



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT

DOCKET NO. 50-312

RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 68
License No. DPR-54

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Sacramento Municipal Utility District (the licensee) dated February 17, 1983, as supplemented and revised by your letters of July 12, 1983, January 8, February 7 and March 18, 1985, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public;
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-54 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 68 are hereby incorporated in the

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

June 5, 1985

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RIngram

DOCKET No. 50-312

MEMORANDUM FOR: Docketing and Service Branch
Office of the Secretary of the Commission

FROM: Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT: Sacramento Municipal Utility District

One signed original of the *Federal Register* Notice identified below is enclosed for your transmittal to the Office of the Federal Register for publication. Additional conformed copies (6) of the Notice are enclosed for your use.

- ☐ Notice of Receipt of Application for Construction Permit(s) and Operating License(s).
- ☐ Notice of Receipt of Partial Application for Construction Permit(s) and Facility License(s); Time for Submission of Views on Antitrust Matters.
- ☐ Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License.
- ☐ Notice of Receipt of Application for Facility License(s); Notice of Availability of Applicant's Environmental Report; and Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Facility License(s) and Notice of Opportunity for Hearing.
- ☐ Notice of Availability of NRC Draft/Final Environmental Statement.
- ☐ Notice of Limited Work Authorization.
- ☐ Notice of Availability of Safety Evaluation Report.
- ☐ Notice of Issuance of Construction Permit(s).
- ☐ Notice of Issuance of Facility Operating License(s) or Amendment(s).
- ☐ Order.
- ☐ Exemption.
- ☐ Notice of Granting of Relief.
- ☒ Other: Notice of Denial. Please insert date on the 2nd page 2nd paragraph of this notice for a 30-day intervention period, and call Carol on extension 28960 to inform her of the date inserted. Referenced documents have been provided PDR.

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Division of Licensing, ORB#4

Enclosure:
As stated


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license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "John F. Stolz", is written over the typed name.

John F. Stolz, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #4
Division of Licensing

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: June 4, 1985

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 68

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-54

DOCKET NO. 50-312

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

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3-42a	3-42a
3-43	3-43
-	3-55a
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3-57	3-57
3-57A	3-57a
4-33	4-33*
4-34	4-34
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-	4-91

*Overleaf page included for document completeness.

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RANCHO SECO UNIT 1
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

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RANCHO SECO UNIT 1
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Limiting Conditions for Operation

3.7 AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS

Applicability

Applies to the availability of off-site and on-site electrical power for station operation and for operation of station auxiliaries.

Objective

To define those conditions of electrical power availability necessary to provide for safe reactor operation and to provide for continuing availability of engineered safety features in an unrestricted manner.

Specification

- 3.7.1 The reactor shall not be brought critical unless the following conditions are met:
- A. All nuclear service buses, nuclear service switchgear, and nuclear service load shedding systems are operable.
 - B. Two 220 KV lines are in service.
 - C. One 6900 volt reactor coolant pump motors bus is energized.
 - D. Emergency diesel generators A and B are operable and at least 35,000 gallons of fuel are in each storage tank.
 - E. Plant batteries are charged and in service.
 - F. Two out of three battery chargers are operable for 125 volt DC buses "A" and "C", and "B" and "D".
 - G. One out of two battery chargers are operable for each 125 VDC bus "A2" and "B2."
 - H. Three out of four inverters SiA, SiB, SiC, and SiD, and both inverters SiA2 and SiB2 are operable for 120 volt AC vital bus power.
 - I. Both startup transformers, No. 1 and No. 2, are in service.
 - J. The switchyard voltage is 215 KV or above.
 - K. The interconnections between 480 volt switchgear 3A and 3A2, and 3B and 3B2 are operable.
- 3.7.2 The reactor shall not remain critical unless all of the following requirements are satisfied:
- A. One 220 KV line shall be fully operational and capable of carrying nuclear service and auxiliary power except as specified in D below.

RANCHO SECO UNIT 1
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Limiting Conditions for Operation

- B. Both startup transformers shall be in service except that one will be sufficient if during the time one startup transformer is inoperable, the associated diesel generator is started and run continuously.
- C. Both diesel generators shall be operable except that from and after the date that one of the diesel generators is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, reactor operation is permissible for the succeeding 15 days provided that during such 15 days the operable diesel generator shall be load tested daily and both startup transformers are available. If the diesel is not returned to service at the end of 15 days, the other diesel will be started and run with at least minimum load continuously for an additional 15 days. If at the end of the second 15 days the diesel is not returned to service, the reactor shall be brought to the cold shutdown condition within an additional 24 hours.
- D. If the plant is separated from the system while carrying its own auxiliaries, or if all 220 KV lines are lost, continued reactor operation is permissible provided that one emergency diesel generator is started and run continuously until a transmission line is restored.
- E. The essential nuclear service electrical buses, switchgear, load shedding, and automatic diesel start systems shall be operable except as provided in C above and as required for surveillance testing.
- F. Nuclear service batteries are charged and in service except that one nuclear service battery may be removed from service for not more than 24 hours.
- G. Both sets of nuclear services buses 4A, 4A2 and 4B, 4B2 are operable except that one set of nuclear service buses (4A, 4A2 or 4B, 4B2) may be removed from service for not more than 24 hours provided that all equipment on the other set of nuclear service buses is operable.
- H. If the switchyard voltage goes below 219KV, positive actions, within the District's procedures, will be implemented in an attempt to return the voltage to 219KV. If the switchyard voltage goes below 217KV or remains below 219KV for 8 hours, one electrical division will be operated on its diesel generator independent of off-site power. The other electrical division will be operated on off-site power with its associated diesel generator on standby status. The switchyard voltage must be returned to 219KV within the next 24 hours. Switchyard voltage above 219KV will allow unrestricted plant operation.

RANCHO SECO UNIT 1
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Limiting Conditions for Operation

- 3.7.3 If both diesel generators become inoperable, the unit shall be placed in the cold shutdown condition.
- 3.7.4 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with at least 126 kw of pressurizer heaters. With the pressurizer inoperable due to inoperable emergency power supplies to the pressurizer heater either restore the inoperable emergency power supply within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 12 hours.
- 3.7.5 The voltage protection system trip setting shall be as stated in Table 3.7-1.
- 3.7.6 Voltage Protection System Limiting Conditions
- A. Startup and operation are not permitted unless the minimum requirements and action statements of Table 3.7-2 are met.
 - B. In the event the number of protective channels falls below that listed in Table 3.7-2, the plant will be brought to a hot shutdown within 48 hours.

Bases

The auxiliary electrical power systems are arranged so that no single failure can inactivate enough safety features equipment to jeopardize plant safety.

The normal source of power to the redundant nuclear service loads is by the two startup transformers connected to the 220-KV station switchyard. All of the normal power supply to plant auxiliary loads is provided through the two unit auxiliary transformers connected to the generator buses. Emergency power for the nuclear service loads is obtained from two on-site diesel generators. Since the startup transformers are sized to carry full plant auxiliary loads, if plant auxiliaries' power is not available from the unit auxiliary transformer, it will be obtained from the startup transformers.

The five 220-KV transmission lines are not under the direct control of the Rancho Seco station. Therefore, all five cannot be assumed to be available at all times. However, extensive reliability and protective features are utilized so that the probability of losing more than one source of 220-KV power from faults is low. By requiring that two 220-KV lines are in service prior to startup, one circuit will be immediately available following a loss of the onsite alternating current diesel power supplies and the other offsite 220-KV line. If there is a loss of all 220-KV remote connections, power to the safety features will be supplied by the diesel generators.

RANCHO SECO UNIT 1
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Limiting Conditions for Operation

The 35,000 gallons of fuel stored in each storage tank permit operation of the two diesel generators for seven days. It is considered unlikely not to be able to secure fuel oil from an outside source during this time under the worst of weather conditions.

The set of four 125 volt DC control panelboards (SOA, SOB, SOC, SOD) and the set of two 125 volt DC control panelboards (SOA2, SOB2) are arranged so that loss of one bus will not preclude safe shutdown or operation of safety features systems. During periods when one plant battery is de-energized for test or maintenance, the associated 125 volt DC bus can be supplied from its battery charger.

Each redundant pair ("A" and "C", "B" and "D") of safety features actuation and reactor protection 125 volt DC buses has a standby battery charger in addition to a battery charger for each bus. The 125 volt DC buses "A2" and "B2" each, has a standby battery charger. Loss of power from one battery charger per pair of redundant DC buses or for DC bus "A2" or "B2" has no significant consequence since a standby battery charger is available. In addition, each 125 volt DC bus can continue to receive power from its respective battery without interruption.

Sufficient redundancy is available with any three of the four 120 volt AC vital power buses (S1A, S1B, S1C, S1D) in service such that reactor safety is assured. Every reasonable effort will be made to maintain all safety instrumentation in operation. Following criticality, continued operation with inverters out-of-service as stated in Specification 3.7.1.H is governed by the individual LCOs for the components powered by the out-of-service inverter.

During periods of station operation under the condition of electrical system degradation, as described above in Specification 3.7.2, the operating action required is to start and run sufficient standby power supplies so as not to compromise the safety of the plant. As seen in Specification 3.7.2, a time limit is placed on operation during certain degraded conditions based on the reliability of the available power supply.

The requirement that 126 KW of pressurizer heaters and their associated controls being capable of being supplied with electrical power from an emergency bus provides assurance that these heaters can be energized during a loss of offsite power condition to maintain natural circulation at HOT SHUTDOWN.

The voltage protection system is designed to isolate the nuclear service buses from the startup transformers when the bus voltage exceeds the allowable operating limits of the equipment. The allowable operating range for the 4160 volt nuclear service buses is 3733 to 4626 volts and 397 to 521 volts for the 480 volt nuclear service buses. This corresponds to a switchyard voltage range of 215 to 244 KV. This range of switchyard voltage encompasses the normal operating range of 221 to 239 KV.

REFERENCE

FSAR, Section 8

RANCHO SECO UNIT 1
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Limiting Conditions for Operation

Table 3.14-1 (Continued)

FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS FOR SAFETY SYSTEMS

Zone	Instrument Location	Minimum Operable		
		Heat	Flame	Smoke
75-1	B Switchgear Room (NSEB)	0	0	1
75-2	BB2 Battery Room (NSEB)	0	0	1
75-3	BD2 Battery Room (NSEB)	0	0	1
76-1	A Switchgear Room (NSEB)	0	0	1
76-2	BA2 Battery Room (NSEB)	0	0	1
76-3	BC2 Battery Room (NSEB)	0	0	1
77-1	North B Electrical Equipment Room (NSEB)	0	0	1
77-2	South B Electrical Equipment Room (NSEB)	0	0	1
78-1	North A Electrical Equipment Room (NSEB)	0	0	1
78-2	South A Electrical Equipment Room (NSEB)	0	0	1
81	B Cable Tunnel/Shaft (NSEB)	0	0	3
82	A Cable Tunnel/Shaft (NSEB)	0	0	3
84-2	B Mechanical Equipment Room (NSEB)	0	0	1
84-3	A Mechanical Equipment Room (NSEB)	0	0	1

RANLMO SECU UNIT 1
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Limiting Conditions for Operation

3.14.3 Spray and Sprinkler Systems

Specification

3.14.3.1 The spray and/or sprinkler systems located in the following areas shall be OPERABLE:

- a. Control Room (Zone 3)
- b. Controlled Area, Mezzanine Level (Zone 20)
- c. Main Lube Oil Area, Grade Level (Zone 32)
- d. Grade Level (Zone 34)
- e. North Diesel Room (Zone 40)
- f. South Diesel Room (Zone 41)
- g. West Controlled Area, Grade Level (Zone 42)
- h. East Controlled Area, Grade Level (Zone 43)
- i. South and East -20' Level (Zone 46)
- j. MSEB B Cable Tunnel/Shaft (Zone 81)
- k. MSEB A Cable Tunnel/Shaft (Zone 82)
- l. MSEB Mechanical Equipment Rooms A and B (Zone 84)

3.14.3.2 With one or more of the above, items a through f, required spray and/or sprinkler systems inoperable, within one hour establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment for those areas in which redundant systems or components required to safely shut down and cool down the plant could be damaged; for other areas, establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Restore the system to OPERABLE status within 14 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.5.E within the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.

3.14.4 CO₂ System

Specification

3.14.4.1 The CO₂ systems located in the following areas shall be OPERABLE with a minimum capacity of 66% and a minimum pressure of 275 psig in the storage tank.

- a. Zone 12 West DC Control Room Mezzanine Level
- b. Zone 13 West 480 VAC Room Mezzanine Level
- c. Zone 14 West Cable Tray Area
- d. Zone 15 East Cable Tray Area
- e. Zone 16 East 480 VAC Room Mezzanine Level
- f. Zone 17 East DC Control Room Mezzanine Level
- g. Zone 36 West Battery Room Grade Level

RANCHO SECU UNIT 1
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Limiting Conditions for Operation

3.14.4.1 (Continued)

- h. Zone 37 West 4160 VAC Room
- i. Zone 38 East 4160 VAC Room
- j. Zone 39 East Battery Room
- k. Zone 40 North Diesel Room
- l. Zone 41 South Diesel Room
- m. Zone 19 Communications Room
- n. Zone 75 B Switchgear Room NSEB
- o. Zone 76 A Switchgear Room NSEB
- p. Zone 77 B Electrical Equipment Room NSEB
- q. Zone 78 A Electrical Equipment Room NSEB

3.14.4.2 With one or more of the above required CO₂ systems inoperable, within one hour establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment for those areas in which redundant systems or components required to safely shut down and cool down the plant could be damaged; for other areas, establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Restore the system to OPERABLE status within 14 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.5.E within the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.

3.14.5 Fire Hose Stations

Specification

3.14.5.1 The fire hose stations in the following locations shall be OPERABLE.

- a. All inside stations specified in Table 3.14-2
- b. Hydrant 2
- c. Hydrant 3
- d. Hydrant at coordinates N59+17; E30+20
- e. Hydrant at coordinates N58+83; E32+83

3.14.5.2 With one or more of the fire hose stations above inoperable, route an additional equivalent size fire hose to the unprotected area(s) from an OPERABLE hose station within 1 hour if the inoperable fire hose is the primary means of fire suppression; otherwise, route the additional hose within 24 hours. Restore the fire hose station to OPERABLE status within 14 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.5.E within the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability, and plans and schedule for restoring the station to OPERABLE status.

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Limiting Conditions for Operation

Table 3.14-2

INSIDE BUILDING FIRE HOSE STATIONS

ID No.	Location
I Auxiliary Building Hose Stations	
HS 1	+40 ft. Level Corridor by Counting Room
HS 2	+40 ft. Level Corridor Across from Control Room
HS 3	+40 ft. Level Corridor by Chemistry Lab
HS 4	+40 ft. Level Corridor by Cleaning Room
HS 5	+20 ft. Level in Ventilation Equipment Room
HS 6	+20 ft. Level Corridor by Communications Room
HS 7	Grade Level by CRD Cooling Water Heat Exchanger
HS 8	+20 ft. Level Corridor by Ventilation Equipment Room
HS 9	+20 ft. Level Corridor by A/C Equipment Room
HS 10	Grade Level Corridor by Diesel Generator Room
HS 11	Grade Level Corridor Across from East 4160 Switchgear Room
HS 12	Grade Level Corridor Across from East battery Room
HS 13	Grade Level Corridor by East End Stairwell
HS 14	Grade Level by Waste Solidification Area
HS 15	-20 ft. Level HPI Pump A Room
HS 16	-20 ft. Level Containment Penetration Valve Area
HS 17	-20 ft. Level Corridor by Waste Gas Decay Tank Room
HS 18	-20 ft. Level Corridor North of dA Evaporator Room
HS 19	-47 ft. Level Stairway by East and West DHR Pump Rooms
HS 20	-20 ft. Level Corridor East of HPI Pump B Room
II MSEB Hose Stations	
HS 21	MSEB First Floor North
HS 22	MSEB First Floor South
HS 23	MSEB Second Floor North
HS 24	MSEB Second Floor South

RANCHO SECO UNIT 1
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Surveillance Standards

- 4.5.3.2.B 1. The section of the system that is downstream of the pump suction isolation valve shall be tested by use in normal operation or by hydrostatically testing at 180 psig.
2. The section of the system from the containment emergency sump isolation valve to the pump isolation valve shall be tested at no less than 52 psig as a containment local leak rate test under para 4.4.1.2.
3. Visual inspection shall be made for excessive leakage from components of the system. Any excessive leakage shall be measured by collecting and weighing or by another equivalent method.

Bases

The leakage rate limit for the Decay Heat Removal System is a judgment value based on assuring that the components can be expected to operate without mechanical failure for a period on the order of 200 days after a loss of coolant accident. The test pressures achieved either by normal system operation or by hydrostatically testing, give an adequate margin over the highest pressure within the system after a design basis accident. Similarly, the pressure tests for the return lines from the containment to the Decay Heat Removal System are equivalent to the peak calculated pressure after a LOCA. A Decay Heat Removal System and Reactor Building Spray System sum total leakage rate of 6.0 gal/h will limit offsite exposures due to leakage to insignificant levels relative to those calculated for leakage directly from the Reactor Building in the design basis accident. The dose to the thyroid calculated as a result of this leakage is 7.21 rem for a 2 hour exposure at the site boundary. (1)

REFERENCES

- (1) FSAR, paragraph 14.3.9.3.

4.6 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM PERIODIC TESTING

Applicability

Applies to the periodic testing and surveillance of the emergency power system.

Objective

To verify that the emergency power sources and equipment are operable and respond properly when required.

Specification

- 4.6.1 At intervals not to exceed one month, a test of the diesel generators will be performed to verify proper operation of these emergency power sources and associated equipment. This test will be performed to assure that:
- A. Each diesel generator can be started from the control room.
 - B. Each diesel generator can be synchronized with its associated 4160 volt nuclear service bus.
- 4.6.2 During each refueling interval, a test of the diesel generators and emergency start circuits shall be performed to verify that these emergency power sources and associated equipment are operable by:
- A. Simulating a loss of offsite power in conjunction with a safety features actuation signal, and:
 - 1) Verifying de-energization of the nuclear services buses and operation of the load shedding circuitry.
 - 2) Verifying the diesel starts from ambient condition on the auto-start signal and energizes the nuclear services buses, and by verifying proper operation of the automatic load sequencing circuitry, including manual closing of the A Train intertie breakers from the Control Room and manual energization of the A Train essential HVAC from the Control Room. The B Train intertie breakers are automatically closed and the B Train Control Room essential HVAC System is automatically energized. The diesel generators will be operated for at least 5 minutes in this condition.
 - 3) Verifying that on diesel-generator trip, the load shedding circuitry operates properly and the diesel restarts on the auto-start signal, and by verifying proper operation of the automatic load sequencing circuitry. The diesel generator will be operated for at least 5 minutes in this condition.
 - B. Load testing the diesel generators to SFAS capacity.

RANCHO SECO UNIT 1
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Surveillance Standards

4.6.5 Diesel generator fuel oil supply shall be tested as follows:

- A. During the monthly diesel generator test, the diesel fuel oil transfer pumps shall be monitored for operation.
- B. Once a month, quantity of the diesel fuel oil shall be logged and checked against minimum specifications.

The tests specified will be considered satisfactory if control room indication and/or visual examination demonstrates that all components have operated properly.

4.6.6 The pressurizer shall be tested as follows:

- A. The pressurizer water level shall be determined to be within its limits at least once per 12 hours.
- B. The emergency power supply for the pressurizer heaters shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by transferring power from the normal to the emergency power supply and energizing the heaters.

Bases

The tests specified are designed to demonstrate that the diesel generators will provide power for operation of safety features equipment. They also assure that the emergency generator control system and the control systems for the safety features equipment will function automatically in the event of a loss of all normal a-c station service power, and upon receipt of a safety features actuation signal. They assure the manual closure of the 3A, 3A2 intertie breakers. The tests also assure the manual energization of the A Train Control Room essential HVAC System functions in the event of a loss of all normal AC station service power and upon receipt of an SFAS signal. They assure the 3B, 3B2 intertie breakers are automatically closed and the B Train Control Room essential HVAC System is automatically energized. The 3A-3A2 and 3B-3B2 interties are not required if the event is only a safety features actuation. The testing frequency specified is intended to identify and permit correction of any mechanical or electrical deficiency before it can result in a system failure. The fuel oil supply, starting circuits and controls are continuously monitored and any faults are alarmed and indicated. An abnormal condition in these systems would be signaled without having to place the diesel generators on test.

Precipitous failure of the plant battery is extremely unlikely. The surveillance specified is that which has been demonstrated over the years to provide an indication of a cell becoming unserviceable long before it fails.

REFERENCE

- (1) IEEE 308

RANCHO SECO UNIT 1
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Surveillance Standards

4.31 NUCLEAR SERVICE ELECTRICAL BUILDING EMERGENCY HEATING VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONING

Applicability

Applies to the Nuclear Service Electrical Building (NSEB) Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) System components.

Objective

To verify that this system and its components will be able to perform their design functions.

Specification

4.31.1 The NSEB Emergency HVAC shall be:

- A. Demonstrated operable at least once per 31 days by initiating flow through the essential air handling unit.
 1. Verify that the air handling unit maintains a flow rate of 24,500 cfm \pm 10 percent.
 2. Verify that the condensing unit is operational.

Bases

The purpose of the Emergency Nuclear Service Electrical Building HVAC is to limit high temperatures which the building would be subjected to upon loss of normal cooling. The high temperatures will affect the environmental qualification of safety related electronic equipment housed within the NSEB which is used to support the Control Room/TSC upon accident conditions. The system is designed with an air handling unit and a condensing unit which are activated upon high temperature signals.

Since this system is not normally operated, a periodic test is required to ensure its operability when needed. Monthly testing of this system will show that the system is available for its safety action. During this test the system will be observed for unusual or excessive noise or vibration when the fan motors are running. The air flow of 24,500 cfm was selected to limit the temperatures in the building to 80°F maximum (with the exception of the cable shafts).

The system is automatically started when the temperature in the NSEB Switchgear Room exceeds 95°F, except upon loss of offsite power; in which case, the system can be manually started by the operator.