

April 15, 1979

50-320

Mr. G. P. Miller
Station Superintendent
Metropolitan Edison Company
Post Office Box 480
Middletown, PA 17057

Subject: Review of Unit II's March 28, 1979 Transient

Dear Gary:

As agreed in the Saturday, April 14, 1979, get-together in the Superintendents Conference Room, I submit a few of the thoughts that have passed through my mind during and since those review discussions.

I believe we all got a lot of memory recall benefit out of that session, plus a feeling of being together on so many other thoughts. Personally, I believe that we all really have to pull together more than we ever may have before in order to accomplish an enlightenment of Investigative Groups and the Public in general. Met-Ed and TMI, including in no small bit B&W, have really taken severe shots by the media and the NRC in the public forum. We must also exercise our rights in the same public forum to correct and educate the rest of the world. I know what we did, and I also know that our collective actions and Met-Ed's real (not imagined) image is of a very high technical and moral standard. Our biggest task, as I see it, is to bring out the facts without confusion and embellishment in such a manner (not very technical) that most people will understand what we are saying and thereby change all of the negative impressions. Naturally, the anti-nukes won't listen because their minds are not allowed to be open but there is a very large segment of the general public that will listen because they really do want to know the truth. Any one of us involved must keep it in our minds that the real end of the tunnel is to have both Unit I and II back on the line, a little safer and we operations people a lot smarter because of March 28, 1979; but really in that mode of operation with a lot of the general public really backing us up.

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
G. P. Miller

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If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "L. C. Rogers". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the typed name.

L. C. Rogers
Site Operations Manager

OTHER REFLECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. (a) During significant occurrences as Station Emergency and General Emergency at the TMI Station, Met-Ed should have a designated individual on the Emergency Bill, that is "qualified" and "recognized" by management, to perform the communication linkup with Met-Ed, CFU, B&W, PA State, NRC, EPA, off-site officials, etc., throughout the emergency time. He should provide status, data, and expected evolutions to all of these outside parties until such time as they are able to provide their own on-site linkups.
- (b) As I observed events in the communications system during the long day and several days subsequently, it was apparent that several of the outside parties were given necessary information but apparently in different sections of their organizations; and they were not talking to each other, thereby, creating additional questions coming from several sources within the same organizations. EXAMPLE: The NRC people on site were on an open telephone line to a "situation room," I believe at the Region #1 office (not sure), and information was flowing in a generous fashion. Yet the NRC headquarters was in turn generating questions to the site independent of their own on-site inspectors. In fact, they were not even talking to them (the NRC people) but in turn asking for plant personnel to provide the answers and also directing questions and demands to B&W Lynchburg. (The Lynchburg source for any answers during any developing crisis is not an acceptable flow path for outside organizations since B&W is by nature and geography not able to be on top of rapidly changing conditions.) Another example was that the commissioner of the NRC, as quoted in the media, was in the dark and thoroughly confused. I submit that he and his deputies have technical advisors closely at hand during significant events to interpret the information already in the NRC at other areas which need a central tie-in mechanism to allow the top decision makers the chance to make good ultimate proclamations.
2. In other taped interviews, the Shift Supervisor identified two B&W people, that were assisting Unit I in their startup program, as arriving in the Unit II Control Room. Subsequent questioning shows that these people were not B&W people. In fact were Scott Wilkerson (Met-Ed Nuclear Engineer) and another Met-Ed employee. There were no B&W personnel on site until I arrived approximately 0710 hours on 28 March 1979 (point of clarification).
3. Respecting the normal human concern and also training towards that concern to not aggravate plant operating conditions or cause damage to plant equipment, any action similar to securing "all" reactor coolant flow during transients must be drilled into the operators and supervisors as an action that should not be automatic but tailored as a case basis. This type of suggestion is going to be difficult to implement since in one transient as example, securing pumps would be absolutely correct and in another it would be an action that would tend to aggravate the problems.

REFLECTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

4. A need is identified now to evaluate all possible system communication connections between the reactor building and the outside environment, such as the auxiliary building, fuel building, direct outside, etc. These evaluations need to look at normal pumping systems, D/P driven systems (press in reactor building and not other places), D/P following pumping actions and merely stopping of the pumping (siphoning actions) air-borne paths, and all of this could be a major undertaking. Needs high management type emphasis because of the auxiliary building contamination problem on this transient, although the installed normal systems were not supposedly lined up to allow such flow between buildings. This needs attention and corrective action follow-up.
5. The Site Emergency Plan/General Plan needs review. My personal experience was that when I arrived at the North Bridge Gate, your plan was in effect - entry was being denied to traffic. I was recognized by your guards as being needed for the problems. They gave me my 002 "red" badge and opened the gate allowing me entry. I arrived at the area of the Unit II turbine building access. Steve Drabick was on duty. I went into the Catalytic Building and left my briefcase, picked up my hard hat and walked across the street. Steve Drabick said, "Lee, you cannot go in." I asked him to call the Unit II Control Room on his radio. He did and gave me my "green 025 security entry badge." I went in. However, Steve Drabick was very busy at that time turning back all of the normal day shift craft workers that had entered through the South Bridge entry. In fact, I think I remember a bus being there. I talked to Jim Blanton (Catalytic supervisor) and told him that the plant had tripped and had experienced "complications." The point is that a lot of personnel were coming onto the site from the South Bridge and the "Brass Gate Entry" at a time when the North Bridge was tight and controlled. Needs a serious look at effective closing both bridges and the brass gate with the emergency condition announcement and follow up accountability at some emergency designated area.
6. Need to provide continuous recordable (retrievable) instrumentation of the vital nature; incore T/C's is an example of very valuable data not retrievable now and would have solved many of the advertised concerns. A survey of vital, needed instruments is certainly in order. These do not necessarily need to be displayed in an area of the CRO but should be able to be recovered post transient.
7. A thought about corrective maintenance needs on the CRO available instrumentation. Met-Ed needs to establish a procedure for identifying priority of corrective maintenance on critical instrumentation, i.e., pressurizer level instrument, one channel was unreliable due to known panel switch problems. This problem and others like it should have a required repair date and mechanism for repair if plant operations are to continue.
8. I have been informed that BW Lynchburg has incorporated the TMI-2 transient into the Simulator Programs. Other Utilities are cycling their operators through the simulation on a crash basis during the night shifts. I submit that Met-Ed seriously consider a similar program for their licensed operators acquainting everyone with the indications and actions that can be taken to lessen a recurrence. This is in preparation for the Unit I return to operations that we all are looking forward to within a short-time frame.