

GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY



OVERBEND STATION

HOTSPICE BOX 120

ST FRANCISVILLE, LOUISIANA 70778

AREA CODE 504

630-5004

345-0651

September 18, 1992

RBG- 37497

File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

River Bend Station - Unit 1
Docket No. 50-458

Please find enclosed Licensee Event Report No. 92-017 for River Bend Station - Unit 1. This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73.

Sincerely,

W.H. Odell
Manager - Oversight
River Bend Nuclear Group

PAE *SN* *DCH*
LAE/PDG/FRC/DCH/JAD/kvm

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cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400
Arlington, TX 76011

NRC Resident Inspector
P.O. Box 1051
St. Francisville, LA 70775

INPO Records Center
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, GA 30339-3064

Mr. C.R. Oberg
Public Utility Commission of Texas
7800 Shoal Creek Blvd., Suite 400 North
Austin, TX 78757

Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality
Nuclear Energy Division
P.O. Box 82135
Baton Rouge, LA 70884-2135
ATTN: Administrator

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MMBR-714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20545-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

RIVER BEND STATION

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000 458

PAGE (3)

1 OF 3

TITLE (4) ISOLATION OF FUEL AND AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM DAMPERS AND AN EQUIPMENT DRAIN VALVE DUE TO FAILED FUSES

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT NUMBER (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
08	19	92	92	017	00					05000
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000

OPERATING MODE (9)	5	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5. (Check one or more) (11)				
POWER LEVEL (10)	0	20.405(a)(i)	20.405(c)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366a)
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

L.A. ENGLAND, DIRECTOR - NUCLEAR LICENSING

TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

(504) 381-4145

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC
X	WK	FU	B569	Y	X	VF	FU	B569	N
X	VF	FU	B569	N	X	VG	FU	B569	N

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
X					

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On 08/19/92 at 0250 with the unit in Operational Condition 5 (Refueling) four fuses failed during the performance of STP-058-4802 causing dampers 1HVR*AOD18A, 1HVR*AOD164, 1HVR*AOD214, 1HVR*AOD249, 1HVF*AOD101, 1HVF*AOD137B, 1HVF*AOD112, 1HVF*AOD137, and 1DER*AOV126 to stroke closed. This resulted in drywell and containment sumps overflowing, and isolation of the auxiliary building and the fuel building ventilation systems. This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (iv) to document these engineered safety feature (ESF) actuations.

During the performance of surveillance test procedure (STP)-058-4802, while performing steps 7.1.11 and 7.2.11, fuses 1DERB03-F1, 1HVRB20-F1, 1HVFB05-F2, and 1HVRA19-F1 failed. These two steps require the operator to take switches 1B21H-S19D and 1B21H-S19C to the "TEST" position. Control room logs state that while performing step 7.2.11, a Division II isolation signal was expected, however, it was not expected for valves or dampers to stroke closed.

All actuations occurred as designed upon loss of power. The valve and dampers stroked closed to isolate parts of containment.

REQUIRED NUMBER OF DIGITS/CHARACTERS
FOR EACH BLOCK

BLOCK NUMBER	NUMBER OF DIGITS/CHARACTERS	TITLE
1	UP TO 46	FACILITY NAME
2	8 TOTAL 3 IN ADDITION TO 05000	DOCKET NUMBER
3	VARIES	PAGE NUMBER
4	UP TO 76	TITLE
5	6 TOTAL 2 PER BLOCK	EVENT DATE
6	7 TOTAL 2 FOR YEAR 3 FOR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 2 FOR REVISION NUMBER	LER NUMBER
7	6 TOTAL 2 PER BLOCK	REPORT DATE
8	UP TO 18 - FACILITY NAME 8 TOTAL - DOCKET NUMBER 3 IN ADDITION TO 05000	OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED
9	1	OPERATING MODE
10	3	POWER LEVEL
11	1 CHECK BOX THAT APPLIES	REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR
12	UP TO 50 FOR NAME 14 FOR TELEPHONE	LICENSEE CONTACT
13	CYCLE VARIES 2 FOR SYSTEM 4 FOR COMPONENT 4 FOR MANUFACTURER NPRDS VARIES	EACH COMPONENT FAILURE
14	1 CHECK BOX THAT APPLIES	SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED
15	6 TOTAL 2 PER BLOCK	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) **TEXT CONTINUATION**

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (5)			PAGE (3)
RIVER BEND STATION	05000 458	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	2 OF 3
		92	- 017 -	0	

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

REPORTED CONDITION

On 08/19/92 at 0250 with the unit in Operational Condition 5 (Refueling) four fuses failed causing heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) dampers and an equipment drain valve to all stroke closed. This resulted in drywell and containment sumps overflowing, and isolation of the fuel building and the auxiliary building ventilation systems. These isolations constitute actuations of engineered safety features (ESFs); therefore, this report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (iv).

INVESTIGATION

Prior to the event, I&C Maintenance was performing STP-058-4802, "Primary Containment Isolation System Manual Initiation Switches Time Response Test". During the performance of steps 7.1.11 and 7.2.11, fuses 1HVFB05-F2, 1DERB03-F1, 1HVRA19-F1, and 1HVRB20-F1 failed resulting in the closure of 1HVR*AOD18A, 1HVR*AOD164, 1HVR*AOD214, 1HVR*AOD249, 1HVF*AOD101, 1HVF*AOD37B, 1HVF*AOD112, 1HVF*AOD137, and 1DER*AOD126. Step 7.1.11 involves taking switch 1B21H-S19D, a Division I switch, from its "NORMAL" to its "TEST" position. Step 7.2.11 involves taking switch 1B21H-S19C, a Division II switch, from its "NORMAL" position to its "TEST" position. It was discovered that fuses 1HVRB05-F2, 1DERB03-F1, and 1HVRB20-F1 failed while performing step 7.2.11, and fuse 1HVRA19-F1 failed while performing step 7.1.11.

An extensive search of the condition report (CR), maintenance work order (MWO), and surveillance test procedure (STP) histories did not reveal a similar occurrence during any previous performance of this STP. However, 1HVRB20-F1 was replaced on 5/9/89 under MWO R131126, and fuse 1HVFB05-F2 was replaced on 11/8/90 and on 5/9/89 under MWOs R056670 and R131126 respectively. Even though these MWOs occurred at the approximate time STP-058-4802 was performed, during RF-2 and RF-3, there is no documented evidence to tie the MWOs to the STP performances.

The fuses were replaced and the STP steps were re-performed successfully. Electrical current measurements of the fuses demonstrate their adequacy within their present configuration. The highest current reading (1.1 amps) was taken through 1HVRA19-F1. All four fuses are sized for 3 amps. Therefore, the fuses do not appear to be undersized.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
RIVER BEND STATION	05000 458	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	3 OF 3
		92	- 017	- 0	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

ROOT CAUSE

At this time the root cause for the failed fuses is indeterminate. The review of the CR, MWO and STP histories did not indicate that this is a recurring problem. In addition, the adequacy of the replaced fuses has been demonstrated.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The fuses were replaced and the STP steps were re-performed successfully. A caution will be added to STP-058-4801 to alert operators to the potential for fuse failures.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

All actuations occurred as designed upon loss of power. The equipment drain valve closing, and the HVAC damper isolating, did not at any time present a hazard to the public since it isolated parts of containment.