



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

FOR OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 54 TO PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-16

JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-219

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated September 23, 1980, Jersey Central Power and Light Company (the licensee) submitted proposed changes to the Technical Specifications as contained in Appendix A to Provisional Operating License No. DPR-16 for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. The proposed changes would incorporate certain TMI-2 Lessons Learned Category "A" requirements. The licensee's request is in response to the NRC staff's letter dated July 2, 1980.

2.0 DISCUSSION

By our letter dated September 13, 1979, we issued to all operating nuclear power plants requirements established as a result of our review of the TMI-2 accident. Certain of these requirements, designated Lessons Learned Category "A" requirements, were to have been completed by the licensee prior to any operation subsequent to January 1, 1980. Our evaluation of the licensee's compliance with these Category "A" items was enclosed with our letter to Jersey Central Power and Light Company dated May 8, 1980.

In order to provide reasonable assurance that operating reactor facilities are maintained within the limits determined acceptable following the implementation of the TMI-2 Lessons Learned Category "A" items, we requested that licensees amend their Technical Specifications to incorporate additional Limiting Conditions of Operation and Surveillance Requirements, as appropriate. This request was transmitted to all licensees on July 2, 1980. Included therein were model specifications that we had determined to be acceptable. The licensee's application is in response to our request. Each of the issues identified by the NRC staff and the licensee's response is discussed in the Evaluation below.

3.0 EVALUATION

3.1 Emergency Power Supply/Inadequate Core Cooling

As applicable to boiling water reactors, we indicated that water level instrumentation is important to post-accident monitoring and that surveillance of this instrumentation should be performed. The licensee's

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submittal did not specifically address this issue; however, the licensee indicated in discussions with the NRC staff that surveillance of the reactor water level instrumentation is included as part of the existing Technical Specification surveillance requirements for reactor water level protective instrumentation.

We reviewed Sections 3.1 and 4.1 of the existing Technical Specifications which address limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for protective instrumentation and compared them against the guidelines for water level instrumentation in our model specifications. These guidelines, simply stated, require (1) two operable instrument channels; (2) with less than two channels operable, operability of two channels must be restored within seven days or reactor shutdown is required; (3) with less than one channel operable, operability must be restored within 48 hours; and (4) instrument checks should be performed once per month. The current technical specifications for the low and low-low reactor water level protective instrumentation requires that a minimum of two instrument channels be operable per operable trip system and that the control rods be inserted if the minimum conditions for operation are not met. In addition, channel checks are performed daily for this protective instrumentation.

On our review, we find that the current Oyster Creek Technical Specifications meet our guidelines. Therefore, we conclude that no further change is required.

### 3.2 Valve Position Indication

Our requirements for installation of a reliable position indicating system for relief and safety valves were based on the need to provide the operator with a diagnostic aid to reduce the ambiguity between indications that might indicate either an open relief/safety valve or a small line break. Such a system did not need to be safety grade provided that backup methods of determining valve position are available. The licensee's submittal included proposed technical specifications for relief valves but omitted specifications for safety valves. We discussed this matter with the licensee's representative who agreed that the safety valves should also be included in the proposed specifications. We also discussed clarification of "Primary Detector" and "Backup Indications" as indicated on proposed Tables 3.13.1 and 4.13.1. We mutually agreed that both tables should be interpreted so that "Primary Detector" means acoustic monitor, and "Backup Detector" means thermocouple.

Based on our review, we find that the licensee's submittal as modified by the NRC staff satisfies our requirements and is, therefore, acceptable.

### 3.3 Containment Isolation

Our request indicated that the Technical Specifications should include a Table of Containment Isolation Valves which reflect the diverse isolation signal requirement of this Lessons Learned issue. The licensee's response revises Section 3.5.A.3 of the Technical Specifications and provides a new Table 3.5.2 which lists the containment isolation valves. The licensee's response also revises Section 4.5.1 by including references to the new Table 3.5.2.

We have reviewed the licensee's response which reflects diverse isolation signals to each valve. Based on our review, we find that the licensee's submittal satisfies our requirements and is acceptable.

### 3.4 Shift Technical Advisor

Our request indicated that the Technical Specifications related to shift manning should be revised to reflect the augmentation of a Shift Technical Advisor (STA). We discussed the current Technical Specifications with the licensee's representative and mutually agreed that the current specification 6.2.2.g should be clarified to indicate that each on duty shift shall include a Shift Technical Advisor except that this position need not be filled if the reactor is in the refuel or shutdown mode and the reactor water temperature is less than 212°F. The licensee's submittal indicates that the individual performing this function will have a Bachelor's Degree or equivalent in a scientific or engineering discipline with specific training in plant design, and responses and analysis of the plant for transients and accidents.

Based on our review, we find that the licensee's submittal as modified by the NRC staff satisfies our requirements and is, therefore, acceptable.

### 3.5 Integrity of Systems Outside Containment

Our request indicated that licensees should be required to periodically conduct a System Integrity Measurements Program to prevent the release of significant amounts of radioactivity to the environment via leakage from engineered safety systems and auxiliary systems which are located outside reactor containment. The licensee's response stated that they had reviewed the safety significance of the program and felt that it would be inappropriate to make it a license condition. The licensee did commit through responses to NUREG 0578 to initiate and maintain this program.

In discussions with the licensee's representative, we suggested and it was mutually agreed that it would be appropriate to include this requirement in the Administrative Controls Section of the Technical Specifications. The licensee's program includes provisions for a

preventive maintenance program and periodic visual inspections. The program also includes system leak measurements at frequencies not to exceed refueling cycle intervals.

Based on our review, we find that the inclusion of this requirement in the Administrative Controls Section of the Technical Specifications satisfies our requirement and is, therefore, acceptable.

### 3.6 Iodine Monitoring

Our request indicated that the licensee should implement a program which will ensure the capability to determine the airborne iodine concentration in areas requiring personnel access under accident conditions. The licensee's response stated that they had reviewed the safety significance of the program and felt that it would be inappropriate to make it a license condition. The licensee did commit through responses to NUREG-0578 to initiate and maintain this program.

In discussions with the licensee's representative, we suggested and it was mutually agreed that it would be appropriate to include this requirement in the Administrative Controls Section of the Technical Specifications. The licensee's program includes training of personnel, procedures for monitoring, and provisions for maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment.

Based on our review we find that inclusion of this requirement in the Administrative Controls Section of the Technical Specifications satisfies our requirement and is, therefore, acceptable.

## 4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement, or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

## 5.0 CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Date: March 29, 1981