


James A. FitzPatrick
Nuclear Power Plant
P.O. Box 41
Lycoming, New York 13093
315 342-3840



Harry P. Salmon, Jr.
Resident Manager

October 1, 1992
JAAP-92-0689

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Mail Station P1-137
Washington, D.C. 20555


SUBJECT: DOCKET NO. 50-333
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT: 92-042-00 - FIRE WATCH POSTS
NOT MAINTAINED DUE TO
PERSONNEL ERRORS BY FIRE
WATCHPERSONS

Dear Sir:

This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Questions concerning this report may be addressed to
Mr. David Holliday at (315) 349-6359.

Very truly yours,


HARRY P. SALMON, JR.

HPS:DAH:tld
Enclosure

cc: USNRC, Region I
USNRC Resident Inspector
INPO Records Center

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ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

PAGE (3)

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EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																					
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES					DOCKET NUMBER(S)														
9	9	0	1	9	2	9	2	—	0	4	2	0	0	1	0	0	1	9	2	0	5	0	0	0						

OPERATING MODE (B)		N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR -- (Check one or more of the following) (11)						
POWER LEVEL (10)	000		20.402(b)		20.405(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)
			20.406(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)
			20.406(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vi)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text: NRC Form 300A)
			20.406(a)(1)(iii)	X	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		
			20.406(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		
			20.406(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

ABSTRACT (Line 45 740B) is a 100% empty space (rewritten line) [16]

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The plant was shutdown and in the cold condition for maintenance and refuel. On two occasions in the month of September, fire watches were not maintained as required by Technical Specifications 3.12.F or as required to meet other commitments. Both situations involved fire watch personnel error (Cause Code A). On 09/01/92 a fire watch person was discovered inattentive to the assigned post in the Radwaste Control Room [NE] approximately 25 minutes after the watchperson had assumed the post. On 09/19/92 a fire watch person left the assigned post in a small portion of the Reactor Building [NG] about 10 minutes prematurely. The events were not safety significant due to the short time intervals, the areas being watched, and the plant conditions. Corrective actions in both cases involved immediate re-establishment of the fire watches, immediate termination of employment and continuing reinforcement of procedural requirements. LERs-92-001, 92-006, and 92-030 describe similar fire watch performance deficiencies.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR 9 2	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 0 4 2	REVISION NUMBER 0 0	0 2 OF 0 5		

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

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Description

The plant was shutdown and in the cold condition for maintenance and refuel. During the month of September, approximately 30 fire watches were on duty to provide compensatory action for deficiencies in fire barrier penetrations, fire suppression systems, 10CFR50, Appendix R requirements (see LER-91-024, 92-004, 92-015, and 92-017) and to support maintenance and modification activities.

On two occasions in the month of September, fire watches were not maintained as required by Technical Specifications, 3.12.F, or as required to meet commitments contained in correspondence to the NRC. The two situations involve fire watch personnel error (Cause Code A) and are described below:

1. On September 1, 1992, rotating fire watches had been assigned to a post in the Radwaste Control Room because three fire barrier electrical penetrations had questionable seal configurations. At approximately 0425 hours, two members of the Operations staff entered the Radwaste Control Room and found the fire watchperson inattentive to the assigned post, in violation of site procedures.

The Shift Supervisor was notified. The watchperson was relieved from duty by another fire watch. Later that day, the watchperson met with a Shift Supervisor and admitted to dozing and being inattentive to the fire watch post.

The Radwaste Control Room [NE] contains non-safety related equipment and controls and has no significant fire loading on either side of the fire barriers. The room has an ionized combustion products (smoke) detection circuit which alarms in the Main Control Room [NA]. Other roving fire watches and operators pass through the room occasionally. The watchperson had been on the post for approximately 25 minutes and no work activities were being performed on either side of the barriers.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3 9 2	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR 9 2	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 0 4 2	REVISION NUMBER 0 0 0 3	OF 0 5	

TEXT (If no space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

2. On September 19, rotating fire watches had been assigned to a post in the Reactor Building (Secondary Containment) [NG] on elevation 500 in the southwest quadrant as a compensatory fire watch for a smoke detection system [IC] out of service.

An environmental enclosure around electrical switchgear was being removed requiring the smoke detection circuit for that quadrant to be disabled. Shortly before 2300 hours, the watchperson left the post unattended for five to ten minutes.

Another fire watch had walked through the area at the end of his shift and waved at the watchperson. The watchperson assumed the wave to mean that the other fire watch was taking the post. The watchperson did not follow approved procedures for fire watch relief and acknowledgement. The post was reestablished by other fire watch personnel.

The environmental enclosure being removed was a 14 feet by 20 feet structure which surrounded one 4.16 kv switchgear [EB]. The enclosure is normally unoccupied and contains a smoke detector connected to a circuit which alarms in the Main Control Room. Only the smoke detection circuit for the immediate area was out of service and no work activities were being performed near the enclosure or in the area.

Cause

In both situations, a brief lapse in providing compensatory action in the form of a fire watch was due to personnel error, specifically fire watch personnel violated procedures in which they had been trained and repeatedly reminded of during staff meetings.

In both situations, corrective actions taken as a result of previous incidents (LERs-92-001, 92-006, 92-010, and 92-030) should have prevented these incident. The corrective actions helped to minimize the time lapses and assisted in prompt reestablishment of the deficient posts. Additional fire watch supervisors, on site 24 hours a day, and improved communication with operations personnel lead to quick discovery of the lapses and prompt re-establishment of the posts with other fire watch personnel. Procedures and training are in place which specify requirements for maintaining alertness and performing fire watch relief and acknowledgement. Both of these situations would have been averted if the personnel had adhered to these requirements.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FOR COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE REG. AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUC. REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Analysis

The failure to maintain the fire watch posts for approximately 25 minutes in the first case and approximately 10 minutes in the second case resulted in a violation of Technical Specification 3.12.F.2. As a result, the event requires a report under 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B); that is, an operation prohibited by the plant technical specifications.

The events are not significant from a safety point of view because of the short times involved. Also, in the first case, the areas involved did not contain safety-related components. In the second case, adjacent areas of the plant (one approximately 30 feet away) had smoke detection systems which were operable. There were no work activities that would add transient combustibles or add ignition sources being performed in either of the areas at the times the fire watches were not on duty. Both areas are visited by operating personnel on a regular basis and by fire watch personnel traveling to and from other posts. As a result, any postulated fire would have been discovered quickly and could have been suppressed using fire extinguishers or installed hose stations.

There have been seven failures involving missed fire watches due to fire watch personnel errors in 1992, totalling 250 minutes (see also LERs-92-001, 006, 030). With about 228,000 fire watch manhours worked this year, the resultant rate is one failure every 54,720 man hours. Although this is a low incident rate, the Power Authority is striving to eliminate such events totally.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 60.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3 9 2	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 386A's) (17)

Corrective Actions

1. In both instances, the posts were re-established with other qualified fire watch personnel within minutes of discovery bringing the plant into compliance with the Technical Specifications.
2. The situations and consequences described in this LER, along with reinforcement of relevant procedural requirements, will be reviewed by all compensatory fire watch personnel. Scheduled completion date: October 23, 1992.
3. The fire watch personnel who failed to follow instructions and procedures have been terminated.

Additional Information

Failed Components: None

Previous Similar Events: LERs-92-001, 92-006, and 92-030 describe similar fire watch performance deficiencies. LERs-92-010, 92-019, and 92-025 describe other missed fire watches due to supervisory or procedural deficiencies.