

differential pressure variations which resulted in a reactor scram. Following a safety evaluation, the modification was approved by the Operations Committee in June 1971, with the recommendation that periodic response time checks be made to ensure against plugging of the snubbers. Operational checks were performed following installation by the application of a differential pressure to the sensing lines, with switch response times observed to be less than one second (to switch set point equivalent to 144 percent of the full power differential pressure). At the request of the Safety Audit Committee, a procedure for the measurement of response time was also developed. Performance of this procedure in the workshop with a spare differential pressure switch and associated snubbers yielded a response with a time constant of 1.28 seconds as compared to an allowed time constant of 2.5 seconds (corresponds to a trip response time of 0.4 seconds, as assumed by the FSAR).

13. Failure of Main Steam Line Drain Valves to Close

A licensee report^{11/} discussed the failure of a main steam line drain valve to close on July 28, 1972. Discussions with plant staff personnel indicated the event to have been as described in the subject report. As stated in the report, a followup inspection revealed 12 contactors to have loose screws. Licensee personnel concluded that the screws had apparently not been sufficiently tightened during initial manufacture. All loose screws were tightened as necessary, which should prevent recurrence, since lockwashers are provided.

14. MSIV Reset Switches

During a previous inspection ^{12/} the licensee indicated an intention to install a second MSIV reset switch during an outage in May 1972, such that one switch would reset the inboard and one switch would reset the outboard MSIV's. The inspector verified by observation of the control panel that the intended installation had been completed.

15. Fuel Pool Siphoning

The potential for inadvertent siphoning of the fuel pool was discussed with a plant staff representative during the inspection and a subsequent telephone conversation. Discussion with the licensee representative and review of a piping diagram of the fuel pool system indicated

^{11/} Letter, NSP to Directorate of Licensing, dated 8/28/72

^{12/} RO Inspection Report No. 050-263/72-03