

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) NORTH ANNA POWER STATION, UNIT 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 E 3 8	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2
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TITLE (4)

COVERING OVER SERVICE WATER PIPING LESS THAN DESIGN DEPTH

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 3	2 8	8 5	8 5	0 0 4	0 1	0 5	0 9	8 5	NORTH ANNA, UNIT 2		0 5 0 0 0 3 3 9
											0 5 0 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)											
OPERATING MODE (9) 1		20.402(b)			20.405(e)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)			50.36(e)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)			73.71(e)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)			50.36(e)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)			X OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)			
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)			
POWER LEVEL (10) 110.10		20.405(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(ix)			

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)								TELEPHONE NUMBER			
E. Wayne Harrell								AREA CODE			
								7 0 3 8 9 4 - 5 1 5 1			

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)											
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)						EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)									
X NO									

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On March 28, 1985, with both units at 100 percent power, a review of survey results disclosed a deficiency involving the Service Water System supply and return piping between the Service Water Pump house and the Safeguards area. For a length of approximately fifty linear feet, the depth of compacted backfill over the piping was less than the six feet required for tornado missile protection. The minimum depth of backfill over the piping was two and one half feet. Corrective actions were immediately developed and initiated in order to re-establish a backfill coverage over the affected piping equivalent to the original design. This was completed by March 29, 1985. This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(vi).

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PDR ADOCK 05000338
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) NORTH ANNA POWER STATION, UNIT 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 8	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 5	— 0 0 4	— 0 1	0 2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

On March 28, 1985, with both units at 100 percent power, a review of survey results disclosed a deficiency involving the Service Water System (EIIIS System Code BI) supply and return piping between the Service Water Pumphouse and the Safeguards area. For a length of approximately fifty linear feet, the depth of compacted backfill over the piping was less than the six feet required for tornado missile protection. The minimum depth of backfill over the piping was two and one half feet.

The Service Water System is a common system and is designed for removal of heat resulting from the simultaneous operation of various systems and components of both North Anna units. The Service Water lines affected by this deficiency were the redundant 36 inch main supply and return headers used to distribute Service Water from the Service Water Reservoir (EIIIS Component Identifier RVR) to both units. The rupture of either a supply or return line in the affected area would not be isolable and therefore would render that header inoperable. Since the design basis function of the Service Water System can be achieved with only one operable header, any missile projected by tornado or otherwise would have to rupture either the supply or return line of both headers in order to render the Service Water System inoperable.

An engineering evaluation concluded that the probability of a missile strike rendering both Service Water headers inoperable was extremely low and therefore the operability of the Service Water System was not significantly reduced as a result of the deficiency.

Corrective actions were developed immediately following discovery and subsequently initiated the same day. A backfill coverage equivalent to the original design was re-established over the affected piping by March 29, 1985. This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(vi).

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION
P.O. BOX 402
MINERAL, VIRGINIA 23117



May 9, 1985

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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016 Phillips Building
Washington, D.C. 20555

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
Dear Sirs:

Virginia Power hereby submits the following updated Licensee Event Report applicable to North Anna Units 1 and 2. This update includes the title that was inadvertently omitted from page 1 of LER 85-004-00.

Report No. LER 85-004-01

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be forwarded to Safety Evaluation and Control for their review.

Very Truly Yours,


E. Wayne Harrell
for Station Manager

Enclosures (3 copies)

cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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