

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) NORTH ANNA POWER STATION, UNIT 2										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 9					PAGE (3) 1 OF 02									
TITLE (4) UNIT 2 REACTOR TRIP, APRIL 26, 1985																								
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)														
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)											
0	4	2	6	8	5	8	5	0	0	6	0	0	5	0	9	8	5	0	5	0	0	0		
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																								
OPERATING MODE (9)		1		20.402(b)				20.406(e)				X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)								
POWER LEVEL (10)		1 1 0 1 0		20.408(a)(1)(i)				50.38(e)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(e)								
				20.408(a)(1)(ii)				50.38(e)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)								
				20.408(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)												
				20.408(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)												
				20.408(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(x)												
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																								
NAME E. WAYNE HARRELL										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 7 1 0 1 3 8 1 9 1 4 1 - 1 5 1 1 5 1 1														
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																								
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS														
X	WII	3131	N10017	N																				
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR								
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE):												X NO												

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 0915 on April, 26, 1985, Unit 2 tripped from 100% power when the 120V AC Vital Bus 2-I was inadvertently de-energized. The 120V AC Vital Bus 2-I supplies power to the relay which senses the breaker position of Reactor Coolant Pump 'A'. When the 2-I the 120V AC Vital Bus was de-energized, this relay was de-energized which caused the reactor protection system to sense that the 'A' Reactor Coolant Pump breaker was open. A reactor trip signal was generated as a result of the reactor protection system sensing the 'A' Reactor Coolant Pump breaker open coincident with reactor power greater than 30%. Reactor Coolant Pump 'A' did not actually trip during this event. Power was restored to the 120V AC Vital Bus 2-I within seconds by operator action. All plant parameters responded as expected. The unit was returned to criticality on April 27, 1985 and reached 100% power April 30, 1985.

8505170283 850509  
PDR ADOCK 05000339  
S PDR

1E22  
1/1

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104  
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)  NORTH ANNA POWER STATION, UNIT 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 3 3 9	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 5	0 0 6	0	0 0 2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

At 0915 on April 26, 1985, Unit 2 tripped from 100% power when the 120V AC Vital Bus 2-I (EIIS System Identifier EF, EIIS Component Identifier BU) was inadvertently de-energized. The 120V AC Vital Bus 2-I was de-energized when an unlicensed Control Room Operator (CRO) opened the power supply breaker to the inverter which feeds the 120V AC 2-I Vital Bus. The 120V AC Vital Bus 2-I supplies power to the relay which senses the breaker position of Reactor Coolant Pump 'A'. When the 120V AC 2-I Vital Bus was de-energized, this relay was de-energized which caused the reactor protection system to sense that the 'A' Reactor Coolant Pump breaker was open. A reactor trip signal was generated as a result of the reactor protection system sensing the 'A' Reactor Coolant Pump breaker open coincident with reactor power greater than 30%. Reactor Coolant Pump 'A' did not actually trip during this event. The 120V AC Vital Bus 2-I was re-energized seconds after the trip when the unlicensed CRO, who opened the supply breaker to the inverter, realized his mistake and closed the inverter supply breaker.

All equipment powered from the 120V AC Vital Bus 2-I responded as expected when the bus was de-energized. All eight circulating water waterbox vacuum breakers opened when the vital bus was de-energized, which caused all circulating water pumps to the main condenser to trip. As a result, the condenser was not available to remove secondary side heat via the condenser steam dumps. Instead, steam was released through the steam generator PORV's to the atmosphere. In addition, two rupture discs (EIIS Component Identifier RPD) were blown and four rupture discs were damaged on the low pressure turbines because circulating water was not available to cool the condenser. These rupture discs were replaced.

All Auxiliary Feedwater pumps started as a result of low Steam Generator level. TV-BD-200D, 'B' Steam Generator blowdown inside containment isolation valve, indicated mid-position following a low Steam Generator level isolation signal. The redundant blowdown trip valve, TV-BD-200C, closed during this event. The position indication problem with TV-BD-200D was corrected on April 26, 1985.

The 2-I 120V AC Vital Bus was de-energized when an unlicensed CRO opened a breaker in the wrong power supply cabinet. The Unit 2 Assistant Shift Supervisor (a SRO) had instructed the unlicensed CRO to open a breaker in a specific power supply cabinet as part of preparation for a maintenance activity. The SRO had obtained the breaker number and power supply cabinet identification from name tags on the Main Control Board. The power supply cabinet information on the Main Control Board was misleading which caused the SRO to associate the power supply cabinet information on the Main Control Board with another power supply cabinet. Corrective actions to prevent recurrence are being evaluated.

The Unit was returned to criticality on April 27, 1985 and reached 100% power on April 30, 1985.

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION  
P.O. BOX 402  
MINERAL, VIRGINIA 23117



May 9, 1985

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
016 Phillips Building  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Serial No. N-85-011  
NO/JJM: nih  
Docket No. 50-339

License No. NPF-7


Dear Sirs:

Virginia Power hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report  
applicable to North Anna Unit 2.

Report No. LER 85-006-00

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating  
Committee and will be forwarded to Safety Evaluation and Control for their  
review.

Very Truly Yours,

  
E. Wayne Harrell  
Station Manager

Enclosures (3 copies)

cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

IE22  
11