

NORTHEAST UTILITIES



THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY
HOLYOKE WATER POWER COMPANY
NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

General Offices • Selden Street, Berlin, Connecticut

P.O. BOX 270
HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06141-0270
(203) 665-5000

May 30, 1985

Docket No. 50-336
B11555

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attn: Mr. James R. Miller, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Reference: (1) J. R. Miller letter to W. G. Council, dated April 24, 1985.

Gentlemen:

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2
Reactor Coolant Pump Trip

In Reference (1), the NRC Staff requested that Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO), address several questions to confirm that containment isolation, with continued Reactor Coolant Pump operation, will not lead to seal or pump damage or failure.

Accordingly, NNECO provides written responses as follows:

1. Does any containment isolation signal result in the termination of systems essential for continued operation of the reactor coolant pumps? If so, identify the signals and systems effected.

Response:

Containment isolation signals at Millstone Unit No. 2 do not result in termination of any systems essential for continued operation of the reactor coolant pumps.

2. If essential water services are terminated, provide a description of the operator guidelines, training, and procedures in place (or to be implemented) which assure that these services are restored in a timely manner to prevent seal damage or failure, once a non-LOCA situation has been confirmed.

Response:

Not applicable. Refer to Response #1.

*Accol
1/0*

3. Provide confirmation, including the technical basis, that containment isolation with continued RCP operation will not lead to seal or pump damage or failure.

Response:

Not applicable. Refer to Response #1.

4. Since RCP trip will be required for LOCA events, assurance must be provided that RCP trip, when required, will occur. To address this concern, provide the following information:
 - (a) Identify the components required to trip the RCPs. Include relays, power supplies and breakers. Address reliability and alternate trip methods.
 - (b) If necessary, as a result of the location of any critical component, include the effects of adverse containment conditions on RCP trip reliability. Describe the basis for the adverse containment parameters selected.


Response to #4 (a) and (b):

All relays, power supplies and circuit breakers associated with Reactor Coolant Pumps are located in mild environments - i.e.: the control room and the safety related switchgear rooms of the turbine building, elevations 56' - 6" and 31' - 6". Should a Reactor Coolant pump circuit breaker fail to trip, the associated 6.9 KV bus could be deenergized by opening the supply breaker, from either the normal or reserve transformers, as applicable.

We trust you will find this information satisfactory.

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY



J. F. Opeka
Senior Vice President