



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
476 ALLENDALE ROAD
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406

MAR 05 1991

[REDACTED]
Dear [REDACTED]

The NRC Region I has completed its followup of the concerns that you brought to our attention by way of memoranda dated October 7, September 29, and October 9, 1990, alleging (1) procedural non-compliance with SP-EE-076, (2) a technical specification violation during instrument and controls troubleshooting, (3) an improper tagout during maintenance, and (4) a failure to comply with procedural requirements during fuel movement.

With regard to issue (1), we have previously documented our review of this item in an inspection report 50-336/89-13 and in a letter to you dated June 13, 1990 (attached). We consider this matter both unsubstantiated and closed. The reason this issue is unsubstantiated is that you have not provided documented evidence that compliance with explicit provisions of SP-EE-076 is required in the conduct of activities at Millstone Unit 2.

With regard to issue (2), you alleged that no diesel generator power source was available during the maintenance. We documented our review of this item in inspection report 50-336/90-22, section 5.1.2 (attached). As documented in our report, emergency power was available from a number of sources including manual start of the affected diesel generator. Having only one diesel available by manual start is a condition allowed during refueling at Millstone Unit 2. Your allegation is therefore unsubstantiated. We consider this matter closed.

With regard to issue (3), you alleged that maintenance was performed on the "A" steam generator feedwater regulating valve with an improper tagout. We reviewed this allegation in inspection report 50-336/90-22, section 5.1.1 (attached). We found that all required documentation and authorizations were used in the electrical isolation. Your allegation was therefore unsubstantiated and we consider this matter closed.

Information in this record was deleted
in accordance with the Freedom of Information
Act, exemptions b7C
FOIA- 91-162


9212220049 920608
PDR FOIA
GUILD91-162 PDR

W/107

With regard to issue (4), you alleged that a direct violation of procedures occurred during fuel movement. We reviewed this allegation in inspection report 50-336/90-22, section 9.8 (attached), and found that the procedure was adhered to during the operations however some additional procedural detail may have prevented the problem.. Your allegation was therefore unsubstantiated and we consider this matter closed.

Should you have any additional questions or if I can be of further assistance in these matters, please call me collect at (215) 337-5225.

Sincerely,


Edward Wenzinger, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 4

Attachments: As stated

bcc:

Allegation File RI-90-A-⁰¹⁸⁵~~0180~~, closeout
W. Raymond
J. Stewart

The activities listed below warranted additional inspector followup.

5.1.1 Preventive Maintenance on #2 Steam Generator Feedwater Regulating Valve - Unit 2

The inspector reviewed the adequacy of the electrical isolation of the #2 feedwater regulating valve and the personnel safety precautions associated with the preventive maintenance activity. Authorized work order (AWO) M2-90-6019, was the controlling document for the preventive maintenance on the #2 steam generator feedwater regulating valve (2-FW-51B). In preparation for the mechanical maintenance, a station electrician was required to deenergize and disable the motor operator thus allowing the mechanic's unobstructed access to the valve. Electrical tagout 2-1829-90 was authorized removing operating power from the motor operator. The feedwater regulating valve motor operator has control and feedback power leads, eight of which are lifted from a terminal board by the electrician to establish complete electrical isolation. The lifting of leads is controlled by station procedure ACP-QA-2.06C "Station Bypass Jumper Control for Troubleshooting, RedLining, and Calibration", which allows form SF-235 to be used as a record that leads were lifted and landed as part of the maintenance activity. The AWO contained the completed SF-235 with verifications of both lifting and landing the leads. The inspector concluded that proper documentation and authorizations were used in the electrical isolation. The inspector noted that the AWO did not identify (as a caution statement) that electrical isolation would require the lifting of leads in addition to the tagout. Although the maintenance is performed yearly on two FWRVs and the electrical isolation requirements are well known by electrical personnel and supervision, the caution statement is considered a good safety enhancement and was discussed by the inspector with maintenance planning management. Work group electricians in cases such as these could ensure that the caution statement is added by informing the maintenance planning group.

5.1.2 Troubleshooting of Facility 2 Engineered Safeguards Actuation Cabinet - Unit 2

The inspector reviewed the prerequisites and plant conditions associated with authorized work order (AWO) M2-90-10941 to troubleshoot the facility 2 engineered safeguards actuation circuit, while the plant was in Mode 6 (refueling). To prevent inadvertent engineered safety feature actuations during troubleshooting, the 24 volt supply fuses were removed prior to work. This initial condition disabled the autostart

feature of the emergency diesel generator on loss of normal power (LNP) and would require, as one option, that operators manually start the diesel to facilitate restoration of power. The inspector verified through discussions with the work group, operations department supervision, operator training management, instrument and controls management, and plant director, that the loss of diesel autostart capability on LNP was known and understood by the work group, operators, and management, that the operators were briefed and trained on actions required in event of LNP, and that proper coordination between the work group, operations, and management was maintained during the troubleshooting. The technical specifications, final safety analysis report, and codes and industry standards were also reviewed and no conflicts were identified. The inspector concluded that proper actions were taken by all licensee groups involved and that the troubleshooting was conducted in a professional and efficient manner.

5.1.3 Non-conservative Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor Setpoint - Unit 1

On October 22, 1990, at 3:05 pm, with the plant at 100% of rated power, the licensee determined that the four main steam line (MSL) radiation monitor high-high radiation trip setpoints were non-conservative. The trip setpoints had been adjusted upward at 10:57 am in accordance with procedure SP406C, Main Steam Line Radiation Drawer Calibration, revision 15, change 1, in preparation for transfer of demineralizer resin scheduled for October 23. The licensee declared the monitors inoperable and immediately commenced resetting the instrument setpoints to the proper value. By 3:25 pm adjustments were complete and the monitors were declared operable. At 3:35 pm the licensee simultaneously declared and terminated a Notification of an Unusual Event pursuant to its emergency plan implementing procedures and, following timely notification to state and local agencies, notified the NRC Operations Center of the event as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A), initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by a plant's technical specifications.

The purpose of the MSL radiation instruments is to minimize the release of radioactive material to the environment by continuously monitoring radiation levels in the steam lines. This provides prompt indication of release of fission product gases indicative of gross fuel cladding failure. Radiation levels of three times normal background cause an alarm to annunciate in the control room. An automatic reactor trip and closure of main steam isolation valves occurs at radiation levels of seven times normal background. The trip setpoint is high enough to avoid spurious trip signals while low enough to detect and isolate abnormal amounts of radioactive material in the MSLs.

traceability between the located dust cover at the FME area and the missing dust cover could be ascertained. The licensee dimensional review of reactor internals supplemented by ABB Combustion Engineering, was extensive and considered all possible locations in the event the dust cover lodged within the reactor vessel upper guide structure.

The review of localized flow conditions and flow conditions necessary to move the dust cap within the reactor coolant system were appropriately included in the evaluation. The licensee engineering determination that the dust cover in the reactor coolant system would not adversely affect components was adequate based on geometric configuration, and weight of the dust cap. Licensee corrective actions to improve procedural accountability of ICI dust caps will be reviewed in future inspections.

9.8 Control Element Assembly Bent During Refueling Operations

Event Description

On October 8, 1990, during in-core refueling operations, the licensee identified that control element assembly (CEA)-131 had been damaged. The deformation to CEA-131 resulted when the fuel handling spreader interfered with the CEA spider. The spreader interference resulted in raising the adjacent CEA (CEA-131). Further, the bending of the CEA fingers resulted during lateral movement of the refuel trolley and bridge. The controlling procedure was OP-2303 Refueling Machine Operation From Core to Upender, section 5.7. Step 5.7.18 requires verification of the spreader "up" limit switch indication, and a visual check that no adjacent CEAs have been lifted by the spreader.

Licensee Corrective Actions

The licensee documented the event in plant incident report (PIR) 90-112, and evaluated the condition of fuel assembly M-15 containing CEA-131 in nonconformance report (NCR) 290-264. Authorized work order (AWO) M2-90-11861 documented inspection results of fuel assembly M-15. The inspection of the fuel assembly was performed using fuel vendor procedure ANF-1362(P).

The immediate licensee corrective actions were to reposition the refuel machine and disengaged the spreader from the CEA-131 spider. CEA-131 and fuel assembly M-15 were removed from the reactor vessel and stored into the spent fuel pool for examination. Video examination in the spent fuel pool indicated all five CEA fingers were bent at 21 inches (approximately 13% of active finger length) from the top of the CEA spider.

On October 8, the licensee performed a free path/drag test of fuel assembly M-15 using CEA-6. The CEA was fully inserted and then fully withdrawn while observing the load cell. No underloads upon CEA insertion and no overloads during withdrawal were observed by the licensee.

The fuel vendor evaluated the bearing stresses in contact between the zircaloy fuel assembly guide tube, and the inconel-600 CEA fingers. The analytical evaluation concluded that the integrity of the guide tubes and fuel assembly cage were not compromised based on the as-found condition of CEA-131. To supplement the vendor's analysis, procedure ANF-1362(P) was prepared and implemented to inspect fuel assembly M-15. The inspection consisted of verification that the fuel alignment plate slips onto the upper tie plate without binding; the upper tie plate is level on the alignment plate; verification of proper response to the assembly reaction plate when subjected to an hydraulic pressure, and proper CEA insertion, and withdrawal. No anomalies were noted during the performance of the examination of fuel assembly (M-15) on October 12.

The damaged CEA was replaced one-for-one. The CEA and replacement were not of the susceptible design as described in report detail 7.2.1.

The licensee concluded based on the vendor structural analysis results, and confirmation tests to fuel assembly M-15 that it was acceptable for continued reactor core service. Based on this conclusion, fuel assembly M-15 was reinserted into the vessel for cycle 11 operation.

Assessment and Conclusions

Inspection of this event consisted of discussions with licensee personnel involved in the refuel operations, examinations, and evaluations. The inspection also consisted of review of NCR 290-264, applicable Final Safety Analysis Report sections, FSR 90-112, OP-2303, AWO M2-90-11861, and AWO M2-90-10572.

Based on discussions with the assigned senior reactor operator during the refueling operation, verification of the spreader "up" indication was noted and the refuel camera was viewed to check for any raised adjacent CEA. The camera however, did not provide a full view of all four sides of the raised fuel assembly. The operator focused on the spreader "up" indication, and with that indication a belief that the spreader was unable to grapple unto the adjacent CEA spider.

Inspector assessment of procedural implementation of OP-2303 concluded that applicable steps 5.7.18 and 5.7.19 were adhered to based on available

equipment; however, procedural detail and or equipment was insufficient of accomplish the visual examination to adjacent CEAs during vertical fuel movement. A strong reliance on spreader limit switch indication was noted with inadequate visual back-up review.

Inspector assessment was that licensee identification and corrective actions to the affected fuel assembly and control element assembly were extensive. The assessment was based on vendor support to licensee engineering, and licensee examinations to the affected fuel assembly.

In conclusion, procedural detail and equipment was insufficient to verify that no adjacent CEAs are moved during vertical fuel movement. The inspector will review licensee actions to improve OP 2303 in future routine inspections. Licensee identification and corrective actions were extensive.

9.9 Startup Preparations and Plant Restart

The inspector reviewed bypass jumper lifted leads control log procedure (ACP-QA-206.B) adherence and the on-going plant recovery from the outage. The inspector noted that log entry 2-90-79, temporary shielding, reactor head laydown area, was not cleared although the temporary shielding was no longer being used. The inspector discussed this discrepancy with the shift supervisor who cleared this entry after verifying that it was no longer required. The inspector reviewed the log for timeliness of audits and documentation of PORC meetings which are required for jumper devices in use for greater than three months. No further log problems or discrepancies with audit timeliness were noted.

The inspector observed the performance of high pressure safety injection system alignment procedure 2604E at Millstone 2. The operator performing the lineup properly verified valve positions and coordinated valve manipulations with control room operators.

Selected equipment tag-outs were reviewed prior to plant start-up. Tag-outs 2-2581-90, 2-2550-90, 2-2688-90, 2-2679-90, 2-2662-90, 2-2629-90, 2-2604-90, and 2-1829-90, were adequate to isolate the equipment and afford personnel safety protection.

To this end, plant restoration from the refuel outage was well implemented and coordinated, based on inspector review of system status, and observation of startup activities.

10/10/90 K1-20-A-137
K1-20-A-138

K1-20-A-139 (10/11/90 memo), and

K1-20-A-140 (K1-20-A-139a) with

10/11/90 memo to the effect that

W/109

APPENDIX 4.0

SAMPLE RECORD OF ALLEGATION PANEL DECISIONS

SITE: MS 2

PANEL ATTENDEES:

ALLEGATION NO.: T.O.S. RZ-80-A-0188

Chairman - B. Nehl

DATE: 10/17/90 (Mtg. 1 2 3 4 5)

Branch Chief - Ed. Wenzinger

PRIORITY: High Medium Low

Section Chief (AOC) - D. Haversham

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: Yes No Unknown

Others - W. Raymond

CONCURRENCE TO CLOSEOUT: DO BC SC

P. Halighorst

CONFIDENTIALITY GRANTED: Yes No
(See Allegation Receipt Report)

IS THERE A DOL FINDING: Yes No

IS CHILLING EFFECT LETTER WARRANTED: Yes No

HAS CHILLING EFFECT LETTER BEEN SENT: Yes No

HAS LICENSEE RESPONDED TO CHILLING EFFECT LETTER: Yes No

- No formal confidentiality agreement*
- ACTION: Response (trig) we have investigated this issue
C/O Final decision has been reported
- 1) 1) ~~Referral to OIG~~
 - 2) 2) Contact DRSS, if not problem refer to utility
 - 2) 3) * Routine review by residents - contact allegor on closure
 - 4) 4) Resident - (Scott Stewart) contact allegor more info
 - 3) 5) * Routine review by residents - contact allegor on closure
 - 6) 6) Resident - (Scott Stewart) contact allegor more info / inspect
 - 4) 7) * Routine review by residents - contact allegor on closure.
 - 5) In acknowledgement it state that formal confidentiality not granted, but per NRC procedures identities will not be disclosed

NOTES: _____

W/111

ALLEGATION RECEIPT REPORT

3

Date/Time Received: 10/12/90 1415

Allegation No. R1-90-A-0188
(leave blank)

Name: [REDACTED]

Address: _____

Phone: _____

City/State/Zip: _____

Confidentiality:

Was it requested?	Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>
Was it initially granted?	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>
Was it finally granted by the allegation panel?	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>
Does a confidentiality agreement need to be sent to allegor?	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>
Has a confidentiality agreement been signed?	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>
Memo documenting why it was granted is attached?	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>

Allegor's Employer: NU

Position/Title: [REDACTED]

Facility: Millstone 2

Docket No.: 59/336

(Allegation Summary (brief description of concern(s): _____

Number of Concerns: 7

Employee Receiving Allegation: Ltr to P. Habighorst -> J.S. Stewart
(first two initials and last name)

Type of Regulated Activity (a) ☒ Reactor (d) ☐ Safeguards
(b) ☐ Vendor (e) ☐ Other: _____
(c) ☐ Materials (Specify)

Materials License No. (if applicable): _____

Functional Area(s): ☒ (a) Operations ☐ (e) Emergency Preparedness
☐ (b) Construction ☐ (f) Onsite Health and Safety
☐ (c) Safeguards ☐ (g) Offsite Health and Safety
☐ (d) Transportation ☐ (h) Other: _____

(NRC Region I Form 207
Revised 10/89)

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Act, exemptions b1, b7C
FOIA 91-163

11/12

Issue 1

ATTACHMENT PDCR 2-029-90 Rev. 0
Page 1 of 55.1A DESIGN INPUTS

- 1) Bently Nevada 3300 System Manual
- 2) NUSCO Drawing 25203-
 - a) 35001, Lighting Notes and Details
 - b) 34001, Sh. 7, 8, 9, 65, & 67 Raceway Notes, Symbols, and Details.
 - c) 35038, Sh. 5. Lighting Panel Schedule Panel No. L08
 - d) 35008, Lighting, Grounding & Comm. Plan, Turbine Building El. 54'-6"
- 3) National Electric Code - 1984
 - Article 210, Branch Circuits
 - Article 348, Electrical Metallic Tubing
- 4) Standard Handbook for Electrical Engineers; Fink and Beaty, 11th Ed.; 1978
- 5) Specification SP-EE-076, Standard Specification For Electrical Installations
- 6) IEEE Specification 383, Cable Description Report, Millstone Unit 2

5.1B DETAILED DESIGNDescription

The Bently Nevada 3300 Vibration monitoring system is designed for use on fluid film bearing machinery where a significant portion of the shaft vibration is transmitted to the bearing housing. This system consists of a shaft relative proximity probe, bearing housing relative seismic transducer, and dual vibration monitor instrument rack. The instrument rack consists of a power supply, system monitor, and 9 dual probe vibration monitors, one for each turbine generator bearing housing. The instrumentation is rated for an operating temperature of 32°F to 149 °F with a humidity of 0 to 95%, noncondensing. Therefore ambient conditions on the turbine building deck are acceptable for installation of the vibration monitoring instrument rack.

The 3300 power supply occupies the left most location in the instrument rack. It provides regulated power to all monitors in the rack and contains the system OK relay. The OK relay annunciates any faulty transducers or field wiring in the system. Because the relay is normally dennergized, its change of state also will annunciate loss of primary power to the system.

The system monitor checks the voltage supply levels that are vital for proper system operation and is used to adjust the alarm setpoints for all monitors in the rack.

The 3300 instrument rack receives input from each dual vibration probe mounted at the same relative bearing location of the turbine generator. The dual probe transducer consists of a proximity probe and velocity transducer, mounted together in one assembly. The proximity probe measures relative shaft vibration and the average shaft position. The seismic probe measures bearing housing absolute motion.

Note to file: K1-90-A-192

In addition to panel actions specified, a review of tagging allegations was conducted to determine if regulatory response has been adequate.

Regulatory response determined adequate after Stewart/Wenzinger/Hehl review.

JSS Stewart
1/15/91

N/113

ALLEGATION RECEIPT REPORT

Date/Time Received: Oct 19, 90 Mailing

Allegation No. KI-90-A-0192
(leave blank)

Name: [REDACTED]

Address: _____

Phone: _____

City/State/Zip: _____

Confidentiality:

Was it requested?	Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>
Was it initially granted?	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>
Was it finally granted by the allegation panel	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>
Does a confidentiality agreement need to be sent to allee?	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>
Has a confidentiality agreement been signed?	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>
Memo documenting why it was granted is attached?	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>

Allee's Employer: Northeast Utilities

Position/Title: [REDACTED]

Facility: Millstone 2

Docket No.: 50/335

(Allegation Summary (brief description of concern(s): (1) Station Tagging of MOV during pressurizer overhaul work

Number of Concerns: 1

Employee Receiving Allegation: Letter to P. Habighorst / J. Stewart
(first two initials and last name)

Type of Regulated Activity (a) ☒ Reactor (d) ☐ Safeguards
(b) ☐ Vendor (e) ☐ Other: _____
(c) ☐ Materials (Specify)

Materials License No. (if applicable): _____

Functional Area(s): ☒ (a) Operations ☐ (e) Emergency Preparedness
☐ (b) Construction ☐ (f) Onsite Health and Safety
☐ (c) Safeguards ☐ (g) Offsite Health and Safety
☐ (d) Transportation ☐ (h) Other: _____

(NRC Region I Form 207
Revised 10/89)

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Act, exemptions b1, b7C
FOIA 91-162

11/17/90

UP11FWMO

**** FMMS WORK ORDER SYSTEM. ****

PAGE 1

PL UN L SYS COM SER DEVICE NO. BUILDING.: RB
FMMS ID.....: M2 02 PZR SVL RLF 2-RC-404 ROOM.....: TOP OF PRESSURIZER
LOCAL ID.....: 2-RC-404V ELEVATION: 0038 FEET 06 INCHES
LOCAL SYSTEM: 2301 GRID.....: 2383
DESCRIPTION.: PRESSURIZER POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVE
FL YR SERIAL NO.
WORK ORDER.....: M2 90 09844 CREATED: MP827FE 09 / 12 / 90 184905
LEAD DEPARTMENT.: MNTC PRIORITY: 3 CHANGED: MP827FE 09 / 12 / 90 184905
WORK ORDER TYPE.: CM FREQUENCY: UNIT STATUS REQUIRED.: R
PERIODICITY: 000 DAYS

WORK ORDER STATUS: 1 09 / 12 / 90

PLANNING STATUS.: S 09 / 12 / 90

PROBLEM DESCRIPTION...: OUTLET FLANGE FASTENERS HAVE A HISTORY OF GUALING

NOTE: A SECTION XI REPAIR PLAN IS REQUIRED. PRIOR TO STARTING JOB
CONTACT MAINT ENGINEER, UNIT ISI COORDINATOR AND ANII

SUSPECTED
CAUSE:

ORIGINATOR.....: J DIAMOND
DATE ORIGINATED.....: 09 / 12 / 90 184841 ORIGINATING DEPARTMENT.....: MNTC
APPROVAL DATE.....: 00 / 00 / 00 TROUBLE REPORT NUMBER.....:
SUPERVISOR APPROVAL:

SCHEDULED START DATE: 09 / 15 / 90 COMPLETION DATE: 12 / 15 / 90 DESIRED REQUIRED
12 / 15 / 90

PROJECT REFERENCE.: SDWL10VLV DESCRIPTION:
PRECEDENCE W.O...:1) 2) 3) 4)
ASSOCIATED W.O...:1) 2) 3) 4)
ITEM NUMBER 000001 OF 000001 : OUT OF A POSSIBLE 000001 : SEARCH INACTIVE
UPDATE 8/20=P2,3/15=END SAVE,PA1=NOSAVE.

OCT 24 '90 08:48 NRC MILLSTONE OFFICE P04

UP11PWWO

**** PMMS WORK ORDER SYSTEM. ****

PAGE 1

PL UN L SYS COM SER DEVICE NO. BUILDING.: RB
PMMS ID.....: M2 02 FZR SVL RLF 2-RC-402 ROOM.....: TOP OF PRESSURIZER
LOCAL ID.....: 2-RC-402V ELEVATION: 0038 FEET 06 INCHES
LOCAL SYSTEM: 2301 GRID.....: 2383
DESCRIPTION.: PRESSURIZER POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVE
FL YR SERIAL NO. CREATED: MP827FE 09 / 12 / 90 184819
WORK ORDER.....: M2 90 09843 CHANGED: MP827FE 09 / 12 / 90 184819
LEAD DEPARTMENT.: MNTC PRIORITY: 3 UNIT STATUS REQUIRED.: R
WORK ORDER TYPE.: CM FREQUENCY: PERIODICITY: 000 DAYS

WORK ORDER STATUS: I 09 / 12 / 90

PLANNING STATUS.: S 09 / 12 / 90

PROBLEM DESCRIPTION...: OUTLET FLANGE FASTENERS HAVE A HISTORY OF GUALING

NOTE: A SECTION XI REPAIR PLAN IS REQUIRED. PRIOR TO STARTING JOB
CONTACT MAINT ENGINEER, UNIT ISI COORDINATOR AND ANII

SUSPECTED

CAUSE:

ORIGINATOR.....: J DIAMOND ORIGINATING DEPARTMENT.....: MNTC
DATE ORIGINATED.....: 09 / 12 / 90 184750 TROUBLE REPORT NUMBER.....:
APPROVAL DATE.....: 00 / 00 / 00 SUPERVISOR APPROVAL:

SCHEDULED START DATE: 09 / 15 / 90 COMPLETION DATE: 12 / 15 / 90
DESIRED REQUIRED
12 / 15 / 90

PROJECT REFERENCE.: SDWL10VLV DESCRIPTION:
PRECEDENCE W.O...:1) 2) 3) 4)
ASSOCIATED W.O...:1) 2) 3) 4)
ITEM NUMBER 000001 OF 000001 ; OUT OF A POSSIBLE 000001 ; SEARCH INACTIVE
UPDATE 8/20=P2;3/15=END SAVE;PA1=NOSAVE.

OCT. 24 '90 08:48 NRC MILLSTONE OFFICE P03

UP11PWM0

**** FMMS WORK ORDER SYSTEM. ****

PAGE 1

FL UN L SYS COM SER DEVICE NO. BUILDING.: RB
FMMS ID.....: M2 02 PZR SOV RLF 2-RC-404 ROOM.....: TOP OF PRESSURIZER
LOCAL ID.....: 2-RC-404 ELEVATION: 0038 FEET 06 INCHES
LOCAL SYSTEM: 2301 GRID.....: 2383
DESCRIPTION.: PRESSURIZER POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVE ASSEMBLY
PL YR SERIAL NO. CREATED: MP827FN 04 / 21 / 89 165756
WORK ORDER.....: M2 89 05344 CHANGED: MP827E1 08 / 25 / 90 113804
LEAD DEPARTMENT.: MNTC PRIORITY: 3 UNIT STATUS REQUIRED.: R
WORK ORDER TYPE.: PM FREQUENCY: R PERIODICITY: 545 DAYS
WORK ORDER STATUS: I 03 / 24 / 90 PLANNING STATUS.: G 08 / 25 / 90
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION...: . REFUEL PM: (MECHANICAL)

SUSPECTED

CAUSE:

ORIGINATOR.....: J STANSBURY ORIGINATING DEPARTMENT.....: MNTC
DATE ORIGINATED.....: 04 / 21 / 89 165716 TROUBLE REPORT NUMBER.....:
APPROVAL DATE.....: 00 / 00 / 00 SUPERVISOR APPROVAL:
SCHEDULED START DATE: 09 / 15 / 90 COMPLETION DATE: 12 / 15 / 90 : 12 / 15 / 90
DESIRED REQUIRED

PROJECT REFERENCE.: SDWL10VLV DESCRIPTION:
PRECEDENCE W.O...:1) 2) 3) 4)
ASSOCIATED W.O...:1) 2) 3) 4)
ITEM NUMBER 000001 OF 000001 : OUT OF A POSSIBLE 000001 : SEARCH INACTIVE
UPDATE 8/20=P2,3/15=END SAVE,PA1=NOSAVE.