NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Wolf Creek Generating Station	0 5 0 0 0 4 8 2	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)

ESF Actuation - Containment Purge Isolation, Fuel Building and Control Room Ventilation Isolation

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 5	0 6	8 5	8 5	0 2 9	0 0	0 5	3 1	8 5		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	3	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 1 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Merlin G. Williams - Superintendent of Regulatory, Quality and Administrative Services	AREA CODE 3 1 1 6 — 3 6 4 - 8 8 3 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On May 6, 1985, at approximately 1340 CDT, a Containment Purge Isolation Signal (CPIS), a Control Room Ventilation Isolation Signal (CRVIS), and a Fuel Building Ventilation Isolation Signal (FBVIS) occurred while recovering from a Safety Injection that occurred at 1225 CDT on May 6, 1985. This Safety Injection is discussed in LER 85-027-00.

The CPIS, CRVIS, and FBVIS were caused by flow not being restored to the containment atmosphere radiation monitors during recovery from the Safety Injection and was due to a procedural deficiency which has been corrected.

At the time of this event, the plant was in Mode 3, Hot Standby, prior to initial criticality and the Reactor Coolant System was being returned to normal operating temperature, 557 degrees F, and pressure, 2250 psig, after the previous Safety Injection. All required Engineered Safety Features equipment responded properly. The actuated ventilation systems were restored to normal configuration by approximately 1415 CDT.

This event posed no threat to the health and safety of the public.

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On May 6, 1985, at approximately 1340 CDT, an Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signal (ESFAS) occurred resulting in a Containment Purge Isolation Signal (CPIS), a Control Room Ventilation Isolation Signal (CRVIS), and a Fuel Building Ventilation Isolation Signal (FBVIS). The ESFAS occurred while restoring plant systems to normal configuration after a Safety Injection (SI) that occurred at approximately 1225 CDT. The Safety Injection is discussed in LER 85-027-00.

Investigation revealed that the cause of the CPIS, CRVIS, and FBVIS was low sample flow on GT-RE-32, a containment atmosphere radiation monitor. The redundant containment atmosphere radiation monitor, GT-RE-31, had been placed in bypass at 0852 to allow maintenance to be performed and the containment purge valves were shut in accordance with the applicable Technical Specification Action Statement. When the ESF signals were reset in recovering from the plant SI, there was low flow on the one containment atmosphere radiation monitor in service, the required logic for ESFAS actuation was met, and the CRVIS, CPIS, and FBVIS were automatically initiated.

At the time of this event, the plant was in Mode 3, Hot Standby, prior to initial criticality and the Reactor Coolant System was being returned to normal operating temperature, 557 degrees, and pressure, 2250 psig, in recovery from the Safety Injection. All required Engineered Safety Features responded properly. The radiation monitor supply and return valves were subsequently reopened, and the actuated ventilation systems were restored to normal configuration at approximately 1415 CDT.

The absence of flow on GT-RE-32 was the result of the valves GS-HV-31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, and 39, the supply and return valves between the GT-RE-31 and GT-RE-32 radiation monitors and containment atmosphere, being left closed when recovering from the previous SI.

This event was the result of a procedural deficiency in that a required action was not directly covered by an approved procedure. A section instructing that valves GS-HV-31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, and 39 be reopened after an SI to restore flow to GT-RE-31 and GT-RE-32 has been included in the Safety Injection Recovery Procedure.

There were no radiation levels present in excess of normal background, and there was no threat to the health and safety of the public at any time during this event.

KANSAS GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

GLENN L. KOESTER
VICE PRESIDENT - NUCLEAR

May 31, 1985

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Mr. R.P. Denise, Director
Wolf Creek Task Force
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, Texas 76011

KMLNRC 85-146
Re: Docket No. STN 50-482
Subj: Licensee Event Report 85-029-00

Gentlemen:

The enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (iv) concerning an Engineered Safety Feature actuation.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me or Mr. Otto Maynard of my staff.

Yours very truly,

Glenn L Koester

Glenn L. Koester
Vice President - Nuclear

GLK:dab

Enclosure

xc: PO'Connor (2), w/a
JCummins, w/a

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