

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION V

Report No. 50-344/81-01

Docket No. 50-344

License No. NPF-1

Safeguards Group _____

Licensee: Portland General Electric Company

121 S. W. Salmon Street

Portland, Oregon 97204

Facility Name: Trojan

Inspection at: Rainier, Oregon

Inspection conducted: January 5-8, 1981

Inspectors: _____

J. D. Carlson, Reactor Inspector

1/29/81
Date Signed

A. D. Johnson, Reactor Inspector

1/29/81
Date Signed

Date Signed

Approved By: _____

D. N. Sternberg, Chief, Reactor Project Section 1
Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch

1/29/81
Date Signed

Summary:

Inspection on January 5-8, 1981 (Report No. 50-344/81-01)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of maintenance; surveillance; design, design changes, and modifications; response to IE Bulletins and Circulars and followup on previous inspection items; also included independent inspection effort. The inspection involved 40 inspector hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.

Results: No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.

8108180913

RV Form 219 (2)

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

C. P. Yundt, General Manager
*C. A. Olmstead, Manager, Technical Services
*R. P. Barkhurst, Manager, Operations and Maintenance
*J. D. Reid, Manager, Plant Services
R. P. Schmitt, Engineering Supervisor
*M. R. Snook, OA Supervisor (Acting)
*R. Susee, Training Supervisor
*D. L. Bennett, Control & Electrical Supervisor
*R. L. Steele, Manager, Nuclear Project Eng.
*S. E. Hoag, Nuc. Proj. Eng.
*A. S. Cohlmeier, Nuc. Plant Engineer

The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees during the course of their inspection. These included corporate and plant staff, engineers, and licensed operators.

*Present at Exit Interview.

2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(80-09-03 Closed) Problem with the width of the Source Range Monitor (SRM) anode voltage curve plateau. Westinghouse provided resolution.

(PJ 01-28 Open) Westinghouse Part 21 report on ECCS Reset/Block Function: The inspector reviewed changes to Periodic Instrument and Control Test (PICT) 10-1 and 22-3 for periodic testing of the P-4 relay contacts during operation; however, action on Westinghouse recommendation to test contacts after each cycling of reactor trip breakers remains outstanding.

(PJ 08-16 Open) Eisenhower Letter regarding Interim Criteria for Shift Staffing: The inspector reviewed Administrative Order 3-1, Shift Complement, for on-shift staffing and work hour criteria. The inspector commented that Shift Technical Advisor (STA) coverage was not addressed and Control Operator (CO) work hours were not specified in paragraph V.A.4. The licensee agreed to incorporate the above comments in the Administrative Order.

3. IE Bulletin/Circular Followup

The inspection included followup on licensee actions related to recent IE Bulletins and Circulars. The Bulletins and Circulars had been forwarded to and reviewed by cognizant members of the licensee's organization. Inspection findings relating to the Bulletins and Circulars reviewed during the inspection were as follows:

POOR ORIGINAL

IE Bulletin 80-06, ESF Reset Controls (Open): The licensee's response to the bulletin committed to performing a test to verify installed instrumentation and controls are consistent with the review of the schematic diagrams and demonstrate all equipment remains in its emergency mode upon removal or manual resetting of the actuation signal. The inspector reviewed the licensee's test procedure for testing the ESF relays during the upcoming outage. The inspector had no comments on the procedure content.

IE Bulletin 80-12, DHR System Operability (Closed): The inspector verified the licensee's actions were completed satisfactorily.

IE Bulletin 80-15, Possible Loss of ENS with Loss of Offsite Power (Closed): The inspector reviewed the licensee's resubmittal and completed actions.

IE Bulletin 80-18, Maintenance of Minimum Flow thru CCP'S Following Secondary Side Line Rupture (Open): The inspector reviewed the completed design change package for: 1) aligning the CCP miniflow to the VCT and isolating the return to the pump suction; and 2) removing the SI initiation automatic closure signal from the CCP miniflow isolation valves. The inspector reviewed operator instructions existed to close the CCP miniflow isolation valves when RCS pressure drops below 1550 psig. and subsequently reopen the miniflow isolation valves when RCS pressure rises above 2000 psig. The inspector reviewed the flow verification tests performed by the licensee on the miniflow recirc lines to ensure the design flowrate of 60 gpm minimum is met for each pump. The inspector noted that one pump did not meet the minimum specified. The licensee had been in contact with Westinghouse who had verbally accepted the condition. The inspector requested the licensee resubmit a response to the bulletin with an analysis of the condition. This was agreed to by the licensee's licensing engineer subsequent to the exit interview.

IE Bulletin 80-21, Valve Yokes Supplied by Malcolm Foundry Co. (Closed): The licensee confirmed that no valve yokes manufactured by Malcolm Foundry were installed at Trojan.

IE Bulletin 80-23, Failures of Solenoid Valves by Valcor Engineering Company (Closed): The licensee determined no Valcor Engineering Solenoid Valves were installed at Trojan.

IE Circular 79-22, Stroke Times for Power Operated Relief Valves (Open): The licensee's engineering supervisor committed to add stroke times to Periodic Instrumentation and Control Test (PICT) 17-1 and 17-2.

IE Circular 80-21, Regulation of Refueling Crews (Closed): The inspector determined the licensee had taken action regarding this item.

IE Circular 80-23, Potential Defects in Beloit Emergency Generators (Closed): The licensee does not have this type of equipment at Trojan.

4. Surveillance Testing

The inspector examined the procedures and records pertaining to the following Periodic Engineering Tests (PET) and Periodic Instrument and Control Tests:

- PET-11-1 - Fire Protection System - Fire Main Loop Flow Test
- PET-7-4 - Reactor Coolant System Total Flow Rate Measurement
- PET-3 - Core Power Distribution
- PET-2 - Incore/Excore Detector Calibration
- POT-20-1 - Control Room Ventilation System
- PICT-16-1- Hot Control Rod Drop Time Measurements
- PICT 9-3 - Alarm and Trip Setpoints of Containment Pressure
- PICT-8-1 - Steam Line Pressure - Protection Set III
- PICT-10-1- Reactor Protection System

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

5. Maintenance

The inspector examined the licensee's Maintenance Work Request Procedure (Administrative Order, AO-3-9); Safety Related Equipment Outages Procedure (Administrative Order, AO-3-14); Routine Lubrication Procedure (Administrative Order, AO-3-10); Mechanical and Electric Preventative Maintenance Procedure (Maintenance Procedure, MP-3-3) and the Vendor Manuals for the Boron Injection Pump and the Diesel Driven Fire Pump. In addition, the inspector examined the documentation relating to the following maintenance activities:

- a. Vibration of the Boron Recirculation Pump Motor.
- b. Seal replacement of Boron Recirculation Pump.
- c. 5 year maintenance inspection of the Diesel Driven Fire Pump.
- d. Installation of new suction and discharge valves for the positive displacement reactor coolant system makeup pump and performance of routine pump inspection and maintenance.
- e. Replacement of diaphragm and gasket in the suction valve to the Boron Injection Recirculation Pump.

-3-

During examination of the above maintenance activities, the inspector observed that the Administrative Controls permit maintenance to be performed in accordance with instructions written and approved by the Maintenance Supervisor without either prior to or subsequent independent review by any other persons except for those performing the work. However, in actual practice, maintenance activities received independent reviews by both a maintenance engineer and a QA engineer. These reviews serve as an independent check to preclude unauthorized changes to the plant without first receiving the required reviews and approvals. The licensee representative stated that the possibility of unintentional and unauthorized changes had been raised during an independent audit of the program and that the administrative controls would be amended to assure that work requests are evaluated for potential changes which require additional safety reviews.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

6. Design, Design Changes, and Modifications

As part of NRC's Systematic Assessment of Licensee's Performance (SALP) Program, the inspector continued to review the licensee's program for handling Design Changes and Modifications. The inspector reviewed two Design Change Packages with the associated construction packages for upcoming TMI modifications during the scheduled spring outage. The modifications reviewed were TMI Action Items II.B.1 - Reactor Vessel Head Vent System and II.E.1.1 - Auxiliary Feedwater System Upgrade.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

7. Exit Interview

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on January 8, 1981. The scope and findings of the inspection were discussed, as presented in paragraph 2 through 5.