

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

1					6

[PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION]

LICENSEE NAME					LICENSE NUMBER								LICENSE TYPE					EVENT TYPE						
01	N	J	O	C	P	1	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	4	1	1	1	1	0	3
7	8	9				14	15										25	26				30	31	32

CATEGORY		REPORT TYPE	REPORT SQUARE	DOCKET NUMBER					EVENT DATE					REPORT DATE											
01	CONT		L	L	0	5	0	-	0	2	1	9	0	4	2	5	7	6	0	5	2	4	7		
7	8	57	58	59	60				61				68	69					74	75					

EVENT DESCRIPTION: During surveillance of Core Spray System II pumps, a leak was found in the sensing line that leads to the RV40B pressure switch. The leak was very small in size and would not have affected the operation of the switch. The affected portion of the sensing line was replaced. A dye penetrant test will be performed on all sensing line fittings for the Core Spray System logic instruments to determine if similar problems exist.

(Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/76-15-3L)

7 8 9

SYSTEM CODE			CAUSE CODE		COMPONENT CODE						PRIME COMPONENT BUFFER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER				VIOLATION	
0	7		S	F	F	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	N	Z	9	9	9	N	
7	8	9	10	11	12						17	43	44				48	

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

A leak was found in the sensing line that leads to the RV40B pressure switch.

Laboratory analysis of the sensing line indicates the crack was caused by cold

cycle fatigue failure. The affected portion of the sensing line was replaced.

FACILITY STATUS		% POWER		OTHER STATUS		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION	
1	1	0	9	0	NA	B		NA	
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	44	45	46

FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED: 2

CONTENT OF RELEASE: 2

AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY: NA

LOCATION OF RELEASE: NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
2 2	2	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	NA
11		
12		

Probable Consequences

NA

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE	DESCRIPTION	NA
2		

PUBLICITY

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ADDITIONAL FACTORS

NA

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
8/03020473 Donald A. Ross, Manager

PHONE: 201-539-6111

Jersey Central Power & Light Company



MADISON AVENUE AT PUNCH BOWL ROAD • MORRISTOWN, N. J. 07960 • 201-539-6111



OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/76-15-3L

Report Date

May 24, 1976

Occurrence Date

April 25, 1976

Identification of Occurrence

Operation of Core Spray System II in a degraded mode as a result of a leak in the sensing line to sensor RV40B. This event is considered to be a 30-day reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.2.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The major plant parameters at the time of the occurrence were as follows:

Power:	Core, 1736 MWt
	Electric, 597 MWe (g)
Flow:	Recirculation, 14.4×10^4 gpm
	Feedwater, 6.43×10^6 lb/hr
Stack Gas:	7040 μ ci/sec

Description of Occurrence

While performing a surveillance of Core Spray System II pumps on April 25, 1976, at approximately 2230 hours, a sensing line leading to the RV40B pressure switch was found to be leaking. The RV40B switch senses System II Core Spray booster pump discharge pressure and is used in the failure logic to trip the preferred booster pump NZ03B and start the backup pump NZ03D if a discharge pressure of 230 psig is not obtained in 5 seconds. The leak was very small in size and would not have affected the operation of switch RV40B.

May 24, 1976

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

Laboratory analysis of the sensing line indicates the crack was caused by cold cycle fatigue failure.

Analysis of Occurrence

At the time of the occurrence, Core Spray System I was out of service for maintenance. Had the Core Spray System been called upon to operate, Core Spray System II would have actuated automatically to deliver rated flow to the core. The size of the crack in the sensing line was very small and would not have affected the response of the RV40B sensor. Laboratory analysis further indicated that the overall structural integrity of the sensing line was good and that a complete failure of the sensing line would not have occurred. It should be noted that even if the failure had occurred, the redundant System II Core Spray booster pump discharge pressure switch RV40D would have functioned. The safety significance of this event is considered to be minimal.

Corrective Action

Action taken to correct this situation was to put Core Spray System I back into service, take Core Spray System II out of service and replace the affected portion of the sensing line. A dye penetrant test will be performed on all sensing line fittings for the Core Spray System logic instruments to determine if similar problems exist.