

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT II	0 5 0 0 0 3 6 6	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)
UNPLANNED ACTUATION OF RPS LOGIC CHANNELS

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																				
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)														
0	4	0	9	8	5	-	0	1	2	-	0	0	0	5	0	6	8	5			0	5	0	0	0				

OPERATING MODE (9)		5	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)				
POWER LEVEL (10)		0 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
			20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
			20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
			20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(c)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)	
NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Steven B. Tipps, Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance	<div>AREA CODE</div> <div>9 1 2 3 6 7 - 7 8 5 1</div>

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	
A	I L	D E T	G O 8 0	Y							
X	I L	D E T	G O 8 0	Y							

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 04/09/85, at approximately 1200 CST, with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position, an unplanned actuation of RPS occurred (the control rods were already fully inserted when this event occurred).

An investigation revealed that Main Steam Line (MSL) Radiation Detector 2D11-N006B (feeds RPS channel "B") failed due to its power cable being saturated with water, and resulted in a half scram signal. While plant personnel were investigating this event, what appeared to be the "B" Main Steam Line Radiation Detector failed due to its high voltage cable coming loose from the cable connector causing an electrical short. Since the "C" detector was improperly labeled as the "B" detector, this shorted cable resulted in a half scram signal from RPS channel "A". The failures of both detectors resulted in the unplanned actuation of RPS.

The failed cable for 2D11-N006B is presently being replaced. The failed connector for 2D11-N006C was replaced. Upon completion of repairs, and prior to unit startup, both 2D11-N006B and 2D11-N006C will be functionally tested satisfactorily and returned to service.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 6 8 5 - 0 1 2 - 0 0 0 2 OF 0 2	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

This 30 day LER is required by 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) due to an unplanned actuation of RPS.

On 04/09/85, at approximately 1200 CST, with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position, an unplanned actuation of RPS occurred (the control rods were already fully inserted when this event occurred).

A half scram signal from RPS channel "E" was received from Main Steam Line Radiation Detector 2D11-N006B, and plant personnel were dispatched to determine the cause. While plant personnel were inspecting the high voltage connector on what appeared to be Main Steam Line Radiation detector "B", the high voltage cable came loose from the connector and shorted. Since the "C" detector was improperly labeled as the "B" detector, this shorted cable resulted in a half scram signal from RPS channel "A". These two signals caused the actuation of RPS.

An investigation of the 2D11-N006B failure revealed that its high voltage cable was saturated with water. The investigation revealed no cause for the cable being saturated with water. The cable for 2D11-N006B is presently being replaced.

The failure of the "C" detector was the result of material being placed on the high voltage cable for the detector. The placement of material happened after the unit was shutdown for the outage. The weight of the material resulted in the cable pulling loose from the detector connector. An inspection of the connectors for detectors A, B, and D revealed no damage.

Detectors "B" and "C" were labeled correctly. The cable connector for 2D11-N006C was replaced, and after repairs are complete and prior to Unit startup, the necessary testing will be performed for these detectors.

No actual or potential safety consequences resulted from this event. This event had no impact on any other Unit 2 system or on Unit 1. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event. There is no known similar event.

Georgia Power Company
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
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant


May 6, 1985
GM-85-405

PLANT E. I. HATCH
Licensee Event Report
Docket No. 50-366

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-366/1985-012. This report is required by 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).


H. C. Nix
General Manager


HCN/SBT/vlz

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