



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**
REGION II
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE N.E., SUITE 1200
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1200

April 30, 2020

Mr. Brad Beard
Plant Leader
Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas, L.L.C.
P.O. Box 708, Mail Code J20
Wilmington, NC 2842

SUBJECT: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL- AMERICAS, L.L.C. – NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 70-1113/2020-001

Dear Mr. Beard:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) conducted inspections during the first quarter of calendar year 2020 (January 1 – March 31, 2020), at the Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas, L.L.C. facility in Wilmington, NC. The purpose of these inspections was to determine whether activities authorized under the license in the area of Safety Operations were conducted safely and in accordance with NRC requirements. The inspections consisted of examinations of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel. The enclosed report presents the results of these inspections. At the conclusion of these inspections, the inspectors discussed the findings with you and members of your staff at an exit meeting held in person on January 30, 2020.

Based on the results of these inspections, the NRC has determined that no violations of more than minor significance were identified.

In accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* Section 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice and Procedure," a copy of this letter and enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html>.

Should you have any questions concerning the inspections, please contact Leonard Pitts of my staff at 404-997-4708.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Robert E. Williams Jr., Chief
Projects Branch 1
Division of Fuel Facility Inspection

Docket No. 70-1113
License No. SNM-1097

Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 70-1113/2020-001
w/Attachment: Supplementary Information

cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV®

B. Beard

3

SUBJECT: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL- AMERICAS, L.L.C – NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 70-1113/2020-001 dated
April 30, 2020

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ATTACHED

OFFICE	RII:DFFI/PB1	RII:DFFI/PB1	RII:DFFI/PB2	RII:DFFI/PB1	RII:DFFI/PB2	
NAME	L. Pitts	M. Ruffin	N. Pitoniak	D. Edwards	R. Williams	
DATE	4/27/2020	4/28/2020	4/23/2020	3/24/2020	4/30/2020	
E-MAIL COPY?	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

INSPECTION REPORT

Docket No.: 70-1113

License No.: SNM-1097

Report No.: 70-1113/2020-001

Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-001-0087

Licensee: Global Nuclear Fuel - Americas, LLC

Facility: Global Nuclear Fuel - Americas

Location: Wilmington, North Carolina 28401

Dates: January 1, 2020 to March 31, 2020

Inspectors: N. Pitoniak, Senior Fuel Facility Inspector (Section A.1, B.1)
D. Edwards, Fuel Facility Inspector (Section A.2)

Approved by: R. Williams, Chief
Projects Branch 1
Division of Fuel Facility Inspection

Enclosure

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Global Nuclear Fuel - Americas, LLC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Integrated Inspection Report 70-1113/2020-001
January 1 – March 31, 2020

Nuclear Regulatory Commission regional inspectors conducted inspections during normal shifts in the area of Safety Operations. During the inspections, normal production activities were ongoing. These announced, routine inspections consisted of a selective examination of licensee activities accomplished by direct observation of safety-significant activities and equipment, walkdowns of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, and a review of facility records and procedures. There were no violations of more than minor significance identified during these inspections.

Safety Operations

- In the area of Operational Safety, no violations of more than minor significance were identified. (Section A.1)
- In the area of Nuclear Criticality Safety, no violations of more than minor significance were identified. (Section A.2)

Other Areas

- (Closed) Confirmatory Order Section V, Item 4 “GNF-A shall conduct an NSC assessment of the GNF-A organization by a third party independent of GNF-A who is experienced with NRC nuclear safety culture and safety conscious work environment policies.” (Section B.1)

Attachment

Key Points of Contact
List of Items Opened, Closed, and Discussed
Inspection Procedures Used
Documents Reviewed

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Global Nuclear Fuel - Americas (GNF-A), LLC manufactures uranium dioxide (UO₂) powder, pellets, and light water reactor fuel bundles at its Wilmington, NC facility. The facility converts uranium hexafluoride (UF₆) to UO₂ using a Dry Conversion Process (DCP) and performs fuel fabrication operations. During the inspections, normal production activities at the facility were ongoing.

A. Safety Operations

1. Plant Operations (Inspection Procedure 88020)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the operational safety of the facility to verify the licensee operates the plant safely and in accordance with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 70, the license, and the license application. The inspectors interviewed operators, engineers, laboratory technicians, and the laboratory manager, and reviewed records associated with UO₂ furnaces (Node Group 405), the Gad furnaces (Node Group 504), and the Chemet laboratory (Node Group 805) to verify compliance with Chapter 3, "Integrated Safety Analysis," and Chapter 11, "Management Measures," of the license application. The inspectors reviewed license requirements, quantitative risk assessments, criticality safety evaluations, and operating procedures associated with the UO₂ and Gad sintering furnaces and the Chemet laboratory (see enclosure) to verify the requirements for these areas were consistent within the licensee's documents. The inspectors specifically evaluated the following IROFS to verify they were being implemented as described in the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA):

- IROFS 405-06/504-06
- IROFS 405-07/504-07
- IROFS 405-10
- IROFS 405-11/504-08
- IROFS 405-12/504-09
- IROFS 405-13
- IROFS 405-16/504-11
- IROFS 405-18
- IROFS 405-19/504-13
- IROFS 405-20/504-14
- IROFS 405-15/504-10
- IROFS 900-01
- IROFS 802-05
- IROFS 805-02
- IROFS 807-07

The inspectors performed walkdowns of the UO₂ furnaces and the laboratories to verify the field configurations were maintained in accordance with the configuration control requirements of Chapter 11 of the license application. The inspectors walked down these systems and facilities to confirm the associated IROFS were present and capable of performing their intended safety functions as required by 10 CFR 70.62. The inspectors evaluated engineered and administrative safety controls to verify they were capable of preventing or mitigating associated accident scenarios.

The inspectors reviewed furnace operating procedures to verify required actions for associated IROFS, as identified in the ISA Summary, had been transcribed into written operating procedures. The inspectors evaluated the procedures' contents with respect to operating limits and operator responses to upset conditions to verify the limits needed to assure safety were described in the procedures.

The inspectors reviewed completed surveillances and functional test instructions of select IROFS (see enclosure) to verify management measures, as required by the ISA and Chapter 11 of the license application, were implemented and corrective actions were planned or taken for negative trends and failures.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program (CAP) entries since the last operational safety inspection to verify deviations from procedures and unforeseen process changes affecting nuclear criticality, chemical, radiological, or fire safety were documented and reviewed promptly, per Section 5.3.2.6 of the license application. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions to verify they were adequate to address and resolve the issue as required per Chapter 11 of the license application.

b. Conclusion

No violations of more than minor significance were identified.

2. Nuclear Criticality Safety (Inspection Procedure 88015)

a. Inspection Scope

Criticality Analysis

The inspectors evaluated selected aspects of the licensee's Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) program to verify compliance with selected portions of 10 CFR Part 70, including Subpart H and Appendix A; Chapter 5, "Nuclear Criticality Safety," of the license application; the licensee's NCS manual; and applicable procedures. The inspectors reviewed selected criticality safety analyses (CSAs) and associated assumptions and calculations to verify they were consistent with the commitments in the license application, including the Double Contingency Principle and assurance of subcriticality under normal and credible abnormal conditions. The inspectors reviewed the accident scenarios outlined in the CSAs to determine whether process upsets analyzed in the CSAs remained highly unlikely with the application of IROFS.

The inspectors also reviewed the protection and prevention scores assigned to initiating events, active engineered IROFS, passive IROFS, and administrative controls documented for the respective scenarios in the ISA Summary to verify the licensee used the approved methodology outlined in their license application and procedures.

The CSAs reviewed were associated with the UO₂ Furnace (Node Group 405), GAD Furnace (Node Group 504), and Chemet Laboratory (Node Group 805) and are listed in the supplementary information attached to this inspection report.

Criticality Implementation

The inspectors performed walkdowns of the UO₂ Furnace, and Chemet Laboratory to determine whether the existing plant configuration and operations were consistent with the process descriptions and safety bases in the selected CSAs. The inspectors reviewed process and system descriptions to verify engineered controls established in the CSAs were included and being implemented as specified. The inspectors reviewed the engineered controls in place to control mass, geometry, spacing, and moderation. The inspectors reviewed operating procedures and postings to verify selected administrative controls established in the CSAs were being implemented. The inspectors interviewed operators, engineers, and laboratory staff to verify administrative actions established in the CSAs were understood and implemented as specified.

Criticality Operational Oversight

The inspectors reviewed NCS audit reports to determine whether NCS staff routinely assessed field compliance with established NCS controls, interacted with operators, and entered issues identified during walkdowns into the CAP promptly. Additionally, the inspectors interviewed NCS management and reviewed audit procedures and schedules to verify qualified NCS engineers prepared for and performed the walkthroughs, ensuring the complete set of fissile material processing areas were assessed within two years as outlined in the "Internal Nuclear Safety Audits" procedure.

Criticality Programmatic Oversight

The inspectors reviewed new and revised NCS program procedures, including WI-27-104-04, "Nuclear Safety Design Criteria," to determine whether the licensee developed the NCS program in accordance with license requirements.

The inspectors reviewed the triennial nuclear criticality safety audit deliverable to verify the recommendations were entered in the CAP.

Criticality and Corrective Action

The inspectors reviewed selected NCS-related CAP entries to verify conditions adverse to safety were promptly identified and entered into the CAP, that they received the required level of investigation, and were closed out in accordance with license commitments and procedures. The inspectors reviewed the associated corrective actions to verify they were documented and reviewed promptly, per Section 5.3.2.6 of the license application.

In addition, the inspectors reviewed selected corrective actions to verify they were adequate to address and resolve the issue as required per Chapter 11 of the license application and to verify the licensee followed regulatory requirements and procedures with regards to reporting plant conditions to the NRC. The CAP entries reviewed included CR 28961, CR 29781, and CR 32710.

b. Conclusion

No Violations of more than minor significance were identified.

B. Other Areas

1. Review of Confirmatory Order Section V Item 4 (Inspection Procedure 92703)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions regarding Confirmatory Order (CO) Section V, Item 4 (ML17348A144), which required GNF-A to conduct a Nuclear Safety Culture (NSC) assessment of the GNF-A organization by a third party, independent of the GNF-A organization. The independent organization was required to be experienced with NRC nuclear safety culture and safety conscious work environment policies. GNF-A was required to compare the results of this assessment to the results of the assessment performed under Section III.3.g of the CO in an effort to identify trends. In addition, GNF-A was required to enter corrective actions from the assessment and comparison into the corrective action program, track them to completion, and make results of the final assessment and comparison available to the NRC for review. The inspectors reviewed the GNF-A NSC assessment conducted by an independent third-party organization in May-June 2019 and the subsequent final report submitted in August 2019. The inspectors reviewed the assessors background and determined they were experienced with the NRC nuclear safety and safety conscious work environment policies as required. The inspectors reviewed the comparison between the 2019 and 2017 NSC assessments and the resulting trends identified by GNF-A and determined the trends identified were sufficient and complete. The inspectors interviewed the Fuels Environmental Health and Safety Manager and the Facility Manager and reviewed the corrective actions resulting from the comparison of the 2017 and 2019 NSC assessments and determined the corrective actions were adequate. The inspectors verified these corrective actions were entered, tracked, and documented in the corrective action program as required, specifically under CRs 27516, 33074, 33075, 33076, 33077, and 33277.

b. Conclusion

The inspectors determined the independent third party was experienced with the NRC nuclear safety and safety conscious work environment policies as required. The inspectors determined the trends identified from the comparison of the 2019 and 2017 NSC assessments were sufficient and complete and the established corrective actions were adequate. The inspectors determined that GNF-A has met the requirements as stated in the CO, Section V, Item 4. This item is considered closed.

C. Exit Meeting

The inspection scope and results were presented to members of the licensee's staff at various meetings throughout the inspection period and were summarized on January 30, 2020 to B. Beard and staff. Proprietary information was discussed but not included in the report.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

1. KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

<u>Name</u>	<u>Title</u>
B. Beard	Facility Manager
N. Buddin	Laboratory Manager
J. Degolyer	Integrated Safety Analysis Engineer
D. Eghbali	Senior Criticality Safety
A. Lang	ISA Engineer
M. Martin	Area Engineer
S. Murray	Manager, Facility Licensing
P. Ollis	Facility Licensing
L. Paulson	Criticality Safety Program Manager
J. Rohner	Manager, Fuels EHS
B. Stone	ISA Manager

2. LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

None

Closed

CO Section V, Item 4	CO	GNF-A shall conduct an NSC assessment of the organization using a third party independent of GNF-A who is experienced with NRC nuclear safety culture and safety conscious work environment policies. (Section B.1)
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3. INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

88015	Nuclear Criticality Safety
88020	Operational Safety
92703	Follow-up of Confirmatory Action Letters or Orders

4. DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Records:

- #1 Sintering Furnace Main Pusher Overload Shutdown Functional Test Instruction (FTI) completed 6/24/19
- #1 Sintering Furnace In-Out Logic Functional Test Instruction completed 6/24/19
- #2 Sintering Furnace Main Pusher Overload Shutdown Functional Test Instruction (FTI) completed 11/23/15
- #2 Sintering Furnace In-Out Logic Functional Test Instruction completed 11/23/15
- #3 Sintering Furnace Main Pusher Overload Shutdown Functional Test Instruction (FTI) completed 6/24/19
- #3 Sintering Furnace In-Out Logic Functional Test Instruction completed 6/24/19

#4 Sintering Furnace Main Pusher Overload Shutdown Functional Test Instruction (FTI) completed 4/29/19
 #4 Sintering Furnace In-Out Logic Functional Test Instruction completed 11/25/19
 #5 Sintering Furnace Main Pusher Overload Shutdown Functional Test Instruction (FTI) completed 7/11/18
 #5 Sintering Furnace In-Out Logic Functional Test Instruction completed 8/29/19
 #6 Sintering Furnace Main Pusher Overload Shutdown Functional Test Instruction (FTI) completed 7/30/19
 #6 Sintering Furnace In-Out Logic Functional Test Instruction completed 7/24/18
 2018 Nuclear Safety Audit – Engineering, Chemet and Environmental Labs, dated June 29, 2018
 2Q19 Nuclear Safety Audit – Press Feed, rotary Press, Scrap Press, Gad DM-10/Tumble, Sinter Test Grind, Sintering Furnace, Boat Conveyors, Boat Storage, dated June 29, 2019
 3Q18 Nuclear Safety Audit – UO₂/GadGrind, Rod-Load, Weld, Pellet Storage, Rod Storage, dated October 4, 2018
 3Q19 Nuclear Safety Audit – Node(s) 401-503; 405-504; 406-505, dated October 1, 2019
 4Q19 Nuclear Criticality Safety Audit – DCP Vaporization, Conversion, Powder Outlet, Cylinder Handling and Storage, dated December 10, 2019
 4Q19 Nuclear Safety Audit – Node(s) 301, 507, 801, 802, dated December 11, 2019
 BGS-COR-0060, Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas, Purchase Order No. 900678423, 2019
 Triennial Nuclear Criticality Safety Audit Deliverable, dated November 13, 2019
 CSA-405.01.100, Sintering Furnaces, Rev. 6
 CSA-805.00.100, Chemet Lab, Rev.1
 CSA-805.03.100, Support Labs, Rev.00
 CSA-CHEMET, Chemet Lab – General, Rev. 13
 Inspection of DA Piping completed 4/25/19
 Inspection of H₂ Piping completed 9/22/19
 IROFS 405-15/504-10, Flammable Gas Survey completed 1/13/20
 IROFS 405-19/504-13, Natural Gas Line Inspection completed 4/30/19
 IROFS 405-20/504-14, Natural Gas Line Survey completed 1/13/20
 PHA-805, ISA Reference Report for the 805 Node Group, Rev. 6, dated July 16, 2019
 QRA-805, Laboratory, Rev. 6, dated July 16, 2019

Procedures:

CP-18-104, EHS Regulatory Compliance Audits, Rev. 3.0, dated January 25, 2016
 CP-18-202, Focused Self-Assessments, Rev.12.1, dated December 9, 2019
 CP-20-103, Nuclear Safety Training, Rev. 2.1, dated August 14, 2019
 OP 1001.00.000, Fabrication General, Rev. 00
 OP 1001.00.100, Fabrication General – General Information, Rev. 16
 OP 1001.00.101, Fabrication General – MC&A, Rev.03
 OP 1001.00.201, Fabrication General – Operations, Rev. 05
 OP 1001.00.202, Fabrication General – Abnormal Operations, Rev. 03
 OP 1001.00.203, Fabrication General – Emergency Operations, Rev. 00
 OP 1030.10.000, UO₂ Sintering Furnaces 1, 3, 4, & 6, Rev. 00
 OP 1030.10.100, UO₂ Sintering Furnaces 1, 3, 4, & 6 – General Information, Rev. 06
 OP 1030.10.101, UO₂ Sintering Furnaces 1, 3, 4, & 6 – MC&A, Rev. 00
 OP 1030.10.201, UO₂ Sintering Furnaces 1, 3, 4, & 6 – Pre-Startup, Rev. 03
 OP 1030.10.202, UO₂ Sintering Furnaces 1, 3, 4, & 6 – Heat Up, Rev. 05
 OP 1030.10.203, UO₂ Sintering Furnaces 1, 3, 4, & 6 – Normal Operations, Rev. 07
 OP 1030.10.204, UO₂ Sintering Furnaces 1, 3, 4, & 6 – Shutdown, Rev. 06
 OP 1030.10.205, UO₂ Sintering Furnaces 1, 3, 4, & 6 – Alarm Response, Rev. 05

OP 1030.10.206, UO₂ Sintering Furnaces 1, 3, 4, & 6 – Emergency Operations, Rev. 05
 OP 1030.10.207, UO₂ Sintering Furnaces 1, 3, 4, & 6 – Basic Operator Maintenance, Rev. 07
 OP 1030.10.300, UO₂ Sintering Furnaces 1, 3, 4, & 6 – Process Information, Rev. 05
 OP 1030.20.000, UO₂ Pellet Sintering Furnace #2, Rev. 00
 OP 1030.20.100, UO₂ Sintering Furnace #2 – General Information, Rev. 07
 OP 1030.20.101, UO₂ Sintering Furnace #2 – MC&A, Rev. 00
 OP 1030.20.201, UO₂ Sintering Furnace #2 – Pre-Startup, Rev. 03
 OP 1030.20.202, UO₂ Sintering Furnace #2 – Heat Up, Rev. 04
 OP 1030.20.203, UO₂ Sintering Furnace #2 – Normal Operations, Rev. 08
 OP 1030.20.204, UO₂ Sintering Furnace #2 – Shutdown, Rev. 04
 OP 1030.20.205, UO₂ Sintering Furnace #2 – Alarm Response, Rev. 04
 OP 1030.20.206, UO₂ Sintering Furnace #2 – Emergency Operations, Rev. 04
 OP 1030.20.207, UO₂ Sintering Furnace #2 – Basic Operator Maintenance, Rev. 05
 OP 1030.20.300, UO₂ Sintering Furnace #2 – Process Information, Rev. 05
 OP 1030.30.000, UO₂ Sintering Furnace #5, Rev. 00
 OP 1030.30.100, UO₂ Sintering Furnace #5 – General Information, Rev. 05
 OP 1030.30.101, UO₂ Sintering Furnace #5 – MC&A, Rev. 00
 OP 1030.30.201, UO₂ Sintering Furnace #5 – Pre-Startup, Rev. 02
 OP 1030.30.202, UO₂ Sintering Furnace #5 – Heat Up, Rev. 04
 OP 1030.30.203, UO₂ Sintering Furnace #5 – Normal Operations, Rev. 06
 OP 1030.30.204, UO₂ Sintering Furnace #5 – Shutdown, Rev. 04
 OP 1030.30.205, UO₂ Sintering Furnace #5 – Alarm Response, Rev. 02
 OP 1030.30.206, UO₂ Sintering Furnace #5 – Emergency Operations, Rev. 02
 OP 1030.30.207, UO₂ Sintering Furnace #5 – Basic Operator Maintenance, Rev. 03
 OP 1030.30.300, UO₂ Sintering Furnace #5 – Process Information, Rev. 03
 OP 1070.40.200, Gad Sintering Furnace Room Flammable Gas Leak, Rev. 00
 OP 1070.41.000, Gad Wellman Sintering Furnace, Rev. 00
 OP 1070.41.100, Gad Wellman Sintering Furnace – General Information, Rev. 04
 OP 1070.41.101, Gad Wellman Sintering Furnace – MC&A, Rev. 00
 OP 1070.41.201, Gad Wellman Sintering Furnace – Pre-Startup, Rev. 01
 OP 1070.41.202, Gad Wellman Sintering Furnace – Heat Up, Rev. 03
 OP 1070.41.203, Gad Wellman Sintering Furnace – Normal Operations, Rev. 06
 OP 1070.41.204, Gad Wellman Sintering Furnace – Shutdown, Rev. 03
 OP 1070.41.205, Gad Wellman Sintering Furnace – Alarm Response, Rev. 02
 OP 1070.41.206, Gad Wellman Sintering Furnace – Emergency Operations, Rev. 03
 OP 1070.41.207, Gad Wellman Sintering Furnace – Basic Operator Maintenance, Rev. 03
 OP 1070.41.300, Gad Wellman Sintering Furnace – Process Information, Rev. 02
 OP 1070.42.000, Gad Harper Sintering Furnace, Rev. 00
 OP 1070.42.100, Gad Harper Sintering Furnace – General Information, Rev. 04
 OP 1070.42.101, Gad Harper Sintering Furnace – MC&A, Rev. 00
 OP 1070.42.201, Gad Harper Sintering Furnace – Pre-Startup, Rev. 02
 OP 1070.42.202, Gad Harper Sintering Furnace – Heat Up, Rev. 02
 OP 1070.42.203, Gad Harper Sintering Furnace – Normal Operations, Rev. 07
 OP 1070.42.204, Gad Harper Sintering Furnace – Shutdown, Rev. 03
 OP 1070.42.205, Gad Harper Sintering Furnace – Alarm Response, Rev. 02
 OP 1070.42.206, Gad Harper Sintering Furnace – Emergency Operations, Rev. 03
 OP 1070.42.207, Gad Harper Sintering Furnace – Basic Operator Maintenance, Rev. 03
 OP 1070.42.300, Gad Harper Furnace – Process Information, Rev. 02
 OP 2310.00.400, CAAS Operating, Maintenance, Testing, and Response Procedure
 Detector Functionality, Rev. 03, dated November 16, 2018
 WI-18-104-02, Internal Nuclear Safety Audits, Rev. 4.0, dated May 29, 2019

WI-27-104-02, EHS Administrative Action Guidelines, Rev. 0.3, dated December 2, 2019
WI-27-104-04, Nuclear Safety Design Criteria, Rev. 3.0, dated January 29, 2020

Condition Reports Written as a Result of the Inspection:

CR 33600

Condition Reports Reviewed:

CR 27516

CR 28961

CR 29781

CR 32710

CR 33074

CR 33075

CR 33076

CR 33077

CR 33277

Other Documents:

Comparison of 2017 and 2019 GNF-A Safety Culture Assessment Results

GEH-GSC-0001, Controlled Access Area Training, Revised June 2016

NSE Audit Schedule 2019

PHA-805, ISA Reference report for the 805 Node Group, Rev. 6

QRA-805, Laboratory, Rev. 6

TD 805-02, HF Exposure Treatment Training Material, Rev. 0