



SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
EDISON

An EDISON INTERNATIONAL Company

R. W. Krieger
Vice President
Nuclear Generation

June 13, 1996

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject: Docket No. 50-362
30 Day Report
Licensee Event Report No. 96-002
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3

This submittal provides a written Licensee Event Report (LER) for an out of tolerance condition identified during testing of pressurizer safety valve setpoints. Neither the health nor the safety of plant personnel or the public was affected by this occurrence.

Sincerely,

Enclosure: LER No. 96-002

cc: L. J. Callan, Regional Administrator, NRC Region IV
T. P. Gwynn, Director of Reactor Safety, NRC Region IV
K. E. Perkins, Jr., Director, Walnut Creek Field Office, NRC Region IV
J. A. Sloan, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, San Onofre Units 2 & 3
M. B. Fields, NRC Project Manager, San Onofre Units 2 and 3
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Facility Name (1) SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 3										Docket Number (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 2 1 of 0 1				Page (3) 1 of 0 1				
Title (4) PRESSURIZER SAFETY VALVE SETPOINTS OUT OF TOLERANCE																		
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)								
Month	Day	Year	Year	///	Sequential Number	///	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names			Docket Number(s)				
0	5	1	4	9	6	9	6	0	0	2	NONE							
OPERATING MODE (9) 1			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)															
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 9 9			20.402(b)				20.405(c)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)			
			20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.36(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)			
			20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				Other (Specify in			
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)				Abstract below and			
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)				in text)			
			20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(x)							
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																		
Name R. W. Krieger, Vice President, Nuclear Generation										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 7 1 4 3 6 8 - 6 2 5 5								
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																		
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-	REPORTABLE	////////	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-	REPORTABLE	////////							
			TURER	TO NPRDS	////////				TURER	TO NPRDS	////////							
X	A B	R V D	2 4 5	Y	////////						////////							
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												Expected Submission Date (15)		Month	Day	Year		
Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO																		
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)																		

During the Unit 3 Cycle 8 refueling outage, the pressurizer [AB,PZR] safety valves (PSVs) [AB,RV] were removed. The valves were shipped to the Westinghouse service center (WSC) in Beaumont, CA. for required as-found setpoint testing in May 1996. On 5/14/96, the valves were tested for their as-found lift setpoints, and both valves setpoints were found to be above the Technical Specification (TS) setpoint band of 2500 psia +/- 1 percent. The valve removed from plant tag location 3PSV0200 was determined to lift at 2514 psig (2528.7 psia); 3PSV0201 was determined to lift at 2530 psig (2544.7 psia). Edison reviewed overhaul and test data, and confirmed that the valves were set correctly when installed at the beginning of cycle 7. It is likely that one or both were outside TS limits longer than their allowed out of service time limit (15 minutes) during cycle 7 mode 1 operation. Therefore, Edison is reporting this occurrence in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).

No unusual conditions were found when the valves were disassembled, inspected, reassembled, and reset to the proper setpoint by qualified vendor personnel at the WSC. Edison personnel observed the proper testing and resetting of the PSV setpoints. Edison believes the cause of this condition to be setpoint drift.

Edison completed an analysis of cycle 7 operation with the as-found PSV setpoints and confirmed that the plant always remained bounded by the existing Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) accident analyses. Therefore, there was no safety significance to this occurrence.

LER 2-95-010 reported a similar condition for the Unit 2 PZR safety valves and indicated Edison would evaluate expanding the TS tolerances, as recommended by the NRC (TAC No. M86339), to reduce TS violations caused by setpoint drift. This evaluation is ongoing and expected to be complete by the Unit 2 cycle 10 refueling outage. Edison submitted one additional LER involving PSV or MSSV setpoint drift (LER 2-93-001) due to missing lagging - a cause not present in this case.