



OFFICE OF THE
COMMISSIONER

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

November 7, 1984

MEMORANDUM FROM: Chairman Palladino
FROM: James K. Asselstine *James K. Asselstine*
SUBJECT: COMNP 84-45 - San Onofre 1 Restart

Joe, my votes on the San Onofre questions are as follows:

- (1) Options paper? - Yes
- (2) Recommendations? - Yes
- (3) Public Commission meeting? - Yes
 - (i) only with staff? -- No
 - (ii) include licensee? -- Yes
- (4) Closed meeting with OI? - Yes

cc: Commissioner Roberts
Commissioner Bernthal
Commissioner Zech
OGC
OPE
EDO

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PDR FOIA
BELL84-885 PDR

C/5

November 14, 1984

SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM BRANCH

DOCKET NO. 50-206

RECORD OF PHONE CONVERSATION

DATE: November 7, 1984

TIME: 1:00 pm

PARTICIPANTS: NRC - T. Cheng, ~~B. M. Cheng~~ N. Chokshi, G. Lear
Franklin Research Center - Vu Con, A. Hamid (consultant)
Southern California Edison Company - J. Rainsberry,
M. Knarr, R. Ornelas
Bechtel Power - S. Atalik
Computech - R. Mayes, T. Kelly

SUBJECT: SAN ONOFRE 1 - MASONRY WALLS

SUMMARY OF CONVERSATION:

The purpose of the telephone conference was to discuss the conformance between the test samples, the analytical models and the as-built condition of masonry walls. Specifically, wall FB-5 in the fuel storage building was discussed since the wall was not grouted as the test samples and there were no dowels above (elevation 42'-0). The licensee and its consultants noted that the continuous rebar for this wall provides equivalent reinforcement to the walls with dowels which were tested. The licensee agreed to document the following information within four weeks.

- 1) This wall is the only one with design differences from those tested;
- 2) That equivalent reinforcement is provided by the rebar;
- 3) Whether the first course above the bond beam at the 42' elevation is grouted;
- 4) Stress/strain profiles, based on the test data and analytic results, to show that compression is in the face shell only;
- 5) the location and value of maximum critical stresses and strain on wall FB-5; and
- 6) The licensee's overall conclusion concerning the applicability of the test/analysis program to this wall.

Based on the discussion, the staff concluded that the masonry wall review, for purposes of plant restart, is complete.

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11/2/84 Meeting

① What is the correct seismic design basis for the San Onofre site?

→ five systems + 3 pieces of equipment audited in staff's review of licensee's return to service program

→ licensee did sample analysis of emergency systems -

staff has audited these analyses as well -

→ codes, criteria + margins

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to operate

was the plant considered safe when it was shut down in Feb 1982
BOP - HET report -
said 18 HET call with given
whether plant was considered safe to operate?

When large SCB sample; was big NRC audit C/2

① Where is a reasonable place to draw the line?
signing

② ^{P 33 -} To what extent can/should we consider the
econ. impact of a POC ^(or a licensee) ~~in~~
deciding whether to relax a
safety requirement?

③ Did staff tell SCC that they
believed orig. order was a
license amendment (in 1982? later?)

Further the confirmatory order in 1982
was a license amendment -

August 1982 order

④ Are circumstances to the GDC needed
to outsize cost? (pp-33-34)

- 5/13/82 -- letter from Duntson to ^{Fitzgerald} ~~DeLong~~ requesting
investigation. -- that's when issue was first
raised.

- seismic analysis was begun by SCB
before SEP -

50.54(4) letters sent in 1980 + 1981
requesting the seismic analysis -

proposed to be
SONOS-2+3 were not sig. designed to .67g -
That came out of the staff's USGS review.

4/28/80
SCB filed submission. in 4/80 that stated
that existing design of SONOS-1 was
suffic. to meet .67g - this was a
JCO - had margin beyond .5.

They agreed that ground motion was actually
lower for .67g because of their
seismic analysis, even tho the g force
at the anchor point was higher. So they
agreed no changes were needed to meet .67g.

- On basis of the staff's review of their
analysis, AID denied the 1500
petitions.

11/16/81 - date of denial of petitions

plant would be structurally intact
at .67g -- would it be change to
components + systems.

(2)

- plant was operating off & on until 1982.

- Basis of Stoff's denial - - relied heavily on the licensee's JCR - -

Stoff also felt that structures, systems & components that were designed to .5g would remain functional at .67g. -

But, Stoff had found that a few structures weren't designed to .5g - These weren't originally required to be designed for seismic criteria, & Stoff decided that there should also be seismically designed.

Nov. 1981 - 5/3/82 - - licensee completed its analysis of BOP piping systems & appurtenances - - small bore piping, decay heat removal & shutdown systems - - analysis showed significant overstress

magnitude of overstress & no. of tests found

several limited analysis of supports
" " " " components

(3)

some cases were more than 5 times
the allowable stresses --

no longer gues. of minor variations -
these were gross variations that called
into gues. whether plant was .5 g.

plant shut down on 2/27/82 -- & do
other work -- turbines; steam generators

open ↑

closed ↓