

Enclosure 1

Quad Cities Station Unit 2

Proposed Technical Specification Changes

Revised Pages: 1.1/2.1-2  
1.1/2.1-2a  
1.1/2.1-8  
1.1/2.1-9  
3.1/4.1-1  
3.3/4.3-10

QUAD-CITIES  
DPR-30

D. Reactor Water Level (Shutdown Condition)

Whenever the reactor is in the shutdown condition with irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel, the water level shall not be less than that corresponding to 12 inches above the top of the active fuel\* when it is seated in the core.

\*Top of active fuel is defined to be 360 inches above vessel zero (See Bases 3.2).

Where:

FRP = fraction of rated thermal power (2511 MWt)

MFLPD = maximum fraction of limiting power density where the limiting power density for each bundle is the design linear heat generation rate for that bundle.

The ratio of FRP/MFLPD shall be set equal to 1.0 unless the actual operating value is less than 1.0 in which case the actual operating value will be used.

This adjustment may also be performed by increasing the APRM gain by the inverse ratio, MFLPD/FRP, which accomplishes the same degree of protection as reducing the trip setting by FRP/MFLPD.

2. APRM Flux Scram Trip Setting (Refueling or Startup and Hot Standby Mode)

When the reactor mode switch is in the Refuel or Startup Hot Standby position, the APRM scram shall be set at less than or equal to 15% of rated neutron flux.

3. IRM Flux Scram Trip Setting

The IRM flux scram setting shall be set at less than or equal to 120/125 of full scale.

4. When the reactor mode switch is in the startup or run position, the reactor shall not be operated in the natural circulation flow mode.

B. APRM Rod Block Setting

The APRM rod block setting shall be as shown in Figure 2.1-1 and shall be:

$$S \leq (0.58W_D + 50)$$

QUAD-CITIES  
DPR-30

The definitions used above for the APRM scram trip apply. In the event of operation with a maximum fraction limiting power density (MFLPD) greater than the fraction of rated power (FRP), the setting shall be modified as follows:

$$S \leq (0.58W_D + 50) \frac{FRP}{MFLPD}$$

The definitions used above for the APRM scram trip apply.

The ratio of FRP to MFLPD shall be set equal to 1.0 unless the actual operating value is less than 1.0, in which case the actual operating value will be used.

This adjustment may also be performed by increasing the APRM gain by the inverse ratio, MFLPD/FRP, which accomplishes the same degree of protection as reducing the trip setting by FRP/MFLPD.

- C. Reactor low water level scram setting shall be 144 inches above the top of the active fuel\* at normal operating conditions.
- D. Reactor low water level ECCS initiation shall be 84 inches (+4 inches /-0 inch) above the top of the active fuel\* at normal operating conditions.
- E. Turbine stop valve scram shall be  $\leq$  10% valve closure from full open.
- F. Turbine control valve fast closure scram shall initiate upon actuation of the fast closure solenoid valves which trip the turbine control valves.
- G. Main steamline isolation valve closure scram shall be  $\leq$  10% valve closure from full open.
- H. Main steamline low-pressure initiation of main steamline isolation valve closure shall be  $\geq$  825 psig.

\*Top of active fuel is defined to be 360 inches above vessel zero (See Bases 3.2)

An increase in the APRM scram trip setting would decrease the margin present before the fuel cladding integrity safety limit is reached. The APRM scram trip setting was determined by an analysis of margins required to provide a reasonable range for maneuvering during operation. Reducing this operating margin would increase the frequency of spurious scrams, which have an adverse effect on reactor safety because of the resulting thermal stresses. Thus, the APRM scram trip setting was selected because it provides adequate margin for the fuel cladding integrity safety limit yet allows operating margin that reduces the possibility of unnecessary scrams.

The scram trip setting must be adjusted to ensure that the LGR transient peak is not increased for any combination of maximum fraction of limiting power density (MFLPD) and reactor core thermal power. The scram setting is adjusted in accordance with the formula in Specification 2.1.A.1, when the MFLPD is greater than the fraction of rated power (FRP).

The adjustment may be accomplished by increasing the APRM gain by the reciprocal of FRP/MFLPD. This provides the same degree of protection as reducing the trip setting by FRP/MFLPD by raising the initial APRM readings closer to the trip settings such that a scram would be received at the same point in a transient as if the trip settings had been reduced by  $\frac{FRP}{MFLPD}$ .

## 2. APRM Flux Scram Trip Setting (Refuel or Startup/Hot Standby Mode)

For operation in the Startup mode while the reactor is at low pressure, the APRM scram setting of 15% of rated power provides adequate thermal margin between the setpoint and the safety limit, 25% of rated. The margin is adequate to accommodate anticipated maneuvers associated with power plant startup. Effects of increasing pressure at zero or low void content are minor, cold water from sources available during startup is not much colder than that already in the system, temperature coefficients are small, and control rod patterns are constrained to be uniform by operating procedures backed up by the rod worth minimiser. Of all possible sources of reactivity input, uniform control rod withdrawal is the most probable cause of significant power rise. Because the flux distribution associated with uniform rod withdrawals does not involve high local peaks, and because several rods must be moved to change power by a significant percentage of rated power, the rate of power rise is very slow. Generally, the heat flux is in near equilibrium with the fission rate. In an assumed uniform rod withdrawal approach to the scram level, the rate of power rise is no more than 5% of rated power per minute, and the APRM system would be more than adequate to assure a scram before the power could exceed the safety limit. The 15% APRM scram remains active until the mode switch is placed in the Run position. This switch occurs when reactor pressure is greater than 825 psig.

## 3. IRM Flux Scram Trip Setting

The IRM system consists of eight channels, four in each of the reactor protection system logic channels. The IRM is a 5-decade instrument which covers the range of power level between that covered by the ERM and the APRM. The 5 decades are broken down into 10 ranges, each being one-half a decade in size.

The IRM scram trip setting of 120 divisions is active in each range of the IRM. For example, if the instrument were on Range 1, the scram setting would be 120 divisions for that range; likewise, if the instrument were on Range 5, the scram would be 120 divisions on that range. Thus, as the IRM is ranged up to accommodate the increase in power level, the scram trip setting is also ranged up.

The most significant sources of reactivity change during the power increase are due to control rod withdrawal. In order to ensure that the IRM provides adequate protection against the single rod withdrawal error, a range of rod withdrawal accidents was analyzed. This analysis included starting the accident at various power levels. The most severe case involves an initial condition in which the reactor is just subcritical and the IRM system is not yet on scale.

Additional conservatism was taken in this analysis by assuming that the IRM channel closest to the withdrawn rod is bypassed. The results of this analysis show that the reactor is scrammed and peak power limited to 1% of rated power, thus maintaining MCPK above the fuel cladding integrity safety limit. Based on the above analysis, the IRM provides protection against local control rod withdrawal errors and continuous withdrawal of control rods in sequence and provides backup protection for the APRM.

## DPR-30

### B. APRM Rod Block Trip Setting

Reactor power level may be varied by moving control rods or by varying the recirculation flow rate. The APRM system provides a control rod block to prevent gross rod withdrawal at constant rate. The APRM system provides a control rod block to prevent gross rod withdrawal at constant rate. The APRM system provides a control rod block to prevent gross rod withdrawal at constant rate. This rod block trip setting, which is automatically varied with recirculation loop flow rate, prevents an increase in the reactor power level to excessive values due to control rod withdrawal. The flow variable trip setting provides substantial margin from fuel damage, assuming a steady-state operation at the trip setting, over the entire recirculation flow range. The margin to the safety limit increases as the flow decreases for the specified trip setting versus flow relationship; therefore the worst-case MCPR which could occur during steady-state operation is at 108% of rated thermal power because of the APRM rod block trip setting. The actual power distribution in the core is established by specified control rod sequences and is monitored continuously by the incore LPRM system. As with APRM scram trip setting, the APRM rod block trip setting is adjusted downward if the maximum fraction of limiting power density exceeds the fraction of rated power, thus preserving the APRM rod block safety margin. As with the scram setting, this may be accomplished by adjusting the APRM gains.

C. Reactor Low Water Level Scram

The reactor low water level scram is set at a point which will assure that the water level used in the bases for the safety limit is maintained. The scram setpoint is based on normal operating temperature and pressure conditions because the level instrumentation is density compensated.

D. Reactor Low Low Water Level ECCS Initiation Trip Point

The emergency core cooling subsystems are designed to provide sufficient cooling to the core to dissipate the energy associated with the loss-of-coolant accident and to limit fuel cladding temperature to well below the cladding melting temperature to assure that core geometry remains intact and to limit any cladding metal-water reaction to less than 1%. To accomplish their intended function, the capacity of each emergency core cooling system component was established based on the reactor low water level scram setpoint. To lower the setpoint of the low water level scram would increase the capacity requirement for each of the ECCS components. Thus, the reactor vessel low water level scram was set low enough to permit margin for operation, yet will not be set lower because of ECCS capacity requirements.

The design of the ECCS components to meet the above criteria was dependent on three previously set parameters: the maximum break size, the low water level scram setpoint, and the ECCS initiation setpoint. To lower the setpoint for initiation of the ECCS could lead to a loss of effective core cooling. To raise the ECCS initiation setpoint would be in a safe direction, but it would reduce the margin established to prevent actuation of the ECCS during normal operation or during normally expected transients.

## E. Turbine Stop Valve Scram

The turbine stop valve closure scram trip anticipates the pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux increase that could result from rapid closure of the turbine stop valves. With a scram trip setting of 10% of valve closure from full open, the resultant increase in surface heat flux is limited such that MCPR remains above the MCPR fuel cladding integrity safety limit even during the worst-case transient that assumes the turbine bypass is closed.

F. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Scram

The turbine control valve fast closure scram is provided to anticipate the rapid increase in pressure and neutron flux resulting from fast closure of the turbine control valves due to a load rejection and subsequent failure of the bypass, i.e., it prevents MCPR from becoming less than the MCPR fuel cladding integrity safety limit for this transient. For the load rejection without bypass transient from 100% power, the peak heat flux (and therefore LHGR) increases on the order of 15% which provides wide margin to the value corresponding to 1% plastic strain of the cladding.



### 3.1/4.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM

#### LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

**Applicability:**

Applies to the instrumentation and associated devices which initiate a reactor scram.

**Objective:**

To assure the operability of the reactor protection system.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

**Applicability:**

Applies to the surveillance of the instrumentation and associated devices which initiate reactor scram.

**Objective:**

To specify the type and frequency of surveillance to be applied in the protection instrumentation.

#### SPECIFICATIONS

- A. The setpoints, minimum number of trip systems, and minimum number of instrument channels that must be operable for each position of the reactor mode switch shall be as given in Tables 3.1-1 through 3.1-4. The system response times from the opening of the sensor contact up to and including the opening of the trip actuator contacts shall not exceed 50 milliseconds.
  - B. If, during operation, the maximum fraction of limiting power density exceeds the fraction of rated power when operating above 25% rated thermal power, either:
    1. the APRM scram and rod block settings shall be reduced to the values given by the equations in Specifications 2.1.A.1 and 2.1.D. This may also be accomplished by increasing the APRM gain as described therein.
    2. the power distribution shall be changed such that the maximum fraction of limiting power density no longer exceeds the fraction of rated power.
- A. Instrumentation systems shall be functionally tested and calibrated as indicated in Tables 4.1-1 and 4.1-2 respectively.
  - B. Daily during reactor power operation, the core power distribution shall be checked for maximum fraction of limiting power density (MFLPD) and compared with the fraction of rated power (FRP) when operating above 25% rated thermal power.
  - C. When it is determined that a channel is failed in the unsafe condition and Column 1 of Tables 3.1-1 through 3.1-3 cannot be met, that trip system must be put in the tripped condition immediately. All other RPS channels that monitor the same variable shall be functionally tested within 8 hours. The trip system with the failed channel may be untripped for a period of time not to exceed 1 hour to conduct this testing. As long as the trip system with the failed channel contains at least one operable channel monitoring that same variable, that trip system may be placed in the untripped position for short periods of time to allow functional testing of all RPS instrument channels as specified by Table 4.1-1. The trip system may be in the untripped position for no more than 8 hours per functional test period for this testing.

### C. Scram Insertion Times

The control rod system is analyzed to bring the reactor subcritical at a rate fast enough to prevent fuel damage, i.e., to prevent the MCPR from becoming less than the fuel cladding integrity safety limit.

Analysis of the limiting power transient shows that the negative reactivity rates resulting from the scram with the average response of all the drives as given in the above specification, provide the required protection, and MCPR remains greater than the fuel cladding integrity safety limit.

The minimum amount of reactivity to be inserted during a scram is controlled by permitting no more than 10% of the operable rods to have long scram times. In the analytical treatment of the transients, 290 milliseconds are allowed between a neutron sensor reaching the scram point and the start of motion of the control rods. This is adequate and conservative when compared to the typically observed time delay of about 210 milliseconds. Approximately 90 milliseconds after neutron flux reaches the trip point, the pilot scram valve solenoid deenergizes and 120 milliseconds later the control rod motion is estimated to actually begin. However, 200 milliseconds rather than 120 milliseconds is conservatively assumed for this time interval in the transient analyses and is also included in the allowable scram insertion times specified in Specification 3.3.C.

The scram times for all control rods will be determined at the time of each refueling outage. A representative sample of control rods will be scram tested following a shutdown.

Scram times of new drives are approximately 2.5 to 3 seconds; lower rates of change in scram times following initial plant operation at power are expected. The test schedule provides reasonable assurance of detection of slow drives before system deterioration beyond the limits of Specification 3.3.C. The program was developed on the basis of the statistical approach outlined below and judgment.

The history of drive performance accumulated to date indicates that the 90% insertion times of new and overhauled drives approximate a normal distribution about the mean which tends to become skewed toward longer scram times as operating time is accumulated. The probability of a drive not exceeding the mean 90% insertion time by 0.75 seconds is greater than 0.999 for a normal distribution. The measurement of the scram performance of the drives surrounding a drive exceeding the expected range of scram performance will detect local variations and also provide assurance that local scram time limits are not exceeded. Continued monitoring of other drives exceeding the expected range of scram times provides surveillance of possible anomalous performance.

The numerical values assigned to the predicted scram performance are based on the analysis of the Dresden 2 startup data and of data from other BWR's such as Nine Mile Point and Oyster Creek.

The occurrence of scram times within the limits, but significantly longer than average, should be viewed as an indication of a systematic problem with control rod drives, especially if the number of drives exhibiting such scram times exceeds eight, the allowable number of inoperable rods.