



Carolina Power & Light Company

Brunswick Nuclear Project
P. O. Box 10429
Southport, N.C. 28461-0429

SEP 21 1992

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
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 2
DOCKET NO. 50-324
LICENSE NO. DPR-62
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2-92-006

Gentlemen:

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is submitted in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September 1983.

Very truly yours,


J. W. Spencer, General Manager
Brunswick Nuclear Project

GMT/gmt

Enclosure

cc: Mr. S. D. Ebnetter
Mr. R. H. Lo
Mr. R. L. Prevatte

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION
COLLECTION REQUEST: 60.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN
ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-630), U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE
PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3160-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Brunswick Steam Electric Plant
Unit 2

DOCKET NUMBER (2)
05000324

PAGE (3)

1

TITLE (4) CONTROL ROD DRIVE SYSTEM SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME INSTRUMENT LINE PIPE SUPPORTS WERE
FOUND MISSING

EVENT DATE (6)			LER NUMBER (8)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQ. NO.	REV. NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER	
08	19	92	92	- 006	- 0	09	21	92			

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 3: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

OPERATING (CODE (9))	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 3: (Check one or more of the following) (11)	20.402(b)	20.404(c)	60.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10)	0	20.405(a)(1)(i)	60.36(c)(1)	X 60.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	60.36(c)(2)	60.73(a)(2)(iv)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract and Text)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	60.73(a)(2)(i)	60.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	60.73(a)(2)(ii)	60.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	60.73(a)(2)(iii)	60.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Glen M. Thearling, Regulatory Compliance Specialist

TELEPHONE NUMBER

(919) 457-2038

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRCDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRCDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

EXPECTED
SUBMISSION

MONTH

DAY

YEAR

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

X

NO

DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

On August 19, 1992, Unit 2 was in Cold Shutdown as part of the Outage which began on April 21, 1992. During the Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System Piping Design Turnover Program (DTOP) inspection performed on August 19, 1992, pipe support 2-BSEP-12-I was found missing. Support 2-BSEP-12-I is for the 3/4" instrument line 2-C12-61-3/4-608, which comes from the Control Rod Drive System Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) instrument volume. On August 21, 1992, the continuing inspection found support 2-BSEP-12-G for SDV instrument volume line 2-C12-64-3/4-608 missing. Without these supports the lines do not meet short term operability requirements and were considered inoperable for a seismic event.

Purpose of the DTOP program is to verify that pipe support as-built drawings reflect the actual as-installed condition of the supports. Also incorporated in this program is the completion of items associated with the closeout of IEB 79-14, Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems.

The two missing supports on Unit 2 have been replaced and the initial DTOP review of Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System has since been completed. The investigation results included checks which verified the installation of supports needed for operability of Unit 1's SDV instrument volume.

During a seismic event the failure of these 3/4" lines would result in a loss of the common Reactor Coolant System and Primary Containment pressure boundary. This is considered to be an isolated event.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

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COLLECTION REQUEST: 60.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING
BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH
(P-630), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20545,
AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)				PAGE (3)
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Unit 2	05000324	YEAR		SEQ NO.		2
		92		006	0	

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

TITLE

CONTROL ROD DRIVE SYSTEM SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME INSTRUMENT LINE PIPE SUPPORTS WERE FOUND MISSING

INITIAL CONDITIONS

The Unit was in Cold Shutdown due to an Outage which began on April 21, 1992.

EVENT NARRATIVE

During the Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System Piping Design Turnover Program (DTOP) inspection performed on August 19, 1992, pipe support 2-BSEP-12-I was found missing. Support 2-BSEP-12-I is for the 3/4" instrument line 2-C12-61-3/4-608 which comes from the Control Rod Drive System Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) instrument volume.

The DTOP program involves the packaging of United Engineers and Constructors' pipe stress and pipe support calculations for safety related piping systems for turnover to CP&L. Incorporated into this program in 1987 was the closeout of IEB 79-14. The program will verify that pipe support as-built drawings reflect the actual as-installed condition of the supports. This program will provide for the reinspection of approximately 4000 supports and associated piping. The final product of the DTOP project will be over 5000 revised support drawings and the calculation packages to support these drawings. The review of the CRD and Reactor Recirculation systems were added to the DTOP scope in 1992. Supports within the original DTOP program had been inspected between 1987 and 1989. These inspections on other systems did not find missing supports to be an issue, as the previous inspections performed in 1979 had corrected these problems.

On August 11, 1992, the continuing DTOP review of the CRD system found support 2-BSEP-12-G for SDV instrument volume line 2-C12-64-3/4-608 also missing. Only the outline of the wall-plate and the four mounting studs were left on the wall. Without these supports the lines do not meet short term operability requirements and were considered inoperable for a seismic event. During a seismic event the failure of these 3/4" lines would result in a loss of the common Reactor Coolant System and Primary Containment pressure boundary. The initial DTOP review of the Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System has since been completed. This included the review of PMS since 1979 that affected the Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System.

NED (DTOP) will reinspect the CRD Scram Discharge Headers and drains and a sample of the insert and withdrawal lines. The inspection attributes will be to insure that support have not been removed from these lines. Ongoing NED inspections are currently in progress on the Reactor Recirculation system.

CAUSE OF EVENT

After a thorough search of Brunswick Engineering Support Unit (BESU) records, it cannot be determined why Supports 2-BSEP-12-G and 2-BSEP-12-I are missing. These supports were documented as installed by the as-builts submitted in May of 1980 as part of plant modification (PM) 79-124. No record from that time to the present can be found to instruct removal of these supports. However, removal of these supports is believed to have occurred

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 60.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-690), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20566, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)				PAGE (3)
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		92		006	0	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 385A's) (17)

to facilitate access required to make new welds on the level switches (LSH-NO13A and LSH-NO13E) piping in PM 81-239. They may not have been reinstalled when the pipe modification was completed in 1982. For this PM the revised piping design was pre-assembled, the section of the old pipe was cut, and the new pre-assembled pipe assembly was welded in its place. The close proximity of these supports to the level switches would make welding the new pipe difficult with these supports in place. These two supports were mounted on the north wall of the Unit 2 Reactor Building. The other supports in the same area associated with the scram discharge volume piping and level switches were either not in the way, modified, or removed by the PM. A thorough search of BESU records from March 82 (beginning of PM 81-239) to present did not find other work activities that would have required that these supports be removed.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

- A walkdown of both Unit's SDVs was conducted and no additional seismic inoperabilities were discovered.
- The initial Piping Design Turnover Program (DTOP) review of the Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System has been completed.
- The two missing Unit 2 supports have been replaced (WR/JO 92-AWEG1 and 92-AWKQ1).
- NED (DTOP) will reinspect the CRD Scram Discharge Headers and drains and a sample of the insert and withdrawal lines. The inspection attributes will be to insure that support have not been removed from these lines. These inspections are currently being scheduled to be completed by December 31, 1992.
- The existing Repair/Replacement Program (PLP-08) and the Corrective Maintenance (Automated Maintenance Management System) (OMMM-003) procedures have been reviewed, and are adequate to control the maintenance activities on class 1, 2, and 3 systems and components. Additionally, procedural control enhancements for PM implementation are being developed that will cover the temporary removal of existing equipment interfaces (e.g. supports). This procedure, MAP-004, Modification Work Control Procedure, is to be in place by March 31, 1993.
- This event will be covered as part of the continuing training programs for appropriate Maintenance and Outage Management & Modifications personnel. (Completion due April 30, 1993)

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

During a seismic event the failure of these 3/4" lines would result in a loss of the common Reactor Coolant and Primary Containment pressure boundary. This would not prevent a Scram from fully inserting the Control Rods. With a Scram signal present, the SDV would be pressurized and a rupture would vent directly into the 20' elevation of the Secondary Containment. A rupture of the 3/4" lines would be within the LOCA accident analysis limits for a Primary Coolant leak, and the Primary Containment leakage would be contained within the Secondary Containment.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

None

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)				PAGE (3)
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Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Unit 2	05000324	92	006		0	4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

ELIS COMPONENT IDENTIFICATIONComponentELIS Code