

# NORTHEAST UTILITIES



The Connecticut Light And Power Company  
Western Massachusetts Electric Company  
Norfolk Water Power Company  
Northeast Utilities Service Company  
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company

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Re: 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(b)

September 30, 1992

MP-92-1058

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Reference: Facility Operating License No. NPF-49  
Docket No. 50-423  
Licensee Event Report 92-021-00

Gentlemen:

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report 92-021-00 required to be submitted within thirty (30) days pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(b).

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

Stephen E. Seace  
Vice President - Millstone Station

SES/JSY:tp

Attachment: LER 92-021-00

cc: T. T. Martin, Region I Administrator  
P. D. Swetland, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3  
V. L. Rooney, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 3

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THIS REPORT IS BEING SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 1. (Check one or more of the following.)

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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LEAD:

AREA CODE

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NRC Form 366A (8-89)		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION		APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92  Estimated burden per response to comply with this information collection request: 50.0 hrs. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and Reports Management Branch (p-630), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20585, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.										
<b>* LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION</b>														
FACILITY NAME (1)  Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3		DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0   6   0   0   0   4   2   3		<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <th colspan="2" style="text-align: center;">LER NUMBER (6)</th> <th style="text-align: center;">PAGE (2)</th> </tr> <tr> <th style="text-align: center;">1 AR</th> <th style="text-align: center;">SEQUENTIAL NUMBER</th> <th style="text-align: center;">REVISION NUMBER</th> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">9   2</td> <td style="text-align: center;">0   2   1</td> <td style="text-align: center;">0   0</td> </tr> </table>		LER NUMBER (6)		PAGE (2)	1 AR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	9   2	0   2   1	0   0
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TEXT: If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A et (17)														
<p>I. <u>Description of Event</u></p> <p>On August 31, 1992 at 1335 with the plant in Mode 1 at 100% power (2250 psia and 586 degrees Fahrenheit), the surveillance for Containment Penetration Protection was determined to be incomplete in that the thermal overload protection of the "valve open" portion of each of 8 Loop Stop Valve circuits was not included.</p> <p>As an immediate corrective action, the 8 backup protection circuit breakers were verified to be in the expected open position.</p> <p>Instantaneous and long term overcurrent protection for circuits which pass through containment penetrations are required to prevent damage to the penetrations. The Loop Stop Valve control circuit is unusual in that it has separate thermal overload protection for opening and closing the valves. An electrician performing maintenance on the control circuit initiated the review by reporting that the thermal overload protection for the valve open section was not tested.</p> <p>No automatic or manually initiated safety response was required or initiated.</p> <p>II. <u>Cause of Event</u></p> <p>The cause of this event was incomplete review when preparing the Containment Electrical Penetration protection drawing which summarizes the protective devices for containment penetration circuits. This drawing did not include the thermal overload protection of the Loop Stop Valves "valve open" circuit.</p> <p>As a result, these 8 breakers have not been included in the testing required by Technical Specification (TS) 4.8.4.1.a, and the preventive maintenance required by TS 4.8.4.b.</p> <p>III. <u>Analysis of Event</u></p> <p>This report is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.</p> <p>Technical Specification 3.8.4.1 requires that any inoperable containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective device be compensated for by tripping the associated backup circuit breaker within 72 hours and verifying that the associated backup breaker is tripped every 7 days. Since the operability of these breakers has not been verified since plant start up, they were conservatively declared to have been inoperable. Compensatory action was not taken previously because the status of these breakers was not known by the Control Room staff.</p> <p>No significant safety concern was involved in this event for the following reasons:</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">Since the Loop Stop Valve control circuit is administratively required to be de-energized in all modes which require Containment Penetration Protection to be operable, the probability of a thermal overload occurring on these circuits is very small.</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">Since the testing of other similar circuit breakers did not show significant failure trends, these breakers would be expected to have functioned normally.</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">The instantaneous protection feature for both the "valve open" and "valve close" circuitry has been part of the 10% testing and preventive maintenance programs.</p> <p>IV. <u>Corrective Action</u></p> <p>As immediate corrective action, backup breakers for all 8 of the Loop Stop Valve were verified to be tripped open.</p>														

\* LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

Estimated burden per response to comply with this information collection request: 50 0 hrs. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and Reports Management Branch (p-530), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

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TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 306A (1/17))

IV. Corrective Action

As immediate corrective action, backup breakers for all 8 of the Loop Stop Valve were verified to be tripped open.

To prevent recurrence, the drawing for the Containment Penetration Protection Devices is being revised to show the thermal overload protection for the "valve open" circuit. The drawing will also be reviewed for other similar conditions.

V. Additional Information

This event is considered an isolated event because no other LERs had a root cause of incomplete review of a drawing.

EEIS codes

Systems	Component
Low Voltage Power	Relay AC time overcurrent - 51
System - EC	