LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [ ] (1–6) (PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

	LICENSEE NAME	LICENSE NUMBER	LICENSE TYPE	EVENT TYPE
[0 1]	N J O C P 1 (9–14)	0 0 – 0 0 0 0 0 – 0 0 (15–25)	4 1 1 1 1 (26–30)	0 3 (31–32)

	CATEGORY	REPORT TYPE	REPORT SOURCE	DOCKET NUMBER	EVENT DATE	REPORT DATE
[0 1] CON'T	(57–58)	L (59)	L (60)	0 5 0 – 0 2 1 9 (61–68)	0 4 2 5 7 6 (69–74)	0 5 2 4 7 6 (75–80)

EVENT DESCRIPTION: During surveillance of Core Spray System II pumps, a leak was found in the sensing line that leads to the RV40B pressure switch. The leak was very small in size and would not have affected the operation of the switch. The affected portion of the sensing line was replaced. A dye penetrant test will be performed on all sensing line fittings for the Core Spray System Logic instruments to determine if similar problems exist.

(Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/76-15-3L)

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	COMPONENT CODE	PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	VIOLATION
[0 7]	S F (10)	F (11)	Z Z Z Z Z Z (12–17)	N (43)	Z 9 9 9 (44–47)	N (48)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

A leak was found in the sensing line that leads to the RV40B pressure switch. Laboratory analysis of the sensing line indicates the crack was caused by cold cycle fatigue failure. The affected portion of the sensing line was replaced.

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
[1 1]	E (9)	0 9 0 (10–12)	NA (13–44)	B (45)	NA (46)

	FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY	LOCATION OF RELEASE
[1 2]	Z (9)	Z (10)	NA (11–44)	NA (45)

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
[1 3]	Z Z Z (9–11)	Z (12)	NA (13)

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION
[1 4]	Z Z Z (9–11)	NA (12)

Probable Consequences

[1 5] NA

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
[1 6]	Z (9)	NA (10)

PUBLICITY

[1 7] NA

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

[1 8] NA

[1 9]

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Jersey Central Power & Light Company

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MEMBER OF THE General GPU ELECTRIC POWER COMPANIES SYSTEM Public Utilities Corporation

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/76-15-3L

Report Date

May 24, 1976

Occurrence Date

April 25, 1976

Identification of Occurrence

Operation of Core Spray System II in a degraded mode as a result of a leak in the sensing line to sensor RV40B. This event is considered to be a 30-day reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.2.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The major plant parameters at the time of the occurrence were as follows:

Power:	Core, 1736 MWt
	Electric, 597 MWe (g)
Flow:	Recirculation, 14.4 x 10^4 gpm
	Feedwater, 6.43 x 10^6 lb/hr
Stack Gas:	7040 μci/sec

Description of Occurrence

While performing a surveillance of Core Spray System II pumps on April 25, 1976, at approximately 2230 hours, a sensing line leading to the RV40B pressure switch was found to be leaking. The RV40B switch senses System II Core Spray booster pump discharge pressure and is used in the failure logic to trip the preferred booster pump NZ03B and start the backup pump NZ03D if a discharge pressure of 230 psig is not obtained in 5 seconds. The leak was very small in size and would not have affected the operation of switch RV40B.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

Laboratory analysis of the sensing line indicates the crack was caused by cold cycle fatigue failure.

Analysis of Occurrence

At the time of the occurrence, Core Spray System I was out of service for maintenance. Had the Core Spray System been called upon to operate, Core Spray System II would have actuated automatically to deliver rated flow to the core. The size of the crack in the sensing line was very small and would not have affected the response of the RV40B sensor. Laboratory analysis further indicated that the overall structural integrity of the sensing line was good and that a complete failure of the sensing line would not have occurred. It should be noted that even if the failure had occurred, the redundant System II Core Spray booster pump discharge pressure switch RV40D would have functioned. The safety significance of this event is considered to be minimal.

Corrective Action

Action taken to correct this situation was to put Core Spray System I back into service, take Core Spray System II out of service and replace the affected portion of the sensing line. A dye penetrant test will be performed on all sensing line fittings for the Core Spray System logic instruments to determine if similar problems exist.