.

Failure Data

Not Applicable.