

POOR ORIGINAL

Initial Telephone

Report Date: _____

Date of

Occurrence: January 5, 1980

Initial Written

Report Date: _____

Time of

Occurrence: 3:00 a.m.

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
FORKED RIVER, NEW JERSEY 08731

Reportable Occurrence
Report No. 50-219/80/1-LP

IDENTIFICATION
OF OCCURRENCE:

Violation of the Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.4.B.2,
when EMRV 'D' did not open when tested during shutdown.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined
in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.A.

CONDITIONS PRIOR
TO OCCURRENCE:

_____ Steady State Power	<u>X</u> Routine Shutdown
_____ Hot Standby	_____ Operation
_____ Cold Shutdown	_____ Load Changes During
_____ Refueling Shutdown	_____ Routine Power Operation
_____ Routine Startup	_____ Other (Specify)
_____ Operation	_____

The major parameters at the time of occurrence were:

Power:	Reactor	280 MWt
	Generator	0 MWe
Flow:	Reactor	$.8 \times 10^6$ g/hr
	Recirculation	12.6×10^4 gpm
Stack Gas:		2.67×10^4 uCi/sec

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DESCRIPTION
OF OCCURRENCE:

On Saturday, January 5, 1980 at approximately 3:00 AM while
performing the Electromagnetic Relief Valve Operability Test,
the 'D' EMRV failed to open. There were three attempts to
open the 'D' EMRV and each time there was no audible indication
of steam flow detected and there was not a similar increase in
the downer line temperature as noted in the other EMRV tests.

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APPARENT CAUSE
OF OCCURRENCE:

<input type="checkbox"/> Design	<input type="checkbox"/> Procedure
<input type="checkbox"/> Manufacture	<input type="checkbox"/> Unusual Service Condition
<input type="checkbox"/> Installation/	<input type="checkbox"/> Inc. Environmental
<input type="checkbox"/> Construction	<input type="checkbox"/> Component Failure
<input type="checkbox"/> Operator	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)

Unable to determine cause at this time.

ANALYSIS OF
OCCURRENCE:

The relief valves of the automatic depressurization system enables the core spray system to provide protection against the small break in the event the feedwater system is not active. Since the "D" BWRV was inoperable, the A.D.S. was considered to be operable in a degraded mode. The loss of one BWRV has been addressed in the loss of cooling accident analysis.

Also, the relief valves are provided to remove sufficient energy from the primary system to prevent the safety valves from lifting during a transient. The limiting pressure transient is a turbine trip from rated design power with a failure of the bypass to function. The five relief valves are required to operate to prevent reaching the lowest setpoint of the primary system safety valves. With four relief valves operable and the core thermal power not reduced to 1740 MWt, to preserve a 25 psig margin between peak transient pressure and the lowest safety valve setpoint, there was no assurance that the safety valves would not lift.

CORRECTIVE
ACTION:


To be determined later.

FAILURE DATA:

POOR ORIGINAL

90022227

Prepared by:


Gary A. Horrich

Date:

1-7-80